State v. Wright ( 2020 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA19-863
    Filed: 18 August 2020
    Cleveland County, No. 18 CRS 50333
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    MICHAEL EUGENE WRIGHT, Defendant.
    Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 26 April 2019 by Judge Carla
    Archie in Cleveland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 April
    2020.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Kimberly
    Randolph, for the State.
    Mary McCullers Reece for defendant-appellant.
    YOUNG, Judge.
    Where the State presented sufficient evidence to permit the jury to determine
    the value of stolen goods, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to
    dismiss. Where the jury did not consider alternative theories of guilt not permitted
    by the indictment, defendant cannot show prejudice, and the trial court did not
    commit plain error in its jury instruction. Where the trial court sentenced defendant
    on both the charges of felonious larceny and felonious possession of the goods stolen
    during the larceny, the trial court erred. We vacate the judgment and remand for
    arrest of one conviction and resentencing.
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court
    I. Factual and Procedural Background
    In December of 2017, Jeff Crotts, owner of Knob Creek Orchards, discovered
    that a 120-gallon propane tank was missing from his property, and reported it to the
    sheriff’s office. On 25 January 2018, Amy Lail, a sergeant with the Cleveland County
    Sheriff’s Office (Sgt. Lail), received information that the missing tank was located on
    the property of Peggy Hudson Canipe (Canipe), fiancée of Michael Wright
    (defendant), and that defendant was a suspect in the theft. Shortly after Sgt. Lail
    arrived on Canipe’s property, defendant himself arrived.          Sgt. Lail informed
    defendant that the tank was stolen, and defendant responded that he had purchased
    it “many miles” away, and claimed he was able to load the tank into the back of his
    Chevy Blazer, which Sgt. Lail found “absurd.” Sgt. Lail also noted that the tank had
    been spray-painted, and that the same paint color had been used “in other locations
    around the house[.]” Nelson Speagle (Speagle), a propane manager with Carolina
    Energies who serviced the propane tanks at Knob Creek Orchards, was able to
    identify this tank as the stolen tank by its serial number, and testified that it was
    valued at “roughly $1,330[.]”
    The Cleveland County Grand Jury indicted defendant for felonious larceny and
    felonious possession of stolen goods, namely a “240lb propane tank” worth $2,000. At
    the close of the State’s evidence, the State moved to amend the indictment to remove
    the size of the propane tank, and indicate that the value of the propane tank was in
    2
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court
    excess of $1,000. Defendant did not object, and the trial court allowed the motion. At
    the close of all the evidence, defendant moved to dismiss based upon insufficient
    evidence. The trial court denied this motion.
    The jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of felonious larceny and
    felonious possession of stolen goods. The trial court consolidated the charges for
    judgment, and sentenced defendant to a minimum of 20 months and a maximum of
    36 months in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Adult Correction.
    Defendant appeals.
    II. Motion to Dismiss
    In his first argument, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying
    his motion to dismiss. We disagree.
    A. Standard of Review
    “This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.”
    State v. Smith, 
    186 N.C. App. 57
    , 62, 
    650 S.E.2d 29
    , 33 (2007). “ ‘Upon defendant’s
    motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial
    evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense
    included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense. If so,
    the motion is properly denied.’ ” State v. Fritsch, 
    351 N.C. 373
    , 378, 
    526 S.E.2d 451
    ,
    455 (quoting State v. Barnes, 
    334 N.C. 67
    , 75, 
    430 S.E.2d 914
    , 918 (1993)), cert.
    denied, 
    531 U.S. 890
    , 
    148 L. Ed. 2d 150
    (2000).
    3
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court
    “In making its determination, the trial court must consider all evidence
    admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State,
    giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any
    contradictions in its favor.” State v. Rose, 
    339 N.C. 172
    , 192, 
    451 S.E.2d 211
    , 223
    (1994), cert. denied, 
    515 U.S. 1135
    , 
    132 L. Ed. 2d 818
    (1995).
    B. Analysis
    The charges of both felonious larceny and felonious possession of stolen goods
    require, as an essential element of the charge, that the value of the stolen property
    exceed $1,000. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-72(a) (2019). On appeal, however, defendant
    contends that there was insufficient evidence before the trial court that the stolen
    tank was worth more than $1,000.
    In support of his argument, defendant notes that, when asked to value the
    tank, Speagle stated that enough propane to fill the tank would be worth $300, and
    that the two regulators that accompany the tank would be worth $90 each.
    Combining the costs of the regulators, the fuel, and the tank, Speagle determined
    that the total value was “probably at $1,300, 1,330-something.” However, defendant
    further notes that, when asked how much fuel was left in the tank, Speagle responded
    that he didn’t “have a clue how much.” Moreover, defendant was indicted for stealing
    a propane tank, not for stealing a propane tank and two regulators. Defendant argues
    that, removing the $300 for the cost of fuel, plus $180 for the two regulators, Speagle’s
    4
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court
    valuation of roughly $1,300 drops below the $1,000 threshold necessary for a felony
    charge. As a result, defendant contends that this testimony was insufficient to
    support convictions for either felonious larceny or felonious possession of stolen goods.
    However, the State “is not required to produce ‘direct evidence of ... value’ to
    support the conclusion that the stolen property was worth over $1,000.00, provided
    that the jury is not left to ‘speculate as to the value’ of the item.” State v. Davis, 
    198 N.C. App. 146
    , 151-52, 
    678 S.E.2d 709
    , 714 (2009) (quoting State v. Holland, 
    318 N.C. 602
    , 610, 
    350 S.E.2d 56
    , 61 (1986), overruled on other grounds, State v. Childress, 
    321 N.C. 226
    ,, 
    362 S.E.2d 263
    (1987)). Rather, the State is merely required to present
    some competent evidence of the fair market value of the stolen property, which the
    jury may then consider.
