State v. Dew ( 2020 )


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  •               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA19-737
    Filed: 17 March 2020
    Carteret County, Nos. 16 CRS 53232-33, 16 CRS 53235-36
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    JEREMY WADE DEW, Defendant.
    Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 7 February 2018 by Judge John
    Nobles in Carteret County Superior Court.       Heard in the Court of Appeals 19
    February 2020.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney Generals Wes
    Saunders and Daniel P. O’Brien, for the State.
    Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Daniel K.
    Shatz, for defendant-appellant.
    BERGER, Judge.
    Jeremy Wade Dew (“Defendant”) was found guilty of kidnapping, two counts
    of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury (“AWDWISI”), one count of
    assault on a female, and one count of communicating threats.          Defendant was
    sentenced to 75 to 102 months in prison. Defendant appeals, contending that the
    trial court erred when it (1) denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss because the
    evidence before the trial court established only one assault that resulted in multiple
    injuries, not multiple assaults; (2) instructed the jury that Defendant’s hands, feet,
    STATE V. DEW
    Opinion of the Court
    and teeth could be deadly weapons; and (3) failed to conduct a charge conference. We
    find no error.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    On the weekend of July 29-31, 2016, Defendant and the victim traveled to
    Atlantic Beach, North Carolina for a vacation with the victim’s parents. At the time,
    the victim and Defendant were in a relationship and lived together.
    On July 30, 2016, Defendant took some form of pain medication, went to the
    liquor store, and began drinking. Later in the evening, Defendant obtained the
    victim’s car keys, and stated that he was leaving to “get some cocaine and [expletive
    deleted].” Defendant drove off, and the victim went to a neighbor for help. By the
    time she got help, Defendant returned to the vacation home and locked the victim
    out.
    When Defendant eventually allowed the victim inside, she went into the
    bedroom. Defendant hit the victim in the head while she was seated on the bed.
    Defendant continued to hit the victim with both his hands and fists while calling her
    a “slut.” The victim did not defend herself because she had “never been through a
    situation like this before” and “was too scared to” hit Defendant. For about two hours,
    Defendant “punched [her] in the nose,” “bit [her] ear and bit [her] nose,” “kicked [her]
    in the chest,” “head-butted [her] twice,” and “strangled [her] until vomiting.” The
    victim was unable to scream for help “[b]ecause at one point in time he had [her] face
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    Opinion of the Court
    down with [her] arms behind [her] back.” The sheets to the bed were covered in the
    victim’s blood, and the victim believed Defendant was going to kill her.
    Defendant later forced the victim to get into her car. Defendant drove away
    from the vacation home. While driving, Defendant threw the victim’s cell phone out
    the window and continued to strike her in the head, ultimately rupturing her
    eardrum. At various times throughout the drive, Defendant pulled off the road,
    strangled the victim, and threatened to push her out of the car.
    Around 3:00 a.m. on July 31, 2016, they arrived at the victim’s house in Sims,
    North Carolina. Defendant continued to threaten the victim and threatened to harm
    himself. At this time, the victim was in extreme pain as her head and body hurt, her
    ears were ringing, and her throat was sore.
    Around 6:00 a.m. on July 31, 2016, the victim’s mother called Defendant’s
    phone. The victim answered and told her mother that she needed help. Her mother
    then discovered the blood-stained sheets in the vacation home.        Soon after, the
    victim’s sister came to the house in Sims, and the victim told her sister about what
    Defendant had done the night before.
    The victim’s sister called 911. When EMS arrived, they determined that the
    victim’s nose was broken. She was transported to the emergency room where it was
    determined that the victim needed surgery to prevent further hearing loss.
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    Opinion of the Court
    The victim’s parents arrived at the emergency room and later took her back to
    Atlantic Beach where she gave a statement to the Atlantic Beach Police Department.
    As of September 15, 2016, the victim was still “receiving medical care for [her]
    headaches and dizziness” and was suffering from anxiety and continued ear pain.
