State v. Fields , 265 N.C. App. 69 ( 2019 )


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  •              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA18-673
    Filed: 16 April 2019
    Durham County, Nos. 15 CRS 59893, 17 CRS 444
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    MELVIN LAMAR FIELDS
    Appeal by Defendant from Judgments entered 12 January 2018 by Judge Paul
    C. Ridgeway in Durham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 14
    February 2019.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Lisa
    Bradley, for the State.
    Richard Croutharmel for defendant-appellant.
    HAMPSON, Judge.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    Melvin Lamar Fields (Defendant) appeals from Judgments adjudicating him
    guilty of (1) Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury and (2) Habitual Misdemeanor
    Assault. The Record before us demonstrates the following:
    On 15 August 2016, a Grand Jury indicted Defendant for Malicious Maiming
    of Privy Member and Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury. On 6 February 2017,
    the Grand Jury entered a superseding indictment for Attempted Malicious
    Castration or Maiming of a Privy Member and Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily
    STATE V. FIELDS
    Opinion of the Court
    Injury. The Grand Jury additionally indicted Defendant for Assault, and for Habitual
    Misdemeanor Assault, a separate substantive offense. These indictments alleged, on
    2 November 2015, Defendant attacked and tore the scrotum of A.R.,1 a transgender
    woman. In advance of trial, Defendant stipulated to two prior misdemeanor assaults
    as elements of Habitual Misdemeanor Assault.
    At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges
    against him on the grounds of insufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, Defendant
    alleged the “evidence is insufficient as a matter of law on every element of each charge
    to support submission of the charge to the jury,” and “there is a variance between the
    crime alleged in the indictment and the crime for which the State’s evidence may
    have been sufficient for submission to the jury[.]” Defendant also argued, “as it
    relates to the attempted malicious maiming indictment, the [S]tate has failed to show
    there was . . . any specific intent . . . with malice to maim, disfigure, or render
    impotent” A.R., A.R. was “not permanently injured,” and “the [S]tate has failed to
    show that there was serious bodily injury” to A.R. The trial court denied the Motion.
    Defendant declined to offer evidence on his own behalf and renewed his Motion to
    Dismiss, which the trial court again denied.
    The trial court submitted to the jury the two felony charges of Attempted
    Castration or Maiming and Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury. Rather than
    1   Initials are used to protect the victim.
    -2-
    STATE V. FIELDS
    Opinion of the Court
    submit the charge of Habitual Misdemeanor Assault, the trial court submitted the
    underlying predicate misdemeanor offense of Assault Inflicting Serious Injury,
    pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c)(1).
    The jury returned verdicts finding Defendant not guilty of Attempted
    Castration or Maiming, guilty of Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury, and guilty
    of Assault Inflicting Serious Injury. The jury further found as an aggravating factor
    Defendant took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense.
    The trial court found Defendant had a prior felony record level of III. The court
    sentenced Defendant to a minimum of 19 months and a maximum of 32 months, in
    the presumptive range, for Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury; and a minimum
    of 9 months and a maximum of 20 months, in the presumptive range, for Habitual
    Misdemeanor Assault; to be served consecutively in the custody of the North Carolina
    Department of Adult Correction. Defendant appeals.
    Issues
    The dispositive issues raised by Defendant in this case are: (I) Whether there
    was sufficient evidence of a “serious bodily injury” to submit the charge of Assault
    Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury to the jury; and (II) Whether the trial court erred in
    entering judgment on the Habitual Misdemeanor Assault conviction, predicated on
    the Defendant’s conviction for misdemeanor Assault Inflicting Serious Injury, in light
    -3-
    STATE V. FIELDS
    Opinion of the Court
    of Defendant’s conviction for felony Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury arising
    from the same conduct.
    Analysis
    I. Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury
    In his first argument, Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to
    dismiss the charge of Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury. We disagree.
    A. Standard of Review
    “This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.”
    State v. Smith, 
    186 N.C. App. 57
    , 62, 
    650 S.E.2d 29
    , 33 (2007).
