Walker-Snyder v. Snyder ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2022-NCCOA-97
No. COA21-186
Filed 15 February 2022
Mecklenburg County, No. 17 CVD 6303
LISA WALKER-SNYDER, Plaintiff,
v.
GERARD REGIS SNYDER, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from order entered 20 May 2020 by Judge Tracy H.
Hewett in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2
November 2021.
No brief filed for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Arnold & Smith, PLLC, by Matthew R. Arnold and Ashley A. Crowder, for
Defendant-Appellant.
GRIFFIN, Judge.
¶1 Defendant Gerard Regis Snyder appeals from a domestic violence protective
order entered against him and in favor of his daughter, Kristen Alexis Snyder.
Kristen’s mother, Plaintiff Lisa Walker-Snyder, pursued the order on Kristen’s
behalf. Defendant argues that the order should be vacated because (1) the trial court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the order and (2) competent evidence did
not support the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant committed an act of domestic
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violence. We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the order but that
the order was unsupported by competent evidence of domestic violence. We therefore
vacate the order entered against Defendant.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 Defendant and Plaintiff are former spouses. On 21 November 2019, Plaintiff
filed a motion in Mecklenburg County District Court requesting that the court issue
a protective order against Defendant “with respect to both [Plaintiff] and the parties’
minor child,” Kristen, who was 17 years old at the time. Plaintiff alleged in her
motion that “Defendant[] has committed acts of domestic violence against both
Plaintiff[] and the minor child[.]”
¶3 On 17 February 2020, a hearing was held on Plaintiff’s motion for a protective
order. Plaintiff tendered exhibits showing text message exchanges between
Defendant and Kristen which spanned from June to November of 2019. Kristen
testified during the hearing and characterized Defendant’s text messages to her as
follows:
A lot of them were just about my mom’s litigation and. . .
the interaction between them in court. Some of them were
about college, and how he was no longer going to be able to
pay for me to go. Some of them were odd, and earlier in the
morning, about just either not paying for college or no
longer being [able] to pay for my car. So it was those,
basically, what I would receive.
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When asked how the messages made her feel, Kristen testified, “I really thought that
. . . it was really hurtful, and I just didn’t know what . . . to do with all of this. . . . [I]t
feels that I’m always anxious and upset to get these.”
¶4 On 20 May 2020, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order
with respect to Kristen but denied Plaintiff’s request for a protective order for herself.
The order stated that Defendant’s text messages to Kristen “placed [Kristen] in fear
of continued harassment that rises to such a level as to inflict substantial emotional
distress[.]” Defendant timely filed notice of appeal from the trial court’s order.
II. Analysis
¶5 Defendant argues that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order
because Kristen attained the age of majority before the order was entered and (2)
competent evidence did not support the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant
committed an act of domestic violence. Although the trial court had jurisdiction to
enter the order, we vacate the order for lack of competent evidence of domestic
violence.
A. Jurisdiction
¶6 Defendant argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the protective
order because Kristen “had reached the age of majority” before the order was entered.
Defendant contends that “[o]nce [Kristen] reached the age of 18,” a protective order
“could no longer be entered on her behalf[] as a minor child of Plaintiff[.]” We
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disagree.
¶7 “Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to deal with the
kind of action in question” and “is conferred upon the courts by either the North
Carolina Constitution or by statute.” Harris v. Pembaur, 84 N.C. App. 666, 667, 353
S.E.2d 673, 675 (1987) (citation omitted). With respect to domestic violence protective
orders, subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by statute:
Any person residing in this State may seek relief under this
Chapter by filing a civil action or by filing a motion in any
existing action filed under Chapter 50 of the General
Statutes alleging acts of domestic violence against himself
or herself or a minor child who resides with or is in the
custody of such person. Any aggrieved party entitled to
relief under this Chapter may file a civil action and proceed
pro se, without the assistance of legal counsel. The district
court division of the General Court of Justice shall have
original jurisdiction over actions instituted under this
Chapter.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2(a) (2019).
¶8 We conclude the above-referenced statute provided the trial court with
jurisdiction to enter the protective order. Kristen was seventeen years old when
Plaintiff filed the motion for a protective order on her behalf. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-
2(a) provides that district courts “shall have original jurisdiction over actions
instituted under this Chapter.” Id. Because Plaintiff filed her motion while Kristen
was still a minor, the trial court had jurisdiction to act on the motion and enter the
protective order.
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¶9 Plaintiff also argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because a summons
was not issued to Defendant after Plaintiff filed her motion. See id. (“Any action for
a domestic violence protective order requires that a summons be issued and served.”).
“The purpose of the summons is to[,]” inter alia, “give jurisdiction of the subject
matter of litigation and the parties in that connection[.]” In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343,
346, 677 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2009). However, “when the parties are voluntarily before
the [c]ourt, and . . . a judgment is entered in favor of one party and against another,
such judgment is valid, although not granted according to the orderly course of
procedure.” Id. (citation omitted). Because Defendant appeared at and participated
in the hearing voluntarily, the trial court had jurisdiction to enter its order.
