State v. King ( 2022 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    2022-NCCOA-59
    No. COA21-93
    Filed 1 February 2022
    Burke County, No. 18 CRS 050914
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    DARIUS HEASLEY KING, Defendant.
    Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 17 March 2020 by Judge Alan Z.
    Thornburg in Burke County Superior Court.           Heard in the Court of Appeals 2
    November 2021.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Marc
    Bernstein, for the State.
    Hynson Law, PLLC, by Warren D. Hynson, for Defendant.
    GRIFFIN, Judge.
    ¶1         Defendant Darius Heasley King appeals from the trial court’s judgment
    entering a jury verdict finding Defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Defendant
    contends (1) the State failed to present substantial evidence of premeditation and
    deliberation; (2) the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury ex
    mero motu on the defense of automatism; (3) the trial court abused its discretion by
    not intervening ex mero motu to prevent improper juror questioning during voir dire;
    and (4) the trial court reversibly erred by not intervening ex mero motu to prevent
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    improper remarks in the State’s closing statement. We discern no error.
    I.   Factual and Procedural Background
    ¶2         This case arises out of the murder of Hubert Roland Hunter, Jr., by Defendant
    in Hunter’s apartment on 24 March 2018. The evidence at trial tended to show as
    follows:
    ¶3         Defendant and Hunter lived across the hall from one another in the Sienna
    apartment complex in Morganton. Mary Williams lived in the apartment directly
    underneath Hunter. Around midnight on the night of 24 March 2018, Williams heard
    a “big ruckus upstairs” coming from Hunter’s apartment and thought someone “was
    just playing or something.” Williams heard a “whole lot of stomping and moving
    around and shuffling”, but was not concerned because she routinely heard running
    noises coming from Hunter’s apartment. Williams did not call the police.
    ¶4         The next afternoon, two of Hunter’s friends attempted to visit with Hunter at
    his apartment and instead found his body lying on the apartment floor. Hunter’s
    friends called the police. Police arrived at Hunter’s apartment and discovered his
    body still lying on the floor, surrounded by signs of an altercation. Hunter’s body was
    lying face-down across the threshold between his bedroom and hallway, blood
    staining the side of his face and his right arm bent behind his back. A plastic bag
    and an orange and blue sweatshirt were on the floor near Hunter’s head. Bloodstains
    scattered the nearby floor and walls. Three kitchen drawers were left open. In the
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    living room, an area rug was “[b]unched up” and the couch and other furniture were
    in disarray.
    ¶5         Shortly thereafter, a maintenance worker with the Sienna apartment complex
    reported to police that he discovered a white plastic bag containing bloodstained
    clothing in a dumpster behind the apartments. Police recovered the bag from the
    dumpster, and found a pair of jeans and an eight-inch kitchen knife inside the bag.
    The jeans and knife were also stained with what appeared to be blood.
    ¶6         The State conducted DNA analysis on items found in Hunter’s apartment and
    the dumpster. DNA on the knife and a section of the orange and blue sweatshirt
    matched Hunter’s DNA. DNA found on the knife also indicated a second, minor
    contributor, but the analysis was inconclusive and the State could not determine
    whether Defendant “did or did not handle the handle of the knife.” The collar of the
    sweatshirt and the waist of the jeans contained DNA matching Defendant. The
    State’s medical examiner also examined the injuries on Hunter’s body.          Hunter
    sustained three stabbing and slashing wounds to his neck, one of which was deep
    enough to fracture his spine. He also sustained blunt force injuries to his head, arms,
    and legs. Additionally, the medical examiner identified evidence of hemorrhaging in
    Hunter’s blood vessels, neck muscles, and tongue, which led the medical examiner to
    conclude that strangulation was the ultimate cause of Hunter’s death.
    ¶7         Law enforcement interviewed Defendant multiple times. The State played
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    recordings of Defendant’s interviews for the jury. During the first interview on 26
    March 2018, Defendant told law enforcement that, though he knew Hunter, he did
    not know Hunter had been killed, did not know any reason why Hunter would have
    been killed, and personally would not have fought with Hunter.