    “ ‘Upon defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether
    there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or
    of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of
    such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.’ ” State v. Fritsch, 
    351 N.C. 373
    ,
    378, 
    526 S.E.2d 451
    , 455 (quoting State v. Barnes, 
    334 N.C. 67
    , 75, 
    430 S.E.2d 914
    ,
    918 (1993)), cert. denied, 
    531 U.S. 890
    , 
    148 L. Ed. 2d 150
    (2000).
    B. Serious Bodily Injury
    Our General Statutes define the offense of Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily
    Injury as follows:
    Unless the conduct is covered under some other provision
    of law providing greater punishment, any person who
    assaults another person and inflicts serious bodily injury is
    guilty of a Class F felony. “Serious bodily injury” is defined
    -4-
    STATE V. FIELDS
    Opinion of the Court
    as bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death, or
    that causes serious permanent disfigurement, coma, a
    permanent or protracted condition that causes extreme
    pain, or permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the
    function of any bodily member or organ, or that results in
    prolonged hospitalization.
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.4(a) (2017). Thus, the offense requires the State to show (1)
    an assault, and (2) the assault inflicted “serious bodily injury,” as defined above. On
    appeal, as at trial, Defendant contends the State’s evidence failed to establish this
    second element–whether Defendant’s conduct resulted in “serious bodily injury.”
    The evidence at trial tended to show after the assault, A.R. had a long rip in
    her genitals; A.R. required 15 stitches and pain medication; A.R. remained out of
    work for two weeks and upon return to work was placed on modified duties; A.R.
    continued to suffer pain for three months, and it was six months before the pain
    completely abated. A.R. has a large, jagged scar from the assault. Additionally,
    A.R.’s doctor testified an injury like A.R.’s “would be significantly painful[.]”
    However, Defendant contends A.R. suffered no serious, permanent disfigurement and
    no protracted condition causing her extreme pain.
    Our courts have consistently recognized whether a serious bodily injury has
    been inflicted depends upon the facts of each case and is generally for the jury to
    decide under appropriate instructions. Indeed, this Court has held a trial court
    properly denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss under similar facts on numerous
    occasions. For example, we have held the State presented evidence of “serious bodily
    -5-
    STATE V. FIELDS
    Opinion of the Court
    injury” sufficient for a jury to decide (1) where the victim testified his injuries were
    “very painful[,]” he suffered pain in his mouth for about a month, and a doctor
    testified those injuries caused “severe” and “extreme” pain, State v. Brown, 177 N.C.
    App. 177, 188, 
    628 S.E.2d 787
    , 794 (2006); (2) where the victim suffered a broken jaw
    which was wired shut for two months, along with damage to his teeth, broken ribs,
    and back spasms requiring emergency room visits, and a doctor testified the victim’s
    broken jaw could cause “quite a bit” of pain and discomfort, State v. Williams, 
    150 N.C. App. 497
    , 503-04, 
    563 S.E.2d 616
    , 620 (2002); and (3) where the victim suffered
    broken bones in her face, a broken hand, a cracked knee, and an eye bruised so badly
    it was still problematic at trial, as well as pain lasting five to six weeks after the
    attack, State v. Jamison, 
    234 N.C. App. 231
    , 235-36, 
    758 S.E.2d 666
    , 670 (2014).
    In the instant case, A.R.’s injury required stitches, pain medication, time off
    from work, and modified duties once she resumed work. Her pain lasted for as much
    as six months, and her doctor described it as “significantly painful.” This evidence,
    taken together and giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference, tends
    to show a “permanent or protracted condition that causes extreme pain.” Moreover,
    the assault left A.R. with a significant, jagged scar, which would support a finding of
    “serious permanent disfigurement.” Thus there is substantial evidence supporting a
    finding of “serious bodily injury” as defined by statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.4(a).
    -6-
    STATE V. FIELDS
    Opinion of the Court
    Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to
    dismiss.
    II. Habitual Misdemeanor Assault
    In his second argument, Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to
    submit the predicate misdemeanor of Assault Inflicting Serious Injury to the jury.
