State v. Peace ( 2017 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA17-62
    Filed: 21 November 2017
    Granville County, No. 13CRS050782
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
    v.
    BERTYLAR PEACE, JR., Defendant.
    Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 21 July 2016 by Judge Henry W.
    Hight, Jr. in Granville County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10
    August 2017.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Christine
    Wright, for the State.
    Irons & Irons, PA, by Ben G. Irons II, for defendant-appellant.
    BERGER, Judge.
    Bertylar Peace, Jr. (“Defendant”) was charged with driving while impaired on
    April 18, 2013. Defendant appealed to Superior Court where a Granville County jury
    found him guilty of driving while impaired on July 20, 2016. Defendant alleges his
    trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise the statute of
    limitations as an affirmative defense, and further contends that the prosecutor made
    improper statements during closing argument that would entitle him to a new trial.
    As to both, we disagree.
    STATE V. PEACE
    Opinion of the Court
    Factual & Procedural Background
    On April 18, 2013, Detective Brian Carey with the Oxford Police Department
    observed a GMC pickup truck fail to stop at a stop sign at the intersection of
    Henderson and Hunt Streets. After making a left onto Henderson Street, the vehicle
    was observed exiting the roadway.          Detective Carey followed the vehicle for
    approximately one-half mile. After Defendant’s vehicle crossed the center line and
    veered back off the road, Detective Carey initiated a traffic stop.
    As Detective Carey approached the GMC pickup truck, Defendant was exiting
    the driver’s side door. He stumbled towards the officer and attempted to steady
    himself by grabbing the bed of the truck. Detective Carey instructed Defendant to
    get back into the vehicle, but Defendant refused to comply.
    Detective Carey asked Defendant to produce his license and registration.
    Defendant sifted through various cards, but was unable to locate his driver’s license.
    Detective Carey witnessed him pass his license in the stack of cards at least four
    times, and ultimately had to identify the license for Defendant. Defendant indicated
    he did not have a registration card for the vehicle.
    While interacting with Defendant, Detective Carey observed that Defendant’s
    speech was slurred, he was swaying, and unable to keep his eyes open. Detective
    Carey asked Defendant if he had anything to drink, and Defendant admitted he had
    consumed alcohol “approximately five hours” prior to the stop. Detective Carey
    -2-
    STATE V. PEACE
    Opinion of the Court
    observed a pint of Seagram’s Gin in the front seat of Defendant’s vehicle that was
    nearly empty. Defendant was not asked to perform field sobriety tests because “he
    was so unstable on his feet, [Detective Carey] felt that it would be unsafe[.]”
    A preliminary breath test administered to Defendant at the scene was positive
    for alcohol. However, the trial court struck this testimony after it was determined
    that the preliminary breath test was improperly administered. Defendant requested,
    and the trial court instructed the jury, that
    Detective Brian Carey testified as to the administration
    and results of a preliminary breath test or P-B-T that was
    administered to Bertylar Peace on April 18, 2013. The
    Court instructs you that Detective Carey did not
    administer the P-B-T properly. I instruct you that you are
    to disregard all the testimony you’ve heard relating to the
    administration and-or results of any P-B-T test to Mr.
    Peace on April the 18th, 2013, and that evidence should
    have no bearing whatsoever on your consideration and
    determination of the facts in this case.
    Defendant was arrested and transported to the Oxford Police Department for
    a separate breath test. Defendant informed Officer Alice Judkins that he would not
    provide a breath sample for the test, and the testing sheet was marked as a refusal.
    However, both Detective Carey and Officer Judkins testified that, in their opinion,
    Defendant had consumed a sufficient amount of an impairing substance to
    appreciably impair his physical and mental faculties.
    Following a jury trial which took place on July 19 and 20, 2016, Defendant was
    found guilty of driving while impaired, and was sentenced to twenty-four months
    -3-
    STATE V. PEACE
    Opinion of the Court
    imprisonment as a Level 1 offender. Defendant timely appealed, contending that (1)
    his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to raise the statute of limitations as an
    affirmative defense to his prosecution for impaired driving, and that (2) the trial court
    erred in failing to intervene concerning comments made during the prosecutor’s
    closing argument. As to both contentions, we disagree.
    Analysis
    I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
    “In general, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be considered
    through motions for appropriate relief and not on direct appeal.” State v. Stroud, 
    147 N.C. App. 549
    , 553, 
    557 S.E.2d 544
    , 547 (2001), cert. denied, 
    356 N.C. 623
    , 
    575 S.E.2d 758
     (2002). See also State v. Todd, ___ N.C. ___, ___, 
    799 S.E.2d 834
    , 838 (2017)
    (holding that where the record “is insufficient to determine whether defendant
    received ineffective assistance of counsel,” the trial court should determine if
    counsel’s performance was deficient and if defendant was prejudiced).           Because
    Defendant’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is prematurely asserted on
    direct appeal, the same is dismissed without prejudice.
    II. Comments During Closing Arguments
    Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex
    mero motu during the State’s closing argument. At trial, Defendant failed to object
    -4-
    STATE V. PEACE
    Opinion of the Court
    to the statements which he now contends were improper comments by the prosecutor.
