State v. San ( 2023 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA22-664
    Filed 18 July 2023
    Randolph County, Nos. 18CRS52296-99; 18CRS52424-25; 19CRS55461-62
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    OEUN SAN
    Appeal by Defendant from Judgment entered 11 January 2022 by Judge James
    M. Webb in Randolph County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24
    January 2023.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Kelly A. Moore
    and Special Deputy Attorney General Martin T. McCracken, for the State.
    Benjamin J. Kull for Defendant-Appellant.
    HAMPSON, Judge.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    Oeun San (Defendant) appeals from the denial of a Motion to Suppress and a
    subsequent Judgment entered upon Defendant’s Alford1 plea to Trafficking in
    Methamphetamine, Selling or Delivering a Schedule II Controlled Substance, and
    two counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Felon. As part of the plea agreement, the
    1   See North Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
    , 
    91 S.Ct. 160
    , 
    27 L. Ed. 2d 162
     (1970).
    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    State agreed to dismiss a number of other charges. Relevant to this appeal, the
    Record before us tends to reflect the following:
    Defendant was charged with thirteen separate counts arising from four
    separate alleged offense dates. The first offense date was 15 May 2018, stemming
    from a traffic stop. As a result of this stop, Defendant was charged with Trafficking
    Methamphetamine by Possession, Trafficking Methamphetamine by Transportation,
    Conspiracy to Trafficking Methamphetamine by Possession, Conspiracy to
    Trafficking Methamphetamine by Transportation, Possession of a Firearm by a
    Felon, and Possession with Intent to Sell or Deliver Methamphetamine. The second
    offense date was the following day, 16 May 2018, as a result of a search warrant-
    based search of Defendant’s home. This search resulted in Defendant being charged
    with Trafficking Methamphetamine by Possession, Conspiracy to Trafficking
    Methamphetamine       by    Possession,    Keeping/Maintaining    a   Dwelling    for
    Keeping/Selling a Controlled Substance, and Possession with Intent to Sell or Deliver
    Methamphetamine.        The final two offense dates were 22 October 2019, when
    Defendant was charged with Selling/Delivering Methamphetamine and Conspiracy
    to Sell Methamphetamine, and 23 October 2019, when Defendant was charged with
    an additional count of Possession of a Firearm by a Felon. The State subsequently
    dismissed the charge of Keeping/Maintaining a Dwelling for Keeping/Selling a
    Controlled Substance.
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    On 30 April 2019, Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress alleging the search of
    the vehicle during the 15 May 2018 traffic stop and the 16 May 2018 search of his
    residence were in violation of both the United States and North Carolina
    Constitutions. Defendant’s Motion to Suppress was heard on 26 July 2021. At the
    outset of the hearing, the State announced it consented to the suppression of evidence
    of drugs seized from Defendant’s home resulting from the 16 May 2018 search
    warrant. As a result, the parties proceeded only on the issue of whether evidence
    seized as a result of the 15 May 2018 traffic stop should be suppressed. Defendant
    contended the traffic stop was impermissibly prolonged beyond the mission of the
    traffic stop without reasonable suspicion or consent. At the conclusion of the hearing,
    the trial court took the matter under advisement. Defendant provided notice that in
    the event the Motion to Suppress was denied, he intended to appeal the denial.
    On 24 September 2021, the trial court entered its written Order denying the
    Motion to Suppress the evidence seized at the 15 May 2018 traffic stop. The trial
    court made the following—largely unchallenged—Findings of Fact:
    1. That on May 15, 2018 Detective Richard Linthicum with the
    vice narcotics unit of the Randolph County Sheriff’s Department
    (“Linthicum”) received information that the [D]efendant was in
    possession of a large amount of methamphetamine. Linthicum
    described the provider of the information as a confidential and
    reliable informant; however, the Court heard no evidence as to
    this person’s reliability, and no evidence corroborating the
    information.
    2. That after receiving the information, Linthicum and other
    officers attempted to locate [D]efendant and conduct surveillance.
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    Linthicum located [D]efendant and a female, later identified as
    Jamie Little, driving a Ford Edge at the Dixie Suds Laundry . . . .
    3. Linthicum and Detective Hammer were in an unmarked Ford
    150 [sic] truck parked at the Midtown Dixie gas station, and
    Linthicum noticed the Ford Edge parked next to a wall at the
    laundry. He noticed [D]efendant and Ms. Little going back and
    forth from the vehicle to the laundry.
