State v. Redmond ( 2022 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    2022-NCCOA-5
    No. COA21-212
    Filed 4 January 2022
    Buncombe County, No. 19 CRS 80531
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    ZENA MARIE REDMOND, Defendant.
    Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 18 December 2019 by Judge Alan
    Z. Thornburg in Buncombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
    17 November 2021.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Associate Attorney General Brian M.
    Miller, for the State.
    Carella Legal Services, PLLC, by John F. Carella, for the Defendant.
    GRIFFIN, Judge.
    ¶1         Defendant Zena Marie Redmond, appeals from the trial court’s judgment
    entering a jury verdict finding her guilty of misdemeanor injury to personal property
    with a value in excess of $200. Defendant argues the trial court erred by: (1) denying
    her motion to dismiss based on a fatal variance between the charging document and
    the evidence presented at trial; and (2) ordering that she pay restitution in an amount
    based only on speculative values. We discern no error.
    I.   Factual and Procedural Background
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    Opinion of the Court
    ¶2         This case arises from damage done to a painting in protest of the painter’s
    alleged bad acts. On 12 January 2019, a magistrate judge entered an order charging
    Defendant with injury to personal property in excess of $200 and resisting arrest by
    a public officer. On 23 October 2019, Defendant was tried and found guilty of both
    charges in district court. Defendant appealed to superior court for a jury trial.
    Evidence presented during the proceedings in superior court tended to show as
    follows:
    ¶3         On 12 January 2019, painter Jonas Gerard held a live painting performance
    at the Jonas Gerard Fine Arts Gallery in Asheville. Gerard regularly held these
    performances on the second Saturday of every month. During these performances,
    Gerard would typically paint a few paintings over the course of around three hours.
    Once the paintings were dry, they would be titled, catalogued, posted on the gallery’s
    sales website, and moved out onto the Gallery’s sales floor.
    ¶4         On the morning of January 12, staff at the Jonas Gerard Fine Arts Gallery
    “heard rumors that there was going to be a protest outside of the building” and
    discovered a “blackish tar substance” and “busted balloons all over [the] front foyer,
    front door.”   Mr. Luzader, an employee who assisted Gerard on stage that day,
    testified that he “made a point that day to scan the crowd” during the performance
    and that he was on “high alert because [they] had heard rumors of the protestors.” A
    “section in the crowd caught [Mr. Luzader’s] attention a couple times” because “[t]hey
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    Opinion of the Court
    looked like they didn’t want to be there, they weren’t enjoying [the performance].”
    Mr. Luzader identified Defendant as part of that section in the crowd.
    ¶5         After the performance, Gerard answered questions and invited the audience
    onto the stage to examine the last painting. Gerard stepped away from the painting
    to mingle with the audience. Mr. Luzader testified that he saw Defendant standing
    near an exit door, partially concealed by a partition. Defendant was looking back and
    forth at Mr. Luzader and the paintings in the room. Then Mr. Luzader “heard a
    commotion and some lady screamed[ a]nd about that time a balloon came and hit
    [him] on [his] foot.” Mr. Brasington, another gallery employee, testified that he was
    assisting a woman who had expressed a desire to purchase the painting when the
    commotion occurred. Mr. Brasington stated that, when “[I and the buyer] got back to
    the sales desk, I looked back and I saw [Defendant] unleash at least one balloon, if
    not two” from behind the partition. Mr. Luzader added that, after the event, the
    painting had “this huge black ink stain in the middle of it that [took] up pretty much
    the whole painting” and was “still wet with black ink.”
    ¶6         Mr. Luzader “looked up and saw [Defendant] run out the exit door.” A police
    officer working event security called for back-up and pursued Defendant out of the
    gallery and into the street. The responding officers ultimately detained Defendant
    and an accomplice. At that time, Defendant “had a black mark on her hand and some
    black paint [on her] as well”, and was carrying “a balloon filled with black paint” in
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    2022-NCCOA-5
    Opinion of the Court
    her purse.
    ¶7         At the close of the State’s evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss the charge of
    injury to personal property. The court denied Defendant’s motion. Defendant did not
    present evidence at trial. The jury found Defendant guilty of misdemeanor injury to
    personal property with a value in excess of $200. The superior court sentenced
    Defendant to thirty days in the custody of the county sheriff, then suspended that
    sentence and placed Defendant on eighteen months of supervised probation. The trial
    court also ordered that Defendant pay $4,425.00 in restitution for the damaged
    painting, over Defendant’s objection to the amount. Defendant gave timely written
    notice of appeal.
