State v. Conner ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCCOA-295
No. COA21-715
Filed 3 May 2022
McDowell County, Nos. 18 CRS 50076-77, 18 CRS 50088, 18 CRS 50091, 18 CRS
50134
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
JOHN WESLEY CONNER, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 21 May 2021 by Judge Steve R.
Warren in McDowell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 April
2022.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Tamika
L. Henderson, for the state-appellee.
Drew Nelson for defendant-appellant.
GORE, Judge.
¶1 Defendant John Wesley Conner appeals from judgments entered upon a jury’s
verdicts finding him guilty of statutory rape of a child by an adult, five counts of
indecent liberties with a child, two counts of statutory sex offense with child by adult,
and possession of methamphetamine. After careful review, we find no error in part
and vacate and remand one judgment to the trial court for correction of a clerical
error.
STATE V. CONNER
2022-NCCOA-295
Opinion of the Court
I. Background
¶2 On 19 January 2018, defendant was arrested by McDowell County Sheriff's
Office pursuant to warrants alleging that between 1 November 2017 and 17 January
2018 defendant committed statutory rape of a child by adult and multiple counts of
indecent liberties with a child. Defendant was released pursuant to a secured bond
that same day. On 22 January 2018, additional arrest warrants were issued and
executed alleging that between 1 November 2017 and 17 January 2017 defendant
committed the offenses of statutory sex offense with a child by adult and indecent
liberties with child and on 19 January 2018, defendant committed the offense of
possession of methamphetamine. Defendant was again released pursuant to secured
bond. A final warrant for arrest was issued on 29 January 2018 and executed on 30
January 2018 alleging defendant committed statutory sex offense with child by adult
and indecent liberties with child, between 1 November 2017 and 17 January 2018.
Defendant was once again released pursuant to secured bond.
¶3 Deputies from the McDowell County Sheriff's Office served the first set of
arrest warrants at defendant’s aunt’s house. When deputies arrived at the aunt’s
house defendant was in a locked bedroom. Deputies instructed defendant to exit the
bedroom, but defendant refused indicating that he had a knife and if the deputies
entered the bedroom, he would kill himself. The deputies, communicating with
defendant through the locked door, initiated negotiations with the purpose of
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2022-NCCOA-295
Opinion of the Court
convincing defendant to come out peacefully and not harm himself. The negotiations
lasted approximately five hours. During the negotiations, the deputies told defendant
that they were there to execute arrest warrants regarding allegations made against
him by a child. At some point during the negotiations between McDowell County
Sherriff’s Office deputies and defendant, defendant informed the deputies that he
purchased what he believed to be either methamphetamine or cocaine and those
drugs were with him in the bedroom. Following hours of negotiations deputies were
able to convince defendant to exit the bedroom peacefully.
¶4 On 4 April 2018, defendant was indicted for one count of statutory rape of a
child by an adult, two counts of statutory sex offense with child by an adult, five
counts of indecent liberties with a child, and one count of possession of
methamphetamine.
¶5 The matter came on for trial on 17 May 2021 and lasted five days. During the
trial, defendant objected to the introduction of testimony from a McDowell County
Sherriff’s Office deputy regarding defendant’s statement about the presence of
methamphetamine in the bedroom. Defendant argued that at the time he made the
statement he was in custody and subject to interrogation and, because he was not
read his Miranda rights, any incriminating statements are not admissible at trial.
The trial court overruled defendant’s objection, concluding that the deputy’s
statements during negotiations with defendant were for the purpose of convincing
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2022-NCCOA-295
Opinion of the Court
him to exit the room safely and were not to elicit an incriminating response, thus, the
questions did not constitute interrogation.
¶6 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges
submitted. The trial court entered consecutive sentences of 300 to 420 months
imprisonment each for the statutory rape of child by adult offense and statutory sex
offense with child by adult, four consecutive 16 to 29 months imprisonment sentences
for four of the indecent liberties with a child charges, and one consecutive sentence of
19 to 29 months imprisonment for the final indecent liberties with a child charge. The
trial court consolidated the sentence or the possession of methamphetamine offense
into one of the indecent liberties with child sentences.
¶7 Defendant entered oral notice of appeal in open court on 21 May 2021.
II. Discussion
¶8 Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that the trial court
erred by allowing testimony of a statement defendant made while allegedly in
custody. Second, he argues that the judgment in 18 CRS 50077 contains a clerical
error. We discuss these arguments in turn.
A. Custodial Interrogation
¶9 The questions of whether defendant was subject to custodial interrogation is a
question of law, and thus, subject to de novo review. State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332,
336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001). “Under a de novo review, the court considers the
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Opinion of the Court
matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal.”
State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quotation marks
and citation omitted).