    ¶8         Law enforcement arrested Defendant and interviewed him again the next day.
    During this second interview, Defendant told law enforcement that he went to
    Hunter’s apartment on March 24 to collect three dollars that Hunter owed him for a
    cell phone. Defendant said that Hunter refused to pay him. Defendant explained
    that he threatened to “beat the [expletive] out of [Hunter]”, and Hunter “pulled a
    knife” in response. Defendant then “walked up on [Hunter]” and the two began
    fighting. Defendant admitted that he punched Hunter, choked him, and put the
    plastic bag over his head, but denied stabbing Hunter. According to Defendant,
    Hunter held the knife during the entirety of the fight and was incidentally stabbed
    in the neck while Hunter and Defendant wrestled. Defendant admitted that he took
    the knife out of Hunter’s neck, then threw his own bloodstained jeans and the knife
    into the dumpster behind the apartment complex.
    ¶9         Throughout the second interview, Defendant maintained that he fought in self-
    defense after Hunter grabbed the knife. Defendant told law enforcement that he
    believed Hunter wanted to hurt him with the knife. Defendant insisted Hunter had
    used the knife to cut him, and showed law enforcement cuts on his hands and arms.
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    Defendant admitted that he had choked Hunter in an attempt to make him pass out
    and stop fighting. Defendant claimed that he had also passed out at some point
    during the struggle, and that he had “blacked out” and “go[ne] off” out of anger.
    ¶ 10         Law enforcement took Defendant to the magistrate’s office following his arrest,
    where Defendant gave a third interview to news media.           Defendant once again
    explained that he went to collect money from Hunter, then beat Hunter with his fists
    in self-defense when Hunter pulled out a knife.
    ¶ 11         Defendant presented a single witness before the jury, a friend who testified
    that he was with Defendant most of the day and evening on 24 March 2018 and
    claimed Defendant never mentioned Hunter. At the close of the State’s evidence and
    at the close of all evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss the charge of first-degree
    murder, arguing the State failed to show sufficient evidence of premeditation and
    deliberation. The trial court denied both motions. The jury found Defendant guilty
    of first-degree murder. The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict and
    sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
    Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.
    II.    Analysis
    A. Preservation
    ¶ 12         Defendant filed a conditional petition for writ of certiorari alongside his brief
    on appeal, asking this Court to consider his appeal of the trial court’s judgment in the
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    event that defense counsel’s oral notice of appeal was insufficient. Rule 4 of the North
    Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure states that a party may “appeal from a
    judgment or order of a superior or district court rendered in a criminal action” by
    “giving oral notice of appeal at trial,” and such notice “shall designate the judgment
    or order from which appeal is taken and the court to which appeal is taken[.]” N.C.
    R. App. P. 4(a)(1), (b) (emphasis added).
    ¶ 13         Here, defense counsel informed the trial court in open court: “With respect to
    jury’s verdict, we enter a notice of appeal.” Defense counsel did not specifically state
    that Defendant sought to appeal from the trial court’s judgment entering the jury
    verdict.   Nonetheless, Defense counsel’s words were clear enough to convey
    Defendant’s intent to appeal his first-degree murder conviction to this Court.
    Furthermore, both parties have complied at each stage of the appellate process and
    the State has not been prejudiced by the imperfect wording of Defendant’s appeal.
    See State v. Daughtridge, 
    248 N.C. App. 707
    , 712, 
    789 S.E.2d 667
    , 670 (2016) (holding
    the “[d]efendant’s oral notice of appeal was sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon this
    Court” even though defense counsel’s language was “not a model of clarity,” where
    the language “manifest[ed] [the d]efendant’s intention to enter a notice of appeal” and
    “the State [did] not contend that it was misled or prejudiced in any way by any defect
    in [the d]efendant’s notice of appeal”). Therefore, we hold that Defendant’s oral notice
    of appeal sufficiently conferred jurisdiction on this Court. We dismiss Defendant’s
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    Opinion of the Court
    conditional petition for writ of certiorari as moot.
