Cooper v. Berger ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA17-367
Filed: 7 November 2017
Wake County, No. 16 CVS 15636
ROY A. COOPER, III, in his official capacity as GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF
NORTH CAROLINA, Plaintiff,
v.
PHILLIP E. BERGER, in his official capacity as PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF
THE NORTH CAROLINA SENATE; and TIMOTHY K. MOORE, in his official
capacity as SPEAKER OF THE NORTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Defendants.
Appeal by plaintiff from Memorandum of Order entered 17 March 2017 by a
three-judge panel comprised of Judges L. Todd Burke, Jesse B. Caldwell, III, and
Jeffery B. Foster, in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20
September 2017.
Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Jim W. Phillips,
Jr., Eric M. David and Daniel F. E. Smith, for plaintiff-appellant.
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by D. Martin Warf, Noah H.
Huffstetler and Candace Friel, for defendant-appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Roy A. Cooper, III, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of North
Carolina, appeals from an order of a three-judge superior court panel, which granted
summary judgment in favor of Phillip E. Berger and Timothy K. Moore, in their
official capacities, respectively, as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina
COOPER V. BERGER
Opinion of the Court
Senate and as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives (collectively,
“the General Assembly”). The order is affirmed.
I. Background
On 8 November 2016, a majority of North Carolina voters elected Roy A.
Cooper, III as Governor, who took his oath of office and whose term commenced on 1
January 2017. On 16 December 2016, the General Assembly duly enacted Session
Laws 2016-125 (Senate Bill 4) and 2016-126 (House Bill 17), which were signed into
law by the current Governor, Patrick L. McCrory, and became effective immediately.
On 30 December 2016, Mr. Cooper, while continuing to serve as the duly
elected Attorney General of North Carolina, and while the sitting Governor remained
in office, filed a complaint in his capacity as “Governor-elect,” sought a temporary
restraining order, and a temporary injunction in the Wake County Superior Court,
and asserted the statutory amendments set forth in Session Law 2016-125 were
unconstitutional. On the same day, the trial court granted a temporary restraining
order, enjoining the challenged portions of Session Law 2016-125 before they went
into effect.
The Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court convened and assigned
a three-judge superior court panel to hear the constitutional challenges to Session
Law 2016-125. On 6 January 2017, the panel preliminarily enjoined the challenged
portions of Session Law 2016-125, pending a final determination on the merits.
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Opinion of the Court
Governor Cooper filed an amendment to his complaint on 10 January 2017 and
raised constitutional challenges to Part III of Session Law 2016-126 (the “Advice and
Consent Amendment”) and the portions of Sections 7 and 8 of Part I of Session Law
2016-126 codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-5(d)(2c) (the “Exempt Positions
Amendments”). The superior court conducted a hearing on the merits of his claims
on 7 March 2017.
On 17 March 2017, the trial court panel entered summary judgment in favor
of the General Assembly and rejected the Governor’s challenge to the Advice and
Consent Amendment set forth in Session Law 2016-126. The panel found “[a]dvice
and consent is an exclusive function of the legislative branch.” The panel further
found the executive appointees at issue “are the most important appointments a
Governor makes, as they are appointed to lead the State’s principal departments, said
departments having been created by act of the legislative branch.”
The panel further found:
6. A Legislature that has the authority to create executive
agencies also has the authority to require legislative advice
and consent to fill the leadership roles in those agencies,
absent constitutional limitations to the contrary.
7. No applicable constitutional limitation on such
appointment power exists in our constitution.
8. “The will of the people [] is exercised through the
General Assembly, which functions as the arm of the
electorate. An act of the people’s elected representatives is
thus an act of the people and is presumed valid unless it
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Opinion of the Court
conflicts with the Constitution.” Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. at
546, 556 S.E.2d at 267 (emphasis in original).
9. A statute “must be upheld unless its unconstitutionality
clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears beyond a
reasonable doubt or it cannot be upheld on any reasonable
ground.” Rowlette v. State, 188 N.C. App. 712, 715, 656
S.E.2d 619, 621 (2008) (citations omitted).
10. The Plaintiff has made no evidentiary showing that the
Advice and Consent provision will result in a violation of
the separation of powers provision of the North Carolina
Constitution.
