Shannon v. Testen , 243 N.C. App. 386 ( 2015 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA15-64
    Filed: 6 October 2015
    Wake County, No. 13 CVS 15711
    WILLIAM SHANNON, M.D., Plaintiff,
    v.
    BOB TESTEN, JOSPEH P. JORDAN, and NORTH CAROLINA PHYSICIANS
    HEALTH PROGRAM, INC., Defendants.
    Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 5 September 2014 by Judge Paul C.
    Ridgeway in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 August
    2015.
    Wyrick, Robbins, Yates & Ponton, LLP, by Tobias S. Hampson, for plaintiff-
    appellant.
    Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, LLP, by Michael E.
    Weddington and Robert E. Desmond, and Cranfill Sumner & Hartzog LLP, by
    Beth R. Fleishman, Jaye E. Bingham-Hinch, and Ginger B. Hunsucker, for
    defendants-appellees.
    DIETZ, Judge.
    In 2010, Defendants performed an assessment of Plaintiff William Shannon, a
    physician, at the request of Gaston Memorial Hospital, where Dr. Shannon had staff
    privileges. Based on Defendants’ evaluation, the hospital terminated Dr. Shannon’s
    staff privileges.
    SHANNON V. TESTEN
    Opinion of the Court
    Dr. Shannon then sued Defendants alleging that they breached statutory
    duties owed to him during the evaluation process. Dr. Shannon also alleged that
    Defendants violated statutory due process rights established by applicable federal
    and state peer review laws. The trial court dismissed Dr. Shannon’s complaint for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and Dr. Shannon timely
    appealed.
    We affirm the trial court. Dr. Shannon concedes that 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90
    -
    21.22(f) provides a statutory immunity to Defendants absent allegations of bad faith.
    Here, Dr. Shannon’s complaint alleges that Defendants’ evaluation contained factual
    errors and omissions, but does not allege that those errors and omissions were
    intentional or otherwise done in bad faith. As a result, the complaint fails to allege
    facts sufficient to overcome Defendants’ statutory immunity.
    Likewise, Dr. Shannon’s due process allegations fail to state a claim upon
    which relief can be granted. Even assuming Dr. Shannon can bring a direct cause of
    action against Defendants under the statutory due process language on which he
    relies, that language requires only that “peer review agreements shall include
    provisions assuring due process.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.22
    (b). Here, Dr. Shannon’s
    complaint alleges that the agreement contains provisions ensuring that Defendants’
    activities will “be in accordance with due process.” Thus, on its face, the complaint
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    SHANNON V. TESTEN
    Opinion of the Court
    fails to allege facts sufficient to state a claim for violation of the statute. Accordingly,
    we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Facts and Procedural History
    The following facts are taken from Dr. Shannon’s complaint, accepting all
    allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Thompson
    v. Waters, 
    351 N.C. 462
    , 462-63, 
    526 S.E.2d 650
    , 650 (2000) (citations omitted).
    Dr. Shannon is a licensed medical doctor practicing ophthalmology in
    Gastonia, North Carolina. He had staff privileges at Gaston Memorial Hospital,
    where he had been on the medical staff since 1980. As a result of two patient
    incidents, Gaston Memorial requested Dr. Shannon “undergo a comprehensive
    neuropsychiatric assessment as part of their evaluation.” Gaston Memorial made
    this request to assess whether Dr. Shannon had any physical, psychiatric, emotional,
    or substance abuse related illness, or personal health issues that may have
    contributed to the incidents in question. Dr. Shannon’s Gaston Memorial privileges
    were temporarily suspended, pending the results of this requested evaluation.
    Dr. Shannon cooperated with Gaston Memorial’s request and submitted to
    evaluations by both a psychologist and a psychiatrist in Charlotte in late August and
    early September of 2010. The psychiatrist reported that his and the psychologist’s
    evaluations revealed no cognitive defects, psychiatric disorders, delusional thinking,
    hallucinations, or memory issues. He also concluded that Dr. Shannon did not exhibit
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    SHANNON V. TESTEN
    Opinion of the Court
    dementia or psychiatric illnesses that would affect his performance as a medical
    doctor.