    ¶ 14         However, Defendant has preserved for review only the trial court’s judgment
    entering the jury’s verdict convicting him of first-degree murder. In his brief on
    appeal, Defendant includes factual and procedural history from a pre-trial hearing
    regarding Defendant’s competency to stand trial. The Record contains no notice of
    appeal challenging the trial court’s decision from the competency hearing. Therefore,
    we consider only the evidence presented in Defendant’s first-degree murder trial in
    our review.
    B. Premeditation and Deliberation
    ¶ 15         Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss by
    arguing “there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support
    first-degree murder.”
    ¶ 16         We review the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss to determine whether,
    in the light most favorable to the State, “there [was] substantial evidence (1) of each
    essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and
    (2) of [the] defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.” State v. Powell, 
    299 N.C. 95
    , 98, 
    261 S.E.2d 114
    , 117 (1980). This Court’s review is “concerned only about
    whether the evidence [was] sufficient for jury consideration, not about the weight of
    the evidence.” State v. Fritsch, 
    351 N.C. 373
    , 379, 
    526 S.E.2d 451
    , 455–56 (2000)
    (citation omitted). “Contradictions and discrepancies do not warrant dismissal of the
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    case but are for the jury to resolve.” 
    Id. at 379
    , 
    526 S.E.2d at 455
     (citation omitted).
    ¶ 17         “First-degree murder is the intentional and unlawful killing of a human being
    with malice and with premeditation and deliberation.” State v. Thomas, 
    350 N.C. 315
    , 346, 
    514 S.E.2d 486
    , 505 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 
    528 U.S. 1006
     (1999).
    “’Premeditation means that the act was thought over beforehand for some length of
    time,’ however short.” State v. Leazer, 
    353 N.C. 234
    , 238, 
    539 S.E.2d 922
    , 925 (2000)
    (citation omitted). “Deliberation means an intent to kill, carried out in a cool state of
    blood, in furtherance of a fixed design for revenge or to accomplish an unlawful
    purpose and not under the influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by legal
    provocation or lawful or just cause.” State v. Trull, 
    349 N.C. 428
    , 448, 
    509 S.E.2d 178
    , 191 (1998) (citation omitted).     “Premeditation and deliberation are mental
    processes which are ordinarily . . . prove[n] by circumstantial evidence.” State v.
    Olson, 
    330 N.C. 557
    , 565, 
    411 S.E.2d 592
    , 596 (1992). Our Courts have found that
    the following circumstances can evidence premeditation and deliberation:
    (1) absence of provocation on the part of the deceased, (2)
    the statements and conduct of the defendant before and
    after the killing, (3) threats and declarations of the
    defendant before and during the occurrence giving rise to
    the death of the deceased, (4) ill will or previous difficulties
    between the parties, (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the
    deceased has been felled and rendered helpless, (6)
    evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner, and
    (7) the nature and number of the victim's wounds.
    
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
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    Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 18         Defendant’s conduct immediately before, during, and after the altercation with
    Hunter provides sufficient, substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation.
    The State’s evidence showed that Defendant went to Hunter’s apartment because he
    believed Hunter possessed money that rightfully belonged to him, and demanded that
    Hunter give it to him. Defendant threatened to “beat the [expletive] out of [Hunter].”
    See State v. Potter, 
    295 N.C. 126
    , 131, 
    244 S.E.2d 397
    , 401 (1978) (holding that
    “evidence of [the] defendant’s earlier threats against deceased[ and] his statements
    made shortly after the killing” allowed “legitimate inferences of premeditation and
    deliberation to be drawn”). The State’s medical examiner also testified that Hunter
    sustained three stabbing and slashing wounds to his neck, fracturing his spine; blunt
    force injuries to his head, arms, and legs; and hemorrhaging in his blood vessels, neck
    muscles, and tongue. See State v. Robbins, 
    319 N.C. 465
    , 511–12, 
    356 S.E.2d 279
    ,
    306 (1987) (“[T]he nature and number of the victim’s wounds is a circumstance from
    which premeditation and deliberation can be inferred.” (citation omitted)). Defendant
    did not call the police after he fought with Hunter, or otherwise seek medical
    assistance. Rather, Defendant went home and slept, then disposed of his bloodied
    jeans and the knife in a dumpster the next day. See State v. Taylor, 
    362 N.C. 514
    ,
    532, 
    669 S.E.2d 239
    , 257 (2008) (“[The defendant’s] attempts to cover up his
    participation in the murder also support a finding of premeditation and deliberation.”
