State v. Hauser ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA19-313
Filed: 19 May 2020
Chatham County, No. 17 CRS 050502
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
DAQUEZZ SEMAJ HAUSER, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 3 October 2018 by Judge G.
Bryan Collins, Jr. in Chatham County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of
Appeals 2 October 2019.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General
Victoria L. Voight, for the State.
Erica W. Washington for defendant-appellant.
MURPHY, Judge.
A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling “is manifestly unsupported
by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned
decision.” State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988).
Defendant fails to show the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a
mistrial following the inadvertent display of an image to the jury that bore
similarity to one which had been excluded from evidence. We evaluate the
prejudicial effect of the erroneous evidence by considering the “nature of the
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Opinion of the Court
evidence and the circumstances of the particular case.” State v. Aldridge, 254 N.C.
297, 300, 118 S.E.2d 766, 768 (1961). In light of the nature of the erroneously
displayed photograph, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury to disregard
the image instead of declaring a mistrial.
However, we remand for correction of a clerical error in the written judgment
to reflect a sentence of intermediate punishment, rather than community
punishment, consistent with the trial court’s intermediate punishments, as
pronounced in Defendant’s presence.
BACKGROUND
Daquezz Semaj Hauser, Defendant, was indicted for obtaining property by
false pretenses by selling boxes purportedly containing iPhones that contained only
lug nuts. At trial, the State attempted to introduce State’s Exhibit 17, a photograph
of Defendant taken from his personal Facebook page. The photograph depicted
Defendant posing expressionless with three cell phones. Defendant objected to the
admission of the photograph and the trial court sustained the objection, having
applied the Rule 403 balancing test. The State then sought to introduce State’s
Exhibit 18, which included photographs of the vehicles of both Defendant and the
individuals who had sought to purchase phones from him. Exhibit 18 was admitted
without objection.
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However, in attempting to publish Exhibit 18 on the courtroom’s overhead
video display to the jury, the desktop screen of the State was shown instead. The
desktop screen displayed a picture of Defendant holding several phones, wearing
gold necklaces, and standing in front of a mirror. The prosecutor’s screen was
visible for several seconds before being removed. At the bench conference that
followed, Defendant moved for a mistrial based on the potentially prejudicial nature
of the photograph and its similarity to State’s Exhibit 17, which had been ruled
inadmissible shortly before. The trial court denied the mistrial request but
instructed the jury to “disregard anything that might have flashed up on the screen
right then.”
Defendant was found guilty of obtaining property by false pretenses and
sentenced to a suspended sentence of 6 to 17 months, with 36 months probation. An
89-day active term was imposed as a special condition of Defendant’s suspended
sentence. Defendant appealed and later requested to amend the Record to include a
more complete narrative regarding the projection of the desktop screen and the
bench conference that followed. The trial court subsequently granted that motion,
pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 11(c), and agreed with Defendant’s narrative summary.
ANALYSIS
A. Mistrial
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Opinion of the Court
“The decision to grant or deny a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of
the trial court and will be reversed on appeal only upon a clear showing that the
trial court abused its discretion.” State v. Hurst, 360 N.C. 181, 188, 624 S.E.2d 309,
316 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A mistrial should be granted only
when there are improprieties in the trial so serious that they substantially and
irreparably prejudice the defendant’s case and make it impossible for the defendant
to receive a fair and impartial verdict.” State v. Warren, 327 N.C. 364, 376, 395
S.E.2d 116, 123 (1990); N.C.G.S. § 15A-1061 (2019). “[A] trial court’s decision
concerning a motion for mistrial will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a
clear showing that the trial court abused its discretion.” State v. Bonney, 329 N.C.
61, 73, 405 S.E.2d 145, 152 (1991). “Abuse of discretion results where the court’s
ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have
been the result of a reasoned decision.” Hennis, 323 N.C. at 285, 372 S.E.2d at 527.
