Tutterow v. Hall ( 2022 )


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  •                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    2022-NCCOA-300
    No. COA21-326
    Filed 3 May 2022
    Davie County, No. 19 CVS 470
    GILBERT DEAN TUTTEROW, Administrator of the Estate of Vivian Lynn Tutterow,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    BRIAN K. HALL, KRIS H. HALL; RANDY HALL AUTOMATIVE, LLC; STATE
    FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY; and HORACE MANN
    PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants.
    Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 7 January 2021 by Judge Joseph N. Crosswhite
    in Davie County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 February 2022.
    Martin & Van Hoy, LLP by Henry P. Van Hoy, II; Katherine Freeman, PLLC
    by Katherine Freeman, for plaintiff.
    McAngus, Goudelock & Courtie, PLLC by Jeffrey B. Kuykendal, for defendant
    State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
    Teague, Rotenstreich, Stanaland, Fox & Holt, PLLC by Kara V. Bordman,
    Kenneth B. Rotenstreich, and Robert C. Cratch, for defendant Horace Mann
    Property and Casualty Insurance Company.
    DIETZ, Judge.
    ¶1         This appeal concerns the proper calculation of underinsured motorist or “UIM”
    coverage in a case involving both multiple underinsured tortfeasors and multiple
    UIM insurance policies.
    TUTTEROW V. HALL
    2022-NCCOA-300
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶2         The dispute centers on a provision of the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial
    Responsibility Act addressing this issue. As with other portions of the Act, this
    statutory language is incorporated by law into every automobile insurance policy in
    our State.
    ¶3         The language provides that “if a claimant is an insured under the underinsured
    motorist coverage on separate or additional policies, the limit of underinsured
    motorist coverage applicable to the claimant is the difference between the amount
    paid to the claimant under the exhausted liability policy or policies and the total
    limits of the claimant’s underinsured motorist coverages as determined by combining
    the highest limit available under each policy.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21
    (b)(4).
    ¶4         Here, there were two negligent drivers who caused the accident, each with
    exhausted liability policies of $100,000. There were also two applicable UIM policies,
    each with $100,000 in UIM coverage. As explained below, the trial court properly
    applied the plain language of the statute and determined that the amount of UIM
    coverage available under this statutory calculation “is $0.00,” which is the difference
    between the $200,000 paid under the exhausted liability policies and the combined
    limits of the UIM policies.
    ¶5         The trial court’s calculation follows the statute’s plain language and is
    consistent with the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage identified in our
    State’s case law. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    TUTTEROW V. HALL
    2022-NCCOA-300
    Opinion of the Court
    Facts and Procedural History
    ¶6            In 2014, Vivian Tutterow was killed in a car accident. At the time, Tutterow
    was a passenger in a car driven by Pamela Crump. For purposes of this declaratory
    judgment action, the parties stipulated that both Crump and Defendant Brian Hall,
    the driver of a second vehicle, negligently caused the accident.
    ¶7            The parties involved in this accident had the following relevant insurance
    coverage: Crump had an auto policy issued by Horace Mann with $100,000 per person
    liability limits and $100,000 per person UIM coverage. Hall had an auto policy issued
    by Nationwide with $100,000 per person liability limits.
    ¶8            Tutterow, as a passenger in Crump’s car, was covered under Crump’s $100,000
    per person UIM coverage. Tutterow also had an auto policy issued by State Farm
    with $100,000 per person UIM coverage.
    ¶9            In 2015, Plaintiff, as the administrator of Tutterow’s estate, brought a
    wrongful death action against Crump, Hall, and others. On 10 October 2016, Horace
    Mann tendered the $100,000 limits of its liability policy on behalf of Crump. On 18
    October 2016, Nationwide tendered the $100,000 limits of its liability policy on behalf
    of Hall.
    ¶ 10          Several weeks later, Plaintiff notified the UIM carriers of these tenders but
    advised that Plaintiff had not accepted the tendered liability limits. At that time, the
    TUTTEROW V. HALL
    2022-NCCOA-300
    Opinion of the Court
    two UIM carriers—Horace Mann and State Farm—did not advance coverage under
    the UIM policies.
    ¶ 11         In June 2017, Plaintiff informed the UIM carriers that he had accepted Horace
    Mann’s tender of the full $100,000 liability limit of Crump’s liability policy.
    ¶ 12         In September 2017, State Farm advanced $100,000 to Tutterow’s estate under
    its UIM policy while expressly reserving its “rights to recoup funds” should Plaintiff
    recover from Hall’s liability insurer, Nationwide, “whether such payments are made
    pursuant to a settlement, a judgement or otherwise.”