    Defendant’s contentions are meritless at best.
    Defendant claims that the following comment by the prosecutor was an
    improper expression of opinion: “[t]he State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt
    that this man was under the influence of some impairing substance.” Defendant
    further asserts that the prosecutor made an improper statement of the law when he
    said,
    And implied consent means when everyone here who gets
    their license, if a police officer asks you to blow into that
    machine, you have to blow into that machine.
    ....
    This clearly says that you’re required to take the test, and
    that if you don’t take the test, you’re going to lose your
    license for a year and possibly longer.
    Finally, Defendant claims that the prosecutor’s statement that “Defendant said ‘I
    have been drinking tonight’ ” was not supported by the evidence.
    North Carolina General Statute §15A-1230 plainly states:
    During a closing argument to the jury an attorney may not
    become abusive, inject his personal experiences, express
    his personal belief as to the truth or falsity of the evidence
    or as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, or make
    arguments on the basis of matters outside the record
    except for matters concerning which the court may take
    judicial notice. An attorney may, however, on the basis of
    his analysis of the evidence, argue any position or
    conclusion with respect to a matter in issue.
    -5-
    STATE V. PEACE
    Opinion of the Court
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1230(a) (2015).
    The trial court correctly instructed the jury that “lawyers are permitted in
    their final statements, to argue, to characterize the evidence, and to attempt to
    persuade you to a particular verdict.” Indeed, “counsel are given wide latitude in
    arguments to the jury and are permitted to argue the evidence that has been
    presented and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence.” State
    v. Jones, 
    355 N.C. 117
    , 128, 
    558 S.E.2d 97
    , 105 (2002) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    Judge Dillon, writing for this Court, recently stated:
    Control of counsel’s arguments is left largely to the
    discretion of the trial court. When no objections are made
    at trial . . . the prosecutor’s argument is subject to limited
    appellate review for gross improprieties which make it
    plain that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to
    correct the prejudicial matters ex mero motu. Our review
    requires, a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the argument was
    improper; and, if so, (2) whether the argument was so
    grossly improper as to impede the defendant’s right to a
    fair trial.
    In order to determine whether a prosecutor’s
    remarks are grossly improper, the remarks must be viewed
    in context and in light of the overall factual circumstances
    to which they refer. An argument is not improper when it
    is consistent with the record and does not travel into the
    fields of conjecture or personal opinion.
    State v. Madonna, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___, COA16-1300, 
    2017 WL 4629562
    , *4 (2017) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    -6-
    STATE V. PEACE
    Opinion of the Court
    The statements at issue herein were consistent with the evidence presented to
    the jury, and did not delve into conjecture or personal opinion. The prosecutor was
    merely summarizing the evidence in the first statement, arguing that the State had
    proven what is required by law, and attempting to persuade the jury “to a particular
    verdict.”   With regards to the second argument concerning Defendant’s willful
    refusal, the prosecutor reasonably summarized the impact of Defendant’s failure to
    submit to blood alcohol screening pursuant to 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.5
    (b), which is
    not an element the jury was required to decide. Finally, Defendant admitted that he
    consumed alcohol five hours earlier that evening. Whether Defendant’s merriment
    ended in the late afternoon or early evening, it cannot reasonably be argued that the
    prosecutor misstated the evidence regarding Defendant’s admission to alcohol
    consumption.
    Even if there were some legitimacy to Defendant’s contentions regarding
    closing arguments, the trial court’s instructions to the jury were, once again, more
    than adequate to address any concern:
    At the conclusion of these arguments, I will instruct you on
    the law in this case[.]
    ....
    Now, if in the course of making a final argument to you, a
    lawyer attempts to restate part of the evidence, and what
    you remember the evidence to be is different from that of
    the lawyer, then it is your duty in recalling and
    -7-
    STATE V. PEACE
    Opinion of the Court
    remembering the evidence to guide it exclusively and solely
    by what you determine the evidence to be.
    See State v. Campbell, 
    359 N.C. 644
    , 679, 
    617 S.E.2d 1
    , 23 (2005), cert. denied, 
    547 U.S. 1073
    , 
    164 L. Ed. 2d 523
     (2006) (holding that defendant’s right to a fair trial was
    not impeded when the prosecutor made alleged improper statements, but the trial
    court instructed the jury “not to rely on the closing arguments as their guide in
    evaluating the evidence”).
    Even if, assuming arguendo, the remarks made by the prosecutor were
    improper, which they were not, Defendant’s argument still fails because he has not
    demonstrated prejudice. See State v. Huey, ___ N.C. ___, 
    804 S.E.2d 464
     (2017); see
    also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2015).           Given the overwhelming evidence
    presented at trial, there is no “reasonable possibility . . . a different result would have
    been reached[.]” Huey, ___ N.C. at ___, 804 S.E.2d at 473.
    Conclusion
    Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is dismissed without
    prejudice.   Furthermore, the statements made by the prosecutor during closing
    arguments were not improper, and Defendant received a fair trial free from error.
    DISMISSED IN PART; NO ERROR IN PART.
    Judges DILLON and ZACHARY concur.
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: COA17-62

Judges: Berger

Filed Date: 11/21/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024