The NC State Bar v. Foster , 257 N.C. App. 113 ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA17-443
Filed: 19 December 2017
Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the North Carolina State Bar, No. 14 DHC 7
THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR, Plaintiff,
v.
JENNIFER NICOLE FOSTER, Attorney, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 13 September 2016 by the
Disciplinary Hearing Commission of the North Carolina State Bar. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 18 October 2017.
The North Carolina State Bar, by Counsel Katherine Jean and Deputy Counsel
David R. Johnson, for plaintiff-appellee.
Jennifer Nicole Foster, pro se, for defendant-appellant.
ELMORE, Judge.
Attorney Jennifer Nicole Foster (“defendant”) appeals from an order of
discipline issued by the Disciplinary Hearing Commission (“DHC”) of the North
Carolina State Bar. In its order, the DHC determined that defendant violated Rules
of Professional Conduct 3.5 and 8.4. The DHC thus imposed a two-year suspension
of defendant’s law license, stayed for the duration of the suspension so long as
defendant complies with certain conditions. After careful review, we affirm the order
of the DHC.
N.C. STATE BAR V. FOSTER
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
Defendant was admitted to the North Carolina State Bar in 1995 and was
practicing law in Asheville as of 2011. On the evening of 5 November 2011, defendant
entered the magistrate’s office in the Buncombe County Detention Center to inquire
about arrest warrants that had been issued for several members of the Occupy
Asheville movement. Defendant encountered Magistrate Amanda Fisher, one of two
magistrates on duty at the time, and identified herself as an attorney there on behalf
of the movement. Defendant then asked Magistrate Fisher “what the hell is going on
around here” regarding the warrants. Magistrate Fisher warned defendant to watch
her language and told her that she was in a courtroom. Defendant, however,
maintains that Magistrate Fisher never mentioned the word “court” or warned
defendant to watch her language.
Office policy prohibited Magistrate Fisher from providing defendant with
information regarding outstanding warrants on other individuals, but she did inform
defendant there were no outstanding warrants on defendant herself. Defendant
responded “what the f*** is going on around here,” prompting Magistrate Fisher to
renew her warning to defendant, but defendant nevertheless repeated the profanity
multiple times. As Magistrate Fisher told defendant she was being held in contempt
of court, defendant walked out of the magistrate’s office, loudly repeating more
vulgarities as she left.
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At Magistrate Fisher’s request, detention officers stopped defendant from
leaving the premises and returned her to the magistrate’s office. The second
magistrate on duty that evening appeared and witnessed the remainder of
defendant’s profanities while Magistrate Fisher entered the order for contempt. On
17 January 2012, defendant was convicted of direct criminal contempt of court
following a 1 December 2011 hearing in Buncombe County Superior Court.
Defendant appealed, and this Court ultimately reversed her conviction on procedural
grounds. In re Foster, 227 N.C. App. 454, 744 S.E.2d 496, 2013 WL 2190072 (2013)
(unpublished).
Based on these events, the State Bar filed a complaint against defendant with
the DHC on 25 March 2014. The proceedings were continued pending federal action
initiated by defendant against Magistrate Fisher, among others, and the DHC
eventually held a hearing on 8 July 2016. In its order of discipline dated 13
September 2016, the DHC found that defendant’s conduct violated Rules of
Professional Conduct 3.5(a)(4)(B) and 8.4(d), and it stayed a two-year suspension of
her license pending compliance with certain conditions (e.g., that defendant follow
the recommendations and treatment program of her therapist). Defendant filed
timely notice of appeal.
II. Discussion
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Any attorney admitted to practice law in this state is subject to the disciplinary
jurisdiction of the DHC for, inter alia, violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct
adopted by the State Bar. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 84-28(a)–(b)(3) (2015). Either party
may appeal a final order from the DHC to this Court, where our review is limited to
“matters of law or legal inference.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 84-28(h).