¶ 10 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires police
officers to give suspects of a crime certain warning in order to protect that individual’s
right against self-incrimination in the inherently compelling context of custodial
interrogations by police officers. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16
L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). “[T]he initial inquiry in determining whether Miranda warnings
were required is whether an individual was ‘in custody.’” Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 337,
543 S.E.2d at 826.
¶ 11 The Miranda Court defined custodial interrogation as “questioning initiated
by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444,
16 L. Ed. 2d at 706. The Supreme Court has since provided further context to this
definition. In Oregon v. Mathiason, the Supreme Court stated that
police officers are not required to administer Miranda
warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the
requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the
questioning takes place in the station house, or because the
questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda
warnings are required only where there has been such a
restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in
custody.”
STATE V. CONNER
2022-NCCOA-295
Opinion of the Court
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 719 (1977). The ultimate
inquiry is based on the totality of the circumstances and requires a determination
whether there was a “formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 133 L. Ed.
2d 383, 394 (1995).
¶ 12 This State’s Supreme Court summarized the application of Miranda in
custodial interrogations as such: “in determining whether a suspect [is] in custody,
an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a
restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”
State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662, 483 S.E.2d 396, 405, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900,
139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997). Therefore, “the appropriate inquiry in determining whether
a defendant is in custody for purposes of Miranda is, based on the totality of the
circumstances, whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 339,
543 S.E.2d at 828 (cleaned up).
¶ 13 Defendant argues that Miranda warnings were required because he was
subject to an interrogation. Defendant argues the encounter was an interrogation
because the deputy knows or reasonably should have known that the words or actions
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Opinion of the Court
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. See State v. Golphin, 352
N.C. 364, 406, 533 S.E.2d 168, 199 (2000).
¶ 14 The facts of the present case show that the McDowell County Sheriff's Office
deputies arrived at the house to execute an arrest warrant and arrest defendant.
When the deputies arrived, defendant locked himself in a bedroom, refused to exit
the bedroom, and threatened to kill himself. The deputies engaged in negotiations
with defendant in an attempt to convince him to leave the bedroom. Defendant was
informed the deputies were there to arrest him, but the negotiations were limited to
the purpose of having defendant safely leave the bedroom. During the negotiations,
defendant informed the deputies there was methamphetamine in the bedroom.
Defendant was not placed under formal arrest, nor did the deputies restrain his
movement (defendant chose to lock himself in the bedroom).
¶ 15 Our review of North Carolina case law does not reveal any North Carolina
cases with facts directly on point. However, other jurisdictions have contemplated
similar factual scenarios. See United States v. Mesa, 638 F.2d 582, 588 (3d Cir. 1980)
(concluding the defendant was not in custody when barricaded in a motel room with
a gun and communicating with law enforcement via the telephone); see also West v.
State, 923 P.2d 110, 113 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (“For reasons that seem sound upon
reflection, [multiple courts around the country] unanimously conclude that custodial
interrogation requiring Miranda warnings does not occur when police communicate
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Opinion of the Court
with a barricaded suspect who holds them at bay.”); Atac v. State, 125 So. 3d 806, 811
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that a defendant who refused to exit his
apartment and threatened to commit suicide was not in custody when law
enforcement attempted to convince him to exit the apartment peacefully). We find
these court’s decisions persuasive.
¶ 16 In the instant matter, defendant refused to exit the bedroom and threatened
to commit suicide if McDowell County Sheriff’s Office deputies entered the bedroom.
The deputies attempted to convince him to exit the bedroom peacefully. At the time
of the negotiation defendant was not under formal arrest. Law enforcement cannot
be expected to issue Miranda warnings when attempting to arrest an individual.
Miranda warnings are only required once an arrest has been made or law
enforcement is able to exercise a degree of control equivalent to a formal arrest.
Defendant’s actions prevented the deputies from placing defendant under formal
arrest or exercising any degree of control equivalent to a formal arrest. We conclude
that because defendant had barricaded himself in the bedroom and refused to exit
defendant was not in custody. Thus, we need not reach the issue of whether the
deputies’ conversation with defendant amounted to “interrogation,” as defendant
argues, because defendant was never in custody; therefore, Miranda warnings were
not required.
B. Clerical Error
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2022-NCCOA-295
Opinion of the Court
¶ 17 Defendant next asserts that the judgment in 18 CRS 50077 contains a clerical
error. The judgment states the minimum sentence for the offense as 19 months.
However, at sentencing the trial court announced the minimum sentence as 16
months. The State concedes this clerical error and contends that the matter should
be remanded to the trial court for correction. See Sate v. Linemann, 135 N.C. App.
734, 738, 522 S.E.2d 781, 784 (1999). We agree.
III. Conclusion
¶ 18 For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the trial court did not err in
allowing testimony of defendant’s statement to McDowell County Sheriff’s Office
deputies that he possessed methamphetamine. We also conclude that the judgment
in 18 CRS 50077 contains a clerical error. Thus, we find no error in part and vacate
and remand in part for correction of clerical error.
NO ERROR IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
Judge MURPHY concurs in result only.
Judge GRIFFIN concurs.