    On August 1, 2016, Defendant was arrested. On February 5, 2018, Defendant
    was tried on the following offenses: (1) first degree kidnapping; (2) assault by
    strangulation; (3) AWDWISI;1 (4) AWDWISI;2 (5) assault on a female for kicking the
    victim in the chest; (6) assault on a female for head-butting the victim in the forehead;
    and (7) communicating threats. On February 7, 2018, a Carteret County jury found
    Defendant guilty of kidnapping, two counts of AWDWISI, one count of assault on a
    female for head-butting the victim in the forehead, and one count of communicating
    threats.
    On February 8, 2018, Defendant entered written notice of appeal. Defendant
    argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it (1) denied Defendant’s motion to
    dismiss because the evidence before the trial court established only one assault that
    resulted in multiple injuries, not multiple assaults; (2) instructed the jury that
    Defendant’s hands, feet, and teeth could be deadly weapons; and (3) failed to conduct
    a charge conference. We disagree.
    1   The alleged deadly weapons for this assault were Defendant’s hands and fists.
    2   The alleged deadly weapons for this assault were Defendant’s hands, fists, and teeth.
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    Analysis
    I. Motion to Dismiss
    “This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.”
    State v. Smith, 
    186 N.C. App. 57
    , 62, 
    650 S.E.2d 29
    , 33 (2007). A motion to dismiss
    is properly denied if there is substantial evidence of (1) each element of the charged
    offense, and (2) defendant being the perpetrator of the charged offense. See State v.
    Earnhardt, 
    307 N.C. 62
    , 65, 
    296 S.E.2d 649
    , 651 (1982). “Substantial evidence is such
    relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion.” State v. Smith, 
    300 N.C. 71
    , 78-79, 
    265 S.E.2d 164
    , 169 (1980) (citation
    omitted). “In making its determination, the trial court must consider all evidence
    admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State,
    giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any
    contradictions in its favor.” State v. Rose, 
    339 N.C. 172
    , 192, 
    451 S.E.2d 211
    , 223
    (1994) (citation omitted).
    In order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a
    party must have presented to the trial court a timely
    request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds
    for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the
    specific grounds were not apparent from the context.
    N.C. R. App. P. 10(a)(1). Further, “[t]his Court will not consider arguments based
    upon matters not presented to or adjudicated by the trial court. Even alleged errors
    arising under the Constitution of the United States are waived if defendant does not
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    Opinion of the Court
    raise them in the trial court.” State v. Haselden, 
    357 N.C. 1
    , 10, 
    577 S.E.2d 594
    , 600
    (2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Here, Defendant argued at the close of the State’s evidence:
    And then on the assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
    serious injury. Again, deadly weapon being the hands. We
    would argue that the case law seems to look at the size
    difference between the defendant and the victim, the
    brutality of the attack, what actually – the injuries that
    occurred.
    The State’s evidence was that this was an ongoing
    assault that lasted for two hours within the trailer and
    then most of the ride home. And we would contend if those
    hands were deadly weapons as bad as those pictures are
    and as bad as her injuries are, that they would be a lot
    worse based on what the State’s evidence has been and we
    would ask that that be – that the deadly weapon part of
    those be dismissed at this point.
    Defendant then renewed his objection at the close of all of the evidence. Defendant
    also argued at the close of all of the evidence that “the charging documents all put
    the date of these incidents as July 31st,” but did not include July 30th in the dates of
    offense.
    Defendant’s arguments on his motion to dismiss for sufficiency of the evidence
    were directed only to whether his hands could be considered deadly weapons given
    what his attorney contended was insignificant evidence of injury, and that the bills
    of information did not include the correct dates of offense. Defendant did not argue,
    as he does in this appeal, that the evidence before the trial court established only one
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    Opinion of the Court
    assault that resulted in multiple injuries, not multiple assaults. Thus, Defendant
    has failed to preserve this argument for appellate review. See State v. Harris, 
    253 N.C. App. 322
    , 327, 
    800 S.E.2d 676
    , 680 (2017) (“[T]he law does not permit parties to
    swap horses between courts in order to get a better mount in the [appellate court].”
    (citation and quotation marks omitted)).
