Nanny's Korner Day Care Ctr. ( 2020 )


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  •               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA19-416
    Filed: 7 January 2020
    N.C. Industrial Commission, I.C. No. TA-26087
    NANNY’S KORNER DAY CARE CENTER, INC., Plaintiff,
    v.
    NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
    DIVISION OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT, Defendant.
    Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 21 December 2018 by the North
    Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 October 2019.
    Ralph T. Bryant, Jr., for Plaintiff-Appellant.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Charles
    Whitehead, for Defendant-Appellee.
    COLLINS, Judge.
    Nanny’s Korner Day Care Center, Inc. (“Plaintiff”), appeals from order entered
    on 21 December 2018 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission dismissing
    Plaintiff’s claim against the North Carolina Department of Health and Human
    Services, Division of Child Development (“Defendant”), under the North Carolina
    Tort Claims Act. Because Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations, we
    affirm.
    NANNY’S KORNER DAY CARE CTR. V. N.C. DHHS
    Opinion of the Court
    I. Factual and Procedural History
    This is the third time the parties have been before this Court in the last five
    years. A detailed factual history of this case can be found at Nanny’s Korner Day
    Care Ctr., Inc. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
    825 S.E.2d 34
    (N.C. Ct. App.
    2019) (“Nanny’s Korner II”). The facts relevant to this case are as follows:
    On 23 April 2010, Defendant notified Plaintiff that Defendant had decided to
    issue administrative disciplinary action based on substantiation by the Robeson
    County Department of Social Services that child abuse had occurred at Plaintiff’s day
    care facility. Defendant then issued a notice of administrative action to Plaintiff on
    15 June 2010, invoking disciplinary action. Plaintiff appealed Defendant’s decision
    through the administrative appeal process, first to the Office of Administrative
    Hearings, then to Wake County Superior Court, and then to this Court. On 20 May
    2014, this Court held that Defendant had violated Plaintiff’s rights by not conducting
    an independent investigation into the alleged child abuse, and reversed Defendant’s
    decision. Nanny’s Korner Care Ctr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 234 N.C.
    App. 51, 64, 
    758 S.E.2d 423
    , 431 (2014) (“Nanny’s Korner I”).
    On 23 January 2017, Plaintiff filed a claim with the Industrial Commission
    under the Tort Claims Act, seeking $600,000 in compensatory and consequential
    damages due to Defendant’s negligent failure to conduct an independent
    investigation prior to initiating disciplinary action. Defendant responded by filing a
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    NANNY’S KORNER DAY CARE CTR. V. N.C. DHHS
    Opinion of the Court
    motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
    on the ground, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to file the tort affidavit within three
    years of Defendant’s 15 June 2010 administrative action, as required by the Tort
    Claims Act. After a hearing on 19 April 2017, Deputy Commissioner Robert J. Harris
    issued an order on 4 May 2017, dismissing Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice because
    the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff appealed to the Full
    Commission (the “Commission”).
    The Commission conducted a hearing on 18 October 2017. On 21 December
    2018, the Commission issued an order dismissing Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice,
    holding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The Commission
    concluded that “the time period for Plaintiff to bring a claim for damages under the
    Tort Claims Act began on 15 June 2010 and its Affidavit, filed on 23 January 2017,
    fell outside of the Tort Claims Act’s three-year statute of limitations.”
    Plaintiff timely filed notice of appeal to this Court.
    II. Discussion
    Plaintiff argues that the Commission erred by dismissing Plaintiff’s claim as
    barred by the Tort Claims Act’s three-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff contends
    that (1) the statute of limitations was tolled while Plaintiff exhausted administrative
    remedies; (2) the Court of Appeals’ May 2014 decision in Nanny’s Korner I signified
    Plaintiff’s exhaustion of administrative remedies and, accordingly, marked the
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    NANNY’S KORNER DAY CARE CTR. V. N.C. DHHS
    Opinion of the Court
    beginning of the three-year limitations period; and (3) therefore, Plaintiff’s January
    2017 claim was timely filed. We disagree.
    We review a decision by the Commission under the Tort Claims Act “for errors
    of law only under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil
    actions, and the findings of fact of the Commission shall be conclusive if there is any
    competent evidence to support them.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-293 (2018). When
    considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
    “[t]he question for the court is whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the
    complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be
    granted under some legal theory . . . .” Grant Const. Co. v. McRae, 
    146 N.C. App. 370
    ,
    373, 
    553 S.E.2d 89
    , 91 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We
    review an order allowing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo.
    Leary v. N.C. Forest Prods., Inc., 
    157 N.C. App. 396
    , 400, 
    580 S.E.2d 1
    , 4 (2003).
    “The statute of limitations may be raised as a defense by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
    to dismiss if it appears on the face of the complaint that such a statute bars the
    plaintiff’s action.” Laster v. Francis, 
    199 N.C. App. 572
    , 576, 
    681 S.E.2d 858
    , 861
    (2009) (citation omitted). After a defendant has raised this affirmative defense, the
    burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that he commenced the action within the
    statutory period. 
    Id. -4- NANNY’S
    KORNER DAY CARE CTR. V. N.C. DHHS
    Opinion of the Court
    The Tort Claims Act prescribes a three-year statute of limitations for
    negligence claims. N.C. Gen. Stat. §143-299 (2018).
    The accrual of the statute of limitations period typically
    begins when the plaintiff is injured or discovers he or she
    has been injured. However, when the General Assembly
    provides an effective administrative remedy by statute,
    that remedy is exclusive and the party must pursue and
    exhaust it before resorting to the courts. Nevertheless, the
    exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine is
    inapplicable when the remedies sought are not considered
    in the administrative proceeding.            Under those
    circumstances, the administrative remedy will not bar a
    claimant from pursuing an adequate remedy in civil court.
    Nanny’s Korner 
    II, 825 S.E.2d at 39-40
    (internal quotation marks, brackets, and
    citations omitted). See White v. Trew, 
    217 N.C. App. 574
    , 579-80, 
    720 S.E.2d 713
    , 719
    (2011) (holding that plaintiff’s libel claim seeking monetary damages caused by false
    statements was not barred by the exhaustion doctrine because the statutory remedy
    was to remove statements from employee file, not to award damages), rev’d on other
    grounds, 
    366 N.C. 360
    , 
    736 S.E.2d 166
    (2013). Money damages are not available
    under the North Carolina Administrative Procedure Act (“NCAPA”). Nanny’s Korner
    