    Gaston Memorial then referred Dr. Shannon to North Carolina Physicians
    Health Program, Inc. (“NCPHP”) and the two individual defendants for further
    evaluation. Dr. Shannon met with Defendants Testen and Jordan for approximately
    two hours on or about 29 November 2010. At the time of the meeting, Testen was a
    licensed clinical social worker and served as a consultant and clinical coordinator for
    NCPHP. Jordan was a counselor and employee of NCPHP. NCPHP is a North
    Carolina not-for-profit corporation operating under an agreement with the North
    Carolina Medical Board pursuant to 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.22
    (b), a state law
    governing peer review agreements.
    During the meeting, Dr. Shannon gave Testen and Jordan names of witnesses
    he believed would have relevant information regarding his behavior and the incidents
    that gave rise to the evaluation by NCPHP. He also identified documents, including
    hospital and patient records, that supported his position and explained the two
    incidents.   However, Testen and Jordan did not consult these witnesses and
    documents.
    Following the 29 November 2010 meeting, Testen and Jordan prepared an
    “initial assessment” letter and gave it to the North Carolina Medical Board and
    Gaston Memorial. The letter stated that Dr. Shannon had no alcohol or substance
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    SHANNON V. TESTEN
    Opinion of the Court
    abuse issues, no legal issues, and no history of psychiatric illness. The letter also
    stated that Dr. Shannon was “cooperative and forthcoming,” and complied with their
    drug testing and other informational requests “without hesitation.” But, according
    to Dr. Shannon, the assessment letter contained factual errors and significant
    omissions regarding the two incidents in question.1 Testen and Jordan concluded
    their assessment letter with a recommendation that Dr. Shannon immediately obtain
    further professional evaluation.
    Testen and Jordan repeated their recommendation for further professional
    evaluation in a 4 January 2011 letter sent to Dr. Shannon and copied to the North
    Carolina Medical Board. In this letter Testen and Jordan also stated that they had
    continued to gather information from Dr. Shannon’s earlier psychological and
    psychiatric evaluations in Charlotte and that, “this information has been informative
    and concerning.” The January letter did not explain what was “concerning” about
    the information Testen and Jordan had gathered.
    In December 2010, Gaston Memorial informed Dr. Shannon that, based on
    information provided by Defendants, his staff privileges would not be reinstated. Dr.
    Shannon volunteered his license to the North Carolina Medical Board in February
    2011.
    1   The complaint does not specifically identify these alleged errors and omissions.
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    SHANNON V. TESTEN
    Opinion of the Court
    On 26 November 2013, Dr. Shannon sued Testen, Jordan, and their employer,
    NCPHP, alleging that Testen and Jordan were negligent in performing their
    evaluations, and that NCPHP was vicariously liable as their employer. On 23 June
    2014, Dr. Shannon filed an amended complaint, adding a claim for violation of due
    process under federal and state statutory law governing the peer review process, but
    leaving the original negligence claim unaltered.
    Defendants moved to dismiss Dr. Shannon’s amended complaint pursuant to
    Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that they were immune from suit under 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90
    -
    21.22(f) and that Dr. Shannon had failed to state any claim upon which relief may be
    granted. On 5 September 2014, the trial court granted the motion. Dr. Shannon
    timely appealed.
    Analysis
    This Court reviews the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo.
    Bridges v. Parrish, 
    366 N.C. 539
    , 541, 742 S.E.2d. 794, 796 (2013). We examine
    “whether the allegations of the complaint, if treated as true, are sufficient to state a
    claim upon which relief can be granted under some legal theory.” 
    Id.
     (citations
    omitted). Dismissal is only appropriate if “it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff
    could not prove any set of facts to support his claim.” Scadden v. Holt, 
    222 N.C. App. 799
    , 801, 
    733 S.E.2d 90
    , 91-92 (2012) (citations omitted).
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    SHANNON V. TESTEN
    Opinion of the Court
    I.      Negligence Claim
    Dr. Shannon first argues that his complaint states a claim for breach of duties
    that Defendants owed him under the applicable peer review statutes. Dr. Shannon
    acknowledges that to state a claim in this context he must allege that the Defendants
    acted in bad faith, thus overcoming the statutory immunity provided in 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.22
    (f). Dr. Shannon contends that the Court should infer bad faith from
    the express allegations in the complaint. For the reasons discussed below, we reject
    Dr. Shannon’s argument.