The panel concluded although the Constitution is “silent as to advice and
consent of Statutory officers . . . Article III, Section 5(8) does not prohibit the General
Assembly from appointing statutory officers.” The panel further concluded Article
III, Section 5(8) does not, “beyond a reasonable doubt, restrict the General Assembly’s
advice and consent power as to statutory appointees;” it “permits advice and consent
at the highest level of constitutional office but is not a limitation of advice and
consent;” and it “does not limit the General Assembly to advice and consent on only
constitutional officers.” (Emphasis omitted).
The panel determined our Constitution “does not prohibit a law establishing
senatorial advice and consent over the appointments of the Governor to the heads of
principal state departments,” and the Advice and Consent Amendment does not
violate the separation of powers clause of our Constitution.
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Opinion of the Court
The Governor appeals the entry of summary judgment in favor of the General
Assembly on the constitutionality of the Advice and Consent Amendment.
II. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction lies from appeal of a final judgment of the superior court on the
claims asserted in the Governor’s amended complaint pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7A-27(b)(1) (2015).
III. Issues
The Governor argues the trial court panel erred by granting summary
judgment in favor of the General Assembly and rejecting his challenge to the Advice
and Consent Amendment, and asserts the Advice and Consent Amendment violates
the separation of powers clause of the Constitution of North Carolina. N.C. Const.
art. I, § 6.
IV. Standard of Review
“We review a trial court’s order granting or denying summary judgment de
novo. Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely
substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” Craig v. New Hanover
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 334, 337, 678 S.E.2d 351, 354 (2009) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
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COOPER V. BERGER
Opinion of the Court
“We review constitutional questions de novo.” State ex. rel. McCrory v. Berger,
368 N.C. 633, 639, 781 S.E.2d 248, 252 (2016) (citing Piedmont Triad Reg’l Water
Auth. v. Sumner Hills, Inc., 353 N.C. 343, 348, 543 S.E.2d 844, 848 (2001)).
“In exercising de novo review, we presume that laws enacted by the General
Assembly are constitutional, and we will not declare a law invalid unless we
determine that it is unconstitutional beyond reasonable doubt.” Id. (citations
omitted).
In other words, the constitutional violation must be plain
and clear. To determine whether the violation is plain and
clear, we look to the text of the constitution, the historical
context in which the people of North Carolina adopted the
applicable constitutional provision, and our precedents.
Id. (citations omitted).
The parties conceded at oral argument that all cabinet secretaries and other
appointees nominated by the Governor, who are subject to the Advice and Consent
Amendment, were approved by the Senate. As such, any asserted as-applied
constitutional challenge to the Advice and Consent Amendment is moot. See Town of
Beech Mtn. v. Genesis Wildlife Sanctuary, Inc., __ N.C. App. __, __, 786 S.E.2d 335,
347 (2016), aff’d, __ N.C. App. __, 799 S.E.2d 611 (2017) (“The basic distinction is that
an as-applied challenge represents a plaintiff’s protest against how a statute was
applied in the particular context in which plaintiff acted or proposed to act, while a
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Opinion of the Court
facial challenge represents a plaintiff’s contention that a statute is incapable of
constitutional application in any context.”)
“[A] facial challenge to the constitutionality of an act, as plaintiffs have
presented here, is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully.” Hart v. State,
368 N.C. 122, 131, 774 S.E.2d 281, 288 (2015) (citation omitted). “We seldom uphold
facial challenges because it is the role of the legislature, rather than this Court, to
balance disparate interests and find a workable compromise among them.” Id.
(citation omitted).
The complaint was filed on 30 December 2016, prior to the date Governor
Cooper took his oath of office. The General Assembly has not challenged the trial
court’s finding that “[t]he Governor has standing to raise the[se] arguments” as a real
party in interest under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 17 (2015). Presuming, arguendo,
the Governor possessed standing to bring suit, while he continued to serve as the
elected Attorney General, to challenge a duly enacted law of the General Assembly
prior to his oath as Governor on 1 January 2017, we review the Governor’s facial
constitutional challenge to the Advice and Consent Amendment.
V. Advice and Consent Amendment
The Advice and Consent Amendment, as set forth in Session Law 2016-126,
amended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143B-9. This statute pertains to the Governor’s
appointments of the “head of each principal State department,” and states:
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Opinion of the Court
For each head of each principal State department covered
by this subsection, the Governor shall notify the President
of the Senate of the name of each person to be appointed,
and the appointment shall be subject to senatorial advice
and consent in conformance with Section 5(8) of Article III
of the North Carolina Constitution unless (i) the senatorial
advice and consent is expressly waived by an enactment of
the General Assembly or (ii) a vacancy occurs when the
General Assembly is not in regular session. Any person
appointed to fill a vacancy when the General Assembly is
not in regular session may serve without senatorial advice
and consent for no longer than the earlier of the following:
(1) The date on which the Senate adopts a simple
resolution that specifically disapproves the person
appointed.
