State v. Colt ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
COA No. 22-514
Filed 20 June 2023
Wayne County, No. 18CRS52990
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
KARL DAVID COLT, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 26 April 2021 by Judge William
W. Bland in Wayne County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 April
2023.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General Marissa
K. Jensen, for the State.
Cooley Law Office, by Craig M. Cooley, for defendant-appellant.
FLOOD, Judge.
Karl David Colt (“Defendant”) appeals from the trial court’s Judgment
sentencing him to 80 to 108 months’ imprisonment. Defendant argues the State
failed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule primarily because the minor victim’s body was
never found, and the State did not present sufficient evidence establishing the minor
victim died. Defendant further argues the trial court erred in admitting testimony
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Opinion of the Court
regarding the minor’s mother’s conviction for second-degree murder because, among
other reasons, the testimony was an inadmissible testimonial statement.
After careful review, we conclude that the corpus delicti rule was satisfied
because substantial independent evidence established the trustworthiness of
Defendant’s confession. We further conclude the trial court did not err in overruling
Defendant’s objections to testimony that the mother was in prison for second-degree
murder.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Defendant was indicted on 8 September 2020 for concealment of the death of a
child who did not die of natural causes. On 26 April 2021, a jury found Defendant
guilty. Defendant was sentenced to an aggravated range of 80 to 108 months’
imprisonment.
The evidence presented at trial tended to show Kayla Clements (“Clements”)
gave birth to a baby boy, Kaceyn, on 11 March 2016. In the spring of 2016, shortly
after Kaceyn was born, Clements and Kaceyn moved into the apartment of
Clements’s younger sister, Sandi. Clements and Kaceyn lived with Sandi until
October 2016. Sandi testified that, while Clements and Kaceyn lived in her
apartment, Kaceyn spent most of his time in a Graco Pack ‘n Play (the “Pack ‘n Play”).
Sandi further testified that the Pack ‘n Play had a blue frame with a green cover, and
the green cover had animals around the trim.
Kaceyn’s father, Jose Jimenez (“Jimenez”), had periodic visits with Kaceyn
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after his birth, but Clements stopped allowing Jimenez to see Kaceyn in late 2016.
At trial, testimony confirmed that the last time Jimenez saw Kaceyn was 12
September 2016. While no exact date was given, trial testimony also revealed
Jimenez allegedly made arrangements with Clements to see Kaceyn in “late 2016,”
but Clements always came up with last minute excuses for why she could not meet
Jimenez.
In late 2017, Jimenez hired a private investigator and an attorney to help
locate Kaceyn, but they could not find him. Jimenez testified that Clements visited
Florida in 2017 for “about four or five months” and did not bring Kaceyn with her.
On 8 February 2018, Captain Shawn Harris (“Captain Harris”) of the Wayne
County Sheriff’s Office (the “WCSO”) received a call from an officer of the Goldsboro
Police Department who had spoken with Jimenez about a missing child. Because the
officer believed the case originated outside the jurisdiction of Goldsboro, he
introduced Jimenez to Captain Harris. Jimenez explained to Captain Harris that
Clements had stopped allowing him to see Kaceyn, and Jimenez’s attempts to find
Kaceyn with the help of a private investigator failed. As of 8 February 2018, Jimenez
had not found Kaceyn, but he did know Clements was in the Carteret County Jail, as
confirmed by Captain Harris, who testified she was there on a civil contempt order.
Based on this meeting with Jimenez, the WCSO opened a case on Kaceyn, and
on 12 February 2018, it requested the help of the State Bureau of Investigation (the
“SBI”) in what was officially considered a missing person investigation. Agent Aaron
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Opinion of the Court
Barnes (“Agent Barnes”) of the SBI was assigned to the case.
Through the joint investigation of the WCSO and SBI (collectively,
“investigators”), investigators determined the following. On or around 1 October
2016, Clements and Kaceyn moved out of Sandi’s apartment and into a home in
Goldsboro, North Carolina, (the “Home”). Clements and Kaceyn lived in the Home
from approximately October 2016 through November 2016. Jared Greene (“Greene”)
and Phillip Goff (“Goff”) also resided at the Home. Clements had a romantic
relationship with Goff, and Greene had a romantic relationship with Defendant, who
regularly visited the Home on weekends.
On 15 February 2018, Agent Barnes and two other detectives involved with
the investigation interviewed Defendant. Investigators requested to interview
Defendant based on his contacts with Clements, Greene, and Goff. This interview
was audio recorded, and the recording was played at trial in the presence of the jury.
