State v. Gray , 261 N.C. App. 499 ( 2018 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA17-1162
Filed: 18 September 2018
Bladen County, Nos. 14CRS051701, 16CRS1001
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ERNEST RAYSEAN GRAY, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 16 March 2017 by Judge Douglas
B. Sasser in Bladen County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 June
2018.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Kenneth A.
Sack, for the State.
Glover & Petersen, P.A., by Ann B. Petersen, for defendant-appellant.
BERGER, Judge.
On March 16, 2017, a Bladen County jury convicted Ernest Raysean Gray
(“Defendant”) of first-degree murder and discharging a weapon into an occupied
dwelling, and he was sentenced to life in prison without parole. Defendant asserts
that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss both charges because
the State had not introduced sufficient evidence to establish that he was the
perpetrator of the crimes. We disagree.
Factual and Procedural Background
STATE V. GRAY
Opinion of the Court
In October 2014, Malcolm Jerome Melvin (“Melvin”) was living in a mobile
home park in Elizabethtown, North Carolina, with his girlfriend, Danielle Purdie
(“Purdie”). On October 28, 2014, around 1:15 a.m., Melvin saw a Facebook message
from Defendant on Purdie’s phone. Melvin responded to the message, both
identifying himself and questioning why Defendant was messaging his girlfriend.
Defendant responded with another message that said, “Wassup doh [expletive] y u
inbox back doh . . . I’m sayn wess up [expletive] wat up want beef now I’m down wit
dat.”
After discussing the messages with Melvin, Purdie went back to sleep, but
awoke to a knock at the door at about 2:30 a.m. Melvin retrieved his pistol from a
closet and went to the front door. Purdie remained in the bedroom. From the
bedroom, Purdie could hear voices, but she could not identify the individuals at the
door. A person at the door said, “Wass up doh? Wass up? You want beef?” Purdie
then heard a gunshot, saw Melvin fall to the floor, and heard more gunshots. Purdie
ran to Melvin, but he was not breathing and had no pulse.
Angela Locklear (“Locklear”) and Stephen Johnson (“Johnson”), Defendant’s
uncle, lived in a mobile home that was located about 220 feet from Melvin’s residence.
On October 28, 2014, between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m., Locklear heard gunshots.
Shortly thereafter, Defendant knocked on their door and asked to speak with his
uncle. Locklear testified that Defendant “looked like somebody was after him or
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STATE V. GRAY
Opinion of the Court
something . . . he act[ed] like he was scared.” Defendant told Johnson he did not know
anything about the gunshots. Defendant then fell asleep in their home.
Around 6:00 a.m. the following morning, Twasjay Brown (“Brown”) knocked on
Locklear and Johnson’s door, looking for Defendant. Johnson asked Brown whether
he or Defendant had anything to do with the events that occurred during the night.
Brown denied any involvement. Defendant and Brown then left the residence.
When deputies with the Bladen County Sheriff’s Department began
investigating Melvin’s death on October 28, 2014, they found a wallet, with a driver’s
license and social security card belonging to Defendant, on the ground between
Melvin’s residence and Johnson’s residence. A cell phone belonging to Brown was
also found in the front yard of Melvin’s residence, next to .45 caliber shell casings.
Both .45 caliber and 9mm shell casings were recovered from the front yard of Melvin’s
residence. There were several bullet holes on the exterior of the residence near the
front door, as well as several bullet holes inside of the entrance, where investigators
recovered a .45 caliber bullet. Melvin’s pistol was located inside his residence and
had not been fired. Melvin’s cause of death was determined to be a gunshot wound
to the head. The weapon used to kill Melvin was never recovered.
Defendant was indicted for first-degree murder and discharging a weapon into
an occupied dwelling. At trial, Defendant moved to dismiss both charges at the close
of the State’s presentation of evidence, and the motion was renewed at the close of all
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STATE V. GRAY
Opinion of the Court
the evidence. Both of Defendant’s motions were denied. Defendant was found guilty
of first-degree murder and discharging a weapon into an occupied dwelling, and
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Defendant gave timely notice of
appeal.
Standard of Review
“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.”
State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). “Upon defendant’s
motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial
evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense
included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense. If so,
the motion is properly denied.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451,
455 (citation and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 890, 148 L. Ed. 2d
150 (2000). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-
79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980).
In reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of
evidence, we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all
reasonable inferences. Contradictions and discrepancies
do not warrant dismissal of the case but are for the jury to
resolve. The test for sufficiency of the evidence is the same
whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial or both.
Circumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to
dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence
does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence. If the
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STATE V. GRAY
Opinion of the Court
evidence presented is circumstantial, the court must
consider whether a reasonable inference of defendant’s
guilt may be drawn from the circumstances. Once the court
decides that a reasonable inference of defendant’s guilt
may be drawn from the circumstances, then it is for the
jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in
combination, satisfy it beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is actually guilty.
Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 378-79, 526 S.E.2d at 455 (purgandum1).
Analysis
In North Carolina, a death that is the result of a “felony committed or
attempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first
degree.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(a) (2017).
The elements of felony murder are (1) that a defendant, or
someone with whom the defendant was acting in concert,
committed or attempted to commit a predicate felony under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17(a) (2013); (2) that a killing occurred
in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of that
felony; and (3) that the killing was caused by the defendant
or a co-felon.
State v. Maldonado, 241 N.C. App. 370, 376, 772 S.E.2d 479, 483-84 (purgandum),
appeal dismissed, disc. review denied, ___ N.C. ___, 776 S.E.2d 196 (2015). Shooting
1 Our shortening of the Latin phrase “Lex purgandum est.” This phrase, which roughly
translates “that which is superfluous must be removed from the law,” was used by Dr. Martin Luther
during the Heidelberg Disputation on April 26, 1518 in which Dr. Luther elaborated on his theology
of sovereign grace. Here, we use purgandum to simply mean that there has been the removal of
superfluous items, such as quotation marks, ellipses, brackets, citations, and the like, for ease of
reading.
