State v. Jeter ( 2014 )

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-337
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 21 October 2014
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Mecklenburg County
Nos. 11 CRS 242221-22, 24
TAVARES LAQUIN JETER
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 16 July 2013 by
Judge Eric L. Levinson in Mecklenburg County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 22 September 2014.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Phyllis A. Turner, for the State.
Bryan E. Gates, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Defendant Tavares Laquin Jeter appeals from the judgments
entered after a jury found him guilty of robbery with a
dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous
weapon, and felonious breaking or entering. Defendant contends
the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the
robbery charge because the State’s evidence showed he took no
active role in the commission of the offense. We find no error.
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At about noon on 15 September 2011, Gary Parsons opened his
front door and was attacked by two men who were waiting outside.
Mr. Parsons saw a gold Chevrolet parked in front of his house.
The men “bum-rushed” Mr. Parsons, then punched him repeatedly
and used a taser or stun gun to subdue him and drag him into a
bathroom. Mr. Parsons suffered injuries to his head and neck.
During the struggle, two more men, including defendant, came
into the house. The men did not interfere with the attack. A
few days later, Mr. Parsons identified defendant in a
photographic lineup and indicated he was seventy to eighty
percent (70 – 80%) certain of the identification. Mr. Parsons
described defendant as albino.
While Mr. Parsons was in the bathroom, he could hear
footsteps throughout the house. After about five minutes, Mr.
Parsons heard the house’s front door slam and emerged from the
bathroom to find that several items were missing from his home,
including a television, laptops, and a cell phone. One of Mr.
Parsons’ neighbors saw defendant exit Mr. Parsons’ home and
leave in a gold Chevrolet, and another neighbor saw an albino
man get into a gold car. After the men left, Mr. Parsons went
to a neighbor’s house to get help.
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At about the same time as the robbery, an undercover police
officer working in Mr. Parsons’ neighborhood saw a gold
Chevrolet traveling at a high rate of speed toward I-485 and
followed it until a license plate check revealed no outstanding
warrants or other reason to follow it. A few minutes later, the
officer heard about the robbery at Mr. Parsons’ home and the
description of the getaway car, so he and another officer waited
at the address listed on the car’s registration. At about 2:00,
a gold Chevrolet arrived at the address. The car’s occupants
went inside the house for about fifteen minutes, then returned
to the car and went to a fast food restaurant. When officers in
marked police cars attempted to block the car in the restaurant
parking lot, it sped away. After a short chase, the driver fled
on foot, but officers were able to detain a female passenger and
the car. In the trunk, officers found a television and
computers. Defendant’s fingerprints were lifted from the base
of the television. Officers also found a cell phone in the car
that had defendant’s phone number saved as a contact.
A jury found defendant guilty of robbery with a dangerous
weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon,
and breaking or entering. The trial court sentenced defendant
to an active term of 51 to 71 months imprisonment for the
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robbery conviction. The trial court consolidated the remaining
convictions into a judgment imposing 20 to 33 months
imprisonment, suspended the sentence, and placed defendant on 30
months of supervised probation. Defendant appeals.
In his sole argument, defendant contends the trial court
erred by denying his motion to dismiss the robbery charge
because there was no evidence he took an active role in the
crime. We disagree.
“When a defendant moves to dismiss a charge against him on
the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the trial court
must determine ‘whether there is substantial evidence of each
essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant
being the perpetrator of the offense.’” State v. Garcia, 358
N.C. 382, 412, 597 S.E.2d 724, 746 (2004) (citation omitted),
cert. denied sub nom Garcia v. North Carolina, 543 U.S. 1156,
161 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2005). “In reviewing challenges to the
sufficiency of evidence, [the appellate court] must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the
State the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” State v.
Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 596, 573 S.E.2d 866, 869 (2002) (citation
omitted). “The test of the sufficiency of the evidence to
withstand the defendant’s motion to dismiss is the same whether
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the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or both.” State v.
Vause, 328 N.C. 231, 237, 400 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1991).
Armed robbery is defined by statute:
Any person or persons who, having in
possession or with the use or threatened use
of any firearms or other dangerous weapon,
implement or means, whereby the life of a
person is endangered or threatened,
unlawfully takes or attempts to take
personal property from another or from any
place of business, residence or banking
institution or any other place where there
is a person or persons in attendance, at any
time, either day or night, or who aids or
abets any such person or persons in the
commission of such crime, shall be guilty of
a Class D felony.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-87(a) (2013) (emphasis added); see State v.
Willis, 127 N.C. App. 549, 551, 492 S.E.2d 43, 44 (1997)
(defining the essential elements of armed robbery). “By its
express terms G.S. 14-87 extends to one who aids and abets in an
attempt to commit armed robbery.” State v. Dowd, 28 N.C. App.
32, 38, 220 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1975).
Our courts have defined aiding and abetting:
A person is not guilty of a crime merely
because he is present at the scene even
though he may silently approve of the crime
or secretly intend to assist in its
commission; to be guilty he must aid or
actively encourage the person committing the
crime or in some way communicate to this
person his intention to assist in its
commission. The communication or intent to
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aid does not have to be shown by express
words of the defendant but may be inferred
from his actions and from his relation to
the actual perpetrators.
State v. Goode, 350 N.C. 247, 260, 512 S.E.2d 414, 422 (1999)
(citations omitted).
Although defendant is correct that mere presence at a crime
scene is insufficient to support an inference of guilt, the
evidence in this case was sufficient to withstand defendant’s
motion to dismiss the robbery charge. Although Mr. Parsons
testified that defendant did not take an active role in beating
him and he did not witness the perpetrators take property, the
evidence supports an inference that defendant aided his
accomplices in robbing Mr. Parsons.
First, defendant and another man entered the house together
minutes after the first two men rushed the door and attacked Mr.
Parsons. During the assault on Mr. Parsons, during which the
two assailants struck Mr. Parsons and used a stun gun to subdue
him, defendant stood just a few feet away without intervening or
protesting. Mr. Parsons identified defendant and saw a gold
Chevrolet parked in front of his house at the time of the
offense. Other witnesses saw defendant leave the house and get
in a gold Chevrolet, and police officers later recovered the
stolen property from a gold Chevrolet. Most significantly, the
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perpetrators took a television and other property from Mr.
Parsons’ home, and defendant’s fingerprints were on the
television police recovered from the gold Chevrolet. Finally,
defendant’s phone number was saved as a contact on a cell phone
found in the car.
All of this evidence, taken together and in the light most
favorable to the State, demonstrates that defendant had a
relationship with his accomplices and took an active role in
removing the stolen property from Mr. Parsons’ home.
Accordingly, defendant was more than a mere bystander to the
commission of the robbery and we find no error in the trial
court’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss the armed
robbery charge.
No error.
Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).