“The trial court's decision in this regard is to be afforded great deference since the
trial court is in a far better position than an appellate court to determine whether
the degree of influence on the jury was irreparable.” State v. King, 343 N.C. 29, 44,
468 S.E. 2d 232, 242 (1996).
“Our system of justice is based upon the assumption that trial jurors are
women and men of character and of sufficient intelligence to fully understand and
comply with the instructions of the court, and are presumed to have done so.” State
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v. Hines, 131 N.C. App. 457, 462, 508 S.E.2d 310, 314 (1998) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, when a trial court acknowledges an
evidentiary error “and instructs the jury to disregard it, the refusal to grant a
mistrial based on the introduction of the evidence will ordinarily not constitute an
abuse of discretion.” State v. Barts, 316 N.C. 666, 684, 343 S.E.2d 828, 840 (1986);
see State v. Upchurch, 332 N.C. 439, 450, 421 S.E.2d 577, 583 (1992) (stating that
“[w]hen a court properly instructs jurors not to consider certain statements, any
prejudice is ordinarily cured”). Indeed, we “have generally held that where
inadmissible evidence is published to the jury, a trial court may cure this error by
instructing the jury not to consider that specific evidence.” Hines, 131 N.C. App. at
462-63, 508 S.E.2d at 314.
However, a trial court abuses its discretion by not granting a mistrial when
the jurors cannot recall which information they must exclude from their
consideration, whether due to the large amount of evidence at issue, the
insufficiently detailed cautionary instruction itself, or a combination of the two. Id.In Hines, we held that a jury must be able to differentiate the improper evidence
from proper evidence, and that a mistrial is appropriate when the jury cannot do so.
Id., 131 N.C. App. at 463-464, 508 S.E.2d at 314-315. Additionally, a trial court’s
instruction must clearly and completely identify the evidence that the jury must
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disregard, and failure to so instruct is error. Id. While these factors were present in
Hines, neither are present in this case.
By contrast, a trial court does not abuse its discretion upon “immediate and
thorough curative action taken by the trial court” to clearly and completely identify
the evidence the jury must disregard. Barts, 316 N.C. at 684, 343 S.E.2d at 840. In
Barts, the Supreme Court held that a single, discrete incident of improper
testimony where multiple robbery “jobs” were referenced, instead of just one, could
be cured. Id. There, the trial court asked the jury if they could disregard the
improper testimony and all jurors responded affirmatively. Id.“In some cases, however, the cautionary admonitions of the trial judge are
ineffective to erase from the minds of a jury the effects of prejudicial errors.” Hines,
131 N.C. App. at 463, 508 S.E.2d at 314 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Whether the erroneous admission of . . . evidence . . . should be deemed cured and
held nonprejudicial . . . depend[s] largely upon the nature of the evidence and the
circumstances of the particular case.” Aldridge, 254 N.C. at 300, 118 S.E.2d at 768.
Per Aldridge, we consider “the nature of the evidence and the circumstances”
of Defendant’s case, such as the nature of the evidence erroneously admitted and
the principle issue in contention at Defendant’s trial. Id. Here, Defendant was
indicted and convicted of obtaining property by false pretenses. At trial, “a key
element of [obtaining property by false pretenses was] that [Defendant’s]
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representation [to the victims was] intentionally false and deceptive.” State v.
Compton, 90 N.C. App. 101, 103, 367 S.E.2d 353, 354 (1988). “A person’s intent is
seldom provable by direct evidence, and must usually be shown through
circumstantial evidence.” Compton, 90 N.C. App. at 104, 367 S.E.2d at 355. For
instance, in a case where the defendant obtained insurance proceeds by false
pretenses, we held the defendant’s failure to respond to her insurance company and
failure to attend or reschedule an examination “raised a reasonable inference as to
her awareness that her claims were fraudulent.” State v. Holanek, 242 N.C. App.
633, 651, 776 S.E.2d 225, 238 (2015).
As in Holanek, the present case included enough evidence for a reasonable
inference that Defendant was aware his claims were fraudulent. Prior to the
transactions taking place, Defendant had been in regular communication with the
victims through Facebook and text message regarding the sales but immediately
ceased all contact once the transactions had taken place. As a condition of each
sale, Defendant forbade the purchasers from opening the boxes prior to his receiving
payment and he left the premises (running in one case) before the boxes were
opened. The circumstantial evidence of Defendant’s behavior “raised a reasonable
inference as to [his] awareness” that his actions were fraudulent. Id.-7-
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In considering the nature of the erroneous evidence, we look to the Record.
The trial court approved the following “appropriate and factually accurate”
narrative:
. . . During [Defendant]’s trial, the prosecutor offered
State’s Exhibit 18, a photo of the vehicle [Defendant]
drove, into evidence without objection. The prosecutor
then moved to publish Exhibit 18 to the jury using the
courtroom’s overhead video display. (Tp. 303). The Court
video system displays to a large screen that is in view of
the jury, and on a smaller screen in front of defense
counsel and the judge. The Court granted the prosecutor’s
motion to publish Exhibit 18 (Tp. 303). The prosecutor,
unable to locate a digital copy of Exhibit 18, displayed her
desktop file explorer screen to the jury instead.