In the 15 February 2018 interview, Defendant confirmed that he visited
Greene, Clements, and Goff at the Home on weekends from August 2016 until
approximately May 2017.
During the interview, Defendant stated “at one time there was a child [in the
Home], but I do not know what ever happened to the child after that.” Defendant
confirmed the child in the home was Clements’s. Defendant described the Home as
“a small cinder block house.” Defendant described Kaceyn as an “infant,” but guessed
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he was likely younger than a year old. In October 2016,1 when Defendant saw Kaceyn
for the first time, he observed Kaceyn in a playpen and noticed Kaceyn had bruises
on his face that Defendant thought could have been the result of “shaken baby”
syndrome. Defendant further told investigators the next time he saw Kaceyn, Kaceyn
seemed to have trouble breathing, had a severely swollen head, and appeared
braindead. Defendant stated he did not think Kaceyn could have survived without
medical treatment.
When investigators asked Defendant if he knew where Kaceyn was, Defendant
told investigators he thought it was possible Clements and Goff hid Kaceyn’s body in
a wooded area across the street from the Home where Goff frequently set up a
campsite. Defendant described the campsite as being “a good distance” and not fully
visible from the road, with a beaten down path with cut down branches leading to the
campsite. Defendant drew investigators a map detailing where the campsite was in
comparison to the Home.
Following the interview, investigators confirmed Defendant’s statements that
the home was a small cinder block residence with a wooded area across the street.
On 16 February 2018, investigators searched the wooded area and found “a dark blue
or purple . . . Graco playpen frame,” a stuffed teddy bear, an inflatable pool toy, and
1 Defendant told investigators he did not know the exact date, but it was right after Hurricane
Matthew because road closures made it difficult for him to drive to the Home. During the trial, Judge
Bland took judicial notice that Hurricane Matthew passed through North Carolina on 9 October 2016.
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a piece of fabric with a Hello Kitty design on it. Agent Barnes also confirmed that
the wooded area contained a campsite due to the presence of a stone fire pit and logs
for sitting, and the campsite was not visible from the road.
At trial, the State presented the jury with the Graco playpen frame found in
the wooded area. After the playpen frame was set up, the State asked Sandi if the
playpen frame found in the woods matched the dimensions of the Pack ‘n Play
Clements used for Kaceyn while living with Sandi. Sandi confirmed the frame found
in the woods had the same dimensions as Kaceyn’s Pack ‘n Play. Sandi testified that
Kaceyn’s Pack ‘n Play had a loose end-rail that prevented the Pack ‘n Play from
standing up properly.
Agent Barnes confirmed Greene had moved to Florida when Agent Barnes
traveled to Florida to interview Greene regarding Kaceyn’s disappearance. During
the interview, Greene showed Barnes texts in which Defendant stated, “[I’m] getting
screwed in this case by [Clements] killing her baby,” “[Clements] killed or abused her
child,” and “[y]ou didn’t report the crime to the cops just like I didn’t[.]” At trial,
Agent Barnes read these text messages to the jury.
On 27 March 2018, investigators interviewed Defendant a second time. This
interview was also recorded and played at trial in the presence of the jury. Defendant
claimed he overheard Clements tell Goff that Kaceyn had died, and they needed to
“get rid” of Kaceyn. Even though, in his first interview, Defendant stated he thought
Kaceyn may have been buried in the woods across from the home, in this interview,
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Defendant told investigators Clements and Goff made plans to hide the body
somewhere around "Grasshopper’s home.” Grasshopper was a woman who frequently
sold methamphetamine to Defendant, Clements, and Goff. Defendant claimed
Clements told Goff that Grasshopper’s house would be an excellent place to get rid of
the body.
According to Defendant, when Clements, Goff, Greene, and Defendant were
preparing to leave the Home, Clements went into her room to, presumably, get herself
and the baby ready. When Clements came out of the room, she had the baby carrier
completely covered with a tan blanket. Defendant drove Clements, Greene, and Goff
to Grasshopper’s house “around midnight.” While at Grasshopper’s house, Goff
waited in the car while everyone else went inside. About “twenty to thirty minutes
later,” Clements, Greene, and Defendant returned to the car after purchasing
methamphetamine from Grasshopper, and the carrier was empty and the blanket
was wadded up in a ball.
Defendant hypothesized Goff could have disposed of Kaceyn’s body in a “line of
trees” located on the right side of Grasshopper’s house. Defendant told investigators
that, when Goff, Clements, Defendant and Greene all returned home that night, Goff
and Clements told the other two not to say anything about what took place that night.
Defendant stated in the second interview that he felt bad that he did not call for help,
and one of his biggest mistakes was failing to tell people about Kaceyn’s death or
report it to law enforcement.