    Alternatively, Defendant contends once the jury returned its verdict, including
    finding Defendant guilty of the Class F felony of Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily
    Injury, the trial court was required to arrest judgment on misdemeanor Assault
    Inflicting Serious Injury and to not enter judgment on Habitual Misdemeanor
    Assault. Specifically, Defendant argues N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c) statutorily
    mandates he could not be convicted and sentenced for misdemeanor Assault Inflicting
    Serious Injury because he was convicted and sentenced for felony Assault Inflicting
    Serious Bodily Injury, which imposes greater punishment, for the same conduct.
    We summarily conclude, for the essential reasons stated in Section I, above,
    the evidence was sufficient to submit the issue of Assault Inflicting Serious Injury to
    the jury. We are, however, constrained to agree that once Defendant was convicted of
    a Class F felony assault, the trial court was required to arrest judgment on the
    misdemeanor assault conviction and not enter judgment on the charge of Habitual
    Misdemeanor Assault arising from the same assault.
    A. Preservation and Standard of Review
    -7-
    STATE V. FIELDS
    Opinion of the Court
    Although Defendant did not object at trial to the trial court’s entry of two
    separate assault judgments, “[w]hen a trial court acts contrary to a statutory
    mandate, the defendant’s right to appeal is preserved despite the defendant’s failure
    to object during trial.” State v. Lawrence, 
    352 N.C. 1
    , 13, 
    530 S.E.2d 807
    , 815 (2000).
    We apply de novo review to Defendant’s argument. State v. Jones, 
    237 N.C. App. 526
    ,
    532, 
    767 S.E.2d 341
    , 345 (2014).
    B. Multiple Assaults Arising from the Same Conduct
    Our General Statutes codify Habitual Misdemeanor Assault as follows: “A
    person commits the offense of habitual misdemeanor assault if that person violates
    any of the provisions of G.S. 14-33 and causes physical injury, or G.S. 14-34, and has
    two or more prior convictions for either misdemeanor or felony assault, with the
    earlier of the two prior convictions occurring no more than 15 years prior to the date
    of the current violation.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33.2 (2017). Habitual Misdemeanor
    Assault is a Class H felony. 
    Id. The indictment
    charging Defendant with Habitual Misdemeanor Assault
    alleged: (I) Defendant assaulted A.R. inflicting serious injury to A.R.’s scrotum
    causing physical injury; and (II) Defendant had been convicted of two or more felony
    or misdemeanor assault offenses. Based on Defendant’s stipulation to the two prior
    assault offenses, the only question for the jury on the Habitual Misdemeanor Assault
    -8-
    STATE V. FIELDS
    Opinion of the Court
    charge was whether Defendant committed Assault Inflicting Serious Injury under
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c)(1). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c)(1) provides, in relevant part:
    Unless the conduct is covered under some other provision
    of law providing greater punishment, any person who
    commits any assault . . . is guilty of a Class A1
    misdemeanor if, in the course of the assault . . ., he or she:
    (1) Inflicts serious injury upon another person . . .
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c)(1) (2017).
    The jury found Defendant guilty of Assault Inflicting Serious Injury. In
    addition, however, the jury returned a guilty verdict on Assault Inflicting Serious
    Bodily Injury, a Class F felony, for his assault on A.R. resulting in the same injury.
    See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.4(a).
    In State v. Jamison, this Court addressed the question of whether a defendant
    could be convicted and sentenced for both Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury and
    a misdemeanor assault under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c). This Court reviewed the
    statutory mandate of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c) and, in particular, the prefatory
    clause: “Unless the conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing
    greater punishment . . . .” 
    Jamison, 234 N.C. App. at 238
    , 758 S.E.2d at 671. This
    Court held the prefatory language “unambiguously bars punishment for [a lesser
    class of assault] when the conduct at issue is punished by a higher class of assault.”