    
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.22
     governs peer review agreements by the North
    Carolina Medical Board concerning programs for impaired physicians. The statute
    provides an immunity to suit for those participating in the peer review process: “Peer
    review activities conducted in good faith pursuant to any agreement under this
    section shall not be grounds for civil action under the laws of this State.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.22
    (f). As a result, a plaintiff suing individuals or corporations involved
    in this statutory peer review process must allege bad faith in order to survive a Rule
    12(b)(6) motion.
    To allege bad faith, the complaint must do more than allege mere negligence.
    Bad faith requires some showing of intentional dishonesty or a wrongful motive. As
    our Supreme Court has observed, “[bad faith] implies a false motive or a false
    purpose, and hence it is a species of fraudulent conduct. Technically, there is, of
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    SHANNON V. TESTEN
    Opinion of the Court
    course, a legal distinction between bad faith and fraud, but for all practical purposes
    bad faith usually hunts in the fraud pack.” Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 
    202 N.C. 604
    , 
    163 S.E. 676
    , 677 (1932).
    Here, Dr. Shannon’s complaint fails to allege bad faith. Indeed, the complaint
    does not even contain a conclusory allegation that Defendants acted in bad faith; to
    the contrary, the allegations read like a run-of-the-mill negligence claim.        The
    complaint alleges that Defendants committed various mistakes in the peer review
    process:
    17. Upon information and belief, the individual defendants
    did not interview necessary witnesses with knowledge of
    what had occurred on the two incidents in question.
    19. The initial assessment by the individual defendants
    contained factual errors and significant omissions
    regarding the two incidents in question that cast Dr.
    Shannon in a poor light professionally.
    23. Upon information and belief, the individual defendants
    did not interview the individuals who Dr. Shannon
    identified as having relevant information . . . and did not
    review the relevant hospital and patient records with him
    or with eyewitnesses to the events in question.
    None of these allegations suggest the report’s alleged “factual errors” and “omissions”
    were intentional.    Moreover, the complaint contains a number of allegations
    indicating the defendants acted in good faith:
    20. The individual defendants in their initial assessment,
    accurately stated that Dr. Shannon does not have
    difficulties with alcohol or substance abuse, has no history
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    SHANNON V. TESTEN
    Opinion of the Court
    of mental or psychiatric illness or legal issues; and the
    defendants found Dr. Shannon “cooperative and
    forthcoming.”
    21. The individual defendants reported that Dr. Shannon
    “without hesitation” completed their request for a urine
    drug screen and complied with their request to sign a
    release allowing the individual defendants to speak with
    members of the hospital, as well as the psychologist and
    psychiatrist who had previously evaluated him.
    27. During the December 30, 2010, telephone conversation
    . . . defendant Jordan extended the time limit for [Dr.
    Shannon] making an appointment for evaluation to
    January 30, 2011.
    Dr. Shannon argues that this Court should infer bad faith from the fact that
    defendants provided little specific information to him during their inquiry and that
    their report ultimately contained at least some factual errors and omissions. But this
    is an inferential leap too far. In essence, Dr. Shannon contends that the Court should
    infer willfulness from carelessness. To do so would set aside the distinction between
    negligence and bad faith established in cases from this Court and our Supreme Court.
    See Edwards v. Northwestern Bank, 
    39 N.C. App. 261
    , 268, 
    250 S.E.2d 651
    , 656
    (1979); Bundy, 
    202 N.C. at 607
    , 
    163 S.E. at 677
    . Accordingly, we hold that the
    complaint fails to allege bad faith—a necessary step in overcoming the legal
    immunity afforded by 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.22
    (f)—and therefore fails to state a
    claim upon which relief can be granted.
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    SHANNON V. TESTEN
    Opinion of the Court
    II.      Due Process Claim
    Dr. Shannon next argues that his complaint states a claim for violation of
    statutory due process protections provided by the applicable federal and state peer
    review laws. We disagree.