Disciplinary actions are reviewed under the whole record test. N.C. State Bar
v. Talford, 356 N.C. 626, 632–33, 576 S.E.2d 305, 309–10 (2003). The whole record
test “requires the reviewing court to determine if the DHC’s findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence in view of the whole record, and whether such
findings of fact support its conclusions of law. Such supporting evidence is
substantial if a reasonable person might accept it as adequate backing for a
conclusion.” Id. (citation omitted). In addition to being substantial, the evidence the
DHC uses to support its findings and conclusions must be clear, cogent, and
convincing. Id. (citing In re Suspension of Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 648, 252 S.E.2d 784,
790 (1979)). Although the reviewing court must consider contradictory evidence, the
presence of such evidence “does not eviscerate challenged findings, and the reviewing
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the DHC. The DHC determines the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.” N.C. State Bar v. Adams,
239 N.C. App. 489, 495, 769 S.E.2d 406, 411 (2015). Thus, when there are two
reasonably conflicting views, “ ‘the whole record test does not allow the reviewing
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court to replace the DHC’s judgment . . . even though the court could justifiably have
reached a different result had the matter been before it de novo.’ ” N.C. State Bar v.
Sutton, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 791 S.E.2d 881, 890 (2016) (brackets omitted) (quoting
N.C. State Bar v. Nelson, 107 N.C. App. 543, 550, 421 S.E.2d 163, 166 (1992)).
A. Rule 3.5(a)(4)(B) Violation
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.5 states in relevant part that “a lawyer shall
not . . . engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal, including . . . undignified or
discourteous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal.” N.C. R. Prof. Conduct
3.5(a)(4)(B). While defendant admits to disrespecting Magistrate Fisher, she argues
that a magistrate is not a “tribunal” as defined in Rule 1.0(n), and thus denies
disrespecting a tribunal in violation of Rule 3.5(a)(4)(B). At issue then is what
constitutes a tribunal and whether a magistrate fits within the meaning of that
definition as applied in Rule 3.5.
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.0 defines certain terms that appear within the
substantive rules. Under Rule 1.0(n),
“Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding
arbitration proceeding, or a legislative body, adminis-
trative agency, or other body acting in an adjudicative
capacity. The term encompasses any proceeding conducted
in the course of a trial or litigation, or conducted pursuant
to the tribunal’s rules of civil or criminal procedure or other
relevant rules of the tribunal, such as a deposition,
arbitration, or mediation. A legislative body, adminis-
trative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative
capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of
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evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, may
render a binding legal judgment directly affecting a party’s
interests in a particular matter.
N.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.0(n). While Rule 1.0 does not include the term “magistrate,”
a magistrate may be defined as a “judicial officer with strictly limited jurisdiction and
authority, often on the local level and often restricted to criminal cases,” and a
magistrate’s court is a “court with limited jurisdiction over minor criminal and civil
matters.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
The North Carolina Constitution describes our General Courts of Justice to
include appellate, superior, and district courts. N.C. Const. art. IV, § 2; see also N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7A-4 (2015). Magistrates are created in this article and declared “officers
of the District Court.” N.C. Const. art. IV, § 10; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-170.
They are nominated by the clerk of superior court and appointed by the senior
resident superior court judge. N.C. Const. art. IV, § 10; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-171(b).
Magistrates must retire and may be removed on the same grounds as a judge of the
General Courts of Justice. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-170, 173. In sum, magistrates are
judicial officers. See Bradshaw v. Admin. Office of Courts, 320 N.C. 132, 133, 357
S.E.2d 370, 370 (1987) (holding that magistrates are “members of the judiciary” for
limited purpose of statute making members ineligible for employment benefits).
Most powers of magistrates are rooted in criminal law. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7A-273. Magistrates have the power to enter judgments for pre-determined
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infractions and misdemeanors; to issue arrest warrants, search warrants, and grant
bail in certain cases; to conduct initial appearances; and to accept waivers, pleas, and
enter judgments for certain worthless check cases. Id.; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. §§
15A-243, 304, 305 (2015). Additionally, magistrates have the power “[t]o punish for
direct criminal contempt.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-292(a)(2). Although the general
statutes are silent about the physical office for magistrates, these can vary from small
offices to large courtrooms, depending on the needs and budget of the district. John
M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence: An Ethnography of
Judicial Decision Making in Informal Courts, 66 N.C. L. Rev. 467, 477 (1988).