    
    Id. at 239,
    758 S.E.2d at 671. Thus, this Court concluded the statute mandated a
    defendant could not be convicted and sentenced for both felony Assault Inflicting
    -9-
    STATE V. FIELDS
    Opinion of the Court
    Serious Bodily Injury under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.4(a) and misdemeanor Assault
    on a Female under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c)(2) for the same conduct. Because the
    trial court entered judgment on both felony and misdemeanor assault for the same
    conduct, this Court arrested judgment on the misdemeanor assault charge.
    Applying Jamison to this case, where the jury returned its verdict finding
    Defendant guilty of Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury, a higher class of assault
    providing for punishment as a Class F felony, under the plain language of N.C. Gen.
    Stat. § 14-33(c), the trial court could not impose judgment or sentence for Assault
    Inflicting Serious Injury, a lesser class of assault arising from the same conduct.
    Thus, the trial court was required to arrest judgment on Assault Inflicting Serious
    Injury and instead enter judgment solely on the higher Class F felony. See 
    Jamison, 234 N.C. App. at 239
    , 758 S.E.2d at 672. As such, it follows, the trial court was then
    precluded from entering judgment on the Habitual Misdemeanor Assault charge
    expressly predicated on the misdemeanor assault charge. Rather, the statutory
    mandate of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c), governing the predicate misdemeanor assault,
    requires Defendant be sentenced only for the assault conviction imposing greater
    punishment for the same conduct, here felony Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily
    Injury.
    The State contends, however, the jury’s finding on misdemeanor Assault
    Inflicting Serious Injury was used only for the purpose of establishing one element of
    - 10 -
    STATE V. FIELDS
    Opinion of the Court
    the separate offense of Habitual Misdemeanor Assault. The State draws comparisons
    to habitual felon status, suggesting Habitual Misdemeanor Assault is simply
    intended to enhance punishment and thus may be imposed in addition to another
    assault charge arising from the same conduct.
    However, “[u]nlike habitual felon status, habitual misdemeanor assault is a
    substantive offense and a punishment enhancement (or recidivist, or repeat-offender)
    offense.”   State v. Sydnor, 
    246 N.C. App. 353
    , 356, 
    782 S.E.2d 910
    , 913 (2016)
    (citations and quotation marks omitted); compare State v. Priddy, 
    115 N.C. App. 547
    ,
    549, 
    445 S.E.2d 610
    , 612 (1994) (holding Habitual Impaired Driving, unlike Habitual
    Felon status, is “a separate felony offense,” and not “solely a punishment
    enhancement status”). In essence, the offense of Habitual Misdemeanor Assault
    replaces the underlying predicate misdemeanor, elevating the same conduct to a
    felony based on a defendant’s prior assault convictions. Thus, for example, in State
    v. Jones, this Court recognized “the trial court could not administer punishment for
    both habitual misdemeanor assault, a Class H felony, and assault on a female, a class
    A1 misdemeanor” resulting from the same 
    conduct. 237 N.C. App. at 533
    , 767 S.E.2d
    at 345. The rationale in Jones was again premised on “the unambiguous phrase
    ‘[u]nless the conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing greater
    punishment[,]’ in G.S. 14-33(c).” 
    Id. We therefore
    vacated the conviction for Assault
    on a Female and remanded for resentencing on Habitual Misdemeanor Assault.
    - 11 -
    STATE V. FIELDS
    Opinion of the Court
    This is consistent with longstanding precedent holding a defendant may not be
    charged with multiple classes, or multiple charges of the same class, of assault arising
    from a single assault. For example, in State v. Dilldine, this Court noted it was
    improper for a defendant to be separately charged with Assault with Intent to Kill
    and Assault with Intent to Kill Inflicting Serious Injury arising from a single assault.
    
    22 N.C. App. 229
    , 231, 
    206 S.E.2d 364
    , 366 (1974); see also State v. Maddox, 159 N.C.
    App. 127, 132, 
    583 S.E.2d 601
    , 604 (2003) (“In order for a defendant to be charged
    with multiple counts of assault, there must be multiple assaults”).