    (citation omitted)); State v. Sierra, 
    335 N.C. 753
    , 759, 
    440 S.E.2d 791
    , 795 (1994)
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    (considering as evidence of premeditation and deliberation that “[a]fter the shooting,
    [the] defendant returned home, hid the murder weapon, and went to sleep”). In the
    light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and
    deliberation to submit the charge of first-degree murder to the jury.
    ¶ 19         Defendant contends the evidence that he “blacked out when [Hunter] got that
    knife in his hand” and that Hunter attacked Defendant with the knife “fatally
    undermined the State’s theory of premeditation and deliberation” because the
    evidence showed that Defendant fought Hunter “in a state of passion” in response to
    “sufficient provocation” by Hunter. See State v. Corn, 
    303 N.C. 293
    , 298, 
    278 S.E.2d 221
    , 224 (1981) (holding insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation
    where “[a]ll the evidence tend[ed] to show that [the] defendant shot [the victim] after
    a quarrel, in a state of passion, without aforethought or calm consideration”
    (emphasis added)); State v. Huggins, 
    338 N.C. 494
    , 498, 
    450 S.E.2d 479
    , 482 (1994)
    (“[W]ords or conduct not amounting to an assault or a threatened assault may be
    enough to arouse a sudden and sufficient passion in the perpetrator to negate
    deliberation[.]” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). However, this was only some
    of the evidence presented to the jury. There was other substantial evidence, as
    described above, which was sufficient to submit the issue of premeditation and
    deliberation to the jury, and it was for the jury to weigh the evidence presented.
    Fritsch, 
    351 N.C. at 379
    , 
    526 S.E.2d at
    455–56.
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    Opinion of the Court
    ¶ 20         The trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge
    of first-degree murder.
    C. Jury Instruction on Defense of Automatism
    ¶ 21         Defendant argues that the trial court “plainly erred in failing to instruct on the
    complete defense of automatism where that instruction was a substantial feature of
    the case arising from the evidence.” Defendant acknowledges that neither party
    requested a jury instruction on automatism and, therefore, the issue was not
    preserved for review by this Court. “[U]npreserved issues related to jury instructions
    are reviewed under a plain error standard[.]” State v. Collington, 
    375 N.C. 401
    , 410,
    
    847 S.E.2d 691
    , 698 (2020). “Defendant is entitled to relief only if the instructions
    amounted to plain error, which is error so fundamental as to amount to a miscarriage
    of justice or which probably resulted in the jury reaching a different verdict than it
    otherwise would have reached.” State v. Gainey, 
    355 N.C. 73
    , 106, 
    558 S.E.2d 463
    ,
    484 (2002) (citation, quotation marks, and internal marks omitted).
    ¶ 22         The trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on all substantive features of the
    case, regardless of whether a particular instruction is requested by a party. State v.
    Loftin, 
    322 N.C. 375
    , 381, 
    368 S.E.2d 613
    , 617 (1988). “All defenses arising from the
    evidence presented during the trial constitute substantive features of a case and
    therefore warrant the trial court’s instruction thereon.”       
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    However, “the trial court should never give instructions that are not supported by a
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    Opinion of the Court
    reasonable view of the evidence.” State v. Clark, 
    324 N.C. 146
    , 162, 
    377 S.E.2d 54
    ,
    64 (1989) (citation omitted); see 
    id.