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Agent Barnes testified that through his investigation, he determined
“Grasshopper” was an individual named Sonya Mendez who sold methamphetamine.
Throughout the course of his investigation, Agent Barnes never found anyone who
saw Kaceyn after October 2016. At the time he was last seen, Kaceyn would have
been only eight months old, and by the time the investigation began, he would have
been almost two years old.
On 13 July 2018 an arrest warrant was issued for Defendant for concealment
of the death of a child. On 8 September 2020, a grand jury indicted Defendant for
concealment of death of a child who did not die of natural causes.
At trial, Defendant’s counsel motioned for mistrial numerous times. The first
motion for mistrial was based upon Agent Barnes’s testimony that Clements was in
prison for second-degree murder. During Agent Barnes’s testimony, the State asked
him where Clements presently was, and Agent Barnes testified that she was
“currently in the North Carolina Department of Corrections.” The State then asked,
“[d]o you know why?” Defendant’s counsel then objected on various grounds,
including the Confrontation Clause, relevancy, unfair prejudice, and a run-around of
the corpus delicti rule.
The trial court overruled Defendant’s counsel’s objection, allowing the State to
ask why Clements was in the North Carolina Department of Corrections. Upon
questioning by the State, Agent Barnes answered, “[f]or second-degree murder.”
Defendant’s counsel motioned for mistrial due to this testimony, and the trial court
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Opinion of the Court
denied the motion.
In a renewed motion for mistrial, Defendant’s counsel added as another ground
for mistrial the trial court’s ruling that there was sufficient evidence to satisfy the
corpus delicti rule. The trial court denied the motion.
At trial, Defendant’s counsel also motioned to dismiss on the basis of
insufficiency of the evidence and failure to satisfy the corpus delicti rule. The trial
court denied the motion, finding Defendant’s confession was supported by substantial
independent evidence tending to establish its trustworthiness, and finding the State
presented substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime charged.
Defendant did not testify or present evidence at trial. A jury convicted
Defendant of concealment of the death of a child who did not die of natural causes,
and the trial court sentenced Defendant in the aggravated range of 80 to 108 months’
imprisonment.
II. Jurisdiction
Appeal lies of right directly to this Court from any final judgment of a superior
court. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2021). “A defendant who has entered a plea of
not guilty to a criminal charge, and who has been found guilty of a crime, is entitled
to appeal as a matter of right when final judgment has been entered.” N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 15A-1444(a) (2021).
III. Issues
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The issues before this Court are whether the trial court erred by: (1) denying
Defendant’s corpus delicti challenge and motion to dismiss, and (2) overruling
Defendant’s objections to Agent Barnes’s testimony that Clements was in prison for
second-degree murder. We will address these issues in turn.
IV. Analysis
A. Corpus Delicti Challenge
On appeal, Defendant argues the State failed to satisfy the corpus delicti rule
because it did not present evidence to strongly corroborate Defendant’s extrajudicial
statements to law enforcement. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review
“We review de novo the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss.” State v.
DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. 279, 284, 827 S.E.2d 744, 748 (2019). “In making its
determination, the trial court must consider all evidence admitted, whether
competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State
the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its
favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994).
Circumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to
dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence
does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence. If the
evidence presented is circumstantial, the court must
consider whether a reasonable inference of defendant’s
guilt may be drawn from the circumstances. Once the court
decides that a reasonable inference of defendant’s guilt
may be drawn from the circumstances, then it is for the
jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in
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combination, satisfy [it] beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant is actually guilty.
State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 379, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted).
“Upon a defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence, the question
for the court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of
the offense charged and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of such offense.”
DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 284, 827 S.E.2d at 748. “Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980).
“Whether a defendant’s extrajudicial confession may survive a motion to dismiss
depends upon the satisfaction of the corpus delicti rule.” DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at
284, 827 S.E.2d at 749.
2. Relevant Law
“[A]n extrajudicial confession, standing alone, is not sufficient to sustain a
conviction of a crime.” State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 222, 229, 337 S.E.2d 487, 491 (1985).
When the State substantially relies upon an extrajudicial confession, the reviewing
court applies the corpus delicti rule “which requires some level of independent
corroborative evidence in order to ensure that a person is not convicted of a crime
that was never committed.” DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 284, 827 S.E.2d at 749(internal quotation marks omitted). Corpus delicti, meaning the body of the crime,
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consists of “the injury or harm constituting the crime,” and a showing that “th[e]
injury or harm was caused by someone’s criminal activity.” Parker, 315 N.C. at 231,
337 S.E.2d at 492. A defendant’s confession ordinarily furnishes the proof necessary
to show “the defendant was the perpetrator of the crime.” State v. Trexler, 316 N.C.