    Even if we assume Defendant preserved his new argument, the State
    presented sufficient evidence of each assault for which Defendant was convicted. “In
    order for a defendant to be charged with multiple counts of assault, there must be
    multiple assaults.’’ State v. McCoy, 
    174 N.C. App. 105
    , 115, 
    620 S.E.2d 863
    , 871 (2005)
    (citation and quotation marks omitted). To establish that multiple assaults occurred,
    there must be “a distinct interruption in the original assault followed by a second
    assault[,] so that the subsequent assault may be deemed separate and distinct from
    the first.” State v. Littlejohn, 
    158 N.C. App. 628
    , 635, 
    582 S.E.2d 301
    , 307 (2003)
    (purgandum). To determine whether Defendant’s conduct was distinct, we are to
    consider: (1) whether each action required defendant to employ a separate thought
    process; (2) whether each act was distinct in time; and (3) whether each act resulted
    in a different outcome. State v. Rambert, 
    341 N.C. 173
    , 176-77, 
    459 S.E.2d 510
    , 513
    (1995)
    In State v. Wilkes, 
    225 N.C. App. 233
    , 
    736 S.E.2d 582
    (2013), the defendant
    initially punched the victim in the face, breaking her nose, causing bruising to her
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    Opinion of the Court
    face, and damaging her teeth. The victim’s son entered the room where the incident
    occurred with a baseball bat and hit the defendant. 
    Id. at 235,
    736 S.E.2d at 585.
    The defendant was able to secure the baseball bat from the child, and he began
    striking the victim with it. 
    Id. at 235,
    736 S.E.2d at 585. The defendant’s actions in
    the subsequent assault “crushed two of [the victim]’s fingers, broke[] bones in her
    forearms and her hands, and cracked her skull.” 
    Id. at 235,
    736 S.E.2d at 585.
    This Court, citing our Supreme Court in Rambert, determined that there was
    not a single transaction, but rather “multiple transactions,” stating, “[i]f the brief
    amount of thought required to pull a trigger again constitutes a separate thought
    process, then surely the amount of thought put into grabbing a bat from a twelve-
    year-old boy and then turning to use that bat in beating a woman constitutes a
    separate thought process.” 
    Wilkes, 225 N.C. App. at 239-40
    , 736 S.E.2d at 587.
    In State v. Harding, 
    258 N.C. App. 306
    , 
    813 S.E.2d 254
    , 263, writ denied, review
    denied, 
    371 N.C. 450
    , 
    817 S.E.2d 205
    (2018), this Court again applied the “separate-
    and-distinct-act analysis” from Rambert, and found multiple assaults “based on
    different conduct.” 
    Id. at 317,
    813 S.E.2d at 263. There, the defendant “grabb[ed the
    victim] by her hair, toss[ed] her down the rocky embankment, and punch[ed] her face
    and head multiple times.” 
    Id. at 317,
    813 S.E.2d at 263. The defendant also pinned
    down the victim and strangled her with his hands. This Court determined that
    multiple assaults had occurred because the “assaults required different thought
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    Opinion of the Court
    processes. Defendant’s decisions to grab [the victim]’s hair, throw her down the
    embankment, and repeatedly punch her face and head required a separate thought
    process than his decision to pin down [the victim] while she was on the ground and
    strangle her throat to quiet her screaming.” 
    Id. at 317-18,
    813 S.E.2d at 263. This
    Court also concluded that the assaults were distinct in time, and that the victim
    sustained injuries to different parts of her body because “[t]he evidence showed that
    [the victim] suffered two black eyes, injuries to her head, and bruises to her body, as
    well as pain in her neck and hoarseness in her voice from the strangulation.” 
    Id. at 318,
    813 S.E.2d at 263.
    In the present case, Defendant had to employ separate thought processes in
    his decisions to punch, slap, kick, bite, and head-butt the victim. In addition, the
    assaults which caused the victim’s injuries did not occur simultaneously, with one
    strike, or in rapid succession. Rather, Defendant’s actions were at separate and
    distinct points in time. Each assault also resulted in different injuries to the victim.
    The victim suffered a ruptured eardrum from Defendant’s strikes on her ear, she
    suffered a concussion from the Defendant’s conduct in head-butting her, she suffered
    a fractured nose from Defendant striking her nose, and she suffered permanent
    scarring from Defendant biting her nose and ear.