    4. The Ford Edge left the laundry and parked beside Linthicum’s
    truck at the gas station, Ms. Little attempted to go in the gas
    station but it was closed.
    5. The Ford Edge left the gas station and Linthicum followed
    them . . . .
    6. That Linthicum noticed the Ford Edge cross the double center
    line when the vehicle turned left off of Highway 311 onto Stout
    Road, and he radioed this information to [Deputy] Kyle Cox
    (“Cox”), also with the Randolph County Sheriff's Department,
    who was driving a marked patrol vehicle, to conduct a traffic stop
    on the vehicle. Linthicum pulled over on the side of the road to
    allow Cox to pass him to make the traffic stop. Linthicum saw
    Cox initiate the stop and the Ford Edge stopped, and then
    Linthicum continued traveling on Stout Road and waited for
    further instructions.
    7. That Cox initiated the traffic stop on the Ford Edge, the
    vehicle stopped[,] and Cox went to the driver’s side of the vehicle,
    and told Ms. Little the reason he stopped her and asked for her
    driver’s license and registration. Ms. Little gave her driver’s
    license and registration to Cox.
    8. That Cox went to his patrol vehicle, and ran a records check
    on Ms. Little and the vehicle, which took three to four minutes.
    Cox recognized [D]efendant as the passenger in the vehicle.
    9. That Cox then requested Ms. Little exit the vehicle so he could
    explain the warning citation to her, which is Cox’s routine
    procedure. Cox and Ms. Little walked behind the Ford Edge and
    in front of Cox’s patrol vehicle. Cox explained to Ms. Little the
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    warning citation while standing in front of the patrol vehicle, and
    asked Ms. Little if she had any questions. After Cox returned Ms.
    Little’s documents, he then asked Ms. Little if there was anything
    in the vehicle that he needed to know about including guns, drugs,
    bombs, large amounts of U.S. currency or any other weapons.
    That Ms. Little said she had a gun on the seat. However, based
    on testimony from the other officers involved, they were not aware
    of this information until after the search of the vehicle.
    10. That Detective Joshua Santiago and Detective John Lamb[e]
    with the Randolph County Sheriff’s Department, Vice Narcotics
    Unit (“Santiago” and “Lamb[e]”), also arrived on scene. Santiago
    and Lamb[e] had previously been informed of the information
    that [D]efendant had a large amount of methamphetamine.
    Santiago is a certified K-9 handler of K-9, Lizzy. Lizzy was
    certified on cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin and marijuana.
    11. That Santiago noticed Ms. Little sitting in the driver’s seat of
    the Ford Edge when he and Lamb[e] arrived on scene. He then
    spoke to Cox, and Cox informed Santiago he was writing Ms.
    Little a warning ticket and he was going to get Ms. Little out of
    the vehicle to explain the warning ticket to her.
    12. When Cox got Ms. Little out of the vehicle, Santiago asked
    Lamb[e] to get [D]efendant out of the vehicle due to Santiago
    readying to deploy Lizzy. While Cox and Ms. Little were in front
    of Cox’s patrol vehicle, Santiago deployed Lizzy to complete an
    open air sniff around the vehicle.
    13. That although Cox asked Ms. Little a question about whether
    she had anything in the vehicle he needed to know about after he
    returned her driver’s license and registration and gave her the
    warning ticket, this open air sniff around the vehicle started
    simultaneously to Cox asking Ms. Little to exit her vehicle and
    explaining the warning ticket to her.
    14. Lizzy sat, which is a passive alert, at the area of the front
    passenger door.
    15. Based on Lizzy’s alert, the vehicle and containers within the
    vehicle were searched.
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    The trial court then concluded: “Based upon a totality of the circumstances the [c]ourt
    concludes that the Defendant’s [M]otion to [S]uppress for lack of probable cause
    should be denied.”
    On 11 January 2022, Defendant and the State entered a plea arrangement.
    Defendant entered an Alford plea to: Trafficking Methamphetamine by Possession
    and Possession of a Firearm by a Felon both arising from the 15 May 2018 offense
    date; Selling/Delivering Methamphetamine from the 22 October 2019 offense date;
    and Possession of a Firearm by a Felon from the 23 October 2019 offense date. The
    State agreed to dismiss all other pending charges. The trial court consolidated the
    four charges into a single judgment and sentenced Defendant to an active prison term
    of 70 to 93 months and imposed a $50,000 fine. Defendant’s trial counsel announced
    in open court: “We had a motion to suppress. I gave notice in advance that if the
    motion was denied, we intend to give notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. It was
    denied on September 24th of 2021, therefore we’re giving notice of appeal for denial
    of that motion to the Court of Appeals.”