    II.    Analysis
    ¶8         Defendant makes two arguments on appeal: (1) the trial court should have
    dismissed the charge of injury to personal property due to a fatal variance; and (2)
    the trial court ordered restitution based upon speculative values.
    A. Fatal Variance in Ownership Evidence
    ¶9         Defendant contends the “trial court erred by denying [her] motion to dismiss
    based on a fatal variance between the charging document and the State’s evidence at
    trial regarding ownership of the damaged painting.” Our Courts review motions to
    dismiss to determine whether, in the light most favorable to the State, there was
    substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime charged and whether the
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    2022-NCCOA-5
    Opinion of the Court
    defendant was the perpetrator of the offense. State v. Craycraft, 
    152 N.C. App. 211
    ,
    213, 
    567 S.E.2d 206
    , 208 (2002) (citations omitted).
    ¶ 10         “[A] challenge to a fatal variance between the [charging document] and proof
    is made by motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence in the trial court.” State
    v. Jones, 
    223 N.C. App. 487
    , 496, 
    734 S.E.2d 617
    , 624 (2012) (citations and quotation
    marks omitted), aff’d, 
    367 N.C. 299
    , 
    758 S.E.2d 345
     (2014). “It has long been the law
    of this state that a defendant must be convicted, if convicted at all, of the particular
    offense charged in the [charging document].” State v. Faircloth, 
    297 N.C. 100
    , 107,
    
    253 S.E.2d 890
    , 894 (1979). “A variance occurs where the allegations in [the charging
    document], although they may be sufficiently specific on their face, do not conform to
    the evidence actually established at trial.” State v. Norman, 
    149 N.C. App. 588
    , 594,
    
    562 S.E.2d 453
    , 457 (2002) (citation omitted). To prevail on a motion to dismiss for
    fatal variance, “the defendant must show a fatal variance between the offense
    charged and the proof as to [t]he gist of the offense”, meaning that the State’s evidence
    contained “a variance regarding an essential element of the offense.” State v. Pickens,
    
    346 N.C. 628
    , 646, 
    488 S.E.2d 162
    , 172 (1997) (citations and quotation marks
    omitted).
    ¶ 11         Under 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-160
    , “if any person shall wantonly and willfully
    injure the personal property of another, causing damage in an amount in excess of
    two hundred dollars ($200.00), [s]he shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.” N.C.
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    Opinion of the Court
    Gen. Stat. § 14-160(b) (2019). “The identity of the owner of the property that the
    defendant allegedly injured is a material element of the offense of injury to personal
    property.” State v. Ellis, 
    368 N.C. 342
    , 344–45, 
    776 S.E.2d 675
    , 677 (2015) (citations
    and quotation marks omitted).       “[A] criminal pleading seeking to charge the
    commission of crimes involving theft of or damage to personal property, including
    injury to personal property, must allege ownership of the property in a person,
    corporation, or other legal entity capable of owning property.” 
    Id.
     The charging
    document for injury to personal property “must allege a person who has a property
    interest in the property [injured,] and . . . the State must prove that that person has
    ownership, meaning title to the property or some special property interest.” See State
    v. Greene, 
    289 N.C. 578
    , 584, 
    223 S.E.2d 365
    , 369 (1976).
    ¶ 12         The magistrate’s charging order in this case stated:
    [T]here is probable cause to believe that . . . [Defendant]
    named above unlawfully and willfully did wantonly injure
    personal property, A PAINTING, the property of JONAS
    GERARD. The damage caused was in excess of $200.00.
    ¶ 13         Defendant contends that although the charging document alleges the painting
    was “the property of Jonas Gerard”, the State’s evidence at trial showed that the
    painting was actually owned by Gerard’s corporation, Jonas Gerard Fine Arts, Inc.
    (“JGFAI”). Additional evidence presented at trial showed that the damaged painting
    was owned by JGFAI, an S-corporation held in a revocable trust, and that Gerard
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    Opinion of the Court
    was both an employee of JGFAI and the sole owner of JGFAI. Therefore, record
    evidence in this case shows that “Jonas Gerard” and “Jonas Gerard Fine Arts, Inc.,”
    are separate legal persons or entities, each of which is capable of owning property.