     (“[E]vidence which merely shows it possible for
    the fact in issue to be as alleged, or which raises a mere conjecture that it was so, is
    an insufficient foundation for a verdict, and should not be left to the jury.” (citation
    omitted)).
    ¶ 23         Automatism, or unconsciousness, is a “complete defense to a criminal charge
    . . . because ‘[t]he absence of consciousness not only precludes the existence of any
    specific mental state, but also excludes the possibility of a voluntary act without
    which there can be no criminal liability.’” State v. Jerrett, 
    309 N.C. 239
    , 264–65, 
    307 S.E.2d 339
    , 353 (1983) (citation omitted). Automatism is, “under the law of this State,
    . . . an affirmative defense; and [] the burden rests upon the defendant to establish
    this defense, unless it arises out of the State’s own evidence, to the satisfaction of the
    jury.” State v. Caddell, 
    287 N.C. 266
    , 290, 
    215 S.E.2d 348
    , 363 (1975). Our Court has
    stated that if “the evidence of unconsciousness ‘arises out of the State’s own evidence,’
    the burden rests on the State to prove the defendant’s consciousness beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” State v. Tyson, 
    195 N.C. App. 327
    , 331, 
    672 S.E.2d 700
    , 704 (2009)
    (citation omitted).
    ¶ 24         During its case-in-chief, the State presented recordings of each of Defendant’s
    interviews with law enforcement and the news media. Recordings from Defendant’s
    second interview included multiple instances of Defendant stating that he “blacked
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    Opinion of the Court
    out” during his altercation with Hunter. “I didn’t know what was going on in my
    mind[,]” Defendant continued, “I didn’t know what I was doing . . . when I go off, I
    black out like that.” “I blacked out when he got that knife in his hand. That’s all I
    remember.” However, although Defendant repeatedly stated that he had “blacked
    out”, he was able to describe his fight with Hunter with great detail and told law
    enforcement that he “knew what was going on.” No other evidence presented during
    either the State’s case-in-chief or during Defendant’s presentation of evidence tended
    to show that Defendant was unconscious during his altercation with Hunter, or that
    Defendant had any history of concerns with unconsciousness.
    ¶ 25         This evidence did not warrant an instruction on automatism. Defendant’s own
    self-serving statements were insufficient evidence to satisfy a reasonable jury that
    Defendant lacked consciousness.      Our Courts have recognized in a myriad of
    circumstances that the evidence must include something more than a defendant’s
    self-serving statements to substantively support a jury instruction. See State v.
    Thomas, 
    350 N.C. 315
    , 347, 
    514 S.E.2d 486
    , 506 (1999) (citation omitted) (holding
    trial court did not err by not giving jury instruction on second-degree murder where
    “the only evidence offered by defendant to negate first-degree murder was his own
    testimony denying his involvement in the crime”); State v. Smith, 
    347 N.C. 453
    , 464,
    
    496 S.E.2d 357
    , 363 (1998) (holding the defendant’s self-serving statements that he
    lacked requisite intent were insufficient evidence to rebut elements of the crime
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    Opinion of the Court
    charged); see also State v. Stanton, 
    319 N.C. 180
    , 191, 
    353 S.E.2d 385
    , 392 (1987)
    (“Testimony of a self-serving declaration made by a defendant following an alleged
    crime is incompetent as substantive evidence.” (citation omitted)). Furthermore, our
    Courts have traditionally held that a jury instruction on automatism was appropriate
    based on evidence beyond a defendant’s own self-serving statements. Jerrett, 
    309 N.C. at 266
    , 
    307 S.E.2d at 353
     (holding automatism instruction was appropriate
    where the defendant, his parents, and two psychiatrists all testified to his history of
    black-outs); State v. Fields, 
    324 N.C. 204
    , 212, 
    376 S.E.2d 740
    , 744–45 (1989) (holding
    evidence supported automatism instruction where the defendant, his family, and an
    expert witness testified that defendant had a history of being “in his own world”);
    Tyson, 
    195 N.C. App. at 331
    , 
    672 S.E.2d at 704
     (holding evidence gave rise to jury
    instruction on automatism where State’s witnesses testified to drugging the
    defendant until he was unresponsive before engaging in sexual acts with him).