    Appellate Jurisdiction
    As an initial matter, Defendant filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this
    Court in the event we deem his oral Notice of Appeal insufficient to preserve his
    appeal from the trial court’s Judgment. “An order . . . denying a motion to suppress
    evidence may be reviewed upon an appeal from . . . a judgment entered upon a plea
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    of guilty.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b) (2021). However, a defendant must (1) notify
    the prosecutor and the trial court of his intention to appeal during plea negotiations
    and (2) provide notice of appeal from the final judgment. State v. McBride, 
    120 N.C. App. 623
    , 625-26, 
    463 S.E.2d 403
    , 404-05 (1995), aff’d per curiam, 
    344 N.C. 623
    , 
    476 S.E.2d 106
     (1996).
    Here, Defendant, through trial counsel, complied with only one of the two
    required steps to preserve his appeal from his guilty plea. Defendant complied with
    step 1 by notifying the prosecutor and trial court of his intent to appeal the denial of
    the Motion to Suppress prior to his plea being accepted. However, after Judgment
    was entered, trial counsel gave oral Notice of Appeal but specified the appeal was
    from the denial of the Motion to Suppress and failed to state the appeal was from the
    Judgment rendered by the trial court. As such, Defendant has lost his right to appeal
    from the Judgment entered by the trial court. See State v. Miller, 
    205 N.C. App. 724
    ,
    725, 
    696 S.E.2d 542
    , 542 (2010) (dismissing appeal where defendant gave written
    notice of appeal “from the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress,” but did not
    specify the judgment itself).
    Nevertheless, in the context of this case, we discern Defendant’s intent to
    appeal from both the Motion to Suppress and the Judgment. Indeed, for its part, the
    State contends Certiorari is unnecessary as the State does not seek dismissal of the
    appeal. In our discretion, and in aid of our jurisdiction, we allow Defendant’s Petition
    and issue our Writ of Certiorari. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-32(c) (2021).
    -7-
    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    Issues
    The issues on appeal are whether: (I) Finding of Fact 13, that “the open air
    sniff around the vehicle started simultaneously to Cox asking Ms. Little to exit her
    vehicle and explaining the warning ticket to her,” is supported by competent evidence
    in the Record; and (II) the trial court’s Findings of Fact support its Conclusion: “Based
    upon a totality of the circumstances . . . Defendant’s [M]otion to [S]uppress for lack
    of probable cause should be denied.”
    Analysis
    “Our review of a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress is strictly limited
    to a determination of whether [the trial court’s] findings are supported by competent
    evidence, and in turn, whether the findings support the trial court’s ultimate
    conclusion.” State v. Reynolds, 
    161 N.C. App. 144
    , 146-47, 
    587 S.E.2d 456
    , 458 (2003)
    (citation and quotation marks omitted). The trial court’s conclusions of law, however,
    are reviewed de novo. See State v. Fernandez, 
    346 N.C. 1
    , 11, 
    484 S.E.2d 350
    , 357
    (1997) (citation omitted).    “In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we
    examine the evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the State[.]”
    State v. Moore, 
    152 N.C. App. 156
    , 159, 
    566 S.E.2d 713
    , 715 (2002) (citations omitted).
    I.      Finding of Fact 13
    Defendant challenges only one of the trial court’s Findings of Fact: Finding 13.
    In Finding of Fact 13, the trial court found:
    That although Cox asked Ms. Little a question about whether she
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    had anything in the vehicle he needed to know about after he
    returned her driver’s license and registration and gave her the
    warning ticket, this open air sniff around the vehicle started
    simultaneously to Cox asking Ms. Little to exit her vehicle and
    explaining the warning ticket to her.
    In particular, Defendant contends the portion of the Finding that “this open air sniff
    around the vehicle started simultaneously to Cox asking Ms. Little to exit her vehicle
    and explaining the warning ticket to her” is unsupported by the evidence, self-
    contradictory and illogical, and further contradicted by Finding of Fact 12.      We
    disagree.