Her desktop file screen displayed an image of [Defendant]
with several phones in hand, wearing gold necklaces, and
standing in front of a mirror. Three minutes earlier, the
Court had not allowed State’s Exhibit 17, a very similar
image, into evidence based upon a Rule 403 analysis. (See
Tp. 301). (emphasis added).
Once defense counsel noticed the image displayed, an
objection was made. At 10:43:50 the prosecutor apologized
and the screen display was disconnected. (Tp. 303). A
bench conference was held off the record and out of the
hearing of the jury. Defense counsel contended at the
bench conference that the photo and the list of descriptive
file names on the desktop screen were prejudicial to
[Defendant] and counsel moved for a mistrial. The Court
denied that motion. Following the conference, the Court
gave the jury a limiting instruction, telling them to
“disregard anything that might have flashed up on the
screen right then.” (Tp. 304).
The Record does not contain an image of the desktop screen, but the transcript is in
accord with the Record Supplement’s narrative:
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[Prosecutor]: Did -- but you also looked through his
Facebook page; is that right?
[Detective]: Yes.
[Prosecutor]: And found some images?
[Defense]: Objection.
THE COURT: Approach the bench. Let me see those
while we are at it.
(A bench conference was held off the record and out of the
hearing of the jury . . . .)
THE COURT: All right. Under a Rule 403 analysis, the
State’s proffer of [Exhibit 17] is not allowed. The
defendant’s objection is sustained . . . [.] All right.
...
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I offer State’s Exhibit
Number 18 and ask that it be published.
[Defense]: No objection.
THE COURT: Without objection let it be received, and
motion to publish is allowed.
(State’s Exhibit Number 18 was received into evidence.)
[Defense]: Your Honor, objection.
[Prosecutor]: Oh, sorry.
[Defense]: May we approach?
[Prosecutor]: Sorry, Your Honor. I am unable to locate it
on the system. So if I could just stand before the jury.
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THE COURT: Yes, you can approach. Hang on.
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, disregard anything
that might have flashed up on the screen right then. All
right. (emphasis added).
The nature of the evidence and circumstances of Defendant’s case bear
similarities to both Barts and Hines, but in effect, are more easily distinguished.
The circumstances are most similar to Hines as inadmissible evidence was
inadvertently published to the jury; however, unlike the jury in Hines, the jury here
did not face the same “impossible task” of distinguishing among forty documents
and deciding what to remember and what to disregard. Hines, 131 N.C. App. at
462-463, 508 S.E.2d at 314. Unlike the jury in Hines, this jury only had to
disregard one image displayed for several seconds; additionally, the trial court told
them to disregard it—a possible task. The jurors could “fully understand and
comply with the instructions of the court, and are presumed to have done so.” Id.Moreover, unlike in Hines, we do not have a second independent piece of
inadmissible evidence “inadvertently published to the jury” that lacked a limiting
instruction. Id. Closer to Barts, the trial court here took “immediate . . . curative
action” to quarantine all inadmissible evidence. Barts, 316 N.C. at 684, 343 S.E.2d
at 840.
To be sure, unlike Barts, the trial court here did not ask and confirm whether
the jury could follow its instruction. Disregarding a single image is not as indelible
as disregarding a witness’s testimony about multiple robbery “jobs” when told only
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Opinion of the Court
to consider the witness’s testimony about a single “job.” The trial court did not
abuse its discretion by issuing just a curative instruction to address any resulting
prejudice to Defendant from the inadvertent showing of the picture.
Defendant also asserts “[t]he State sought to play on a racial trope in order to
fill [this hole and other] holes in their case” by flashing an image “that could evoke
negative racial associations in the viewer.” “Whether direct racial slurs, or indirect
appeals to racial prejudice, when a prosecutor seeks to invoke a jury’s racial biases
to obtain a conviction, such statements are improper.” State v. Copley, 839 S.E.2d
726 (N.C. 2020) (Earls, J., concurring). However, the inadvertent display of an
allegedly prejudicial desktop screen is not equivalent to a prosecutor’s intentional
appeal to a jury’s emotions via improper and clear reference to a defendant’s race.
There were no arguments or references made to any aspect of this photograph
either directly or indirectly by the State. We see no evidence to support the State
having used the inadvertent display of the desktop screen to fill a hole in its case or
to interject race into the trial.