    In Davis, the State presented evidence that a stolen Panasonic DVD player
    had been purchased for over $1,300, that it was in substantially the same condition
    as when purchased, and that the only Panasonic dealer in the area marketed the
    same DVD player for over $1,300. This Court held that, viewed in the light most
    favorable to the State, the reasonable selling price of the DVD player, at the time and
    place of the theft and in the condition in which it was when stolen – the measure of
    fair market value – was over $1,300.
    Id. at 152, 678
    S.E.2d at 714. The defendant
    argued that the DVD player could not be worth over $1,000 because it was not
    functional without its electronic brain, but this Court held that argument failed,
    5
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court
    noting that “[t]he State did not have to prove that a DVD player without its brain
    was worth over $1,000.00, as long as the State provided some evidentiary basis that
    placed the jury's determination of its value beyond ‘speculat[ion].’ ” Davis, 198 N.C.
    App. at 
    152, 678 S.E.2d at 714
    (quoting 
    Holland, 318 N.C. at 610
    , 350 S.E.2d at 61).
    We held that the issue of whether the DVD player, without its brain module, was
    nonetheless worth $1,000 was “properly before the jury for resolution.”
    Id. at 153, 678
    S.E.2d at 714; see also State v. Olson, 
    330 N.C. 557
    , 564, 
    411 S.E.2d 592
    , 595
    (1992) (holding that “[a]ny contradictions or discrepancies in the evidence are for the
    jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal”).
    In the instant case, the State presented evidence, namely the testimony of
    Speagle, that the stolen propane tank was worth $1,300, more than the requisite
    $1,000 threshold. Whether the absence of fuel or regulators put that valuation below
    the $1,000 threshold was a question “properly before the jury for resolution,” and did
    not warrant dismissal. In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    State and giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference, the State
    presented sufficient evidence of the value of the propane tank to take the issue beyond
    “speculation” and permit its consideration by the jury. Accordingly, we hold that the
    trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss.
    III. Jury Instruction
    6
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court
    In his second argument, defendant contends that the trial court committed
    plain error in its jury instructions. We disagree.
    A. Standard of Review
    “In criminal cases, an issue that was not preserved by objection noted at trial
    and that is not deemed preserved by rule or law without any such action nevertheless
    may be made the basis of an issue presented on appeal when the judicial action
    questioned is specifically and distinctly contended to amount to plain error.” N.C.R.
    App. P. 10(a)(4); see also State v. Goss, 
    361 N.C. 610
    , 622, 
    651 S.E.2d 867
    , 875 (2007),
    cert. denied, 
    555 U.S. 835
    , 
    172 L. Ed. 2d 58
    (2008).
    “Under the plain error rule, defendant must convince this Court not only that
    there was error, but that absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a
    different result.” State v. Jordan, 
    333 N.C. 431
    , 440, 
    426 S.E.2d 692
    , 697 (1993).
    B. Analysis
    The trial court, in its jury instructions, informed the jury that it could find
    defendant guilty of felonious larceny if it found that defendant “took and carried away
    another person’s property[,]” and that said property “was worth more than $1,000[.]”
    This instruction was lifted verbatim from the North Carolina Pattern Jury
    Instructions, N.C.P.I.-Crim 216.10, with the consent of the parties.        On appeal,
    defendant contends that this instruction improperly permitted the jury to find
    defendant guilty under an alternate theory not charged in the indictment. Because
    7
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court
    defendant failed to object to this instruction at trial, we review this argument for
    plain error.
    Defendant was initially indicted for the theft and possession of “a 240lb
    propane tank.” Subsequently, the State moved to amend the indictment to remove
    the size of the propane tank, and the trial court allowed the motion.        However,
    defendant notes that he was not charged with taking any other property aside from
    the tank itself, and contends that the trial court’s overly broad instruction – that
    defendant carried away “another person’s property” instead of “a propane tank” –
    permitted the jury to find him guilty of felonious larceny based on the value of
    additional items not included in the indictment. Indeed, our Supreme Court has held
    that, where instructions permit the jury to convict on grounds other than those
    charged in the indictment, those instructions are error, and also plain error. State v.
    Tucker, 
    317 N.C. 532
    , 536, 
    346 S.E.2d 417
    , 420 (1986).
    Notwithstanding this rule, however, defendant fails to show that he was in fact
    prejudiced by this instruction, in that the jury would otherwise have reached a
    different result. Defendant contends that, had the jury been “specifically instructed
    to consider the value of the propane tank, they would not have found that the tank
    alone was worth more than $1,000,” and that absent the over-broad instruction, the
    jury could not have found defendant guilty of felonious larceny. However, as we have
    held above, this assertion is inaccurate. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to
    8
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court
    find the value of the propane tank to be in excess of $1,000. Defendant’s mere
    assertion that there was not sufficient evidence of value does not, therefore, establish
    prejudice. Nor does defendant suggest that he was in fact found guilty of the theft of
    any property aside from the tank itself; he merely alleges that the tank did not
    possess the requisite value. Indeed, in reviewing the evidence before the trial court,
    we cannot find any reason to assume that the jury based its verdict on any
    consideration other than the value of the tank alone.
    Accordingly, while we recognize that the better practice may have been to
    designate the specific property taken, we do not agree that defendant has shown that
    the jury considered, or was permitted to consider, an improper theory based on the
    instruction given. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in instructing the
    jury, pursuant to the Pattern Jury Instructions, that defendant could be found guilty
    of stealing “property” as opposed to some more specific term.
    IV. Sentencing
    In his third argument, defendant contends that the trial court erred in
    sentencing him for both larceny and possession of stolen property. We agree.