    It follows, therefore, a defendant may not be convicted and sentenced for two
    substantive assault charges arising from a single assault. In this case, the
    indictments cited only one assault resulting in the same injury. Likewise, the trial
    court’s instructions to the jury for both offenses relied upon whether Defendant
    “assaulted the victim by intentionally causing a tear in the alleged victim’s
    scrotum[.]” Thus, in this case, Defendant could not be convicted and sentenced for
    both the substantive assault charge of Habitual Misdemeanor Assault, predicated on
    misdemeanor Assault Inflicting Serious Injury, and the higher Class F felony Assault
    Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury, both arising from the assault on A.R. leading to the
    same injury. See Jones, 237 N.C. App. at 
    533, 767 S.E.2d at 345
    ; Jamison, 234 N.C.
    App. at 
    239, 758 S.E.2d at 671
    . Consequently, we must hold, because the jury
    returned its verdict finding Defendant guilty of felony Assault Inflicting Serious
    - 12 -
    STATE V. FIELDS
    Opinion of the Court
    Bodily Injury, the trial court erred in entering judgment and sentencing Defendant
    for Habitual Misdemeanor Assault predicated on misdemeanor Assault Inflicting
    Serious Injury arising from the same conduct. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s
    judgment as to Habitual Misdemeanor Assault (17 CRS 444).2
    Conclusion
    We conclude there was no error in the trial court’s judgment on the charge of
    Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury (15 CRS 59893) but vacate the trial court’s
    judgment on the charge of Habitual Misdemeanor Assault (17 CRS 444).
    NO ERROR IN PART, VACATED IN PART.
    Judge ZACHARY concurs.
    Judge BERGER concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.
    2 We do not remand for resentencing because the trial court imposed the sentence for Habitual
    Misdemeanor Assault to run consecutively from the separate judgment and sentence for the higher
    Class F felony Assault Inflicting Serious Bodily Injury.
    - 13 -
    No. COA18-673 – State v. Fields
    BERGER, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
    I concur with the majority that there was substantial evidence to support
    submission to the jury of the charge of assault inflicting serious bodily injury. I
    respectfully dissent from the remainder of the majority opinion because the trial court
    did not err.
    Judgment was entered against Defendant for assault inflicting serious bodily
    injury and habitual misdemeanor assault. Defendant argues that the trial court
    erred by (1) punishing him for assault inflicting serious injury and assault inflicting
    serious bodily injury arising out of the same conduct, (2) failing to arrest judgment
    on “one of the assault convictions,” and (3) convicting Defendant of a principle offense
    and lesser-included offense arising out of the same conduct. Defendant essentially is
    attacking his conviction on double jeopardy grounds from three different directions.
    “[H]abitual misdemeanor assault is a substantive offense and a punishment
    enhancement (or recidivist, or repeat-offender) offense.” State v. Carpenter, 155 N.C.
    App. 35, 49, 
    573 S.E.2d 668
    , 677 (2002) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see
    also State v. Smith, 
    139 N.C. App. 209
    , 212-14, 
    533 S.E.2d 518
    , 519-20 (2000). In
    relevant part, an individual may be found guilty of habitual misdemeanor assault if
    that person commits an assault set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33 which causes
    physical injury, and that individual “has two or more prior convictions for either
    misdemeanor or felony assault, with the earlier of the two prior convictions occurring
    STATE V. FIELDS
    BERGER, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part
    no more than 15 years prior to the date of the current violation.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
    33.2 (2017). Assault inflicting serious injury is an offense set forth in Section 14-
    33(c)(1), and thus, an element of habitual misdemeanor assault.
    The majority correctly notes that the prefatory clause to Section 14-33 states
    “[u]nless the conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing greater
    punishment,” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c) (2017), and that this language precludes
    punishment for lower class assaults when the conduct at issue “is punished by a
    higher class of assault.” (Citation omitted.)        The majority would be correct if
    Defendant here were being punished for assault inflicting serious bodily injury and
    the A1 misdemeanor of assault inflicting serious injury pursuant to Section 14-33.