Defendant also contends the nature of the photograph itself had the potential
to evoke “negative racial associations” upon being viewed by the jury. We likewise
see no evidence that that was the case or find the photograph to be prejudicial based
on race.
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After considering the nature of the evidence and the circumstances of this
case, Defendant has not overcome the presumption that the jury was able to
understand and comply with the trial court’s limiting instruction. It remained
possible for him to receive a fair and impartial verdict. The trial court’s ruling was
not manifestly unsupported by reason or so arbitrary that it could not have been the
result of a reasoned decision. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion.
B. Clerical Error
Defendant argues the trial court imposed community punishment in
accordance with N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.17(c); thus, Defendant contends the sentence
of 36 months supervised probation was erroneous under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343.2
(d)(3). The State argues Defendant was sentenced to an intermediate punishment,
in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.17(c), as reflected in both the sentencing
hearing transcript and the judgment, and further, the box checked “community
punishment” instead of “intermediate punishment” was a clerical error.
“When [we are] confronted with statutory errors regarding sentencing issues,
such errors are questions of law, and as such, are reviewed de novo.” State v. Allen,
249 N.C. App. 376, 379, 790 S.E.2d 588, 591 (2016) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). “When a defendant assigns error to the sentence imposed by the
trial court our standard of review is whether [the] sentence is supported by evidence
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introduced at the trial and sentencing hearing.” State v. Chivers, 180 N.C. App.
275, 278, 636 S.E.2d 590, 593 (2006) (citation omitted); see N.C.G.S. § 15A-444(a1)
(2019). A clerical error is “[a]n error resulting from a minor mistake or
inadvertence, esp[ecially] in writing or copying something on the record, and not
from judicial reasoning or determination.” State v. Jarman, 140 N.C. App. 198, 202,
535 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2000) (citation omitted). “When, on appeal, a clerical error is
discovered in the trial court's judgment or order, it is appropriate to remand the
case to the trial court for correction because of the importance that the record speak
the truth.” State v. Smith, 188 N.C. App. 842, 845, 656 S.E.2d 695, 696-97 (2008)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In Allen, we remanded a sentencing error where the original written order
indicated the defendant was sentenced to intermediate punishment, rather than
community punishment. Allen, 249 N.C. App. at 382, 790 S.E. 2d at 592. We did so
because the Record reflected the trial court and prosecutor both stated the plea
agreement contained an assignment of community punishment, the trial court
stated it was sentencing the defendant to community punishment and correctly
stated the requirements for community punishment, the first page of the original
written order assigned community punishment, and a 10-day jail sentence would be
in compliance with community punishment requirements. Allen, 249 N.C. App. at
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381-82, 790 S.E.2d at 592. A subsequent modified order was vacated because it
reflected the clerical error in the original order. Id.
This Record reflects a similar error and we hold it was clerical. Based on his
prior record level, Defendant was sentenced for a Class H felony at Level I, eligible
to receive either intermediate or community punishment.1 See N.C.G.S. § 15A-
1340.17(c). The State requested intermediate punishment and Defendant requested
community punishment.
The trial court manifested its decision for an intermediate punishment,
sentencing Defendant to 36 months supervised probation2 and an 89-day period of
confinement, the bulk of which was to be served on weekends. The probation
sentence was in excess of the community punishment maximum sentence of 30
months. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1343.2(d)(3). Defendant’s sentence, an intermediate
punishment, was also reflected in his judgment.
Defendant’s split sentence was enumerated within the “Intermediate
Punishments” section of the judgment and reflects what was specified in the
sentencing hearing. By contrast, the “Community and Intermediate Probation
Conditions” section has no such marks. The only indication regarding community
punishment is a checkmark in the box for community punishment at the top of the
1 Defendant was also eligible for an active sentence. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.17(c).
2 The trial court pronounced Defendant’s sentence of 36 months probation twice during
sentencing.
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judgment. When considering in total the sentencing hearing, the conditions
imposed by the trial court in Defendant’s presence, and the written judgment, we
conclude the mark in the community punishment box was clerical error, “resulting
from a minor mistake or inadvertence . . . and not from judicial reasoning or
determination.” Jarman, 140 N.C. App. at 202, 535 S.E.2d at 878. We remand to
the trial court for correction.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion for
a mistrial. We remand for correction of a clerical error in the written judgment to
be consistent with the trial court’s imposed sentence.
NO ERROR IN PART; REMANDED FOR CORRECTION OF CLERICAL
ERROR.
Judges ZACHARY and ARROWOOD concur.
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