The definitions and core functions described above and applied here indicate
that a magistrate is a tribunal as that term appears in Rule 3.5. Consistent with
Rule 1.0, the State Bar defines “tribunal” as a court or other adjudicative body that
administers justice. Like a tribunal, a magistrate is an adjudicative body led by a
judicial officer, but typically with limited jurisdiction over criminal or civil matters.
However, it is clear based on the powers conferred upon them by our legislature that
magistrates administer justice within their limited jurisdiction.
The State Bar’s definition of tribunal also includes “a court or other body acting
in an adjudicative capacity.” N.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.0(n) (emphasis added). “A . . .
body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation
of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, may render a binding legal
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judgment directly affecting a party’s interests in a particular matter.” Id. (emphasis
added). Like a tribunal, a magistrate can render a binding legal judgment; she
possesses the power to enter judgments for pre-determined infractions,
misdemeanors, and worthless check cases. After the presentation of evidence by a
law enforcement officer, a magistrate may issue search warrants and arrest
warrants, which directly affect a party’s liberty interests. When a magistrate enters
an order for contempt, as Magistrate Fisher did here, it is based on a magistrate’s
own observations of the party in contempt. The order itself carries penalties
including fines and imprisonment. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 5A-12 (2015).
The nature of our state constitution and general statutes also indicates that
magistrates are intended to be a court. Significantly, magistrates are created in the
same constitutional article as the state’s judicial branch and are declared officers of
the district court. The laws that establish the confines of magistrates  such as
method for appointment, qualifications, age limits, hours, and salary  are listed in
the same chapter of the general statutes as the laws of the judicial department.
Moreover, the rules governing the removal and retirement of magistrates are the
same as those for any judge of the appellate, superior, or district courts. In re Kiser,
126 N.C. App. 206, 208, 484 S.E.2d 441, 442 (1997). Thus, a magistrate appears to
be a tribunal according to the definition set forth in Rule 1.0 and applied in Rule 3.5.
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Defendant first contends that a magistrate does not constitute a tribunal here
because the signage at the detention center only indicated an office and not a court.
However, whether the signs indicated an office or a court is not dispositive of this
issue. Depending on the jurisdiction, a magistrate in this state may have a courtroom
or an office. Conley & O’Barr, Fundamentals of Jurisprudence, at 477. Defendant
also argues that a magistrate is not a tribunal because the comments to Rule 3.5
indicate that a judge, as opposed to a judicial official, presides over a tribunal. This
assertion is simply incorrect. Although comment 8 to Rule 3.5 states that “a lawyer
should not communicate with a judge relative to a matter pending before . . . a
tribunal over which the judge presides,” a great leap in logic is required to conclude
from this comment that a tribunal only exists when presided over by a judge.
For the reasons stated above, we find defendant’s contention that a magistrate
is not a tribunal to be unpersuasive. We therefore hold that the DHC did not err in
concluding that defendant disrespected a tribunal in violation of Rule 3.5(a)(4)(B).
B. Rule 8.4(d) Violation
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4 states that “[i]t is professional misconduct for
a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]”
N.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4(d). Defendant does not deny her conduct itself; rather, she
contends that the DHC “rendered wholly conclusory findings of fact” that her conduct
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harmed the administration of justice and interfered with the ability of the
magistrates to perform their duties on the night at issue. We disagree.
“Threats, bullying, harassment, and other conduct serving no substantial
purpose other than to intimidate, humiliate, or embarrass anyone associated with the
judicial process including judges, opposing counsel, litigants, witnesses, or court
personnel violate the prohibition on conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice.” N.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4, cmt. 5 (emphasis added).