    II, 825 S.E.2d at 40
    .
    In Nanny’s Korner II, Plaintiff made a similar argument to the one it makes in
    this case, but in the context of a procedural due process claim filed in the trial court:
    Plaintiff argues the statute of limitations was tolled while
    Plaintiff exhausted its administrative remedies through
    the appeal of Defendant’s final agency decision in Nanny’s
    Korner I.       Plaintiff contends the exhaustion of
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    NANNY’S KORNER DAY CARE CTR. V. N.C. DHHS
    Opinion of the Court
    administrative remedies doctrine required Plaintiff to
    exhaust its remedy through the claim under the NCAPA
    before Plaintiff’s right to bring a constitutional claim arose.
    Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that its cause of action for the
    alleged due process violation did not accrue until 9 June
    2014, when this Court issued its mandate in Nanny’s
    Korner I.
    
    Id. We disagreed
    and concluded that Plaintiff’s constitutional procedural due
    process claim was properly dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because the statute of
    limitations on Plaintiff’s constitutional claim was not tolled while Plaintiff exhausted
    its administrative remedies. 
    Id. at 40-41.
    This Court held that
    the statute of limitations began to run on or about 15 June
    2010, when Defendant issued the written warning to
    Plaintiff. Defendant’s written warning was the “breach”
    that proximately caused—in Plaintiff’s own words—a
    “real, immediate, and inescapable” injury. The statute of
    limitations began to run when Plaintiff was injured or
    discovered the injury, which in this case happened almost
    simultaneously. The statute of limitations was not tolled
    while Plaintiff pursued its administrative remedies in
    Nanny’s Korner I because in that action, Plaintiff sought a
    remedy not available through the NCAPA—namely,
    monetary damages.            In its complaint, Plaintiff
    acknowledges that the NCAPA “does not provide a remedy
    for . . . lost income and profits.” Therefore, the statute of
    limitations was not tolled while Plaintiff pursued its
    administrative remedies, and the filing of the instant claim
    on 22 May 2017 fell outside the statute of limitations.
    