    First, there is competent evidence in the Record to support the trial court’s
    Finding. Defendant focuses exclusively on Deputy Cox’s written report. This report
    on its face indicates Deputy Cox had concluded the stop by issuing a warning ticket
    and asked Ms. Little if there was anything in the car Deputy Cox should know about
    like weapons, contraband, or large sums of currency. The Report further states
    “Detective Santiago then deployed his canine Lizzy . . . [.]” However, Defendant’s
    reliance on Deputy Cox’s report ignores other testimony and evidence, including
    Detective Santiago’s testimony. Detective Santiago testified when he arrived on the
    scene to handle Lizzy while she conducted the open-air sniff, Deputy Cox was in the
    process of issuing the warning ticket and told Detective Santiago he was going to ask
    Ms. Little to step out of the car so he could explain the warning ticket to her. Once
    Deputy Cox asked Ms. Little to step out of the car to explain the warning ticket,
    Detective Santiago asked Detective Lambe to remove Defendant from the car, so
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    Lizzy could be deployed. Detective Santiago also testified that as he went to retrieve
    and deploy Lizzy, he briefly overheard the conversation between Deputy Cox and Ms.
    Little when Deputy Cox was still explaining the warning ticket. Lizzy conducted her
    open-air sniff while Deputy Cox and Ms. Little were still having their conversation.
    Detective Santiago’s testimony was also consistent with his written report. Further,
    Detective Lambe testified when Deputy Cox asked Ms. Little to step out of the car,
    Detective Santiago asked Detective Lambe to remove Defendant from the car also, so
    Lizzy could be deployed. Detective Lambe’s written report reflects “Deputy Cox had
    [Ms.] Little whom was driving the vehicle step out to explain the warning citation
    while Detective Santiago deployed K9. Before doing so I asked the male passenger
    to step out of the vehicle . . . .” This evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the
    State on appellate review, supports the finding “this open air sniff around the vehicle
    started simultaneously to Cox asking Ms. Little to exit her vehicle and explaining the
    warning ticket to her.” See State v. Williams, 
    366 N.C. 110
    , 114, 
    726 S.E.2d 161
    , 165
    (2012) (“The trial court’s findings of fact on a motion to suppress are conclusive on
    appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.”
    (citations and quotation marks omitted)).
    Second, Finding of Fact 13 is not illogical or internally inconsistent. Defendant
    argues it is logically impossible for the open-air sniff to have started precisely
    simultaneously to both Ms. Little being asked to exit the vehicle and the warning
    ticket being explained to her—as those were two separate occurrences. Defendant
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    reads the Finding too narrowly. Rather, when read in context, it is apparent that the
    trial court, in this Finding, is acknowledging the evidence that after Deputy Cox
    finished his explanation, handed over the warning citation, and returned Little’s
    license and registration, he then asked about items in the car—which could be seen
    as extending the traffic stop after its mission was completed.        The trial court,
    however, goes on to clarify that the open-air sniff was initiated prior to Deputy Cox’s
    inquiry. In other words, the open-air sniff was occurring prior to the stop arguably
    being extended beyond its mission.
    Third, Defendant contends Finding of Fact 13 is contradicted by Finding of
    Fact 12. To the contrary, Finding of Fact 13 is perfectly consistent with Finding of
    Fact 12. Finding of Fact 12 states: “When Cox got Ms. Little out of the vehicle,
    Santiago asked Lamb[e] to get [D]efendant out of the vehicle due to Santiago readying
    to deploy Lizzy. While Cox and Ms. Little were in front of Cox’s patrol vehicle,
    Santiago deployed Lizzy to complete an open air sniff around the vehicle.”
    Defendant’s argument, again, rests on an overly narrow focus on the trial court’s use
    of the term “simultaneously” in Finding of Fact 13. However, Finding 12 reflects that
    Santiago began the process of deploying Lizzy when Ms. Little got out of the vehicle
    and Detective Lambe removed Defendant; Lizzy then performed the sniff while
    Deputy Cox and Ms. Little were in front of the patrol vehicle.
    Thus, the trial court’s Findings, read together, reflect that the sniff was, in
    fact, undertaken during the same time frame as Ms. Little getting out of the car and
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    Deputy Cox explaining the warning citation to her. Therefore, Finding of Fact 13 is
    supported by evidence in the Record and is consistent with itself and the trial court’s
    other Findings. Consequently, Finding of Fact 13 may, in turn, also be relied on to
    support the trial court’s Conclusions.