528, 533, 342 S.E.2d 878, 881 (1986).
The corpus delicti rule itself is rooted in three policy factors:
first, the shock which resulted from those rare but
widely reported cases in which the “victim” returned alive
after his supposed murderer had been convicted; and
secondly, the general distrust of extrajudicial confessions
stemming from the possibilities that a confession may have
been erroneously reported or construed, involuntarily
made, mistaken as to law or fact, or falsely volunteered by
an insane or mentally disturbed individual[;] and, thirdly,
the realization that sound law enforcement requires police
investigations which extend beyond the words of the
accused.
DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749.
“[T]o be relied on to prove the corpus delicti . . . the trustworthiness of the
confession” must be “established by corroborative evidence.” Id. at 235, 337 S.E.2d
at 494. Our Supreme Court expanded the strict rule that always required
independent proof of the corpus delicti and adopted in its place the “trustworthiness
version” of the rule. Id. at 230, 337 S.E.2d at 492. Under this version, “the adequacy
of corroborating proof is measured not by its tendency to establish the corpus
delicti but by the extent to which it supports the trustworthiness of the admissions.”
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Id. at 230, 337 S.E.2d at 492 (quotation marks omitted). This applies especially to
the instant case where the victim’s body cannot be found. See State v. Cox, 367 N.C.
147, 153, 749 S.E.2d 271, 276 (2013) (carefully applying the trustworthiness version
of the corpus delicti rule is especially important in those cases where there is no body
to be found).
Under the trustworthiness version of the corpus delicti rule, “the State need
not provide independent proof of the corpus delicti so long as there is substantial
independent evidence tending to establish the trustworthiness of the defendant’s
extrajudicial confession.” DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749 (quotation
marks omitted). “Such substantial independent evidence may includ[e] facts that
tend to show the defendant had the opportunity to commit the crime, as well as other
strong corroboration of essential facts and circumstances embraced in the defendant’s
confession.” DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749 (emphasis in original)
(quotation marks omitted). We may look to the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether the evidence strongly corroborates a defendant’s confession. State
v. Sweat, 366 N.C. 79, 85, 727 S.E.2d 691, 696 (2012) (“Under the totality of the
circumstances, the State strongly corroborated essential facts and circumstances
embraced in defendant's confession.”); see also DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 286, 827
S.E.2d at 750 (“[T]ogether with the [d]efendant’s opportunity to commit the[] crimes
and the circumstances surrounding his statement to detectives provide sufficient
corroboration to engender a belief in the overall truth of [d]efendant’s confession.”)
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(emphasis added). Where there is no contention that a defendant’s “extrajudicial
confession was the product of deception or coercion,” the trustworthiness of a
defendant’s confession is “bolstered.” DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 286, 827 S.E.2d at
750 (quotation marks omitted); see also Cox, 367 N.C. at 154, 749 S.E.2d at 277 (“The
trustworthiness of [the] defendant’s confession is thus further bolstered by the
evidence that defendant made a voluntary decision to confess.”).
It is unnecessary for the State to present “independent evidence of each element
of the crime to show [that the d]efendant’s confession . . . [is] trustworthy. . . . The
State need only show corroborative evidence tending to establish the reliability of the
confession—not the reliability of each part of the confession which incriminates the
defendant.” State v. Messer, 255 N.C. App. 812, 822, 806 S.E.2d 315, 323 (2017)
(emphasis added) (quotations omitted).
3. Elements of the Crime
The elements of the concealment of death charge are: (1) failure to notify law
enforcement of the death of a child; (2) intent to conceal the death of a child; (3) the
victim was a child who is less than sixteen years of age; and (4) knowing or having
reason to know the child did not die of natural causes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-
401.22(a1), (e) (2021).
Here, substantial evidence of the first element exists because Defendant never
discussed Kaceyn’s death with law enforcement until investigators interviewed him,
corroborating Defendant’s confession that one of his biggest mistakes was failing to
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tell people about Kaceyn’s death or report it to law enforcement. See N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§ 14-401.22(a1), (e). Additionally, there is substantial evidence of the third element
because Sandi’s trial testimony that Kaceyn was born on 11 March 2016 corroborates
Defendant’s confession that Kaceyn was an infant likely younger than a year old. See
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-401.22(a1), (e). Accordingly, we must determine whether at
trial, the State presented substantial independent evidence tending to establish the
trustworthiness of Defendant’s confession as it relates to the second element, the
intent to conceal the death of a child, and the fourth element, knowing or having
reason to know the child did not die of natural causes. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at
285, 827 S.E.2d at 749; see also See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-401.22(a1), (e).