    Id. at 40.
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    NANNY’S KORNER DAY CARE CTR. V. N.C. DHHS
    Opinion of the Court
    The same analysis is applicable in this case. Despite the fact that Plaintiff
    brought this action before the Commission under the Tort Claims Act, as opposed to
    the superior court with a constitutional claim in Nanny’s Korner II, the statute of
    limitations began to run on or about 15 June 2010, when Defendant issued the
    written warning to Plaintiff. The statute of limitations was not tolled while Plaintiff
    pursued its administrative remedies in Nanny’s Korner I because Plaintiff seeks
    monetary damages, a remedy not available under the NCAPA. Accordingly, the filing
    of the instant claim on 23 January 2017 fell outside the three-year statute of
    limitations prescribed in the Tort Claims Act. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §143-299.
    Plaintiff argues that Abrons Family Prac. & Urgent Care, PA v. N.C. Dep’t of
    Health & Human Servs., 
    370 N.C. 443
    , 
    810 S.E.2d 224
    (2018), demands application
    of the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine. In Abrons, plaintiffs—all of
    whom were health care providers—filed suit against DHHS and Computer Sciences
    Corporation (“CSC”). 
    Id. at 444-45,
    810 S.E.2d at 226. DHHS had entered into a
    contract with CSC to implement a new Medicaid Management Information System.
    
    Id. at 445,
    810 S.E.2d at 226. After the system went live, plaintiffs began submitting
    claims to DHHS for Medicaid reimbursements. 
    Id. However, glitches
    in the software
    resulted in delayed, incorrectly paid, or unpaid reimbursements to plaintiffs. 
    Id. Plaintiffs filed
    claims—including claims for monetary damages—alleging that CSC
    was negligent in its design and implementation of the system and that DHHS
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    NANNY’S KORNER DAY CARE CTR. V. N.C. DHHS
    Opinion of the Court
    breached its contracts with each of the plaintiffs by failing to pay Medicaid
    reimbursements. 
    Id. Further, plaintiffs
    alleged that “they had a contractual right to
    receive payment for reimbursement claims and that this was ‘a property right that
    could not be taken without just compensation.’” 
    Id. Moreover, plaintiffs
    “sought a
    declaratory judgment that the methodology for payment of Medicaid reimbursement
    claims established by DHHS violated Medicaid reimbursement rules.” 
    Id. at 445,
    810
    S.E.2d at 227.
    After receiving adverse determinations on their reimbursement claims,
    plaintiffs failed to request a reconsideration review or file a petition for a contested
    case, as specifically required by DHHS procedures. 
    Id. at 448,
    810 S.E.2d at 228; see
    also 
    id. at 446-47,
    810 S.E.2d at 227-28 (discussing DHHS regulations and provisions
    of the NCAPA which specifically require Medicaid providers to request a
    reconsideration review and file a petition for a contested case hearing before
    obtaining judicial review). As a result, our Supreme Court held that the trial court
    correctly dismissed plaintiffs’ claims because they failed to exhaust their
    administrative remedies and failed to demonstrate that such exhaustion would be
    futile. 
    Id. at 453,
    810 S.E.2d at 232. The Court explained: “Because resolution of
    the reimbursement claims must come from DHHS, simply inserting a prayer for
    monetary damages does not automatically demonstrate that pursuing administrative
    remedies would be futile. Notwithstanding the claims that are outside the relief that
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    NANNY’S KORNER DAY CARE CTR. V. N.C. DHHS
    Opinion of the Court
    can be granted by an administrative law judge, the reimbursement claims ‘should
    properly be determined in the first instance by the agenc[y] statutorily charged with
    administering’ the Medicaid program.” 
    Id. at 452,
    810 S.E.2d at 231 (quoting Jackson
    ex rel. Jackson v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 
    131 N.C. App. 179
    , 188-89, 
    505 S.E.2d 899
    , 905 (1998)).
    In this case, Plaintiff has filed a claim with the Commission under the Tort
    Claims Act, seeking compensatory and consequential damages due to Defendant’s
    negligence. Unlike the relevant claims in Abrons, this claim is exclusively one for
    negligence and, therefore, it is not a mere “insertion of a prayer for monetary
    damages” into what is otherwise a claim that is primarily administrative. 
    Id. See Intersal,
    Inc. v. Hamilton, 
    834 S.E.2d 404
    , 416 (N.C. 2019) (distinguishing Abrons:
    “Here, plaintiff has filed a claim against the State Defendants for their alleged
    violations of plaintiff's media rights under the 2013 Settlement Agreement. Unlike
    the relevant claims in Abrons, this claim is exclusively one for common law breach of
    contract and, therefore, it is not a mere ‘insertion of a prayer for monetary damages’
    into what is otherwise a claim that is primarily administrative.”) (citation omitted).
    III. Conclusion
    Because the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s claim began to run on or about
    15 June 2010, the filing of the instant claim on 23 January 2017 fell outside the three-
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    NANNY’S KORNER DAY CARE CTR. V. N.C. DHHS
    Opinion of the Court
    year statute of limitations prescribed by the Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, we affirm
    the Commission’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges ARROWOOD and HAMPSON concur.
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