State v. Juene , 263 N.C. App. 543 ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA18-526
Filed: 15 January 2019
Guilford County, Nos. 16CRS085458-61, 16CRS085469
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
DARIEUS ANDREW JUENE, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 15 February 2017 by Judge
David L. Hall in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27
November 2018.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Christine
Wright, for the State.
William D. Spence for the Defendant.
DILLON, Judge.
Defendant Darieus Andrew Jeune1 appeals judgments against him for robbery
with a dangerous weapon and other crimes based on a robbery which occurred at a
shopping mall. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence because the pre-trial identification was impermissibly suggestive.
We disagree and conclude that Defendant had a fair trial, free from prejudicial error.
1 We note that the correct spelling of Defendant’s last name is “Jeune.” However, the
indictments and judgments below all spell Defendant’s last name as “Juene.”
STATE V. JEUNE
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
In September 2016, three victims were robbed in the Four Seasons Mall
parking lot in Greensboro by three assailants. Defendant was apprehended and
identified by the victims as one of the assailants of the robbery. Defendant was
indicted on robbery with a dangerous weapon and other charges.
In February 2017, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the show-up
identification made by the three victims. In open court, the trial court denied
Defendant’s motion to suppress and made findings of fact and conclusions of law from
the bench.
Defendant was found guilty of all charges by a jury and was sentenced in the
presumptive range for each charge, to be served consecutively. Defendant gave oral
notice of appeal in open court.
II. Analysis
On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his Motion
to Suppress Evidence. More specifically, Defendant argues that the show-up
identification should have been suppressed.
A. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress for
whether “competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether
the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-
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STATE V. JEUNE
Opinion of the Court
68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011). Findings of fact are “conclusive and binding . . . when
supported by competent evidence,” while conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.
State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994).
B. Pre-Trial Identification of Defendant
Defendant argues that the show-up procedure was impermissibly suggestive
and created a substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, thereby
violating his due process rights under the United States and North Carolina
constitutions.
Identification evidence, such as a show-up, “must be excluded as violating the
due process clause where the facts of the case reveal a pretrial identification
procedure so impermissibly suggestive that there is a substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification.” State v. Thompson, 303 N.C. 169, 171, 277 S.E.2d 431,
433 (1981). Using a totality of the circumstances test, the central question is
“whether . . . the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure
was suggestive.” Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
Our Supreme Court has identified factors to consider when evaluating the
reliability of the identification: “the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal
at the time of the crime; [] the witness's degree of attention; [] the accuracy of the
witness's prior description of the criminal; [] the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the confrontation; and [] the length of time between the crime and the
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STATE V. JEUNE
Opinion of the Court
confrontation.” State v. Harris, 308 N.C. 159, 164, 301 S.E.2d 91, 95 (1983) (citing
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 109-16 (1976)).
Show-ups, while potentially inherently suggestive, are not per se violative of a
defendant’s due process rights. State v. Turner, 305 N.C. 356, 364, 289 S.E.2d 368,
373 (1982) (“An unnecessarily suggestive show-up identification does not create a
substantial likelihood of misidentification where under the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the crime, the identification possesses sufficient aspects
of reliability.”). For example, in Turner, our Supreme Court held that a one-man
show-up was admissible, though suggestive, where the victim’s identification of the
defendant was based on the victim attentively observing the defendant in poor
lighting conditions during the alleged crime, having seen the defendant in the
neighborhood previously, and a general physical description given to the police.
Turner, 305 N.C. at 365, 289 S.E.2d at 374.
In the present case, the facts and circumstances surrounding the show-up are
as follows: Before the alleged robbery occurred, Defendant and the other perpetrators
followed the victims around in the mall and the parking lot. Defendant was two feet
away from one of the victims at the time of the robbery. The show-up occurred
approximately fifteen minutes after the robbery. Prior to the show-up, the victims
gave a physical description of Defendant to the police. All three victims were seated
together in the back of a police officer’s squad car during the show-up. Defendant
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STATE V. JEUNE
Opinion of the Court
and the other perpetrators were handcuffed during the show-up. Defendant and the
other perpetrators were standing in a well-lit area of the parking lot, in front of the
squad car, during the show-up. Defendant matched the physical description given by
the victims. Upon approaching the area where Defendant and the other perpetrators
were detained, all three victims spontaneously shouted, “That’s him, that’s him!” All
the victims also identified Defendant in court.
While these procedures were not perfect, we conclude that there was not a
substantial likelihood of misidentification in light of the reliability factors
surrounding the crime and the identification. Turner, 305 N.C. at 364, 289 S.E.2d at
373.
III. Conclusion
The pre-trial identification of Defendant was reliable. Even though the show-
up may have been suggestive, it did not rise to the level of irreparable
misidentification. As such, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion
to suppress.
NO ERROR.
Judges Bryant and Zachary concur.
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