B. Competent Evidence of Domestic Violence
¶ 10 Defendant argues that the trial court’s order was unsupported by competent
evidence of domestic violence. Specifically, Defendant contends that there was no
competent evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant “placed
[Kristen] in fear of continued harassment that rises to such a level as to inflict
substantial emotional distress.” We agree.
¶ 11 We review a domestic violence protective order to determine “whether there
was competent evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether its
conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts. Where there is competent
evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact, those findings are binding on
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appeal.” Hensey v. Hennessy, 201 N.C. App. 56, 59, 685 S.E.2d 541, 544 (2009). “The
trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal.” Bunting v. Bunting,
266 N.C. App. 243, 249, 832 S.E.2d 183, 188 (2019) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
¶ 12 “To support entry of a [protective order], the trial court must make a conclusion
of law ‘that an act of domestic violence occurred.’” Kennedy v. Morgan, 221 N.C. App.
219, 223, 726 S.E.2d 193, 196 (2012) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a) (2011)).
“Although N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a) states that the trial court must ‘find’ that an act
of domestic violence occurred, in fact this is a conclusion of law; the trial court must
make findings of fact based upon the definition of domestic violence to support this
conclusion[.]” Id. at 223, 726 S.E.2d at 196 n.2. “While the trial court need not set
forth the evidence in detail[,] it does need to make findings of ultimate fact which are
supported by the evidence; the findings must identify the basis for the ‘act of domestic
violence.’” Id. at 223, 726 S.E.2d at 196.
¶ 13 Here, the trial court concluded that Defendant’s text messages to Kristen
“placed [her] in fear of continued harassment that rises to such a level as to inflict
substantial emotional distress.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3A defines “harassment” as
“[k]nowing conduct . . . directed at a specific person that torments, terrorizes, or
terrifies that person and that serves no legitimate purpose.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
277.3A(b)(2) (2019). “The plain language of the statute requires the trial court to
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apply only a subjective test to determine whether the aggrieved party was in actual
fear; no inquiry is made as to whether such fear was objectively reasonable under the
circumstances.” Bunting, 266 N.C. App. at 250, 832 S.E.2d at 188 (citation omitted).
“Substantial emotional distress” is defined as “[s]ignificant mental suffering or
distress that may, but does not necessarily, require medical or other professional
treatment or counseling.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3A(b)(4).
¶ 14 We conclude that competent evidence does not support the conclusion that
Defendant’s texts to Kristen “torment[ed], terrorize[d], or terrifie[d]” her. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-277.3A(b)(2). When asked to describe Defendant’s texts to her, Kristen
testified,
A lot of them were just about my mom’s litigation and . . .
the interaction between them in court. Some of them were
about college, and how he was no longer going to be able to
pay for me to go. Some of them were odd, and earlier in the
morning, about just either not paying for college or no
longer being [able] to pay for my car. So it was those,
basically, what I would receive.
When asked how the messages made her feel, Kristen testified, “I really thought that
. . . it was really hurtful, and I just didn’t know what . . . to do with all of this. . . . [I]t
feels that I’m always anxious and upset to get these.”
¶ 15 At no point did Kristen’s testimony indicate that she was in any state of fear
because of Defendant’s text messages to her. If anything, her texts to Defendant
indicate the opposite. For example, after receiving one message from Defendant
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about finances, Kristen replied, “Oh boy I’m really shook [laughing emoji.]” Her other
responses to Defendant’s messages were similarly flippant and did not indicate any
state of fear. At no point did Kristen attempt to block Defendant from texting her.
Instead, she continuously replied to the messages she received.
¶ 16 Moreover, Kristen’s testimony did not assert substantial emotional distress
stemming from Defendant’s messages to her. Being generally “anxious” or “upset”
about Defendant’s conduct cannot constitute substantial emotional distress. If such
feelings rose to the level of substantial emotional distress under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
277.3A(b)(4), then we would cease to have any real standard at all for “substantial”
emotional distress.
¶ 17 We are mindful that “[w]here the trial judge sits as the finder of fact, and where
different reasonable inferences can be drawn from the evidence, the determination of
which reasonable inferences shall be drawn is for the trial judge.” Wornstaff v.
Wornstaff, 179 N.C. App. 516, 519, 634 S.E.2d 567, 569 (2006) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “[T]he trial court was present to see and hear the
inflections, tone, and temperament of the witnesses, and . . . we are forced to review
a cold record.” Id. Here, however, the Record contains no evidence that Kristen was
“torment[ed], terrorize[d], or terrifie[d]” by Defendant’s text messages to her. N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-277.3A(b)(2). Her own testimony as well as her messages to
Defendant indicate that she was not in any state of fear. There is also no evidence of
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substantial emotional distress. We therefore vacate the protective order entered
against Defendant for lack of competent evidence of domestic violence.
III. Conclusion
¶ 18 We hold that the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the order against
Defendant pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-2(a). However, we vacate the order for
lack of competent evidence of domestic violence.
VACATED.
Judges MURPHY and JACKSON concur.