    A. Standard of Review
    “Whether multiple punishments were imposed contrary to legislative intent
    presents a question of law, reviewed de novo by this Court.” State v. Hendricksen,
    9
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court
    
    257 N.C. App. 345
    , 
    809 S.E.2d 391
    , 393, review denied, 
    371 N.C. 114
    , 
    812 S.E.2d 856
    (2018).
    B. Analysis
    Defendant contends, and the State concedes, that it is a violation of legislative
    intent to convict a defendant of both stealing property and possessing that same
    property. Indeed, our Supreme Court has held that, while “[l]arceny and possession
    of property stolen in the larceny are separate crimes[,]” it is inappropriate for the trial
    court to punish an individual for both when the same property is involved. State v.
    Perry, 
    305 N.C. 225
    , 234, 
    287 S.E.2d 810
    , 815 (1982), overruled on other grounds by
    State v. Mumford, 
    364 N.C. 394
    , 
    699 S.E.2d 911
    (2010). Specifically, the Court held
    that “the Legislature did not intend to punish an individual for larceny of property
    and the possession of the same property which he stole.”
    Id. at 235, 287
    S.E.2d at
    816. When the trial court enters judgment on both larceny and the possession of
    property stolen in the larceny, our remedy is to vacate the conviction for the latter.
    See State v. Stroud, 
    252 N.C. App. 200
    , 
    797 S.E.2d 34
    (2017). Because the trial court
    consolidated the two charges for judgment, we therefore vacate the judgment entirely,
    and remand this matter to the trial court, with instructions to arrest the charge of
    possession of stolen property and enter judgment only upon the charge of larceny,
    and to resentence defendant accordingly.
    10
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Opinion of the Court
    NO ERROR IN PART, NO PLAIN ERROR IN PART, VACATED AND
    REMANDED IN PART.
    Judge COLLINS concurs in separate opinion.
    Judge MURPHY concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion.
    2
    No. COA19-863 – State v. Wright
    COLLINS, Judge, concurring.
    I concur in the majority opinion. I write separately to add additional analysis
    to the discussion of the second issue involving the jury instruction.
    The trial court, in its jury instructions, informed the jury that it could find
    defendant guilty of felonious larceny if it found that defendant “took and carried away
    another person’s property[,]” and that said property “was worth more than $1,000[.]”
    On appeal, defendant contends that this instruction was plainly erroneous as it
    improperly permitted the jury to find defendant guilty under an alternate theory not
    charged in the indictment.
    “It is the rule in this State that the trial court should not give instructions
    which present to the jury possible theories of conviction which are . . . not charged in
    the bill of indictment, and that where the indictment for a crime alleges a theory of
    the crime, the State is held to proof of that theory and the jury is only allowed to
    convict on that theory.” State v. Litchford, 
    78 N.C. App. 722
    , 727, 
    338 S.E.2d 575
    ,
    578 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Here, Defendant was initially indicted for the theft and possession of “[a]
    240LB propane tank.” Subsequently, the State moved to amend the indictment to
    remove the size of the propane tank, and the trial court allowed the motion. The
    evidence presented a trial shows that Speagle, a propane manager with Carolina
    Energies, identified the propane tank by its serial number. Speagle testified that the
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    COLLINS, J., concurring
    propane tank “had been sprayed over, camouflaged a little bit” and he called his office
    to confirm that the propane tank’s serial number matched the “serial number
    connected to” the propane tank stolen from Crotts’ labor camp.          Speagle then
    explained how he recovered and removed the tank from the property and that “the
    value of the tank” was approximately $1330. Through Speagle’s testimony, the State
    established that the propane tank stolen from Crotts was the exact propane tank
    recovered from the Canipe’s property. The State provided no evidence of any other
    property that Defendant was alleged to have taken.
    While “[t]echnically, it would have been better for the trial court to have
    charged the jury that it had to find” that Defendant took and carried away a propane
    tank, “[s]uch a misstatement by the trial court . . . does not amount to submitting to
    the jury a possible theory of conviction which is neither supported by the evidence
    nor the indictment.”
    Id. at 728, 338
    S.E.2d at 579. There is no fatal variance here
    where both the indictment and the evidence show that Defendant stole a propane
    tank, the trial court charged the jury that it could find Defendant guilty if he “took
    and carried away another person’s property,” and there is no evidence from which the
    jury could determine that Defendant had stolen property other than a propane tank.
    See State v. Pringle, 
    204 N.C. App. 562
    , 567, 
    694 S.E.2d 505
    , 508 (2010) (determining
    “no error, much less plain error,” where “the trial court’s instruction was in accord
    with the material allegations in the indictment and the evidence presented at trial”).
    2
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    COLLINS, J., concurring
    We discern no plain error in the trial court’s instructions on felonious larceny because
    it cannot be said that the instructional mistake “had a probable impact on the jury’s
    finding of guilt.” State v. Odom, 
    307 N.C. 655
    , 661, 
    300 S.E.2d 375
    , 379 (1983)
    (citation omitted).
    2
    No. COA19-863 – State v. Wright
    MURPHY, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
    While I concur fully with the improper sentencing under both larceny and
    possession of stolen property issue, I concur in outcome only as to the jury instruction
    issue.    However, I respectfully dissent as to the Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
    According to the language of the indictment, the jury should only have considered the
    value of the propane tank in determining if Defendant stole property worth more than
    $1,000.00, elevating the larceny from a misdemeanor to a felony. Therefore, the
    evidence of the propane tank’s value presented by the State was insufficient to
    support a conviction of felonious larceny because there was no testimony as to the
    value of the propane tank alone and the only testimony on value was in reference to
    the combined value of the propane tank, an unknown amount of propane gas within
    the tank, the regulator attached to it, and the regulator attached to the building.