    ¶ 26         This case is similar to State v. Boyd, 
    343 N.C. 699
    , 
    473 S.E.2d 327
     (1996). In
    Boyd, the defendant argued “that his own uncontradicted testimony was sufficient
    evidence from which the jury could have found that he was unconscious[.]” 
    Id. at 713
    ,
    
    473 S.E.2d at 334
    . During the trial, the defendant testified that “he could not
    remember many of his actions on the day of the crimes[.]” 
    Id. at 714
    , 
    473 S.E.2d at 334
    . The Boyd Court noted that the defendant “pointed only to his own testimony at
    trial as evidence to support an instruction on unconsciousness” and that, despite his
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    Opinion of the Court
    claims of memory loss, the defendant “was able to recall many of the graphic details
    of the murders as shown by the inculpatory statement he gave to police within hours
    of committing the murders.”      
    Id.
     (citation omitted).   Further, although expert
    witnesses testified for the defendant, “neither of [the] defendant’s expert witnesses
    gave testimony in support of [the] defendant’s unconsciousness claim.” 
    Id. at 715
    ,
    
    473 S.E.2d at 335
    . The Boyd Court held “the trial court did not err by refusing to
    instruct the jury on unconsciousness” because the defendant “relie[d] only upon his
    own self-serving testimony at trial that [was] wholly contradicted by the statement
    he gave to police within hours of committing the murders.” 
    Id.
    ¶ 27          In the present case, Defendant points only to his own self-serving statements
    made in his second interview to law enforcement within forty-eight hours of his
    altercation with Hunter. The single witness that Defendant presented to the jury did
    not give testimony supporting Defendant’s alleged history of “black[ing] out” and
    “go[ing] off.”   Rather, Defendant told law enforcement in the interview that he
    “blacked out” once Hunter pulled out the knife, that he did not know “what was going
    on in [his] mind”, and assured law enforcement “[t]hat’s all I remember.” Defendant
    also stated that he “knew what was going on” and further recounted specific details
    of the altercation that occurred after Hunter got the knife, including claims that he
    beat Hunter with his fists, that he choked Hunter, and that Hunter incidentally
    stabbed himself in the neck with the knife. Defendant’s ability to recount the events
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    of the altercation contradicted his claims of memory loss in the same interview.
    ¶ 28          That this evidence arose from the State’s case-in-chief does not change our
    conclusion. The State had no need to provide additional evidence to satisfy a burden
    of proof that Defendant was awake because Defendant’s self-serving statements were
    not enough to reasonably show unconsciousness. Cf. Tyson, 
    195 N.C. App. at 331
    ,
    
    672 S.E.2d at 704
     (holding the State had burden to show the defendant was actually
    conscious where its own witnesses testified that they caused the defendant to be
    unconscious during the time of the offense).             Here, no sufficient evidence of
    automatism “arose out of the State’s own evidence.” 
    Id.
     The trial court did not err
    by not giving an instruction on automatism of its own accord. Defendant’s statements
    in the interview recordings were not evidence from which a reasonable juror could
    find automatism, and therefore we cannot say an instruction on automatism would
    have had a probable impact on the outcome of this case.
    D. Impermissible Questioning During Voir Dire
    ¶ 29         Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by not intervening
    ex mero motu during the State’s voir dire of prospective jurors when the State asked
    “clearly improper” questions which “exceeded the permissible boundaries of voir dire.”
    “The nature and extent of the inquiry made of prospective jurors on voir dire
    ordinarily rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Bond, 
    345 N.C. 1
    , 17, 
    478 S.E.2d 163
    , 171 (1996) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 
    521 U.S. 1124
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    Opinion of the Court
    (1997).   “[D]efendant must show abuse of discretion and prejudice to establish
    reversible error relating to voir dire.” State v. Bishop, 
    343 N.C. 518
    , 535, 
    472 S.E.2d 842
    , 850 (1996).