    As an initial matter, Dr. Shannon cannot pursue a claim under the federal law,
    the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, because that statute does not provide a
    private cause of action. Hancock v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 
    21 F.3d 373
    ,
    375 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Bok v. Mut. Assurance, Inc., 
    119 F.3d 927
    , 928 (11th Cir.
    1997) (per curiam); Wayne v. Genesis Med. Ctr., 
    140 F.3d 1145
    , 1147 (8th Cir. 1998);
    Singh v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 
    308 F.3d 25
    , 45 n.18 (1st Cir. 2002).
    Dr. Shannon concedes that he does not—and cannot—pursue a private cause
    of action under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act. But he argues that he
    can pursue a state common law claim for the violation of his statutory due process
    rights provided by the federal law. To support this novel theory, Dr. Shannon cites
    our Supreme Court’s holding that “the common law, which provides a remedy for
    every wrong, will furnish the appropriate action for the adequate redress of a
    violation of that right.” Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 
    330 N.C. 761
    , 782, 
    413 S.E.2d 276
    ,
    289 (1992). This language from Corum concerns rights established in the North
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    SHANNON V. TESTEN
    Opinion of the Court
    Carolina Constitution.2 Thus, Corum does not permit a litigant to bring a state
    common law claim to enforce an alleged violation of a federal statute simply because
    federal law does not permit a private cause of action. See Craig v. New Hanover Cnty.
    Bd. of Educ., 
    363 N.C. 334
    , 339, 
    678 S.E.2d 351
    , 355 (2009); Copper v. Denlinger, 
    363 N.C. 784
    , 788, 
    688 S.E.2d 426
    , 428-29 (2010) (both limiting Corum to violations of the
    state Constitution). Accordingly, Dr. Shannon’s claim based on federal law fails to
    state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
    Dr. Shannon also asserts a claim under 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.22
    (b), which
    provides that “peer review agreements shall include provisions assuring due process.”
    We are not persuaded that the General Assembly intended for this provision to
    provide a private cause of action against third parties like the defendants in this case,
    who are subject to a peer review agreement with the North Carolina Medical Board.
    Rather, if the Medical Board failed to comply with the statutory obligation to ensure
    that “peer review agreements shall include provisions assuring due process,” Dr.
    Shannon’s claim, if one exists at all, ought to be directed at the Medical Board.
    In any event, even assuming Dr. Shannon can sue Defendants for the alleged
    violation of 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.22
    (b), the allegations in Dr. Shannon’s complaint
    2 Dr. Shannon has not alleged a violation of his state constitutional due process rights in his
    complaint. He only alleges that Defendants violated his statutory due process rights under the
    applicable federal and state peer review laws, 
    42 U.S.C. § 11112
     and 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.22
    . But,
    even if Dr. Shannon’s complaint could somehow be read to allege a constitutional violation, it never
    alleges the trigger of state constitutional due process rights: state action. To the contrary, it alleges
    that Defendant NCPHP is a private corporation and the individual Defendants are NCPHP employees.
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    SHANNON V. TESTEN
    Opinion of the Court
    establish that Defendants complied with the statute. The statute requires only that
    “peer review agreements shall include provisions assuring due process.” 
    Id.
     Dr.
    Shannon alleges that the “‘memorandum of understanding’ between Gaston
    Memorial Hospital and the North Carolina Medical Board, pursuant to North
    Carolina General Statute § 90-21.22(b) . . . requires the activities of Defendant
    NCPHP to be in accordance with due process.” Simply put, the complaint itself
    alleges that the peer review agreement includes provisions assuring due process.
    Thus, Dr. Shannon’s complaint fails to state a claim for violation of 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.22.3
    Conclusion
    For the reasons discussed above, the trial court did not err in dismissing
    Plaintiff William Shannon’s Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim upon
    which relief can be granted.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges BRYANT and STEPHENS concur.
    3  We also note that agency regulations create a thorough process for NCPHP to follow in
    conducting its assessment, and this process readily provides the sort of notice and opportunity to be
    heard necessary to satisfy basic due process rights. See 21 NCAC 32K.0201, 32K.0202. Dr. Shannon
    does not allege that these requirements were violated, and the allegations in the complaint establish
    that they were satisfied.
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