State v. Osborne , 261 N.C. App. 710 ( 2018 )


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  •               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA18-9
    Filed: 2 October 2018
    Randolph County, No. 14 CRS 55829
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    SHELLEY ANNE OSBORNE
    Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 21 February 2018 by Judge
    Edwin G. Wilson Jr. in Randolph County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of
    Appeals 20 August 2018.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Alesia
    Balshakova, for the State.
    Meghan Adelle Jones for defendant.
    DIETZ, Judge.
    Defendant Shelley Anne Osborne appeals her conviction for possession of
    heroin. Law enforcement found Osborne unconscious in a hotel room and, after
    emergency responders revived her, she admitted she used heroin. Officers searched
    the hotel room and found syringes, spoons with burn marks and residue, and a rock-
    like substance.
    The State did not have the substance tested using a scientifically valid
    chemical analysis. Instead, at trial the State relied on Osborne’s statement to officers
    STATE V. OSBORNE
    Opinion of the Court
    that she used heroin, as well as officers’ descriptions of the rock-like substance and
    the results of field tests on the substance, including one performed in open court.
    As explained below, the State’s evidence was insufficient to survive a motion
    to dismiss. The State relies on a series of Supreme Court cases, later synthesized in
    this Court’s decision in State v. Bridges, __ N.C. App. __, 
    810 S.E.2d 365
    (2018),
    concerning the defendant’s own identification of the seized substance. Here, by
    contrast, Osborne never identified the seized substance as heroin—she told officers
    only that she had used heroin before losing consciousness. Although the State’s
    evidence strongly suggests the seized substance was heroin, that evidence was not
    enough “to establish the identity of the controlled substance beyond a reasonable
    doubt” and thus the State was required to present “some form of scientifically valid
    chemical analysis” to survive a motion to dismiss. State v. Ward, 
    364 N.C. 133
    , 147,
    
    694 S.E.2d 738
    , 747 (2010). Because the State acknowledges that it did not present
    any scientifically valid chemical analysis at trial, we vacate the trial court’s judgment
    on this count.
    Facts and Procedural History
    On 17 November 2014, police responded to a call about a possible overdose in
    a hotel room. After arriving at the hotel room, officers found Defendant Shelley Anne
    Osborne in the bathroom. She was unconscious, unresponsive, and turning blue.
    Osborne    regained   consciousness    after    emergency   responders    arrived    and
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    STATE V. OSBORNE
    Opinion of the Court
    administered an anti-overdose drug. When Osborne regained consciousness, she told
    an officer that she “had ingested heroin.”
    The responding officers searched the hotel room and found Osborne’s two
    children, who were around four or five years old. The officers also found multiple
    syringes, spoons with burn marks and residue on them, and a rock-like substance
    that appeared to be heroin. An officer conducted a field test on the rock-like
    substance, which yielded a “bluish color,” indicating a “positive reading for heroin.”
    On 14 September 2015, the State indicted Osborne for possession of heroin and
    two counts of misdemeanor child abuse. At trial, one of the responding officers
    testified about discovering Osborne unconscious in the hotel room and her admission
    that she had used heroin. The officer also described the rock-like substance, including
    how it resembled heroin; explained the results of the field test indicating the
    substance was heroin; and discussed how other objects found in the hotel room,
    including the syringes and spoons, were common paraphernalia used to inject heroin.
    The officer also performed a field test on the substance seized from the hotel room in
    open court and displayed the results, which indicated the substance was heroin, to
    the jury. Osborne did not object to the in-court field test. Osborne also did not present
    any evidence in her defense. She moved to dismiss the charges at the close of the
    evidence. The trial court denied the motion.
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    STATE V. OSBORNE
    Opinion of the Court
    The jury convicted Osborne on all charges, and the trial court sentenced her to
    6 to 17 months in prison for possession of heroin and a consecutive sentence of 60
    days for the two counts of misdemeanor child abuse. The trial court suspended both
    sentences. Osborne appealed.
    Analysis
    Osborne argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the
    possession of heroin charge because the State failed to present sufficient evidence
    that the seized substance was heroin. As explained below, we agree that the evidence
    presented was insufficient but recognize that this issue is unsettled and may merit
    further review in our Supreme Court.