    Further, any determination by the jury as to the value of the propane tank alone
    would be speculative due to the impossibility of subtracting the value of an unknown
    amount of propane gas from the combined value to deduce the value of the propane
    tank.
    BACKGROUND
    The indictment states, “[t]he jurors for the State upon their oath present that
    on or about the date of offense shown and in the county named above [Defendant]
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    named above unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously did steal, take and carry away A
    240LB PROPANE TANK[.]”          The indictment was later properly amended to “a
    propane tank with a value in excess of a thousand dollars.”
    At trial, the value of the propane tank was described in many different ways,
    each time by Nelson Speagle (“Speagle”). Speagle worked as a propane manager for
    Carolina Energies with almost 19 years of experience at the time of his testimony.
    Speagle, on behalf of Carolina Energies, had provided propane gas, regulators, and
    propane tanks to the victim in this case. Speagle estimated the value of the tanks
    three times, in the following ways:
    [State:] Are you familiar with how much these tanks are
    worth?
    [Speagle:] Right -- With the tank and the gas and
    regulators, it’s roughly $1,330, somewhere in that ballpark.
    [State:] Are you talking about the tanks pertaining to [the
    victim]?
    [Speagle:] Yes.
    ...
    [State:] And based on your training and experience and
    your job duties, were you able to give -- or were you able to
    come up with a fair market value of how much this tank
    was?
    [Speagle:] Just the tank?
    2
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    [State:] No. Total. Everything in it.
    [Speagle:] Total?       You're probably at $1,300, 1,330
    something.
    [State:] And that’s including the regulators that are on the
    tank?
    [Speagle:] That’s the tank, the regulators, and the fuel.
    ...
    [State:] So just to be clear, it’s your opinion that on the date
    of January 25th the value of the tank that you received was
    approximately $1,330?
    [Speagle:] Yeah.
    (Emphasis added). Regarding the regulators and their value, Speagle testified:
    [State:] Okay. And when you noticed this tank, did you
    notice that the regulators were with it?
    [Speagle:] One was and the other wasn’t. It was laying, I
    think, in the yard or on the ground there.
    [State:] And normally are these regulators attached to the
    propane tank?
    [Speagle:] We’ve got one that the regulator attaches to the
    tank and one regulator that attaches to the house or
    structure, wherever we put the tank.
    [State:] And how much would a regulator cost?
    [Speagle:] Roughly $90.
    3
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    Speagle also testified that he did not know how much propane gas was in the
    propane tank at the time he retrieved it, and the last time he checked the tank, at an
    unknown date, it was full. In terms of the value of the propane gas, he testified
    [State:] So would you say that the gas was about $500
    worth of gas in this particular tank, or are you just saying
    that’s –
    [Speagle:] The gas that was in it fits 96 gallons. You’re
    looking at roughly $300 for gas.
    At the close of all evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss all charges, and the
    trial court denied the motion. Defendant was found guilty of felonious larceny and
    felonious possession of stolen goods. This Dissent focuses on Defendant’s argument
    that “[t]he trial court erred in failing to dismiss the charges where the evidence of
    value was insufficient to support convictions for felonious larceny and felonious
    possession of stolen goods.”
    ANALYSIS
    Although this Dissent focuses only on the issue of whether the State presented
    sufficient evidence to support a value of more than $1,000.00 justifying a charge of
    felonious larceny,1 it is important to clarify that Defendant’s indictment includes only
    1 While Defendant was also found guilty of felonious possession of stolen goods, I will focus on
    the conviction of felonious larceny because the analysis applies with equal force to both charges
    because both charges were based on the same evidence and I agree with the parties and the Majority
    that it was improper to sentence Defendant to both possession of stolen goods and larceny.
    4
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    the “propane tank.”      The evidence at trial discussed the combined value of the
    propane tank, propane gas, and regulators, the value of the regulators, and what the
    value of the propane gas could be. However, no evidence at trial ever valued the
    propane tank alone, nor can that value be deduced from the evidence presented at
    trial.
    A. Larceny Indictments
    “Generally, the same degree of certainty must be used to describe the goods in
    indictments for obtaining property by false pretenses as in indictments for larceny.”
    State v. Ricks, 
    244 N.C. App. 742
    , 752, 
    781 S.E.2d 637
    , 643 (2016) (citing State v.
    Reese, 
    83 N.C. 637
    , 639 (1880)). “The principle that the item obtained in a false
    pretense crime and the thing stolen in larceny must be described with the same
    degree of certainty was reaffirmed in 1915. . . . The item must be described with
    ‘reasonable certainty’ and ‘by the name or term usually employed to describe it.’”
    Id. at 752, 781
    S.E.2d at 644 (quoting State v. Gibson, 
    169 N.C. 318
    , 
    85 S.E. 7
    , 8 (1915)).
    This principle was once more reaffirmed in 2014 when our Supreme Court stated
    “[a]dditionally, ‘it is the general rule that the thing obtained by the false pretense
    must be described with reasonable certainty, and by the name or term usually
    employed to describe it.’” State v. Jones, 
    367 N.C. 299
    , 307, 
    758 S.E.2d 345
    , 351 (2014)
    (quoting 
    Gibson, 169 N.C. at 320
    , 85 S.E. at 8) (internal alterations omitted).
    5
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    Applying the same indictment rules regarding the description of goods to
    larceny and obtaining property by false pretenses, I conclude that when describing
    the stolen item in indictments for larceny, the item “must be described with
    reasonable certainty and by the name or term usually employed to describe it.” Ricks,
    244 N.C. App. at 
    752, 781 S.E.2d at 644
    (internal marks and citations omitted). In
    this case, the indictment only stated “a propane tank.” According to our precedent,
    “propane tank” must refer only to the object that it names or usually describes.