(2) The date on which the General Assembly shall
adjourn pursuant to a joint resolution for a period longer
than 30 days without the Senate adopting a simple
resolution specifically approving the person appointed.
N.C. Sess. Law 2016-126.
Article III, Section 5(8) of the Constitution of North Carolina provides:
“Appointments: The Governor shall nominate and by and with the advice and consent
of a majority of the Senators appoint all officers whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for.” N.C. Const. art. III, § 5(8) (emphasis supplied).
The separation of powers clause of the Constitution of North Carolina declares
that “[t]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State
government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.” N.C. Const. art.
I, § 6. The separation of powers clause is violated “when one branch exercises power
that the constitution vests exclusively in another branch” or “when the actions of one
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Opinion of the Court
branch prevent another branch from performing its constitutional duties.” McCrory,
368 N.C. at 645, 781 S.E.2d at 256.
The Governor argues the Advice and Consent Amendment permits the
Senate’s review of and consent to his appointments of persons to serve as his
immediate deputies, the cabinet secretaries. He asserts it violates the separation of
powers clause by interfering with the Governor’s faithful execution of the law and the
executive power to select deputies, who will promote and implement the Governor’s
policies the voters elected him to pursue. See N.C. Const. art. III, § 5(4) (conferring
upon the Governor the duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed”).
The Governor further argues, presuming arguendo the General Assembly’s
power includes the power to exercise advice and consent over some executive officers,
“the exercise of such a power over the Governor’s cabinet secretaries goes too far.”
The Governor asserts the cabinet secretaries are not simply members of an executive
branch commission or board. Rather, he asserts they possess significant authority as
the most senior executive officials, who receive their appointments directly from the
Governor.
Separation of powers issues are not analyzed within a vacuum or by an
absolute bright line within a working government. See United States v. Brainer, 691
F.2d 691, 697 (4th Cir. 1982). “The perception of the separation of three branches of
government as inviolable, however, is an ideal not only unattainable but undesirable.
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Opinion of the Court
An overlap of powers constitutes a check and preserves the tripartite balance, as two
hundred years of constitutional commentary note.” In re Alamance Cty. Court
Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 96, 405 S.E.2d 125, 131 (1991).
Asserted separation of powers violations are analyzed on a case-by-case basis
with a flexible and pragmatic approach. See McCrory, 368 N.C. at 646, 781 S.E.2d at
257 (courts “cannot adopt a categorical rule that would resolve every separation of
powers challenge to the legislative appointment of officers”). Disagreements between
coordinate branches of government regarding overlaps and exercises of authority
have and will continue to occur. See Brainer, 691 F.2d at 697.
The Governor relies heavily upon our Supreme Court’s decision in McCrory,
which involved a constitutional challenge to legislation which authorized the General
Assembly to appoint a majority of the voting members to the Oil and Gas Commission,
the Mining Commission, and the Coal Ash Management Commission. Id. at 636-37,
781 S.E.2d at 250-51.
The Court first determined whether the appointments clause in Article III,
Section 5(8) prohibits the General Assembly from appointing statutory officers. Id. at
639, 781 S.E.2d at 252. Following a lengthy historical analysis of Article III, Section
5(8), the Court held that the appointments “clause gives the Governor the exclusive
authority to appoint constitutional officers whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by the constitution. The appointments clause does not prohibit the
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General Assembly from appointing statutory officers to administrative commissions.”
Id. at 639-40, 781 S.E.2d at 252 (emphasis supplied).
The Court in McCrory next determined whether the challenged legislation
violated the separation of powers clause by preventing the Governor from performing
his constitutional duties. Id. at 644, 781 S.E.2d at 255. The Court analyzed whether
the actions of the legislature “unreasonably disrupte[d] a core power of the executive.”
Id. at 645, 781 S.E.2d at 256. The Court determined the three commissions at issue
possessed “final executive authority,” and the “Governor must have enough control
over them to perform his constitutional duty [under Article III, Section 5(4)].” Id. at
646, 781 S.E.2d at 256.