Defendant argues that numerous pieces of evidence the State presented at trial
were either not significant or corroborative, or both. Defendant grounds this
argument primarily on his assumption that the State did not satisfy what he views
was its threshold burden to prove, independently of Defendant’s statements to
investigators, that Kaceyn was dead. We conclude, however, in view of the totality of
the evidence presented at trial, the State strongly corroborated Defendant’s
statements to investigators. See Sweat, 366 N.C. at 85, 727 S.E.2d at 696.
a. Intent to Conceal the Death of a Child
First, we must determine whether substantial independent evidence tends to
establish that Kaceyn was, in fact, dead. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827
S.E.2d at 749; see also Messer, 255 N.C. App. at 822, 806 S.E.2d at 323. We determine
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that substantial evidence tends to support Kaceyn’s death, satisfying the first policy
factor justifying the corpus delicti rule: that no one should be convicted of a crime for
a death that did not occur. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749.
Evidence presented at trial tended to show the following. Jimenez had periodic
visits with Kaceyn after Kaceyn’s birth, but he was unable to see Kaceyn anymore
after Clements made excuses as to why she could not meet with Jimenez, likely
because Clements no longer had Kaceyn. Jimenez’s testimony as to when he last saw
Kaceyn, in late September 2016, matches Defendant’s statements to investigators
that Defendant last saw Kaceyn right after Hurricane Matthew, which passed
through North Carolina on 9 October 2016. Jimenez’s attempts to find Kaceyn with
the help of a private investigator and an attorney failed in late 2017. Clements
traveled to Florida for four or five months in 2017, but she did not have Kaceyn with
her. Jimenez could not find Kaceyn in late 2017, and Clements did not travel to
Florida with Kaceyn, likely because Kaceyn was deceased. Law enforcement failed
to find Kaceyn even after Jimenez’s report of his missing child. These facts clearly
establish that Kaceyn was missing under inherently suspicious circumstances.
Moreover, the evidence discovered across the road from the Home establishes
the trustworthiness of Defendant’s confession that Kaceyn was dead. See DeJesus,
265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749. Investigators confirmed there was a stone
fire pit and logs, which were invisible from the road, corroborating Defendant’s
statements to investigators that there was a hidden campsite across the road from
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the Home. In the campsite area, law enforcement found a stuffed teddy bear, an
inflatable pool toy, fabric with a Hello Kitty design on it, and a “blue or purple” Graco
playpen frame. The discovery of the children’s items in the woods at a minimum
supports an inference of an attempt to discard a deceased baby’s items at the hidden
campsite.
Defendant argues that the dark blue or purple playpen discovered at the
campsite does not match the one in which Clements kept Kaceyn at Sandi’s
apartment, but Sandi’s testimony that Kaceyn spent most of his time in a blue
playpen closely aligns with Defendant’s statements to investigators.
Therefore, in view of the totality of the circumstances and in the light most
favorable to the State, we conclude the discarded children’s items, taken together
with the fact that no one had seen Kaceyn since October 2016 at the latest, constitutes
strong corroboration of Defendant’s confession that Kaceyn was dead. See DeJesus,
265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749; see also Sweat, 366 N.C. at 85, 727 S.E.2d
at 696; see also Rose, 339 N.C. at 192, 451 S.E.2d at 223.
Second, substantial evidence tends to establish Defendant’s intent to conceal
the death of a child. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749.
Defendant’s texts to Greene in which Defendant stated, “[Clements] killed or abused
her child” and “[y]ou didn’t report the crime to the cops just like I didn’t” demonstrate
that Defendant knew a crime occurred yet purposely failed to report it to law
enforcement. Defendant argues his texts are not independent evidence, as required
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by Parker, 315 N.C. at 236, 337 S.E.2d at 495, because they are Defendant’s own
words. Defendant’s text messages to Greene, however, are evidence independent of
Defendant’s statements to investigators.
Accordingly, substantial independent evidence tends to establish Defendant’s
intent to conceal Kaceyn’s death. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 284–85, 827 S.E.2d
at 748–49.
b. Death by Unnatural Causes
Finally, substantial evidence tends to establish that Defendant knew or had
reason to know Kaceyn did not die of natural causes. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at284–85, 827 S.E.2d at 748–49. Defendant’s text to Greene strongly corroborates
Defendant’s confession because these statements show Kaceyn’s death was not
natural. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-401.22(a1), (e).