    Id. Obviously, this includes
    the propane tank in this case. However, nothing in the
    indictment describes with reasonable certainty the regulators, or the propane gas
    within the propane tank. Indeed, the term that would normally refer to these items
    is not “propane tank.” In fact, the only terms ever used by the State, the victim in
    this case, Jeff Crotts (“Crotts”), Sergeant Amy Lail, and an expert in the field,
    Speagle, to refer to the regulators were “regulator,” or “regulators.” The only terms
    used by the State, Crotts, Speagle, and Defense Counsel to refer to the propane gas
    were “gas,” “fuel,” and “propane.” Also, throughout the Record there are distinctions
    made between the tank, the regulators, and the propane gas. The usage of these
    words throughout the trial demonstrates the usual terms that describe regulators
    and propane gas are “regulator,” and “propane,” “gas,” or “fuel” respectively.
    6
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    As a result, the indictment did not charge Defendant with larceny of the two
    regulators attached to the propane tank or the propane gas within the tank. Instead,
    it simply charged Defendant with larceny of the propane tank.2                          Based on the
    indictment, the jury should only have considered the value of the propane tank in
    determining if the value of the stolen property exceeded $1,000.00, making Defendant
    guilty of felonious larceny.         N.C.G.S. § 14-72(a) (2019).            Based on the evidence
    presented at trial, if we were to calculate the value of the propane tank alone, then
    we would subtract the value of the two regulators, worth $90.00 each, and the value
    of the propane gas, worth somewhere between $0.01 and $300.00, from the combined
    value testified to by Speagle, $1,330.00. This is the same as subtracting somewhere
    between $0.01 and $300.00 from $1,150.00, which would leave us with a value for the
    propane tank alone being somewhere between $850.00 and $1,149.99. However, this
    is not the end of the inquiry as to the validity of Defendant’s convictions.
    B. The Motion to Dismiss
    2 Making legal distinctions between an object and an item attached to it is not novel. Our
    Supreme Court similarly distinguished between an item and its attachment in State v. Greene, 
    289 N.C. 578
    , 
    223 S.E.2d 365
    , (1976). In Greene, our Supreme Court held that, although the defendant
    was found in possession of a set of disk boggs that had been attached to a tractor, the doctrine of recent
    possession did not extend to the tractor that the disk boggs had been attached to in part because of its
    ability to be removed from the tractor.
    Id. at 581-583, 223
    S.E.2d at 367-369. Although the issue
    before us is not governed by the doctrine of recent possession, Greene supports making a legal
    distinction between an attachment and the item it was attached to. The logic underlying this
    distinction is equally applicable to an object and its contents when those contents are typically removed
    and replaced.
    7
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    1. Standard of Review
    “This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.”
    State v. Smith, 
    186 N.C. App. 57
    , 62, 
    650 S.E.2d 29
    , 33 (2007).
    2. General Principles
    Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not granting his motion to
    dismiss for insufficient evidence. Specifically, he argues the State failed to present
    sufficient evidence to establish the propane tank had a value exceeding $1,000.00 as
    required in charges of felonious larceny and felonious possession of stolen goods.
    N.C.G.S. § 14-72(a) (2019). No other element of the crime is challenged.
    Upon [D]efendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for
    the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of
    each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser
    offense included therein, and (2) of [D]efendant’s being the
    perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly
    denied. . . .
    If the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or
    conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the
    identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it, the motion
    should be allowed. . . . This is true even though the
    suspicion so aroused by the evidence is strong. . . .
    The evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable
    to the State; the State is entitled to every reasonable
    intendment and every reasonable inference to be drawn
    therefrom; contradictions and discrepancies are for the
    jury to resolve and do not warrant dismissal; and all of the
    evidence actually admitted, whether competent or
    8
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    incompetent, which is favorable to the State is to be
    considered by the court in ruling on the motion. . . .
    The test of the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand the
    motion is the same whether the evidence is direct,
    circumstantial or both. . . . When the motion calls into
    question the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the
    question for the Court is whether a reasonable inference of
    [D]efendant’s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances.
    If so, it is for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken
    singly or in combination, satisfy them beyond a reasonable
    doubt that the defendant is actually guilty.
    State v. Powell, 
    299 N.C. 95
    , 98-99, 
    261 S.E.2d 114
    , 117 (1980) (internal
    citations and marks omitted) (emphasis added).
    Here, the only relevant essential element of felonious larceny relates to the
    value of the property stolen. “Larceny of goods of the value of more than one thousand
    dollars ($1,000[.00]) is a Class H felony.” N.C.G.S. § 14-72(a) (2019).
    3. State v. Davis and State v. Parker
    Relying on State v. Davis, the Majority holds that the State presented sufficient
    evidence of value to withstand Defendant’s motion to dismiss. State v. Davis, 
    198 N.C. App. 146
    , 
    678 S.E.2d 709
    (2009). The Majority relies on Davis to reach the
    conclusion that Defendant’s motion to dismiss was properly denied because “the State
    presented evidence, namely the testimony of Speagle, that the stolen propane tank
    was worth $1,300[.00], more than the requisite $1,000[.00] threshold. Whether the
    absence of fuel or regulators put that valuation below the $1,000[.00] threshold was
    9
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    a question ‘properly before the jury for resolution,’ and did not warrant dismissal.”
    Supra at 6. The Majority bases this conclusion on the proposition from Davis that
    the State “is not required to produce ‘direct evidence of . . . value,’ provided that the
    jury is not left to ‘speculate as to the value’ of the item.”