    However, Defendant here was convicted and punished pursuant to Section 14-
    33.2, which contains no such prefatory language, and thus, does not preclude
    punishment for conduct “covered under some other provision of law providing greater
    punishment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c). As the majority correctly points out “the
    offense of Habitual Misdemeanor Assault replaces the underlying predicate
    misdemeanor.”     Thus, the prefatory language which supports the majority’s
    reasoning is inapplicable.
    Assault inflicting serious bodily injury is a substantive offense defined as an
    assault in which an individual inflicts “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk
    2
    STATE V. FIELDS
    BERGER, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part
    of death, or that causes serious permanent disfigurement, coma, a permanent or
    protracted condition that causes extreme pain, or permanent or protracted loss or
    impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or that results in
    prolonged hospitalization.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32.4(a) (2017).
    No person may be “subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
    life or limb.” U.S. Constitution, Amend. V. In Blockburger v. United States, the
    Supreme Court stated that
    the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
    offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires
    proof of a fact which the other does not. A single act may
    be an offense against two statutes; and if each statute
    requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
    not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not
    exempt the defendant from prosecution and punishment
    under the other.
    State v. Artis, 
    174 N.C. App. 668
    , 674, 
    622 S.E.2d 204
    , 209 (2005) (quoting
    Blockburger v. United States, 
    284 U.S. 299
    , 304 (1932)).
    “North Carolina has adopted and applied the Blockburger test” to determine if
    double jeopardy concerns are implicated in the punishment of multiple offenses. 
    Id. The North
    Carolina Supreme Court has stated that
    even where evidence to support two or more offenses
    overlaps, double jeopardy does not occur unless the
    evidence required to support the two convictions is
    identical. If proof of an additional fact is required for each
    3
    STATE V. FIELDS
    BERGER, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part
    conviction which is not required for the other, even though
    some of the same acts must be proved in the trial of each,
    the offenses are not the same.
    
    Id. (quoting State
    v. Murray, 
    310 N.C. 540
    , 548, 
    313 S.E.2d 523
    , 529 (1984)).
    In State v. Artis, the defendant was charged with malicious conduct by a
    prisoner and habitual misdemeanor assault arising from the same conduct. The
    conduct alleged in both indictments read:
    the defendant named above unlawfully, willfully, and
    feloniously did assault S.E. McKinney, a government
    officer at the Pitt County Detention Center, Greenville,
    North Carolina ... by throwing bodily fluid on S.E.
    McKinney. At the time of the assault S.E. McKinney was
    performing a duty of his office by supervising the
    dispensing of food to the defendant.
    
    Id. This Court
    stated that “[c]onvictions arising from the same incident or similar
    conduct for both do not violate the double jeopardy clause.” 
    Id. at 676,
    622 S.E.2d at
    210.
    Such is the case here. Defendant was indicted for assault inflicting serious
    bodily injury and habitual misdemeanor assault. The allegations in both indictments
    were that Defendant assaulted the victim and caused tearing to victim’s scrotum. 3
    Even though the allegations in the indictments concerning the assault and resulting
    injury were identical, the two substantive offenses required proof of different facts.
    3The indictment for assault inflicting serious bodily injury alleged that the tear to the victim’s
    scrotum was serious bodily injury, while the indictment for habitual misdemeanor assault alleged that
    the Defendant inflicted serious injury and physical injury as a result of the tear in his scrotum.
    4
    STATE V. FIELDS
    BERGER, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part
    Assault inflicting serious bodily injury required the State to prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt that the Defendant committed an assault upon the victim which
    inflicted serious bodily injury. Even though habitual misdemeanor assault has as an
    element the lesser included offense of assault inflicting serious injury, it is a
    substantive offense which also required proof of physical injury and “two or more
    prior convictions for either misdemeanor or felony assault, with the earlier of the two
    prior convictions occurring no more than 15 years prior to the date of the current
    violation.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33.2.
    Because habitual misdemeanor assault is a substantive offense which required
    proof of additional facts and elements beyond that necessary for conviction of assault
    inflicting serious bodily injury, I would find that the trial court did not err.
    5