    Even if Defendant preserved his argument, which he did not, the trial court
    did not err when it denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
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    II. Motion to Dismiss AWDWISI
    Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion
    to dismiss AWDWISI because there was insufficient evidence that he used his hands,
    feet, and teeth as deadly weapons. We disagree.
    “The elements of AWDWISI are: (1) an assault, (2) with a deadly weapon, (3)
    inflicting serious injury, (4) not resulting in death.” State v. Jones, 353 N.C. 159,164,
    
    538 S.E.2d 917
    , 922 (2000) (citation omitted). “A deadly weapon is generally defined
    as any article, instrument or substance which is likely to produce death or great
    bodily harm.” State v. Sturdivant, 
    304 N.C. 293
    , 301, 
    283 S.E.2d 719
    , 725 (1981)
    (citation omitted).
    “An assailant’s hands may be considered deadly weapons for the purpose of the
    crime of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury depending upon the
    manner in which they were used and the relative size and condition of the parties.”
    State v. Allen, 
    193 N.C. App. 375
    , 378, 
    667 S.E.2d 295
    , 298 (2008). “Only where the
    instrument, according to the manner of its use or the part of the body at which the
    blow is aimed, may or may not be likely to produce such results, its allegedly deadly
    character is one of fact to be determined by the jury.” 
    McCoy, 174 N.C. App. at 112
    ,
    620 S.E.2d at 869 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.
    Sturgis, 
    48 F.3d 784
    , 788 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The test of whether a particular object was
    used as a dangerous weapon is not so mechanical that it can be readily reduced to a
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    Opinion of the Court
    question of law. Rather, it must be left to the jury to determine whether, under the
    circumstances of each case, the defendant used some instrumentality, object, or (in
    some instances) a part of his body to cause death or serious injury. This test clearly
    invites a functional inquiry into the use of the instrument rather than a metaphysical
    reflection on its nature.”).
    In the present case, substantial evidence was presented at trial of Defendant’s
    physical advantages over the victim. Defendant is approximately 5 feet 9 inches tall,
    while the victim is 5 feet 4 inches tall and weighs 140 pounds. Although there is no
    evidence in the record of Defendant’s weight, Defendant was present at trial and the
    jury observed Defendant in person, along with photographs of Defendant from the
    incident that were admitted into evidence. Thus, the jury had the opportunity to
    observe the relative size differences of Defendant and the victim.
    Moreover, on the night of the incident, the victim testified that Defendant had
    been drinking throughout the evening, that he was drunk, and that he was acting
    “crazed and possessed.” For over two hours, Defendant struck the victim repeatedly
    with his hands and fists in her ear, nose, and head, which resulted in the victim
    sustaining two black eyes, a fractured nose, and swelling in her face. The victim
    believed that she was “going to die” and could not defend herself against Defendant
    because “he was stronger than her.” According to the victim’s sister, the victim “was
    unrecognizable . . . [and] she was a zombie” the next morning. It appeared to the
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    Opinion of the Court
    victim’s sister that “[h]er eyes were swollen. Her nose was very swollen and it looked
    like blood had come down to the tip. She had a big old gash up here on her head.
    Blood was in her hair. I could tell her ears -- there was some blood on her ears.”
    Furthermore, Defendant bit the victim’s nose and ear. The victim testified that
    the bite to her ear was the most painful part of the attack. The victim’s doctors were
    more concerned about the bite marks on her ear than her ruptured eardrum. At the
    time of trial, the victim had a visible scar from where Defendant bit her on the nose.
    Moreover, the trial court provided the following instruction to the jury that
    “[i]n determining whether fists, hands, and teeth were a deadly weapon, you should
    consider the nature of the fists, hands and teeth, the manner in which they were used,
    and the size and strength of the defendant as compared to the victim.” (Emphasis
    added).
