State v. English ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA19-518
Filed: 16 June 2020
Wake County, Nos. 17 CRS 221499, 221501
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
QUINTON DANTE ENGLISH
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 21 December 2018 by Judge
Rebecca W. Holt in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
26 May 2020.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Ellen A.
Newby, for the State-Appellee.
Leslie Rawls for Defendant-Appellant.
COLLINS, Judge.
Defendant Quinton Dante English appeals judgments entered upon jury
verdicts of guilty of felony first-degree kidnapping, misdemeanor simple assault,
misdemeanor unauthorized use of a vehicle, and two counts of misdemeanor assault
with a deadly weapon. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss the charge of first-degree kidnapping and one of the
counts of assault with a deadly weapon, on grounds that the State failed to present
sufficient evidence of the offenses. We discern no error by the trial court.
STATE V. ENGLISH
Opinion of the Court
I. Procedural History
Defendant was indicted on 9 January 2018 for first-degree kidnapping and
assault by strangulation. On 11 January 2018, Defendant was indicted for larceny
of a motor vehicle, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and two
counts of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill.
A jury trial began on 17 December 2018. The jury found Defendant guilty of
felony first-degree kidnapping, misdemeanor simple assault as a lesser-included
offense of assault by strangulation, misdemeanor unauthorized use of a motor vehicle
as a lesser-included offense of larceny of a motor vehicle, and two counts of
misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon as a lesser-included offense of assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill. The jury found Defendant not guilty of
assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury.
The parties stipulated that Defendant was a prior record level III for
sentencing of the misdemeanor convictions and a prior record level IV for sentencing
of the felony conviction. The trial court consolidated the convictions of felony first-
degree kidnapping, misdemeanor simple assault, and misdemeanor unauthorized use
of a motor vehicle into one judgment, sentencing Defendant to 110 to 144 months’
imprisonment. The trial court consolidated the convictions of two counts of
misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon into another judgment, sentencing
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Opinion of the Court
Defendant to two consecutive sentences of 150 days. The judgments were entered on
21 December 2018.
Defendant gave oral notice of appeal in open court.
II. Factual Background
The State’s evidence at trial tended to show the following: Defendant and
Evelyn Gonzalez were in a relationship for approximately two years, which involved
frequent arguments and Defendant’s physical abuse of Gonzalez. Although Gonzalez
did not report several incidents of physical abuse, she called the police on one occasion
when Defendant hit her, pulled her hair, and choked her.
The two argued during the weekend of 4 and 5 November 2017. After Gonzalez
blocked Defendant’s phone numbers on 5 November 2017, Defendant sent Gonzalez
private messages on Facebook. Gonzalez replied to a few of the messages that day,
but she stopped responding while she was at work. When Gonzalez left work at 5:00
p.m., she walked to her car, which she had left unlocked in the parking lot near the
back of the building. Just as Gonzalez entered the car, Defendant sat up in the back
seat. Defendant testified that there had been previous times he had waited for
Gonzalez in either the driver’s or passenger’s seat of her car to pick her up from work,
but on this day, he was lying down in the back seat waiting for her. Gonzalez asked
Defendant what he was doing in her car, and they began to argue. Defendant was
holding a red knife.
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Opinion of the Court
Defendant took Gonzalez’s phone from her and began looking at her messages.
Gonzalez hesitated to give it to him but did not refuse because she was afraid
Defendant would get angry like he had before, when Defendant “would start
screaming, getting abusive, verbal and physical” if Gonzalez did not give him access
to her phone. Defendant became angry, called Gonzalez a liar, and said that she did
not love him. Gonzalez testified, “I knew he was about to do what he always does
when he got mad,” which is to “[p]ut his hands on me” and “[m]ake me stay in the car
until he is not mad anymore.”
Defendant told Gonzalez to drive the car. When she refused, Defendant got
angry, put his arm around her neck, and “started choking” her. Gonzalez had
difficulty breathing. Defendant brandished the knife, held it to her right side, and
applied force to her neck until she started driving the car. Gonzalez was afraid.