    II.      The Trial Court’s Conclusion of Law
    Defendant further challenges the trial court’s Conclusion of Law: “Based upon
    a totality of the circumstances, the [c]ourt concludes that the Defendant’s [M]otion to
    [S]uppress for lack of probable cause should be denied.” Defendant contends the trial
    court’s Conclusion fails to articulate any rationale for its decision to deny the Motion
    to Suppress.      Defendant further argues the trial court misapprehended the law
    applicable to traffic stops and warrantless dog-sniffs by relying on “a probable cause”
    standard. Finally, Defendant—relying on Rodriguez v. United States, 
    575 U.S. 348
    ,
    
    135 S.Ct. 1609
    , 
    191 L. Ed. 2d 492
     (2015)—contends, even applying the correct
    standard, the trial court’s Findings of Fact do not support its Conclusion of Law.
    First, Defendant contends the trial court’s Conclusion of Law is insufficient for
    appellate review because it fails “to provide the trial court’s rationale regarding why”
    it denied the Motion to Suppress. 2 When ruling on a motion to suppress following a
    hearing, a judge “must set forth in the record his findings of facts and conclusions of
    2 Defendant actually raises this argument as an argument in the alternative should we reject his other
    arguments. For our purposes, however, we first review whether the trial court made a conclusion of
    law adequate for appellate review before reaching Defendant’s more substantive arguments.
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    law.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-977(f) (2021).            As Defendant notes, our Court has
    observed:
    When a trial court fails to make all the necessary determinations,
    i.e., findings of fact resolving disputed issues of fact and
    conclusions of law applying the legal principles to the facts found,
    “[r]emand is necessary because it is the trial court that is
    entrusted with the duty to hear testimony, weigh and resolve any
    conflicts in the evidence, find the facts, and, then based upon those
    findings, render a legal decision, in the first instance, as to
    whether or not a constitutional violation of some kind has
    occurred.”
    State v. Faulk, 
    256 N.C. App. 255
    , 263, 
    807 S.E.2d 623
    , 629 (2017) (emphasis added)
    (quoting State v. Baskins, 
    247 N.C. App. 603
    , 610, 
    786 S.E.2d 94
    , 99 (2016) (citations
    and quotation marks omitted)).          Here, however, the trial court made generally
    unchallenged Findings of Fact and “based on those findings” did “render a legal
    decision.” 
    Id.
     Indeed, in State v. Aguilar, we recently concluded a substantively
    identical conclusion of law was reviewable, particularly when taken in context of the
    findings of fact and prior trial court proceedings, “because the trial court here
    explained that probable cause supported the search based upon the totality of the
    circumstances in the findings.” State v. Aguilar, 2022-NCCOA-903, ¶ 28, 
    882 S.E.2d 411
    , 423. Here, the trial court was tasked with ultimately determining whether law
    enforcement officers had probable cause to search the vehicle as a result of a valid
    dog-sniff.     This is clear from the trial court’s Findings of Fact as well as the
    proceedings reflected in the hearing transcript.             While additional conclusions
    outlining the analytical steps undertaken by the trial court would certainly be more
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    helpful in our review, here, we are able to discern the basis of the trial court’s ruling
    and conduct our review.
    Relatedly, Defendant further argues the trial court’s Conclusion of Law
    constitutes a misapprehension or misapplication of the law, because—Defendant
    asserts—the real issue is not whether the dog-sniff provided probable cause to search
    the vehicle without a warrant but rather whether the dog-sniff itself was permissible
    as part of the traffic stop. As such, Defendant contends the trial court erred in
    applying a “probable cause” legal standard in its Conclusion rather than analyzing
    whether the dog-sniff occurred during the original mission of the traffic stop or was
    otherwise supported by reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity under U.S. v.
    Rodriguez.3 While we agree with Defendant that the underlying issue is whether the
    dog-sniff—which led to the warrantless search—was validly conducted in the course
    of the traffic stop, we disagree the trial court’s Conclusion of Law reflects a
    misapprehension of law.