    Id. at 151-52, 678
    S.E.2d at
    714 (quoting State v. Holland, 
    318 N.C. 602
    , 610, 
    350 S.E.2d 56
    , 61 (1986) overruled
    on other grounds, State v. Childress, 
    321 N.C. 226
    , 
    362 S.E.2d 263
    (1987))). The
    Majority’s reliance on Davis is misplaced.3
    3 Our Supreme Court will not be bound by Davis. State v. Alonzo, 
    373 N.C. 437
    , 440, 
    838 S.E.2d 354
    , 356 (2020) (“We are not bound by the Court of Appeals’ decision in Lark”). Therefore,
    while not critical to the proper outcome, I include this observation of Davis insofar as it misapplied
    Holland and our prior decision in Parker. In Davis, we held “the jury could have reasonably concluded
    that the value of the DVD player deck [the] defendant possessed was worth over $1,000.00 based on
    [the vendor’s] testimony that the entire system retails in his store for over $1,300.00.” Davis, 198 N.C.
    App. at 
    152, 675 S.E.2d at 714
    . We even went on to say “the jury could have reasonably concluded
    that the DVD player was worth $1,300.00 and was merely missing a necessary component, similar to
    a car missing its engine or a watch missing its batteries.”
    Id. at 153, 678
    S.E.2d at 715. It is unclear
    to me how a jury could do anything other than speculate as to the value of a used, non-functional half
    of a two-part system if the only information it had before it regarding value was that a new, fully-
    functional complete system was worth $1,300.00. Additionally, it is unclear how it could ever be
    reasonable for a jury to find that the fair market value of a non-functioning item without its other
    essential component could remain the same as the fully-functional item with both components. Davis
    is even more clearly illogical when it is applied to what we claimed was similar to the facts of Davis—
    a car missing its engine.
    Id. The Davis holding
    would suggest that it is reasonable for a jury to
    conclude that a new car worth $25,000.00 was worth the same as a car in “like-new condition” that is
    “merely . . . missing its engine.” Id. at 152-
    153, 678 S.E.2d at 714
    -715.
    Additionally, Davis holds that “[t]he State is not required to produce ‘direct evidence of . . .
    value’ to support the conclusion that the stolen property was worth over $[]1,000.00, provided that the
    jury is not left to ‘speculate as to the value’ of the item.” Id. at 151-
    152, 678 S.E.2d at 714
    , (quoting
    
    Holland, 318 N.C. at 610
    , 350 S.E.2d at 61). This paraphrasing of Holland was not an accurate
    representation of the cited language’s meaning. In context, the full language referred to is:
    Although the State offered no direct evidence of the Cordoba's value,
    there is in the record evidence tending to show that the victim owned
    10
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    The Majority’s reliance on Davis is misplaced because the proposition cited to
    support its conclusion that the State presented sufficient evidence, by its own terms,
    does not apply here. That proposition is only appropriately applied when “the jury is
    not left to ‘speculate as to the value’ of the item.” Id. (quoting 
    Holland, 318 N.C. at 610
    , 350 S.E.2d at 61). This is precisely the situation we have here. To determine
    two automobiles and that the 1975 Chrysler Cordoba was his favorite
    one of which he took especially good care, always keeping it parked
    under a shed, and that a picture of this automobile was exhibited to
    the jury for the purpose of establishing the location of the automobile
    when discovered after its theft. The State contends that this evidence
    is sufficient to support the jury's finding that the automobile's value at
    the time of the theft exceeded four hundred dollars. We are not
    convinced and find that the substantiality of the evidence is
    insufficient for presentation of the issue of value to the jury. The jury
    may not speculate as to the value. Although the trial court properly
    instructed the jury as to the difference between misdemeanor and
    felony possession, the evidence was not such as would justify the jury
    in finding that the value of the Cordoba exceeded four hundred dollars.
    
    Holland, 318 N.C. at 610
    , 350 S.E.2d at 61 (emphasis added). In context, it is clear that our
    Supreme Court in Holland was not holding “[t]he State is not required to produce ‘direct evidence of .
    . . value’ to support the conclusion that the stolen property was worth over $[]1,000.00,” but was
    instead simply rejecting the State’s argument that the indirect evidence presented was sufficient
    evidence of value to justify submitting the issue to the jury. Davis, 198 N.C. App. at 151-
    152, 678 S.E.2d at 714
    . In fact, the first time such a reading of Holland occurred was in Davis. I would
    encourage our Supreme Court to overrule Davis. Routten v. Routten, 
    843 S.E.2d 154
    , 158-159 (N.C.
    Ct. App. 2020) (“However, the Moore court misapplied our decision in Petersen. . . . We also expressly
    overrule Moore v. Moore”).
    11
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    the value of the propane tank, the jury would have to determine the value of the
    propane gas within the propane tank when it was picked up by Speagle, and then
    subtract it and the value of the regulators from $1,330.00. Since the regulators were
    worth $180.00 and there was no evidence presented of how much propane gas was in
    the propane tank, the jury necessarily had to speculate as to whether the propane
    tank had a value as low as $850.00 or as high as $1,149.99. This is particularly
    significant because to be convicted of felonious larceny the required value of the stolen
    property must be greater than $1,000.00. The jury was asked to blindly guess how
    much gas was in the tank to determine the value of the propane tank.
    Davis also inaccurately describes State v. Parker. Davis states that in Parker
    “the State produced no evidence at all of the value of the stolen property.”
    Id. at 152, 678
    S.E.2d at 714. Upon further reading of Parker, the State presented evidence
    about the value of all of the victims’ stolen items, including those that were alleged
    to be stolen by the defendant and some that were not, the resale value of some of the
    items alleged to be stolen by the defendant, and the amount of money loaned to the
    defendant when he traded stolen items with a pawn store. State v. Parker, 146 N.C.