In order to try to get out of the car, Gonzalez pulled quickly into a gas station
up the street from where her car had been parked. A witness estimated that the car
was travelling about 30 or 40 miles an hour when the driver abruptly stopped in front
of a gas pump, and the tires screeched. Gonzalez told Defendant that she wanted to
go inside the convenience store to get a drink, but Defendant told her that she could
not get out of the car, that they were not stopping, and to keep driving. Gonzalez
noticed people nearby, so she opened the door and screamed for help. Defendant
leaned over the seat, started to choke her, and punched her. Gonzalez testified, “It
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Opinion of the Court
was a lot, and he was like he had his hand around my neck and he was punching like
on the top of my head and I started to get lightheaded.” While Gonzalez tried to get
out of the car, Defendant tried to close the door, told Gonzalez to put her foot on the
pedal, and screamed at her, “Bitch, drive.”
Jacob Capps and Jackson Capps, two brothers whom Gonzalez had never seen
before, pulled up on motorcycles to a gas pump at the same station, noticed a car
pulling into the gas station at a speed of approximately 30 to 40 miles per hour, and
heard the “horrific” sounds of a female screaming. Jacob testified that Defendant was
in the back seat of the car, “over the center console with his arm around [Gonzalez’s]
neck. She was crying. It looked like she had been beaten.” Gonzalez’s neck was red,
her face was swollen and bruised, and she was “screaming, crying, pleading for help.”
The Capps brothers approached the car to try to help Gonzalez. Jacob started hitting
Defendant, and Gonzalez was able to slide underneath Defendant, get out of the car,
and run into the gas station. The convenience store clerk called 911 and instructed
Gonzalez to go in the freezer until the doors to the station were locked.
Jacob entered the back seat on the driver’s side of the car and pinned
Defendant against the roof. Defendant punched Jacob and tried to poke him in the
eyes. Defendant brandished the knife at Jacob. Jacob and Defendant came out of the
car and continued to wrestle, both throwing more punches. Jackson told Jacob that
Defendant had a knife. Jacob tried to subdue Defendant while Defendant was on top
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Opinion of the Court
of him. Jackson kicked Defendant in the face a few times. When Defendant asked
Jacob to let him go, Jacob told Defendant he would let him go after Defendant dropped
the knife. Jackson wrapped his arms around Defendant’s legs and pushed his foot up
against Defendant’s ribs to help subdue him. After approximately one minute,
Defendant dropped the knife, Jackson picked it up, and Jacob let Defendant get up.
When the Capps brothers started to walk away from Defendant, Defendant got
in the car, put it in drive, turned it around with tires squealing, and “floored it” in
their direction. He “stomped” the gas “at high RPMs” and drove about 15 to 20 miles
per hour toward them. Jackson stepped behind the gas pump to shield himself. Jacob
jumped up on the hood of the car to avoid being pinned against the concrete wall of
the gas station. When Defendant crashed the car into the wall of the gas station,
Jacob rolled off the hood onto the ground. Defendant backed the car up and sped
away.
III. Discussion
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss
for insufficient evidence the charges of first-degree kidnapping and one count of
assault with a deadly weapon.
This Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for insufficient
evidence de novo. State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007).
Denial of a motion to dismiss is proper if there is substantial evidence of each
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Opinion of the Court
essential element of the offense and that the defendant was the perpetrator. State v.
Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000). “Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78-79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980) (citations
omitted). When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 378-79, 526
S.E.2d at 455.
A. First-degree kidnapping
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal regarding the kidnapping offense is that
the State failed to provide substantial evidence that Defendant’s purpose was to
terrorize Gonzalez.
Kidnapping is defined by statute as follows:
(a) Any person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or
remove from one place to another, any other person 16
years of age or over without the consent of such person, or
any other person under the age of 16 years without the
consent of a parent or legal custodian of such person, shall
be guilty of kidnapping if such confinement, restraint or
removal is for the purpose of:
.....
(3) Doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the person
so confined, restrained or removed or any other person . . .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39(a)(3) (2018). The offense is first-degree kidnapping if the
person kidnapped was not released by the defendant in a safe place. State v. Moore,
315 N.C. 738, 742, 340 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1986) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-39)). “Since
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Opinion of the Court
kidnapping is a specific intent crime, the State must prove that the defendant
unlawfully confined, restrained, or removed the person for one of the eight purposes
set out in the statute.” Id. at 743, 340 S.E.2d at 404. For purposes of this statute,
“[i]ntent, or the absence of it, may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding
the event and must be determined by the jury.” State v. White, 307 N.C. 42, 48, 296
S.E.2d 267, 271 (1982) (citations omitted).