    To the contrary, the ultimate question for the trial court was whether there
    was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search of the vehicle primarily based
    on the positive alert from the dog-sniff, which necessarily required the trial court to
    3 For its part, the State contends there was probable cause to initiate the search based on the totality
    of the circumstances including a tip from a confidential, reliable informant, knowledge of the firearm
    in the vehicle, and knowledge of Defendant’s prior criminal history. None of these circumstances,
    however, are supported by the trial court’s Findings. To the contrary, the trial court expressly made
    no findings about the reliability of the informant; the officers conducting the search were not aware of
    the firearm until after the search; and there is no finding regarding Defendant’s prior history.
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    first consider the validity of the dog-sniff.4 Nevertheless, “[a]ssuming arguendo that
    the trial court’s reasoning for denying defendant’s motion to suppress was incorrect,
    we are not required on this basis alone to determine that the ruling was erroneous.”
    State v. Austin, 
    320 N.C. 276
    , 290, 
    357 S.E.2d 641
    , 650 (1987) (citing State v. Gardner,
    
    316 N.C. 605
    , 
    342 S.E.2d 872
     (1986)). “A correct decision of a lower court will not be
    disturbed on review simply because an insufficient or superfluous reason is assigned.
    The question for review is whether the ruling of the trial court was correct and not
    whether the reason given therefor is sound or tenable.” 
    Id.
     (citing State v. Blackwell,
    
    246 N.C. 642
    , 644, 
    99 S.E.2d 867
    , 869 (1957)). “The crucial inquiry for this Court is
    admissibility and whether the ultimate ruling was supported by the evidence.” 
    Id.
    Ultimately, Defendant argues the trial court’s Findings cannot support a
    determination the dog-sniff was validly conducted during the traffic stop consistent
    with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.                    Specifically, pointing to Rodriguez,
    Defendant contends the Findings—and in the absence of any finding of reasonable
    suspicion of other criminal activity—do not support a conclusion the dog-sniff was
    conducted prior to the completion of the original mission of the stop.                    As such,
    Defendant asserts the trial court’s denial of the Motion to Suppress should be
    reversed and the trial court’s Judgment vacated.
    4 In the absence of a valid dog-sniff, the trial court may well have determined there was no probable
    cause to perform a warrantless search of the vehicle on the facts before it.
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides the right of the people to
    be secure in their persons and protects citizens from unreasonable searches and
    seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV.; see also N.C. Const. art. I, § 20; State v. Garner,
    
    331 N.C. 491
    , 506-07, 
    417 S.E.2d 502
    , 510 (1992). These protections apply to “seizures
    of the person, including brief investigatory detentions such as those involved in the
    stopping of a vehicle.” State v. Watkins, 
    337 N.C. 437
    , 441, 
    446 S.E.2d 67
    , 69-70
    (1994) (citation omitted).    “Thus, a traffic stop is subject to the reasonableness
    requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Reed, 
    373 N.C. 498
    , 507, 
    838 S.E.2d 414
    , 421-22 (2020). “A traffic stop may become ‘unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the
    time reasonably required to complete [its] mission.’ ” Id. at 508, 838 S.E.2d at 422
    (alteration in original) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 
    543 U.S. 405
    , 407, 
    125 S.Ct. 834
    ,
    837, 
    160 L. Ed. 2d 842
    , 846 (2005)).
    In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court of the United States clarified:
    [a] seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of
    that violation. . . . [T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in
    the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s “mission”—
    to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop, and
    attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the
    infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is
    necessary to effectuate that purpose. Authority for the seizure
    thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or
    reasonably should have been—completed.
    
    575 U.S. 348
    , 354, 
    135 S.Ct. 1609
    , 1614, 
    191 L. Ed. 2d 492
    , 498 (2015) (citations and
    quotation marks omitted).
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    Opinion of the Court
    However, the Rodriguez Court also acknowledged: “the Fourth Amendment
    tolerated certain unrelated investigations that did not lengthen the roadside
    detention.” 
    Id.
     Nevertheless, a traffic stop “ ‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged
    beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of issuing a warning
    ticket.” 
    Id.
     (quoting Caballes, 
    543 U.S. at 407
    , 
    125 S.Ct. at 837
    ). “The seizure remains
    lawful only ‘so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of
    the stop.’ ” Id. at 355, 
    135 S.Ct. at 1615
     (quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 
    555 U.S. 323
    ,
    333, 
    129 S.Ct. 781
    , 788, 
    172 L. Ed. 2d 694
    , 704 (2009)). “An officer, in other words,
    may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.
    But . . . he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable
    suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” 
    Id.