    ¶ 14         Nonetheless, the State presented sufficient evidence that Gerard otherwise
    had a “special property interest” in the painting. In reaching our holding in this case,
    we evaluate cases regarding the crime of injury to personal property as well as the
    crime of larceny. North Carolina case law has acknowledged that these crimes share
    the requirement that the State allege the owner of injured or stolen property. Ellis,
    368 N.C. at 344–45, 776 S.E.2d at 677; State v. Cave, 
    174 N.C. App. 580
    , 582, 
    621 S.E.2d 299
    , 301 (2005) (“To convict a defendant of injury to personal property or
    larceny, the State must prove that the personal property was that ‘of another,’ i.e.,
    someone other than the person or persons accused.” (emphasis added)); State v. Price,
    
    170 N.C. App. 672
    , 673, 
    613 S.E.2d 60
    , 62 (2005). In application, larceny and injury
    to personal property both arise from a defendant’s acts which deprive the owner of
    the use and enjoyment of their personal property.         The breadth of our state’s
    precedent defining “special property interests” that properly allege ownership
    appears in cases of larceny.
    ¶ 15         “[T]he person named in the indictment may be either the person having a
    ‘general interest’ in the . . . property—that is, the actual owner—or the person with a
    ‘special interest’ in the property—that is, the person who had possession and control
    STATE V. REDMOND
    2022-NCCOA-5
    Opinion of the Court
    of it at the time when it was stolen [or damaged].” State v. Carr, 
    21 N.C. App. 470
    ,
    472, 
    204 S.E.2d 892
    , 894 (1974); see State v. Campbell, 
    257 N.C. App. 739
    , 761, 
    810 S.E.2d 803
    , 817 (2018), aff’d as modified, 
    373 N.C. 216
    , 
    835 S.E.2d 844
     (2019)
    (exploring cases of joint possession, parental responsibility, and bailee/custodian
    relationships which Courts have held to be “special property interests”). In Carr,
    record evidence showed that a stolen vehicle was actually owned by an electronics
    business, while the charging document alleged the car was property owned by the
    business owner’s son. Id. at 472, 
    204 S.E.2d at 894
    . However, the son “regarded [the
    vehicle] as his car, took it to college with him, and was in possession of it at all times.”
    Id. at 471, 
    204 S.E.2d at 893
    . This Court held that, based upon this evidence, “it
    [was] clear that [the son] had a special interest in the stolen automobile.” Id. at 472,
    
    204 S.E.2d at 894
    .
    ¶ 16          Conversely, in Campbell, this Court reiterated the rule that “an employee in
    possession of property on behalf of the employer does not have a sufficient ownership
    interest in the property” to allege ownership in a charging document. Campbell, 257
    N.C. App. at 764, 810 S.E.2d at 819.          In Campbell, the defendant stole audio
    equipment which belonged only to a church, but the indictment alleged that the
    equipment was also the property of the church’s pastor. Id. at 762–64, 810 S.E.2d at
    818–19. The evidence showed only that the pastor worked at the church, lived on
    church property, and benefitted from others’ use of the audio equipment in his work;
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    Opinion of the Court
    the pastor had no responsibility for or control over the stolen audio equipment. Id.
    The Campbell Court held this evidence “did not show that [the pastor] had any special
    property interest in the stolen items.” Id. at 766, 810 S.E.2d at 819.
    ¶ 17          Gerard’s relationship to his paintings is similar to the ownership analysis in
    Carr. Record evidence showed that Gerard had authority to use materials owned by
    JGFAI to create paintings and did so at least once per month. Gerard had actual
    possession of the damaged painting throughout its creation and walked away from
    the painting to discuss his work with audience members shortly before the painting
    was damaged. Though a buyer had expressed interest in this particular painting,
    evidence showed that Gerard had not yet finished the painting: the painting’s ink had
    not settled, it had not yet been named, and it had not yet been catalogued or added
    to the sales floor. Even after a painting is catalogued and posted for sale in the
    gallery, testimony showed that Gerard retained the right to revisit his finished
    creations and to alter or improve them if he felt they needed “a little more love.”
    JGFAI employed Gerard for the purpose of creating paintings and granted him
    control over new and finished paintings. Though they were distinct legal entities,
    Gerard regarded himself and JGFAI as one and the same and certainly held out the
    paintings as his own. It is clear from the record that Gerard had a special property
    interest in the paintings he created for JGFAI.
    ¶ 18         The allegation of ownership by Gerard in the charging order was sufficient to
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    Opinion of the Court
    notify Defendant of the particular piece of personal property which she was alleged
    to have damaged. See State v. Spivey, 
    368 N.C. 739
    , 743–44, 
    782 S.E.2d 872
    , 875
    (2016) (“A description of the owner of personal property is useful to differentiate
    between two similar pieces of personal property, thereby notifying the defendant of
    the particular transaction on which the indictment is founded and giv[ing] the
    [defendant] the benefit of the first acquittal or conviction if accused a second time of
    the same offense.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The trial court
    did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss because there was no fatal
    variance between the charging order and the evidence presented at trial.