In this case, the State indicted Defendant on the charge of first-degree
kidnapping, alleging that Defendant unlawfully confined and restrained Gonzalez for
the purpose of terrorizing her. Terrorizing is “more than just putting another in fear”;
it is “putting that person in some high degree of fear, a state of intense fright or
apprehension.” Moore, 315 N.C. at 745, 340 S.E.2d at 405 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence of intent to
terrorize, “the test is not whether subjectively the victim was in fact terrorized, but
whether the evidence supports a finding that the defendant’s purpose was to terrorize
her.” Id. Nonetheless, the “victim’s subjective feelings of fear, while not
determinative of the defendant’s intent to terrorize, are relevant.” State v. Baldwin,
141 N.C. App. 596, 604, 540 S.E.2d 815, 821 (2000) (citations omitted) (sufficient
evidence that defendant acted with purpose to terrorize victim, who was “petrified”
when defendant confined her to her apartment against her will by brandishing a
loaded gun, despite her requests to leave). See also State v. Surrett, 109 N.C. App.
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Opinion of the Court
344, 350, 427 S.E.2d 124, 127 (1993) (sufficient evidence that defendant “intended by
his actions and commands to put the victim in a state of intense fright or
apprehension” where defendant struggled to hold victim in car against her will
despite her screams).
In this case, the evidence shows the following: (a) unbeknownst to Gonzalez,
Defendant lay in the back seat of her car holding a knife while he waited for her to
get off work; (b) Defendant forced Gonzalez to remain inside and drive the car by
applying enough choking force to her neck to create visible red marks and threatening
her with a knife; and (c) even after arriving at the gas station where Gonzalez
screamed for help and tried to open the door to get out of the car, Defendant
attempted to force Gonzalez to stay in the car by hitting the top of her head with
enough force to cause her to be lightheaded. Considered in the light most favorable
to the State, this evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Defendant confined
Gonzalez with the intent to put her in a “high degree of fear, a state of intense fright
or apprehension.” Moore, 315 N.C. at 745, 340 S.E.2d at 405. Moreover, Gonzalez’s
screams, frantic exit from the car, and escape into the convenience store show her
fear during the incident, which is also relevant to support the finding that Defendant
intended to terrorize her. See Baldwin, 141 N.C. App. at 604, 540 S.E.2d at 821.
Accordingly, the State provided substantial evidence of this element of the offense,
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Opinion of the Court
and denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss was proper. See Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 378,
526 S.E.2d at 455.
B. Assault with a deadly weapon
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s
motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence the charge of assault with a deadly weapon
on Jackson, because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Defendant
assaulted him.
Misdemeanor assault with a deadly weapon is defined by statute to include
assault with use of a deadly weapon. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-33(c)(1) (2018). “There is
no statutory definition of assault in North Carolina, and the crime of assault is
governed by common law rules.” State v. Roberts, 270 N.C. 655, 658, 155 S.E.2d 303,
305 (1967). Our Supreme Court has defined assault as “an overt act or an attempt,
or the unequivocal appearance of an attempt, with force and violence, to do some
immediate physical injury to the person of another, which show of force or menace of
violence must be sufficient to put a person of reasonable firmness in fear of immediate
bodily harm.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court
further explained:
This common law rule places emphasis on the intent
or state of mind of the person accused. The decisions of the
Court have, in effect, brought forth another rule known as
the “show of violence rule,” which places the emphasis on
the reasonable apprehension of the person assailed. The
“show of violence rule” consists of a show of violence
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Opinion of the Court
accompanied by reasonable apprehension of immediate
bodily harm or injury on the part of the person assailed
which causes him to engage in a course of conduct which
he would not otherwise have followed. . . . Thus, there are
two rules under which a person may be prosecuted for
assault in North Carolina.
Id. (citation omitted). See also State v. Floyd, 369 N.C. 329, 336, 794 S.E.2d 460, 465
(2016) (the show of violence rule is based on a violent act or threat that causes fear
in another person, as distinguished from an attempt to cause injury to another
person).