The Court held:
[T]he challenged appointment provisions violate the
separation of powers clause. When the General Assembly
appoints executive officers that the Governor has little
power to remove, it can appoint them essentially without
the Governor’s influence. That leaves the Governor with
little control over the views and priorities of the officers
that the General Assembly appoints. When those officers
form a majority on a commission that has the final say on
how to execute the laws, the General Assembly, not the
Governor, can exert most of the control over the executive
policy that is implemented in any area of the law that the
commission regulates. As a result, the Governor cannot
take care that the laws are faithfully executed in that area.
The separation of powers clause plainly and clearly does
not allow the General Assembly to take this much control
over the execution of the laws from the Governor and lodge
it with itself.
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Id. at 647, 781 S.E.2d at 257.
In McCrory, the legislation authorized the General Assembly, not the
Governor, to appoint the majority of members to three committees exercising “final
executive authority[.]” Id. at 646, 781 S.E.2d at 256. That issue is not present here.
Session Law 2016-126 authorizes the Governor to appoint the cabinet
secretaries, “subject to senatorial advice and consent in conformance with Section
5(8) of Article III of the North Carolina Constitution[.]” Under the holding in
McCrory, the Governor does not have the exclusive authority to appoint “statutory
officers to administrative commissions.” Id. at 639-40, 781 S.E.2d at 252 (emphasis
omitted).
Our Supreme Court has also held:
[T]he inhibition on the legislative power to appoint to office
is removed and the inherent power of the Governor to
appoint is restricted to constitutional offices and where the
Constitution itself so provides. Accordingly, it has since
been the accepted view that, in all offices created by
statute, including these directorates and others of like
nature, the power of appointment, either original or to fill
vacancies, is subject to legislative provision as expressed in
a valid enactment.
State ex rel. Salisbury v. Croom, 167 N.C. 223, 226, 83 S.E. 354, 355 (1914) (citing
Cherry v. Burns, 124 N.C. 761, 33 S.E. 136 (1899); Cunningham v. Sprinkle, 124 N.C.
638, 33 S.E. 138 (1899)).
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“The Constitution of North Carolina is not a grant of power; rather, the power
remains with the people and is exercised through the General Assembly, which
functions as the arm of the electorate.” Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. 544, 546, 556 S.E.2d
265, 267 (2001) (citing McIntyre v. Clarkson, 254 N.C. 510, 515, 119 S.E.2d 888, 891-
92 (1961)). “An act of the people’s elected representatives is thus an act of the people
and is presumed valid unless it conflicts with the Constitution.” Id. (emphasis
supplied) (citing McIntyre, 254 N.C. at 515, 119 S.E.2d at 891-92); see also Lassiter v.
Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 248 N.C. 102, 112, 102 S.E.2d 853, 861 (1958),
aff’d, 360 U.S. 45, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1959)).
VI. Conclusion
Article III, Section 5(8) of our Constitution confers upon the Governor the
exclusive authority to appoint constitutional officers subject to limitations in Article
III, Section 5(8). See McCrory, 368 N.C. at 639-40, 781 S.E.2d at 252. The three-judge
superior court panel correctly held the Governor did not meet the high burden to show
beyond a reasonable doubt the General Assembly is without authority to require
senatorial confirmation of the Governor’s appointed statutory officers. The
Governor’s facial constitutional challenge to the amendment to the statute fails.
The three-judge superior court also correctly held the Governor failed to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Advice and Consent Amendment violates the
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separation of powers clause of the Constitution of North Carolina by hindering the
faithful execution of his duties as Governor.
While a provision of the Constitution mandates separation of powers between
the branches, N.C. Const. art. I, § 6, another provision also reserves to the Senate
“the advice and consent” of the Governor’s appointments of constitutional officers.
N.C. Const. art III, § 5(8). If separation of powers does not prohibit or constrain the
Senate from confirming officers created by the Constitution, separation of powers
does not otherwise prohibit “advice and consent” being applied to gubernatorial
appointees over agencies the General Assembly created, and which agencies can be
amended or repealed by statute. “[A] constitution cannot violate itself.” Leandro v.
State, 346 N.C. 336, 352, 488 S.E.2d 249, 258 (1997).
“The Constitution of North Carolina is not a grant of power; rather, the power
remains with the people and is exercised through the General Assembly, which
functions as the arm of the electorate.” Pope, 354 N.C. at 546, 556 S.E.2d at 267.
The order appealed from is affirmed. It is so ordered.
AFFIRMED.
Panel Consisting of: Elmore, Stroud, and Tyson, JJ.
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