    “This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.”
    State v. Smith, 
    186 N.C. App. 57
    , 62, 
    650 S.E.2d 29
    , 33 (2007). “Upon defendant’s
    motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial
    evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense
    included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense. If so,
    the motion is properly denied.” State v. Fritsch, 
    351 N.C. 373
    , 378, 
    526 S.E.2d 451
    ,
    455 (2000). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
    might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 
    300 N.C. 71
    , 78–
    79, 
    265 S.E.2d 164
    , 169 (1980).
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    STATE V. OSBORNE
    Opinion of the Court
    In a drug possession case, “the burden is on the State to establish the identity
    of any alleged controlled substance that is the basis of the prosecution.” State v. Ward,
    
    364 N.C. 133
    , 147, 
    694 S.E.2d 738
    , 747 (2010). “Unless the State establishes before
    the trial court that another method of identification is sufficient to establish the
    identity of the controlled substance beyond a reasonable doubt, some form of
    scientifically valid chemical analysis is required.” 
    Id. The State
    concedes that, other than the field tests conducted by the arresting
    officers, the State did not conduct any forensic analysis that identified the rock-like
    substance seized from Osborne’s hotel room as heroin. The State also concedes—or,
    at least, does not dispute—that the field tests officers conducted at the scene and
    later at trial are not scientifically valid chemical analyses sufficient to support a
    conviction.
    Instead, the State argues that this case is controlled by a line of decisions from
    our Supreme Court involving the defendant’s identification of the controlled
    substance. First, in State v. Nabors, 
    365 N.C. 306
    , 
    718 S.E.2d 623
    (2011), and State
    v. Williams, 
    367 N.C. 64
    , 
    744 S.E.2d 125
    (2013), the Supreme Court held that a
    defense witness’s in-court testimony identifying a substance as cocaine was sufficient
    to overcome a motion to dismiss even in the absence of forensic analysis. Then, in
    State v. Ortiz-Zape, 
    367 N.C. 1
    , 
    743 S.E.2d 156
    (2013), the Supreme Court held that
    an officer’s testimony concerning the defendant’s out-of-court identification of the
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    STATE V. OSBORNE
    Opinion of the Court
    substance as cocaine, combined with the officer’s own testimony that the substance
    appeared to be cocaine, was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
    Recently, this Court attempted to synthesize this line of cases into a coherent
    rule of law. State v. Bridges, __ N.C. App. __, 
    810 S.E.2d 365
    (2018). In Bridges, the
    defendant told a law enforcement officer that she had “a bagg[ie] of meth hidden in
    her bra,” and the officer then found a “meth-like” substance in a baggie in the
    defendant’s bra. Id. at __, 810 S.E.2d at 366. At trial, the officer described the
    defendant’s statements and the discovery of the baggie. 
    Id. We held
    that “the
    arresting officer’s testimony offered without objection during the State’s evidence”
    was sufficient to meet the State’s burden of proof and send the issue to the jury. Id.
    at __, 810 S.E.2d at 367–68.
    The State argues that this case is controlled by Bridges but there is a key
    factual distinction between this case and the Bridges line of cases. In all of the earlier
    cases—Nabors, Williams, Ortiz-Zape, and Bridges—the defendants’ statements (or
    those of another defense witness) identified the substance seized by law enforcement
    as a controlled substance. Here, by contrast, Osborne did not identify the seized
    substance as heroin. Instead, after officers discovered her unconscious in a hotel room
    and emergency responders administered an anti-overdose medication to revive her,
    Osborne told the officers that she had ingested heroin. The officers independently
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    STATE V. OSBORNE
    Opinion of the Court
    searched the hotel room and recovered drug paraphernalia and a rock-like substance
    believed to be heroin.
    We are reluctant to further expand the Bridges holding to apply in cases where
    the defendant did not actually identify the seized substance. To be sure, the State’s
    evidence strongly suggests the seized substance was heroin—Osborne admitted she
    used heroin, there was drug paraphernalia in the hotel room consistent with heroin
    use, the rock-like substance found in the hotel room matched the general description
    of heroin, and a field test indicated the substance was heroin.