On appeal, Defendant argues that the State’s evidence does not satisfy either
rule for establishing assault, as it does not show that Defendant drove the car toward
Jackson or that Defendant’s conduct would put a reasonable person in Jackson’s
position in fear of immediate bodily harm. Defendant supports this argument by
highlighting conflicting testimony.
On direct examination as a witness for the State, Jackson provided the
following testimony:
Q. And at what point did you realize that that vehicle was
coming towards you?
A. When it -- once the gas was stomped and it started
heading towards us.
Q. When you say the gas was stomped, what alerted you to
that?
A. You could hear it. High rpm’s.
Q. And you mentioned the location where you were over at
the pump. Were -- did you have to take any measures to
avoid being hit by the vehicle?
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Opinion of the Court
A. No, Ma’am, I didn’t.
Q. And what about your brother? What were you able to
observe?
A. He tried to get out of the way. Obviously, he couldn’t.
Jumped up, like perfect timing and just caught the hood of
the car and landed on it with his knees and kind of just
plopped on the front and then rolled right off and jumped
behind that pillar right there.
On cross-examination, Jackson testified:
Q. . . . . You got out of the way?
A. Yes, sir.
Finally, on re-direct examination, Jackson testified:
Q. Jackson, you mentioned earlier that when the defendant
was driving the car in your direction, you had to hide
behind the gas pump?
A. Yes, sir. Or yes, Ma’am. Excuse me.
Q. Why did you even go to hide behind the gas pump?
A. A moving vehicle coming towards me and I don’t really
like that. Just getting out of the way.
Q. How far away was the vehicle from you when you made
the decision to go and hide where the gas pumps were?
A. I don’t know. Maybe 10 or 15 feet. I am not sure.
Q. Where the vehicle actually drove, was that in the place
you were standing from when you first noticed the vehicle
coming towards you?
A. No.
Q. Let me ask that another way. Were you standing, prior
to moving behind the gas pump, were you standing in the
direction the vehicle was moving?
A. Do you mean like when he started pulling towards the
bushes? No.
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Opinion of the Court
Q. But when he started pulling towards you and your
brother?
A. Yes. When he started pulling towards -- well, yes, when
he started pulling towards us, I was kind of already
walking up on that little sidewalk area, so I was already
right there by the pump. All I had to do was take two steps
and I was behind it.
The State also presented testimony by a police officer who interviewed
Jackson. The officer testified that Jackson stated that Defendant “drove directly
towards the two brothers attempting to run them over.”
When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the trial testimony
provides substantial evidence of assault. First, the testimony supports a conclusion
that Defendant committed an “overt act or an attempt, or the unequivocal appearance
of an attempt, with force and violence, to do some immediate physical injury” to
Jackson by driving a moving vehicle toward him at a high rate of speed. Roberts, 270
N.C. at 658, 155 S.E.2d at 305. Second, the testimony supports a conclusion that
Defendant’s actions—which included driving the car fast toward Jackson
immediately after both had engaged in a violent struggle—put Jackson reasonably in
fear of immediate bodily harm and prompted him to get out of the way. See id.; Floyd,
369 N.C. at 336, 794 S.E.2d at 465 (show of violence rule is based on a violent act or
threat that causes fear in another person).
We reject Defendant’s contention that any conflicting testimony in the record
renders the State’s evidence insufficient. “[C]ontradictions and discrepancies do not
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Opinion of the Court
warrant dismissal of the case but are for the jury to resolve.” Fritsch, 351 N.C. at
379, 526 S.E.2d at 455 (citation omitted). Thus, all evidence about whether Jackson
was in fear of immediate harm was properly put before the jury. State v. Allen, 360
N.C. 297, 305, 626 S.E.2d 271, 279 (2006) (citation omitted) (“It is for the jury to
decide issues of fact when conflicting information is elicited by either party.”).
Because the State presented sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that
Defendant assaulted Jackson, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s
motion to dismiss.
IV. Conclusion
The State presented sufficient evidence of Defendant’s intent to terrorize
Gonzalez and that Defendant assaulted Jackson. Accordingly, we discern no error by
the trial court in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence of
these two offenses.
NO ERROR.
Chief Judge McGEE and Judge DIETZ concur.
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