    App. 715, 716, 
    555 S.E.2d 609
    , 610 (2001). In Parker, when discussing Holland and
    applying it to the facts of the case, we said:
    [O]ur Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s conviction
    for felonious possession of stolen property where the State
    12
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    failed to present direct evidence of the value of the stolen
    vehicle. There, the State presented evidence tending to
    show that the vehicle was a 1975 Chrysler Cordoba; it was
    the owner’s favorite vehicle and he took especially good
    care of it; and the owner always parked the vehicle under
    a shed. [Citing Holland]. The State also introduced a
    photograph of the vehicle.
    The State maintained that such evidence was sufficient to
    establish the value of the vehicle exceeded $400.00, the
    statutory minimum applicable at that time.
    Id. The Supreme Court
    rejected the argument, stating that “the
    substantiality of the evidence is insufficient for
    presentation of the issue of value to the jury. The jury may
    not speculate as to the value.”
    Id. It concluded that
    such
    evidence “was not such as would justify the jury in finding
    that the value of the Cordoba exceeded four hundred
    dollars.”
    Id. The court therefore
    vacated the defendant’s
    conviction for felonious possession of stolen property and
    remanded for pronouncement of a judgment of guilty of
    misdemeanor possession of stolen property and for re-
    sentencing.
    Id. In this case,
    the State likewise failed to introduce sufficient
    evidence of the value of the stolen goods in [the]
    defendant’s possession. The trial court instructed the jury
    that [the] defendant’s charge was based upon his
    possession of “a Magnavox VCR, cameras, and
    photography equipment.” Although Goodman testified
    that the total estimated value of all stolen items was
    $5,000.00, there is simply no evidence regarding the total
    value of the items contained in the trial court’s charge. The
    only evidence relating to these items was Hayes’ testimony
    that she loaned [the] defendant $40.00 for a Magnavox
    VCR based on her estimate that she could resell it for
    $80.00, and Mitchell’s testimony that she loaned [the]
    defendant $80.00 for two cameras and some photography
    equipment. Such evidence is not sufficient evidence from
    13
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    which a jury could determine to any certainty the value of
    the VCR, cameras, and photography equipment. The jury
    must not be left to speculate about the value of these items.
    See 
    Holland, 318 N.C. at 610
    , 350 S.E.2d at 61. We
    therefore vacate [the] defendant’s conviction for felonious
    possession of stolen property in 99CRS011124. We remand
    that matter to the trial court for entry of a judgment of
    guilty of misdemeanor possession of stolen property, and
    for re-sentencing accordingly.
    Id. at 717-718, 555
    S.E.2d at 610-611 (emphasis added).
    Parker is controlling here, and, based on Parker, the trial court should have
    granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss. In Parker, “[the d]efendant was charged with
    [and convicted of] felonious possession of stolen property . . . [b]ased on his pawning
    of [some of] the stolen goods.”
    Id. at 716, 555
    S.E.2d at 610. The defendant challenged
    the conviction for felonious possession of stolen goods and “argue[d] the State failed
    to present evidence from which the jury could conclude the value of the items stolen
    by [the] defendant was over $1,000.00.”
    Id. at 717, 555
    S.E.2d at 610. At trial in
    Parker, the State introduced evidence regarding the value of all items stolen from the
    property owners; however, the defendant was only charged with having stolen some
    of the missing property and “there [was] simply no evidence regarding the total value
    of the items contained in the trial court’s charge.”
    Id. at 718, 555
    S.E.2d at 611.
    Although there was some testimony as to the value of the items the defendant was
    charged with stealing, “[t]he only evidence relating to these items was [a witness’s]
    testimony that she loaned [the] defendant $40.00 for a Magnavox VCR based on her
    14
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    estimate that she could resell it for $80.00, and [another witness’s] testimony that
    she loaned [the] defendant $80.00 for two cameras and some photography
    equipment.”
    Id. Relying on Holland,
    we held that “[s]uch evidence [was] not
    sufficient evidence from which a jury could determine to any certainty the value of
    the [property the defendant was charged with stealing]. The jury must not be left to
    speculate about the value of these items.” Id. (citing 
    Holland, 318 N.C. at 610
    , 350
    S.E.2d at 61). We then “vacate[d the] defendant’s conviction for felonious possession
    of stolen property . . . [and] remand[ed] . . . for entry of a judgment of guilty of
    misdemeanor possession of stolen property, and for re-sentencing accordingly.” Id.
    (citing 
    Holland, 318 N.C. at 610
    , 350 S.E.2d at 61).
    4. Application to These Facts
    Applying the general principles controlling motions to dismiss, and applying
    Parker to this case, there was insufficient evidence of value to submit the issue to the
    jury.   I would vacate Defendant’s conviction for felonious larceny and felonious
    possession of stolen goods, and remand for entry of judgment of misdemeanor larceny
    or possession of stolen goods and resentencing accordingly.
    a. The Combined Value of the Propane Tank, Propane Gas, and Two
    Regulators
    15
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    In the light most favorable to the State, the value of the propane tank, the two
    regulators, and any propane gas within the tank was $1,330.00. Speagle provided an
    estimate of the value of these items three times. Although Speagle provided a range
    of values from $1,300.00-$1,330.00 the second time he estimated the combined value
    of these three items, his initial and ultimate valuations were that these items
    together were worth $1,330.00. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to
    the State, we must take the higher values given as opposed to the lower values,
    leaving us with $1,330.00 as the combined value of the propane tank, any propane
    gas within the tank, and the two regulators.4
    Although the combined value of the propane tank, the propane gas within it,
    and the regulators is $1,330.00, as stated above, Defendant was only charged with
    larceny of the propane tank. The only value the trial court could have properly
    considered to determine the motion to dismiss as to the felony enhancement of larceny
    was the value of the propane tank alone. To find the value of the propane tank, we
    must subtract Speagle’s estimated value of the two regulators and propane gas from
    his testimony of their $1,330.00 combined value.