    Thus, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the
    State presented substantial evidence of each element of AWDWISI, and that
    Defendant’s hands, feet, and teeth were deadly weapons for the purposes of
    AWDWISI. Furthermore, we are reminded that the jury is the best determinant of
    whether, under the circumstances, Defendant’s use of his hands, fists, and teeth were
    likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. See State v. Fritsch, 
    351 N.C. 373
    , 379,
    
    526 S.E.2d 451
    , 455-56 (2000) (“When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court
    should be concerned only about whether the evidence is sufficient for jury
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    consideration, not about the weight of the evidence.”). Therefore, the trial court did
    not err when it denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
    III. Charge Conference
    Defendant next argues that the trial court violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
    1231(b) by failing to conduct a charge conference. We disagree.
    A charge conference is a recorded conference between the judge and the parties
    outside the presence of the jury where the judge “must inform the parties of the
    offenses, lesser included offenses, and affirmative defenses on which he will charge
    the jury” and the judge must also inform the parties of what parts of the parties’
    tendered instructions will be given to the jury. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1231(b) (2019).
    “The purpose of a charge conference is to allow the parties to discuss the proposed
    jury instructions to insure that the legal issues are appropriately clarified in a
    manner that assists the jury in understanding the case and reaching the correct
    verdict.”   State v. Houser, 
    239 N.C. App. 410
    , 423, 
    768 S.E.2d 626
    , 635 (2015)
    (purgandum).
    Mere noncompliance with Section 15A-1231(b) does not automatically entitle
    Defendant to relief. State v. Corey, ___ N.C. ___, ___, 
    835 S.E.2d 830
    , 838 (2019)
    (overruling State v. Hill, 
    235 N.C. App. 166
    , 
    760 S.E.2d 85
    (2014)).       Rather, a
    defendant must show that he or she was materially prejudiced by the judge’s failure
    to fully comply with the provisions of Section 15A-1231(b). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-
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    Opinion of the Court
    1231(b). A defendant is “materially prejudiced” for purposes of Section 15A-1231(b)
    “when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been
    committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the
    appeal arises.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a) (2019); Corey, ___ N.C. at ___, 835
    S.E.2d at 834; State v. Coburn, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 
    834 S.E.2d 691
    , 695 (2019)
    (concluding that the defendant was not materially prejudiced when portions of the
    charge conference were not recorded, as required by Section 15A-1231, because the
    trial court summarized, on the record, discussions that were not recorded; the
    defendant did not object to the trial court’s summary of the jury instructions on the
    record; and the trial court was cognizant of the dangers of discussions held off the
    record).
    The State correctly argues that Defendant could not have been materially
    prejudiced because a charge conference did occur as shown in the record. At the
    charge conference, the Court asked whether the parties were satisfied with the
    proposed jury instructions.     Defendant stated that he was satisfied with the
    instructions to be given to the jury and had the opportunity to draft the proposed jury
    instructions, as evidence by the following colloquy which occurred outside the
    presence of the jury:
    THE COURT:           All right. Thank you, sir. Give me one
    minute. I’ve got to look up an instruction before I bring the
    jury back in here. Not one you all did. It’s one I’ve got to
    give before you all get started. (Pause.)
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    ...
    [THE STATE]:        Is Your Honor satisfied with the jury
    instructions?
    THE COURT:           I’m satisfied with the jury instructions.
    I just kind of breezed through them, but I’m satisfied with
    them if you all are.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We are, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: All right. Now, listen, if I happen to
    misstate something or misread something, I want you to
    stop me right then, but I don’t want you to -- just stand up
    and say may I approach the bench and then both of you all
    step up here and we’ll address it.
    (Emphasis added). Furthermore, after the trial court instructed the jury, Defendant
    had a second opportunity to object to the instructions, as evidence by the following
    discussion:
    THE COURT:        All right. For purposes of the record,
    Madam Court Reporter, both the defendant and the State
    agreed with the jury charge word-for-word. There’s no
    objection to it.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No objection to any of it.
    (Emphasis added).
    Thus, it is apparent from the record that Defendant participated in a charge
    conference, and he had multiple opportunities to object. Because the trial court
    conducted a charge conference, the trial court did not err. Therefore, Defendant
    cannot show material prejudice, and his argument is without merit.
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    Conclusion
    Defendant received a fair trial, free from error.
    NO ERROR.
    Judges DILLON and ARROWOOD concur.
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