Substantial evidence also tends to establish that Defendant frequented the
Home at the same time Clements and Kaceyn lived there and likely would have been
aware of the suspicious circumstances surrounding Kaceyn’s disappearance.
Defendant himself related these circumstances to law enforcement, corroborating his
statements to investigators that he did not think Kaceyn could survive without
medical treatment as Kaceyn had bruises, trouble breathing, a severely swollen head,
and appeared braindead.
Accordingly, substantial independent evidence regarding Defendant’s
knowledge of Kaceyn’s unnatural death tends to establish the trustworthiness of
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Defendant’s confession. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 284–85, 827 S.E.2d at 748–
49.
4. Voluntariness of the Confession
We note that there is no challenge to the voluntariness of Defendant’s
statements to law enforcement. Defendant was not under arrest during either of his
recorded interviews with law enforcement. Because Defendant’s confession was
voluntary, its trustworthiness is bolstered, and the second factor justifying the corpus
delicti rule—guarding against the untrustworthiness of an involuntary confession—
is satisfied. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 286, 827 S.E.2d at 750; Parker, 265 N.C.
App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 750.
We, therefore, find the corpus delicti rule is satisfied because there is
substantial independent evidence tending to establish the trustworthiness of
Defendant’s confession. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 285, 827 S.E.2d at 749; see
also Sweat, 366 N.C. at 85, 727 S.E.2d at 696. Moreover, Defendant’s confession itself
constitutes substantial evidence that he was the perpetrator of the crime. See Parker,
315 N.C. at 231, 337 S.E.2d at 492; see also DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 284, 827 S.E.2d
at 748. Because there was substantial evidence of each element of the crime charged
and that Defendant was the perpetrator, the trial court properly denied the motion
to dismiss. See DeJesus, 265 N.C. App. at 284, 827 S.E.2d at 748.
B. Testimony that Clements Was in Prison for Second-Degree Murder
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Next, Defendant argues the trial court erred by allowing Agent Barnes’s
testimony regarding Clements’s conviction for second-degree murder because it: (1)
was irrelevant because there was no questioning by the prosecutor or testimony by
Agent Barnes connecting Clements’s whereabouts to Kaceyn’s death; (2) was unfairly
prejudicial because it likely would lead jurors to believe that Clements killed Kaceyn
and therefore, Defendant must have concealed Kaceyn’s death; and (3) constituted a
violation of the Confrontation Clause.
1. Rule 401
Defendant argues the State did not sufficiently connect its questioning about
Clements’s conviction for second-degree murder, and the testimony was therefore
irrelevant pursuant to N.C.R. Evid. 401. We disagree.
“Although the trial court’s rulings on relevancy technically are not
discretionary and therefore are not reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard[,]
. . . such rulings are given great deference on appeal.” Dunn v. Custer, 162 N.C. App.
259, 266, 591 S.E.2d 11, 17 (2004) (quotation marks omitted).
“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” N.C.R. Evid. 401.
Agent Barnes’s testimony that Clements was in prison for second-degree murder was
directly relevant to the fact that Kaceyn died because at trial, the jury heard
testimony regarding the texts Defendant sent to Greene which stated, “[Clements]
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STATE V. COLT
Opinion of the Court
killed or abused her child.” Such evidence was relevant because it made it more
probable that Kaceyn was deceased. See N.C.R. Evid. 401.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by allowing such testimony because it
was relevant to whether Kaceyn was dead. See N.C.R. Evid. 401; see also Dunn, 162
N.C. App. at 266, 591 S.E.2d at 17.
2. Rule 403
Defendant argues evidence of Clements being in prison for second-degree
murder was unfairly prejudicial.
“We review a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 for abuse
of discretion. An abuse of discretion results when the court’s ruling is manifestly
unsupported by reason or is so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a
reasoned decision.” State v. Whaley, 362 N.C. 156, 160, 655 S.E.2d 388, 390 (2008)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]” N.C.R. Evid. 403.
Defendant specifically argues Agent Barnes’s testimony regarding Clements’s
second-degree murder conviction unfairly prejudiced Defendant because it could have
led the jurors to conclude Clements murdered Kaceyn, and Defendant must be guilty
of concealing Kaceyn’s death. This evidence was not unfairly prejudicial because, as
addressed above in Section IV, substantial evidence established that Kaceyn died of
unnatural causes. See N.C.R. Evid. 403.
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STATE V. COLT
Opinion of the Court
Therefore, Agent Barnes’s testimony did not unfairly prejudice Defendant, and
the trial court did not err by overruling Defendant’s objections. See N.C.R. Evid. 403;
see also Whaley, 362 N.C. at 160, 655 S.E.2d at 390.
3. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.C. Const. art. I, § 23
Defendant argues Agent Barnes’s testimony that Clements was in prison for
second-degree murder violated Defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses
against him.
“The standard of review for alleged violations of constitutional rights is de
novo.” State v. Graham, 200 N.C. App. 204, 214, 683 S.E.2d 437, 444 (2009). “Under
a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own
judgment for that of the lower tribunal.” State v. Harris, 242 N.C. App. 162, 164, 775
S.E.2d 31, 33 (2015).
Under both our Federal and State Constitutions, defendants have the right to
confront witnesses against them. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.C. Const. art. I, § 23. The
hallmark of a defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him or her is cross-
examination. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1365,
158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 194 (2004). A witness’s testimonial statements are inadmissible
against a defendant unless at trial the witness “was unavailable to testify, and the
defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. at 54, 124 S. Ct.
at 1365, 158 L. Ed. 2d. at 183.
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STATE V. COLT
Opinion of the Court
Defendant reasons that Clements’s conviction occurred because of her guilty
plea, so testimony regarding her conviction equates to evidence of her guilty plea and
therefore constitutes testimonial evidence against Defendant. While no North
Carolina case directly addresses whether a witness’s testimony regarding the murder
conviction of a defendant in a different case constitutes a testimonial statement, we
did find a Fourth Circuit case that is instructive. The guilty plea of a defendant from
a different case does not constitute testimonial evidence. United States v. Kuai Li,
280 F. App’x 267, 269 (4th Cir. 2008) (federal district court did not err when it took
judicial notice of guilty plea entered by a corrupt government official who assisted the
defendant in the crime “because the taking of such notice did not result in the
admission of a testimonial statement”). On appeal, a Confrontation Clause violation
may be found to be a harmless error in light of other evidence inculpating a defendant.
United States v. Banks, 482 F.3d 733, 741 (4th Cir. 2007).
Here, as an initial matter, Agent Barnes did not testify regarding how
Clements’s conviction for second-degree murder came about. As far as the jury
members knew, it could have resulted from a jury conviction or from a guilty plea.
Even if Agent Barnes’s testimony somehow notified the jury of Clements’s guilty plea,
however, we need not decide whether that constituted a testimonial statement. Any
potential error would be harmless in light of the other evidence establishing that
Kaceyn died of unnatural causes. See Banks, 482 F.3d at 741.
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STATE V. COLT
Opinion of the Court
Accordingly, the trial court did not commit prejudicial error by allowing Agent
Barnes’s testimony regarding Clements’s whereabouts. See Banks, 482 F.3d at 741.
V. Conclusion
We hold the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss
because there was sufficient evidence presented at trial, and the State satisfied the
corpus delicti rule. We further hold that even if testimony that Clements was in
prison for second-degree murder constituted testimonial evidence, any potential
Confrontation Clause error was a harmless error in light of other evidence
implicating Defendant in concealing Kaceyn’s death.
AFFIRMED.
Judge CARPENTER concurs.
Chief Judge STROUD concurs in a separate opinion.
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No. COA22-514 – State v. Colt
STROUD, Chief Judge, concurring.
While I agree with the majority that the trial court properly denied
Defendant’s motion to dismiss and would ultimately conclude there was no
prejudicial error, I write separately as I do not agree with the analysis in section IV.
B. 1 and 2 regarding Rules of Evidence 401 and 403.
As noted by the majority, Agent Barnes testified before the jury regarding his
investigation of Kaceyn’s disappearance. The State asked him “Now, through your
investigation, do you know where Kayla Clements is now?” and he answered, “She is
currently in the North Carolina Department of Corrections.” The State then asked,
“Do you know why?” At this point, Defendant objected and asked “to be heard outside
the presence of the jury.” Outside the presence of the jury, Defendant stated grounds
for the objection in detail, including the Confrontation Clause and the Bruton rule,2
as well as the lack of the relevance of the evidence, unfair prejudice under Rule 403,
and due process.
2 The Bruton rule stems from Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). “In
Bruton[,] the United States Supreme Court held that at a joint trial, admission of a statement by a
nontestifying codefendant that incriminated the other defendant violated that defendant’s right of
cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Evans, 346
N.C. 221, 231, 485 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1997) (citing Bruton, 391 U.S. at 126, 20 L.Ed.2d at 479), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 1057, 139 L.Ed.2d 653 (1998). Furthermore, “[t]he principles set out in Bruton apply
only to the extrajudicial statements of a declarant who is unavailable at trial for full and effective
cross-examination. Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971). Where the
declarant takes the stand and is subject to full and effective cross-examination, a codefendant
implicated by extrajudicial statements has not been deprived of his right to confrontation.” Evans,
346 N.C. at 232, 485 S.E.2d at 277; see State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 118, 235 S.E.2d 828, 836 (1977)
(summarizing the North Carolina Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Bruton rule).