A showing of actual prejudice to the administration of
justice is not required to establish a violation of paragraph
(d). Rather, it must only be shown that the act had a
reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the administration of
justice. . . . The phrase “conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice” in paragraph (d) should be read
broadly to proscribe a wide variety of conduct, including
conduct that occurs outside the scope of judicial
proceedings.
N.C. R. Prof. Conduct 8.4, cmt. 4. Rule 3.5, which prohibits disrespectful conduct
toward a tribunal as described above, discusses similar conduct.
Therefore, the prohibition against conduct intended to
disrupt a tribunal applies to conduct that does not serve a
legitimate goal of advocacy or a requirement of a
procedural rule and includes angry outbursts, insults,
slurs, personal attacks, and unfounded personal
accusations as well as to threats, bullying, and other
attempts to intimidate or humiliate judges, opposing
counsel, litigants, witnesses, or court personnel. . . .
“Conduct of this type breeds disrespect for the courts and
for the legal profession. Dignity, decorum, and respect are
essential ingredients in the proper conduct of a courtroom,
and therefore in the proper administration of justice.”
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Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Alison, 317 Md. 523, 536,
565 A.2d 660, 666 (1989).
N.C. R. Prof. Conduct 3.5, cmt. 10.
In Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Alison, the defendant was found guilty of
misconduct by the Maryland State Bar for, inter alia, directing vulgarities and
profanities at two judges separately in open court, opposing counsel in open court,
and two clerks of court. 317 Md. at 536, 565 A.2d at 666. The defendant appealed
and alleged that his conduct was not prejudicial to the administration of justice. Id.
at 525, 565 A.2d at 661. The Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that it
does not matter if the conduct “delay[s] the proceedings or cause[s] a miscarriage of
justice” because “[c]onduct of this type breeds disrespect for the courts and for the
legal profession.” Id. at 536, 565 A.2d at 666. With respect to the clerks, the court
determined the analysis is the same even though clerks do not have courtrooms. Id.
at 538, 565 A.2d at 667. The court ultimately upheld the defendant’s disciplinary
sanctions, noting “[i]t is not difficult to visualize the damage to the court system and
to the reputation of the legal profession that would result if attorneys were free to
conduct their daily business with court clerks in the manner employed by [the
defendant].” Id.
Defendant’s case is similar to Alison. Here, defendant made vulgar and
profane statements toward and in the presence of Magistrate Fisher, who is a judicial
officer of the district court. As to defendant’s criminal contempt conviction, this Court
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reversed her conviction on procedural grounds while expressing serious concern with
defendant’s underlying behavior, which is at issue in this action.
We are, however, very troubled by defendant’s use of
profanity in the magistrate’s office while conducting court-
related business despite warnings by the magistrate about
the inappropriate language. Such disrespect, particularly
by an attorney familiar with proper courtroom practices, is
wholly inappropriate. . . . Given defendant is a lawyer
practicing in our State’s courts, we find defendant’s
attitude offensive and incomprehensible.
Foster, 2013 WL 2190072, at *8. We again emphasize that defendant’s conduct 
regardless of whether it occurred in a courtroom or a magistrate’s office  was clearly
offensive and inappropriate. Further, there is a reasonable likelihood that such
conduct encourages disrespect for our court system and damages the reputation of
the legal profession. We thus hold that the DHC did not err in finding that defendant
exhibited conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule
8.4(d).
III. Conclusion
Because the definitions and core functions of tribunals and magistrates are
similar, and in light of the nature of our state constitution and general statutes, the
DHC did not err in finding that defendant disrespected a tribunal in violation of Rule
of Professional Conduct 3.5(a)(4)(B). Additionally, because defendant disrespected a
judicial officer and damaged the reputation of the legal profession, the DHC did not
err in finding that defendant exhibited conduct prejudicial to the administration of
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justice in violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d). Accordingly, we affirm the
disciplinary order of the DHC.
AFFIRMED.
Judges DIETZ and INMAN concur.
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