    ¶ 13         In July 2019, Plaintiff informed the UIM carriers that he reached a settlement
    with Hall that included a payment from Nationwide of the $100,000 limits of Hall’s
    liability policy. The following week, State Farm requested that Plaintiff reimburse
    the $100,000 that it had advanced in late 2017. Those funds were placed in escrow
    and Plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of the
    UIM carriers’ coverage obligations and State Farm’s right to reimbursement.
    ¶ 14         The parties later filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After a hearing,
    the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of the UIM
    carriers on the ground that the amount of UIM coverage available “is $0.00.” Plaintiff
    timely appealed.
    TUTTEROW V. HALL
    2022-NCCOA-300
    Opinion of the Court
    Analysis
    ¶ 15         This case concerns a type of insurance coverage known as underinsured
    motorist or “UIM” coverage. UIM coverage serves “as a safeguard when tortfeasors’
    liability policies do not provide sufficient recovery.” North Carolina Farm Bureau
    Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Lunsford, 
    378 N.C. 181
    , 2021-NCSC-83, ¶ 13. UIM coverage is
    governed by the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act—a lengthy,
    complicated statute that explains how UIM coverage and other related insurance
    operates. 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21
    . The provisions of this statute are “written into
    every policy of automobile insurance” as a matter of law. North Carolina Farm
    Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Dana, 
    379 N.C. 502
    , 2021-NCSC-161, ¶ 9.
    ¶ 16         Under the statute, the calculation of applicable UIM coverage has three basic
    steps. First, the reviewing court must determine if a tortfeasor’s vehicle meets the
    definition of an “underinsured highway vehicle.” If so, the court must determine if
    the limits of that tortfeasor’s liability policy are exhausted. Finally, if those liability
    limits are exhausted, the court must calculate the amount of coverage that is
    available under the applicable UIM policy. 
    Id. ¶ 11
    .
    ¶ 17         Here, the trial court concluded—and the parties concede—that the first two
    steps of this analysis are satisfied and that UIM coverage is therefore triggered. All
    that remains is the calculation of the amount of UIM coverage available.
    TUTTEROW V. HALL
    2022-NCCOA-300
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 18         The crux of this case is how to calculate that available UIM coverage when
    there are both multiple underinsured tortfeasors and multiple UIM insurance
    policies. Here, for example, there are two tortfeasors whose liability insurers
    exhausted their policy limits by tendering $100,000 each. There are also two UIM
    carriers that both provided Tutterow with UIM coverage of $100,000 per person.
    ¶ 19         The parties acknowledge that the calculation of UIM coverage in this scenario
    is governed by a specific section of the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial
    Responsibility Act found in Section 20-279.21(b)(4) of our General Statutes:
    In any event, the limit of underinsured motorist coverage
    applicable to any claim is determined to be the difference between
    the amount paid to the claimant under the exhausted liability
    policy or policies and the limit of underinsured motorist coverage
    applicable to the motor vehicle involved in the accident.
    Furthermore, if a claimant is an insured under the underinsured
    motorist coverage on separate or additional policies, the limit of
    underinsured motorist coverage applicable to the claimant is the
    difference between the amount paid to the claimant under the
    exhausted liability policy or policies and the total limits of the
    claimant’s underinsured motorist coverages as determined by
    combining the highest limit available under each policy . . .
    
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21
    (b)(4).
    ¶ 20         Our State’s appellate courts have not yet interpreted how this statutory
    language applies in a case involving both multiple underinsured tortfeasors and
    multiple UIM insurance carriers. The parties acknowledge that we interpret this
    provision as we would any other statute—by first examining the plain language of
    TUTTEROW V. HALL
    2022-NCCOA-300
    Opinion of the Court
    the statute and then, if that language is ambiguous, turning to other interpretive
    tools. Dana, ¶ 16.
    We agree with the trial court that this statutory language is unambiguous and
    supported entry of summary judgment in favor of the UIM carriers. The first sentence
    of this provision addresses a scenario in which the claimant is covered by only one
    UIM policy: “In any event, the limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to
    any claim is determined to be the difference between the amount paid to the claimant
    under the exhausted liability policy or policies and the limit of underinsured motorist
    coverage applicable to the motor vehicle involved in the accident.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20
    -
    279.21(b)(4) (emphasis added).
    ¶ 21         The word “claim” as used in this sentence means the assertion that the
    claimant “has sustained bodily injury” or is “injured” in an automobile collision. 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21
    (b)(3), (4). Moreover, the references to “underinsured motorist
    coverage” and “the limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to the motor
    vehicle involved in the accident”—with the word “coverage” in the singular—signals
    that there is only one UIM policy at issue, that being the UIM policy for the vehicle
    the claimant occupied at the time of the accident.