    4  I come to this conclusion based only on logical reasoning and application of our general
    jurisprudence as my exhaustive research has discovered no applicable caselaw regarding the issue of
    how the light most favorable standard interacts with ranges of values.
    16
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    b. The Value of the Propane Tank without the Regulators and Propane
    Gas
    According to Speagle’s testimony, the value of each regulator was $90.00. One
    regulator was attached to the propane tank while another was attached to the
    building, meaning the total value of the regulators was $180.00. Additionally, it is
    clear that Speagle’s valuation of $1,330.00 included both regulators, as he twice
    stated “regulators” when he described what he was including in his valuation. When
    the value of the two regulators ($180.00) is removed from the value provided by
    Speagle for everything ($1,330.00), we find that the value of the propane tank and
    any propane gas within the tank was $1,150.00.
    At the time the propane tank was stolen, there was up to $300.00 worth of
    propane gas in the tank.         However, we cannot assume that Speagle was
    approximating the value of the propane tank absent any propane gas. Speagle
    consistently included the “gas” or “fuel” when he described what he was including in
    calculating his value of $1,330.00. Speagle’s estimate included the value of an unclear
    amount of gas, with a maximum value of $300.00. There was no evidence presented
    as to how much gas Speagle was including in his estimate of the combined value of
    the propane tank, propane gas, and regulators. Although he was basing his valuation
    on the assumption there was gas within the propane tank when he identified it at
    17
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    and removed it from Defendant’s residence, he explicitly stated “I don’t have a clue
    how much [fuel was in the propane tank].” Any decision as to how much gas there
    was in the tank and its corresponding value is entirely speculative, and the jury could
    not have properly decided this value in calculating the value of the tank without the
    fuel.
    That being said, to recreate the jury’s only legally acceptable path to deducing
    the value of the propane tank, we are faced with the impossible task of determining
    the value of an unknown amount of gas, ranging from $0.01-$300.00. The amount of
    propane gas that the jury determined to be within the propane tank was dispositive
    of whether Defendant was convicted of felonious or misdemeanor larceny because
    after removing the value of the regulators the value of the propane tank and the
    propane gas within it was $1,150.00. If the jury were to determine the propane gas
    was worth anywhere between $0.01-$149.99, then when it would have removed this
    value it would have been left with a value exceeding $1,000.00 for the propane tank,
    satisfying the requirement of felonious larceny; however, if the jury were to determine
    the propane gas was worth anywhere between $150.00-$300.00, then when it would
    have removed this value it would have been left with a value of $1,000.00 or less for
    the propane tank satisfying only the requirement of misdemeanor larceny. This
    impossible task is the exact hurdle required of the jury in this case if it was to properly
    18
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    determine the value of the tank alone from the testimony presented at trial, and it is
    the type of speculation that the law prohibits.
    Like in Parker, in this case there is an estimate of multiple items of stolen
    property—a propane tank, the regulators, and the propane gas within it—not all of
    which Defendant was charged with stealing, but “there is simply no evidence
    regarding the . . . value of the” item Defendant was charged with stealing, the propane
    tank. Parker, 146 N.C. App. at 
    718, 555 S.E.2d at 611
    . Although there is testimony
    on the value of the regulators, and the maximum potential value of the propane gas,
    it is impossible to extrapolate the value of the propane tank from this testimony
    because there is nothing in the Record to suggest how much propane gas was being
    included in Speagle’s combined estimate of the propane tank, the propane gas, and
    the regulators. This evidence “is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as
    to . . . the commission of” felonious larceny because any determination of how much
    propane gas was in the tank for the purposes of the estimate would be conjecture, and
    thus any corresponding determination of the value of the propane tank would also be
    conjecture. 
    Powell, 299 N.C. at 98
    , 261 S.E.2d at 117. Here, like in Parker, there was
    no evidence for the jury to determine “to any certainty the value of the” propane tank
    that Defendant was charged with stealing, and allowing the jury to speculate about
    the value of the propane tank was improper. 
    Parker, 146 N.C. App. at 718
    , 
    555 S.E.2d 19
                                           STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    at 611. The trial court should have granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the
    charge of felonious larceny and felonious possession of stolen goods. I would vacate
    the conviction for felonious larceny and felonious possession of stolen goods and
    remand for entry of judgment for misdemeanor larceny or misdemeanor possession
    of stolen goods and resentencing accordingly.
    CONCLUSION
    The indictment here only refers to the “propane tank,” so only the value of the
    propane tank is considered to determine if Defendant should have been convicted of
    felonious or misdemeanor larceny. The State presented evidence that required the
    jury to speculate as to the value of the propane tank. It was impossible to determine,
    and therefore impossible to remove without speculation, the value of the propane gas
    included in the combined estimate of the propane tank, any propane gas within the
    tank, and the regulators attached to the tank and the building. When the evidence
    requires the jury to speculate as to the value of stolen property, a motion to dismiss
    should be granted. Therefore, the trial court erred in not granting Defendant’s
    motion to dismiss as to felonious larceny and felonious possession of stolen goods, and
    we should vacate Defendant’s felonious larceny charge and remand for entry of
    judgment for misdemeanor larceny or misdemeanor possession of stolen goods and
    resentencing accordingly.
    20
    STATE V. WRIGHT
    Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part
    Were we to vacate the conviction for felonious larceny and remand for entry of
    judgment for misdemeanor larceny or misdemeanor possession of stolen goods and
    resentencing, the second issue raised by Defendant would be moot, as any error in
    failing to instruct the jury that the propane tank must have been shown to be worth
    more than $1,000.00 for the purposes of felonious larceny would have no effect.
    Finally, as to the erroneous sentencing under both larceny and possession of stolen
    goods, I concur with the Majority.
    21