    ¶ 30         During voir dire, counsel’s “attempts to ‘stake out’ a prospective juror in
    advance regarding what his decision might be under certain specific factual scenarios
    are improper.” State v. Jaynes, 
    353 N.C. 534
    , 549, 
    549 S.E.2d 179
    , 192 (2001) (citation
    omitted). “Counsel should not fish for answers to legal questions before the judge has
    instructed the juror on applicable legal principles by which the juror should be
    guided.” State v. Phillips, 
    300 N.C. 678
    , 682, 
    268 S.E.2d 452
    , 455 (1980). “Jurors
    should not be asked what kind of verdict they would render under certain named
    circumstances.” 
    Id.
     In State v. Jaynes, our Supreme Court held that questions which
    sought to “pin down the prospective jurors regarding specific mitigating
    circumstances that would sway them towards a life sentence” did “not amount to
    proper inquiries into whether the prospective jurors could follow the law or the trial
    court’s instructions.” Jaynes, 353 N.C. at 550, 
    549 S.E.2d at 192
    . However, the
    defendant did not challenge questions which asked a juror to explain why she did not
    believe in the death penalty, and the Court held that the juror was properly excluded
    when those questions clarified that the juror’s “views of the death penalty would have
    prevented or substantially impaired the performance of her duties.” 
    Id. at 552
    , 
    549 S.E.2d at 194
    .
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    ¶ 31         Essentially, there is a range of unacceptable to acceptable questions. On one
    end, unacceptable questions tend to ask a juror, “If the evidence shows a particular
    set of facts, what would you decide?” or “What facts would you need to hear in order
    to convict this defendant?” On the other end, acceptable questions ask, “Do you
    acknowledge or believe in the concepts integral to this case?” The trial court has
    discretion to decide where an attorney’s question falls on this spectrum.
    ¶ 32         Defendant asserts that the following questions from the State warranted ex
    mero motu intervention by the trial court because they posed hypotheticals that were
    inappropriately similar to the facts of this case:
    “Does anybody think that a verbal argument justifies the
    use of physical violence?”
    “Does everybody believe if you couldn’t retreat, then you
    think you have the right to defend yourself?”
    “Does anyone not believe in the concept of self-defense? In
    other words, you think – I will use this example: Jesus
    teaches that you turn the other cheek. Does anyone believe
    that’s the way it ought to be? If somebody punches me in
    the face, I should just turn and walk away and not defend
    myself? Anybody really believe that? Again, nothing
    wrong with that, I am just making sure.”
    “If you were in fear for your life and had a weapon, would
    you defend yourself or would you run away?”
    ¶ 33         The trial court did not abuse its discretion because the State did not ask the
    jurors to consider specific circumstances and forecast their ultimate verdict. Mere
    STATE V. KING
    2022-NCCOA-59
    Opinion of the Court
    mention of a weapon, a verbal argument, or an inability to retreat did not amount to
    an inappropriate “stake out” using fact-specific hypotheticals. Instead, the State
    asked the jurors whether they could agree with the law of self-defense as it exists in
    North Carolina: a defendant may use lethal force when he reasonably believes such
    force is necessary to prevent death or bodily harm arising from a fight he did not
    initiate. See State v. Greenfield, 
    375 N.C. 434
    , 441, 
    847 S.E.2d 749
    , 755 (2020). Each
    of the State’s questions reasonably asked: “Would you be willing to accurately apply
    the law of self-defense if presented with facts that qualify under the law?” Just as
    counsel in Jaynes permissibly inquired whether the juror could ever agree with the
    death penalty, the State here acceptably asked the jurors whether they could
    personally agree with the law of self-defense, a matter integral to the resolution of
    this case. The questions asked in this case were proper inquiries as to whether the
    jurors believed in and would follow the applicable law. See State v. Robinson, 
    339 N.C. 263
    , 273, 
    451 S.E.2d 196
    , 202 (1994).