    ¶ 22         The second sentence, by contrast, addresses a scenario in which the claimant
    is covered by more than one UIM policy: “Furthermore, if a claimant is an insured
    under the underinsured motorist coverage on separate or additional policies, the limit
    TUTTEROW V. HALL
    2022-NCCOA-300
    Opinion of the Court
    of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to the claimant is the difference
    between the amount paid to the claimant under the exhausted liability policy or
    policies and the total limits of the claimant’s underinsured motorist coverages as
    determined by combining the highest limit available under each policy.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis
    added).
    ¶ 23         The use of the transitional word “furthermore” indicates that this second
    sentence provides an additional factor or consideration that distinguishes it from the
    preceding statement. See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 474 (10th ed.
    1993). That additional consideration—meaning the thing that distinguishes the
    second sentence from the first—is the existence of multiple UIM policies that apply
    to the claimant. This is confirmed by the grammar of this second sentence, which
    refers to the “total limits of the claimant’s underinsured motorist coverages” in the
    plural form, in contrast to the first sentence, which refers to the “limit of
    underinsured motorist coverage” in the singular.
    ¶ 24         In the scenario addressed in this second sentence, involving multiple
    applicable UIM policies, the statute provides an unambiguous method to calculate
    the applicable limit of combined UIM coverage: it is the difference between the total
    amount paid under all exhausted liability policies and the total limits of all applicable
    UIM policies.
    TUTTEROW V. HALL
    2022-NCCOA-300
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 25         The trial court properly applied this statutory provision here. The court
    calculated the total amount paid under the exhausted liability policies as $200,000
    and calculated the total limits of the claimant’s underinsured motorist coverages as
    $200,000. The court then determined that the total limits of UIM coverage is the
    difference between these two totals and, therefore, the “available UIM coverage is
    $0.00.” This determination properly applied the statute’s plain language and is
    correct.
    ¶ 26         Although we hold that the statute’s plain language is unambiguous and
    compels this result, we note that this interpretation also is consistent with the
    purpose of the statute. As noted above, UIM coverage serves “as a safeguard when
    tortfeasors’ liability policies do not provide sufficient recovery.” Lunsford, ¶ 13. The
    purpose of UIM coverage is to put the insured in a position where total insurance
    coverage for injuries sustained in an automobile accident is no less than the amount
    of UIM coverage. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haight, 
    152 N.C. App. 137
    , 142, 
    566 S.E.2d 835
    , 838 (2002). That is precisely what the plain language of this statute
    accomplishes. Here, for example, the UIM carriers provided combined UIM coverage
    ensuring that, in the event of bodily injury or death in an auto accident, there would
    be at least $200,000 in available insurance coverage. That is the amount of liability
    coverage provided in this case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s entry of
    summary judgment in favor of the UIM carriers on this issue.
    TUTTEROW V. HALL
    2022-NCCOA-300
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 27         Plaintiff also argues that the trial court’s order failed to acknowledge that
    State Farm waived its subrogation rights and thus cannot be entitled to
    reimbursement of the $100,000 in UIM coverage that it advanced while reserving a
    right to reimbursement.
    ¶ 28         Under the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act, no insurer
    “shall exercise any right of subrogation. . . where the insurer has been provided with
    written notice before a settlement between its insured and the underinsured motorist
    and the insurer fails to advance a payment to the insured in an amount equal to the
    tentative settlement within 30 days following receipt of that notice.” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-279.21
    (b)(4). Plaintiff contends that State Farm’s advance of its $100,000 in UIM
    coverage occurred many months after the tender of the full limits by the liability
    carriers, and thus waived State Farm’s subrogation rights as a matter of law.
    ¶ 29         The trial court properly determined that this statutory provision is
    inapplicable. As explained above, when the underlying liability insurers exhausted
    the limits of their two $100,000 policies by tendering the full limits, the UIM carriers
    had no duty to advance any payments because they owed nothing under their policies.
    Because State Farm did not have any obligation to advance payment under its UIM
    policy, the statutory provision governing waiver of subrogation rights upon failure to
    timely advance payment does not apply.
    TUTTEROW V. HALL
    2022-NCCOA-300
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 30         Plaintiff does not assert any other basis to challenge the trial court’s ruling
    with respect to State Farm’s right to reimbursement, and we therefore affirm this
    portion of the trial court’s order as well. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b).
    Conclusion
    ¶ 31         We affirm the trial court’s order.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges MURPHY and JACKSON concur.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-326

Filed Date: 5/3/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/20/2022