    B. Evidence Supporting Restitution
    ¶ 19          Defendant next argues the “trial court erred by ordering Defendant to pay
    $4,425 in restitution by speculating the value of an unsold painting.”
    ¶ 20          “On appeal, we review de novo whether the restitution order was supported by
    evidence adduced at trial or at sentencing.” State v. Wright, 
    212 N.C. App. 640
    , 645,
    
    711 S.E.2d 797
    , 801 (2011). “In determining the amount of restitution, the court shall
    consider . . . [i]n the case of an offense resulting in the damage, loss, or destruction of
    property of a victim of the offense . . . [t]he value of the property on the date of the
    damage, loss, or destruction[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.35(a)(2)(b)(1) (2019).
    ¶ 21          “[T]he quantum of evidence needed to support a restitution award is not high.”
    State v. Moore, 
    365 N.C. 283
    , 285, 
    715 S.E.2d 847
    , 849 (2011). “Prior case law reveals
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    Opinion of the Court
    two general approaches: (1) when there is no evidence, documentary or testimonial,
    to support the award, the award will be vacated, and (2) when there is specific
    testimony or documentation to support the award, the award will not be disturbed.”
    Id.; see State v. Cousart, 
    182 N.C. App. 150
    , 154, 
    641 S.E.2d 372
    , 375 (2007) (holding
    restitution award was adequately supported by victim’s testimony that stolen stereo
    was purchased for $787.00); State v. Price, 
    118 N.C. App. 212
    , 221, 
    454 S.E.2d 820
    ,
    826 (1995) (holding victim’s testimony that, due to the defendant’s conduct, “he had
    to purchase a special van costing $19,900 and that he had incurred $1,000 in medical
    expenses” supported restitution award); cf. Moore, 
    365 N.C. at
    285–86, 
    715 S.E.2d at 849
     (remanding for additional determinations on restitution because testimony “that
    the estimate for repairs was ‘[t]hirty-something thousand dollars’” was “not specific
    enough to support the award of $39,332.49”).
    ¶ 22         Here, Mr. Brasington testified that a buyer was interested in the painting and
    in discussions with sales staff to purchase the painting at the time it was damaged.
    This buyer asked Gerard during the performance how much the painting would cost,
    to which Gerard replied “$8,850.00.” Mr. Brasington further testified that $8,850.00
    was the gallery’s base price for all paintings of this size. Gerard testified at trial that
    he sometimes painted over or added to his paintings, but he could not paint over the
    black ink stain or reuse the damaged painting in any way because the canvas was
    “destroyed completely.” Based upon this evidence, and evidence that Defendant was
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    Opinion of the Court
    assisted by an accomplice, the trial court ordered that Defendant pay $4,425.00—half
    the value of the damaged painting—in restitution.
    ¶ 23         Contrary to Defendant’s assertions, the fact that the specific, damaged item
    had not yet been purchased by a buyer does not mean that the market value assigned
    by the trial court for restitution was speculative. In State v. Freeman, this Court used
    the sale price of substantially similar lumber from another parcel to determine the
    amount of restitution awarded for unsold timber illegally cut from the victim’s
    property. State v. Freeman, 
    164 N.C. App. 673
    , 678, 
    596 S.E.2d 319
    , 322–23 (2004);
    see also Kaplan v. City of Winston-Salem, 
    286 N.C. 80
    , 83, 
    209 S.E.2d 743
    , 746 (1974)
    (“According to the decided cases in North Carolina, ‘[t]he measure of damages for
    injury to personal property is the difference between the market value immediately
    before the injury and the market value immediately after the injury.’”). In the present
    case, it was proper for the trial court to consider the base rate for which Gerard’s
    paintings of the same or similar size are sold. The evidence adduced at trial was
    sufficiently specific to show the market value of the painting prior to damage by
    Defendant on the date of loss, damage, or destruction, and therefore we will not
    disturb the trial court’s award.
    III.    Conclusion
    ¶ 24         We hold the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss
    the charge of injury to personal property. The charging order and the evidence at
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    Opinion of the Court
    trial showed that Jonas Gerard had a special property interest in the painting. The
    trial court also did not err by ordering Defendant to pay $4,425.00 as restitution. The
    State presented sufficient evidence of the market value of the damaged painting.
    NO ERROR.
    Judges DIETZ and TYSON concur.