STATE V. COLT
Stroud, CJ., concurring
Defendant argued,
They’re trying to take an admission from a codefendant
and use it to prove something here. Now that admission by
Ms. Clements is admissible against her, but it is not
admissible against my client. Now the State had every
ability to issue a writ and have Ms. Clements come and
testify here at this trial. They chose not to do so and they
chose not to put her on the list, so this absolutely would
violate the rules in Bruton and the confrontation clause,
and therefore it is inadmissible testimony.
The discussion and voir dire regarding these objections continued at length, for
18 pages of transcript. Ultimately, based on the State’s representation it would limit
the question to Clements’s imprisonment for second-degree murder; the trial court
then overruled Defendant’s objection. The State then asked Agent Barnes again in
the presence of the jury why Clements was incarcerated, and Agent Barnes testified
she was incarcerated for second-degree murder. Defendant then renewed his prior
objections and moved to strike Agent Barnes’s testimony, which the trial court
overruled.
It is entirely reasonable to expect the jury would assume the victim was
Kaceyn, but the identity of the victim was the primary reason for Defendant’s
objection to the question and the trial court’s ruling on the objection. At oral
argument of this case before this Court, the State could not articulate any reason the
evidence that Clements was incarcerated for second-degree murder could be relevant
except that it would tend to show Kaceyn was deceased. Clements was not there to
testify as a witness. Nor did the State present a certified record of Clements’s
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STATE V. COLT
Stroud, CJ., concurring
conviction. Instead, the State sought to rely upon the jury’s logical assumption of a
fact – that Clements was imprisoned for Kaceyn’s murder – when the trial court had
already ruled Agent Barnes could not testify to this fact. Defendant objected to the
evidence of the identity of the victim of Clements’s second-degree murder conviction
for several reasons and the trial court did not allow this evidence to be presented, and
yet the majority opinion still finds the evidence of the second-degree murder
conviction relevant and admissible because the jury would likely infer Kaceyn must
have been the victim of the murder.
The majority opinion is correct that the only way the second-degree murder
conviction could possibly be relevant in this case was if Kaceyn was the victim. The
fact that Clements was imprisoned for murdering someone would not have “any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401 (2021). In other words, the fact that Clements
murdered someone does not aid the jury in determining if Kaceyn was actually
deceased or if Defendant concealed the death of Kaceyn. This unrelated crime would
not “make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination . . .
more probable or less probable.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401. “While our law no
longer strictly forbids stacking inferences upon each other, in this case the link
between the circumstances proved by direct evidence and the inferences drawn from
these circumstances stretches too far” because there was no evidence presented that
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STATE V. COLT
Stroud, CJ., concurring
Clements was imprisoned for Kaceyn’s murder, and the State did not question Agent
Barnes on the identity of the victim of the second-degree murder, as it represented to
the trial court. State v. Lamp, 383 N.C. 562, 571, 884 S.E.2d 623, 629 (2022) (citation
omitted).
The testimony regarding Clements’s imprisonment for second-degree murder
was not relevant, but even worse, the only way it could be relevant is that the jury’s
logical assumption would be that Kaceyn was the victim. And this was the very
reason for Defendant’s objections and the State’s tacit acknowledgement at trial of
the merit of Defendant’s objections based upon the Confrontation Clause and the
Bruton case by the State’s agreement not to elicit testimony as to the identity of the
victim. The trial court should have sustained Defendant’s objection to this testimony
under Rule 401. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401. Therefore, there would be no
need to engage in a Rule 403 analysis regarding prejudicial versus probative value.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2021) (“Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice . . . .” (emphasis added)).
But although this evidence should have been excluded, I agree the error was
not prejudicial in this case. This one sentence of testimony did not prejudice
Defendant considering the substantial amount of evidence tending to show Kaceyn
was deceased and regarding the circumstances of his death, and therefore the trial
court properly denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss. See generally State v. Milby,
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STATE V. COLT
Stroud, CJ., concurring
302 N.C. 137, 142, 273 S.E.2d 716, 720 (1981) (“It is well-established that the burden
is on the appellant not only to show error but also to show that he suffered prejudice
as a result of the error. The test for prejudicial error is whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of contributed to the conviction[.]” (citation
omitted)). Therefore, there was no prejudicial error.
Thus, I write separately to concur in result only.
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