    But the question is not whether the State’s evidence was strong, but whether
    that evidence “establish[ed] the identity of the controlled substance beyond a
    reasonable doubt,” thus eliminating the need for a scientifically valid chemical
    analysis. 
    Ward, 364 N.C. at 147
    , 694 S.E.2d at 747. We are unwilling to hold that it
    does. After all, there are other controlled substances that appear as a white or gray
    rock-like substance. See, e.g., 
    Nabors, 365 N.C. at 308
    , 718 S.E.2d at 624; State v.
    Hicks, 
    243 N.C. App. 628
    , 630, 
    777 S.E.2d 341
    , 343 (2015); State v. Mobley, 206 N.C.
    App. 285, 292, 
    696 S.E.2d 862
    , 867 (2010); State v. McNeil, 
    165 N.C. App. 777
    , 779,
    
    600 S.E.2d 31
    , 33 (2004), aff’d, 
    359 N.C. 800
    , 
    617 S.E.2d 271
    (2005). And the drug
    paraphernalia seized from the hotel room can be used in connection with other
    controlled substances. See, e.g., State v. Wiggins, 
    185 N.C. App. 376
    , 380, 
    648 S.E.2d 865
    , 869 (2007); State v. Muncy, 
    79 N.C. App. 356
    , 358, 
    339 S.E.2d 466
    , 468 (1986).
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    STATE V. OSBORNE
    Opinion of the Court
    Simply put, if we held that the State’s evidence in this case was sufficient to
    show the seized substance was heroin “beyond a reasonable doubt,” it likely would
    eliminate the need for scientifically valid chemical analysis in many—perhaps most—
    drug cases. This, in turn, would render our Supreme Court’s holding in Ward largely
    irrelevant. This Court has no authority to undermine a Supreme Court holding in
    that way. In re Civil Penalty, 
    324 N.C. 373
    , 384, 
    379 S.E.2d 30
    , 37 (1989). If the
    Bridges line of cases warrants further expansion—and further eroding of Ward—that
    change in the law must come from the Supreme Court.
    Applying Ward here, the State’s evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable
    doubt that the seized substance was heroin. 364 N.C. at 
    147, 694 S.E.2d at 747
    . Thus,
    the State was required to present scientifically valid chemical analysis identifying
    the seized substance as heroin. 
    Id. The State
    concedes it did not do so. Accordingly,
    the trial court should have granted Osborne’s motion to dismiss for insufficient
    evidence.
    Because we rule in Osborne’s favor on this issue, we need not address her
    remaining arguments concerning her conviction on the drug possession charge.
    Osborne also challenges her convictions for misdemeanor child abuse on the ground
    that “the indictments for misdemeanor child abuse allege that Ms. Osborne used
    ‘heroin in the presence of the child.’” Osborne argues that the State was required to
    prove the seized substance was heroin to support these charges as well. We disagree.
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    STATE V. OSBORNE
    Opinion of the Court
    Unlike the drug possession charge, the misdemeanor child abuse charges did not
    require the State to present a chemical analysis proving the seized substance was
    heroin. The State’s evidence, including the officers’ discovery of Osborne unconscious
    from an apparent drug overdose; Osborne’s admission that she used heroin; and the
    presence of drug paraphernalia consistent with heroin use in the hotel room occupied
    by Osborne and her children was sufficient to send these charges to the jury.
    Likewise, in light of the State’s other evidence, the admission of the in-court field test
    of the seized substance—even if erroneous—was harmless and certainly did not rise
    to the level of plain error. State v. Lawrence, 
    365 N.C. 506
    , 518, 
    723 S.E.2d 326
    , 334
    (2012). We therefore find no error in the trial court’s judgment on the misdemeanor
    child abuse charges.
    Conclusion
    For the reasons discussed above, we vacate the trial court’s judgment on the
    possession of heroin charge and find no error in the trial court’s judgment on the
    misdemeanor child abuse charges.
    VACATED IN PART; NO ERROR IN PART.
    Chief Judge McGEE and Judge CALABRIA concur.
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