    E. Closing Arguments
    ¶ 34         Lastly, Defendant argues the trial court “reversibly erred by not intervening
    ex mero motu in the State’s closing argument when the State claimed . . . that
    [Defendant], not [Hunter], handled the knife in question, thereby misleading the jury
    on the central issue at trial: self-defense.” Defendant did not object to the State’s
    statements during closing arguments. “The standard of review for assessing alleged
    STATE V. KING
    2022-NCCOA-59
    Opinion of the Court
    improper closing arguments that fail to provoke timely objection from opposing
    counsel is whether the remarks were so grossly improper that the trial court
    committed reversible error by failing to intervene ex mero motu.” State v. Jones, 
    355 N.C. 117
    , 133, 
    558 S.E.2d 97
    , 107 (2002) (citation omitted).
    ¶ 35         “It is well settled that the arguments of counsel are left largely to the control
    and discretion of the trial judge and that counsel will be granted wide latitude in the
    argument of hotly contested cases.” State v. Williams, 
    317 N.C. 474
    , 481, 
    346 S.E.2d 405
    , 410 (1986) (citations omitted). Counsel’s closing arguments may include both
    facts presented during trial and any reasonable inferences drawn from those facts in
    support of their case. 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). Counsel “may not argue to the jury facts
    not in evidence nor travel outside the record by injecting his personal views and
    beliefs.” State v. Monk, 
    291 N.C. 37
    , 53, 
    229 S.E.2d 163
    , 173 (1976) (citation omitted).
    “[D]efendant must show that [counsel’s] comments so infected the trial with
    unfairness that they rendered the conviction fundamentally unfair.” State v. Davis,
    
    349 N.C. 1
    , 23, 
    506 S.E.2d 455
    , 467 (1998) (citation omitted).
    ¶ 36         Defendant contends that it was impermissible for the trial court to allow the
    State to assert during closing arguments that “[Hunter] never got a knife”; that cuts
    on Defendant’s hands “didn’t come from a knife because [Hunter] never had a knife”;
    and that Defendant went into Hunter’s kitchen, acquired the knife himself, and
    stabbed Hunter. Contrary to Defendant’s assertion that “the evidence only pointed
    STATE V. KING
    2022-NCCOA-59
    Opinion of the Court
    in one direction: that [Hunter] handled the knife, not [Defendant]”, the State’s closing
    statement was supported by evidence presented at trial. The uncontradicted evidence
    at trial was that neither Hunter nor Defendant had the knife when they first began
    arguing. One of them acquired the knife at some point during their altercation. The
    evidence showed that three drawers were left open in Hunter’s kitchen, Hunter was
    ultimately stabbed multiple times with a kitchen knife, and Defendant took the knife
    with him when he left Hunter’s apartment.            DNA analysis conclusively found
    Hunter’s DNA on the knife, but also found a separate, inconclusive DNA profile on
    the knife. Even though Defendant admitted that he possessed the knife after the
    altercation and threw it in the dumpster, the DNA analysis did not reveal “whether
    [Defendant] did or did not handle the handle of the knife.”
    ¶ 37         The State argued to the jury that, at some point during their altercation,
    Defendant rummaged through Hunter’s kitchen drawers, found a knife, left the
    drawers open, and then used the knife to stab Hunter. This series of events directly
    contradicted Defendant’s theory of self-defense, but did not contradict the evidence
    presented at trial or rely on evidence outside of the trial record. Rather, the State’s
    closing arguments drew reasonable inferences from the evidence presented.
    Williams, 
    317 N.C. at 481
    , 
    346 S.E.2d at 410
    . The trial court did not commit error,
    much less reversible error, by failing to intervene ex mero motu in the State’s closing
    argument. Jones, 
    355 N.C. at 133
    , 558 S.E.2d at 107.
    STATE V. KING
    2022-NCCOA-59
    Opinion of the Court
    III.     Conclusion
    ¶ 38   We hold that Defendant received a fair trial, free from error.
    NO ERROR.
    Judge JACKSON concurs.
    Judge MURPHY concurs in result only.