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Opinion of the Court
into an occupied dwelling is a qualifying predicate felony for felony murder pursuant
to Section 14-17(a). State v. Wall, 304 N.C. 609, 613, 286 S.E.2d 68, 71 (1982).
When evidence of whether the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime is
circumstantial, “courts often [look to] proof of motive, opportunity, capability, and
identity to determine whether a reasonable inference of the defendant’s guilt may be
inferred or whether there is merely a suspicion that the defendant is the perpetrator.”
State v. Hayden, 212 N.C. App. 482, 485, 711 S.E.2d 492, 494 (2011) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). “The evidence need only give rise to a reasonable inference
of guilt in order for it to be properly submitted to the jury.” State v. Stone, 323 N.C.
447, 452, 373 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1988).
As this Court explained before in State v. Lowry:
The real problem lies in applying the test to the individual
facts of a case, particularly where the proof is
circumstantial. One method courts use to assist analysis
is to classify evidence of guilt into several rather broad
categories. Although the language is by no means
consistent, courts often speak in terms of proof of motive,
opportunity, capability and identity, all of which are
merely different ways to show that a particular person
committed a particular crime. In most cases these factors
are not essential elements of the crime, but instead are
circumstances which are relevant to identify an accused as
the perpetrator of a crime. . . .
While the cases do not generally indicate what
weight is to be given evidence of these various factors, a
few rough rules do appear. It is clear, for instance, that
evidence of either motive or opportunity alone is
insufficient to carry a case to the jury. On the other hand,
when the question is whether evidence of both motive and
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STATE V. GRAY
Opinion of the Court
opportunity will be sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss, the answer is much less clear. The answer
appears to rest more upon the strength of the evidence of
motive and opportunity, as well as other available
evidence, rather than an easily quantifiable ‘bright line’
test.
State v. Lowry, 198 N.C. App. 457, 466, 679 S.E.2d 865, 870-71 (2009) (purgandum).
Here, the State introduced evidence tending to establish both motive and
opportunity. First, motive tended to be sufficiently established with testimony
concerning the hostility that existed between Defendant and Melvin over Defendant’s
communication with Purdie. Although Purdie did not see the individuals and was
unable to identify their voices, the evidence tended to show that similar, distinctive
language had been used both in the message sent by Defendant and by the person
speaking with Melvin at the time he was shot. Both communications were about a
perceived “beef” between Defendant and Melvin over Defendant’s interactions with
Purdie. The Facebook message, which could be affirmatively attributed to Defendant,
along with the fact that a speaker using similar language came to Purdie’s home to
confront Melvin with a weapon, evidenced some hostility between Defendant and
Melvin of the kind that would precipitate an intentional killing. This is sufficient for
a reasonable juror to conclude Defendant had motive to kill Melvin.
Second, Defendant’s opportunity to commit the crimes tended to be sufficiently
established by both physical evidence at the crime scene and testimony of those who
interacted with Defendant near the scene shortly after Melvin’s death. Defendant’s
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STATE V. GRAY
Opinion of the Court
wallet containing his identification and social security cards was found near Melvin’s
residence. Shortly after gunshots were heard, Defendant knocked on the door of
Locklear’s residence, which was located near Melvin’s residence. Brown’s cell phone
was also recovered near the crime scene, and Brown attempted to locate Defendant
shortly after the gunshots had been heard. Because the evidence placed Defendant
at or near the scene of the crime around the time of the victim’s murder, a reasonable
juror could find that Defendant had the opportunity to commit the felony that
resulted in Melvin’s death.
Finally, it is undisputed that, regardless of who fired a weapon into Purdie’s
residence, an occupied dwelling, it resulted in Melvin’s death. The shots Locklear
heard in the mobile home park that night came from outside Melvin’s residence.
Although there were two weapons fired, based on the shell casings found at the scene,
“[i]t is not necessary to support a conviction of felony-murder that defendant actually
inflicted the fatal shot.” State v. Peplinski, 290 N.C. 236, 240, 225 S.E.2d 568, 571
(1976). When “several persons aid and abet each other” and one “fatally wounds the
victim, all being present, each is guilty of murder in the first degree.” Id. at 240-41,
225 S.E. 2d at 571. The State’s evidence tended to show that Brown had come to
Locklear’s residence to meet with Defendant shortly after Melvin’s death. Moreover,
Defendant’s wallet containing his identification and social security cards, along with
Brown’s iPhone, were found at the crime scene. The evidence tended to show that
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STATE V. GRAY
Opinion of the Court
either Defendant or Brown likely fired the fatal shot. Regardless of who actually fired
the fatal shot, however, Defendant could still be found guilty of felony murder.
As our Supreme Court held,
[i]f the evidence presented is circumstantial, the court
must consider whether a reasonable inference of
defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances.
Once the court decides that a reasonable inference of
defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances,
then it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken
singly or in combination, satisfy it beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant is actually guilty.
Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 379, 526 S.E.2d at 455 (emphasis added). Based upon the
evidence introduced by the State, there was sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable inference of Defendant’s guilt could be drawn. The trial court did not err
in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, and the jury’s verdict will not be disturbed
by this Court.
Conclusion
The trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss because
the State introduced substantial evidence of each essential element of both
discharging a weapon into an occupied dwelling and felony murder. Defendant
received a fair trial, free from error.
NO ERROR.
Judges DIETZ and TYSON concur.
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