    Applying Rodriguez, the North Carolina Supreme Court recognizes: “Beyond
    determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ordinary
    inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” State v. Bullock, 
    370 N.C. 256
    , 257, 
    805 S.E.2d 671
    , 673 (2017) (citation and quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).
    “These inquiries include checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are
    outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration
    and proof of insurance.” 
    Id.
     (citation and quotation marks omitted). “In addition, ‘an
    officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order to
    complete his mission safely[,]’ ” including conducting criminal history checks. 
    Id. at 258
    , 
    805 S.E.2d at 673-74
     (citations omitted). Officer safety “stems from the mission
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    of the traffic stop”; thus, “time devoted to officer safety is time that is reasonably
    required to complete that mission.” 
    Id. at 262
    , 
    805 S.E.2d at 676
    . “On-scene
    investigation into other crimes, however, detours from that mission.” Rodriguez, 575
    U.S. at 356, 
    135 S.Ct. at 1616
    . Moreover, “traffic stops remain[ ] lawful only so long
    as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Bullock,
    
    370 N.C. at 262
    , 
    805 S.E.2d at 676
     (alterations and emphasis in original) (citation
    and quotation marks omitted).
    Relevant to this case, this Court, applying Rodriguez, has recognized: “The
    [Rodriguez] Court specifically held that the performance of a dog sniff is not a type of
    check which is related to an officer’s traffic mission.” State v. Warren, 
    242 N.C. App. 496
    , 499, 
    775 S.E.2d 362
    , 365 (2015), aff’d per curiam, 
    368 N.C. 756
    , 
    782 S.E.2d 509
    (2016). “Therefore, under Rodriguez, an officer who lawfully stops a vehicle for a
    traffic violation but who otherwise does not have reasonable suspicion that any crime
    is afoot beyond a traffic violation may execute a dog sniff only if the check does not
    prolong the traffic stop.”    
    Id.
       Indeed, the United States Supreme Court had
    previously concluded “conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a
    traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable
    manner, unless the dog sniff itself infringed respondent’s constitutionally protected
    interest in privacy. Our cases hold that it did not.” Caballes, 
    543 U.S. at 408
    , 
    125 S.Ct. at 837
    .
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    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    In this case, the trial court’s Findings demonstrate the dog-sniff was
    undertaken prior to the completion of the mission of the traffic stop. In particular,
    the trial court found:
    11. That Santiago noticed Ms. Little sitting in the driver’s seat of
    the Ford Edge when he and Lamb[e] arrived on scene. He then
    spoke to Cox, and Cox informed Santiago he was writing Ms.
    Little a warning ticket and he was going to get Ms. Little out of
    the vehicle to explain the warning ticket to her.
    12. When Cox got Ms. Little out of the vehicle, Santiago asked
    Lamb[e] to get [D]efendant out of the vehicle due to Santiago
    readying to deploy Lizzy. While Cox and Ms. Little were in front
    of Cox’s patrol vehicle, Santiago deployed Lizzy to complete an
    open air sniff around the vehicle.
    13. That although Cox asked Ms. Little a question about whether
    she had anything in the vehicle he needed to know about after he
    returned her driver’s license and registration and gave her the
    warning ticket, this open air sniff around the vehicle started
    simultaneously to Cox asking Ms. Little to exit her vehicle and
    explaining the warning ticket to her.
    Crucially, these Findings tend to establish the dog-sniff was undertaken during the
    process of Cox explaining the warning ticket to Ms. Little and prior to Cox asking the
    question potentially unrelated to the mission of the stop. As such, the trial court’s
    Findings support a determination the traffic stop was not prolonged by, or for, the
    dog-sniff.
    Thus, the trial court’s Findings support a determination the dog-sniff which
    led to the search of the vehicle was validly conducted during the time reasonably
    required to complete the mission of the traffic stop. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354,
    - 19 -
    STATE V. SAN
    Opinion of the Court
    
    135 S.Ct. at 1609
    . Therefore, the trial court properly concluded “Based upon a totality
    of the circumstances”—including the validly conducted dog-sniff—“the Defendant’s
    [M]otion to [S]uppress should be denied.” Consequently, the trial court did not err in
    denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.
    Conclusion
    Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm both the trial court’s Order
    denying the Motion to Suppress and the Judgment entered upon Defendant’s Alford
    plea.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges ZACHARY and GRIFFIN concur.
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