State v. Phillips ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA22-866
Filed 3 October 2023
Cumberland County, No. 21 CRS 52924
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
ANGELA BENITA PHILLIPS, Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 11 May 2022 by Judge James F.
Ammons, Jr. in Cumberland County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals
on 26 April 2023.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorneys General John P.
Barkley & Hyrum J. Hemingway, for the State.
Reece & Reece, by Mary McCullers Reece, for Defendant-Appellant.
CARPENTER, Judge.
Angela Benita Phillips (“Defendant”) appeals from judgment after a jury
convicted her of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. On appeal,
Defendant argues the trial court erroneously instructed the jury by including an
instruction on the prohibition of excessive force. After careful review, we agree with
Defendant. We vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.
I. Factual & Procedural Background
On 4 April 2021, after a verbal altercation between Defendant and Latonya
Dunlap (“Victim”), Defendant shot Victim. On 22 June 2021, a Cumberland County
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Opinion of the Court
grand jury indicted Defendant for assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious
injury. On 9 May 2022, the State tried this case before a jury and the Honorable
James Ammons, Jr. in Cumberland County Superior Court.
At trial, witnesses testified that the altercation began with Victim entering
Defendant’s front porch and ended with Defendant shooting Victim while she was on
Defendant’s front porch. During the charge conference, Defendant requested the trial
court provide North Carolina Pattern Jury Instruction-Criminal (“NCPJI”) 308.80 to
the jury. NCPJI 308.80 is an instruction on self-defense, specifically, self-defense
within a defendant’s home. The trial court granted the request but modified NCPJI
308.80 to include language prohibiting the use of “excessive force.” Over Defendant’s
objection, the trial court instructed the jury with the modified charge. On 11 May
2022, the jury found Defendant guilty of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting
serious injury. Defendant orally appealed in open court.
II. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(a) (2021).
III. Issue
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erroneously instructed the jury
by including an instruction on the prohibition of excessive force.
IV. Analysis
This Court reviews the legality of jury instructions de novo. State v. Barron,
202 N.C. App. 686, 694, 690 S.E.2d 22, 29 (2010). “‘Under a de novo review, th[is
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Opinion of the Court
C]ourt considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of
the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632–33, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294
(2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d
316, 319 (2003)).
An erroneous jury instruction “is prejudicial and requires a new trial only if
‘there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed,
a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.’”
State v. Castaneda, 196 N.C. App. 109, 116, 674 S.E.2d 707, 712 (2009) (quoting N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(a)).
North Carolina General Statute section 14-51.2 is colloquially known as the
Castle Doctrine. Under the Castle Doctrine:
the lawful occupant of a home . . . is presumed to have held
a reasonable fear of imminent death or serious bodily
harm. . . when using defensive force that is intended or
likely to cause death or serious bodily harm to another if
both of the following apply: (1) The person against whom
the defensive force was used was in the process of
unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and
forcibly entered, a home . . . . (2) The person who uses
defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an
unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act
was occurring or had occurred.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(b) (2021). In other words, it is presumed that an occupant
of a home may use deadly force to prevent an intruder from entering the home if the
occupant reasonably believed the intruder was trying to unlawfully enter the home.
See id. This presumption, however, is rebuttable. Id. § 14-51.2(c). For example, an
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Opinion of the Court
occupant cannot use deadly force if the intruder has “discontinued all efforts to
unlawfully and forcefully enter the home.” Id. § 14-51.2(c)(5).
In Castle Doctrine scenarios, excessive force1 is not prohibited. See id. § 14-
51.2(b). Indeed, the Castle Doctrine allows an occupant to use the ultimate force
when defending his or her home: “force that is intended or likely to cause death.” Id.
And under the Castle Doctrine, the ultimate force is presumed necessary unless the
presumption is rebutted. See id.
North Carolina has a “Stand Your Ground” Doctrine, as well: N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-51.3 (2021). See State v. Walker, 286 N.C. App. 438, 448, 880 S.E.2d 731, 739
(2022) (labeling N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3 the “stand your ground” statute). Section
14-51.3 states:
A person is justified in using force, except deadly force,
against another when and to the extent that the person
reasonably believes that the conduct is necessary to defend
himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent
use of unlawful force. However, a person is justified in the
use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat in
any place he or she has the lawful right to be if either of
the following applies: (1) He or she reasonably believes that
such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great
bodily harm to himself or herself or another. (2) Under the
circumstances permitted pursuant to [the Castle Doctrine].
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a). In other words, if a person is in a legally occupied place,
that person need not retreat and may use deadly force if he or she “reasonably
1 Excessive force is force that exceeds what reasonably appears necessary for self-
defense. See State v. Shoemaker, 80 N.C. App. 95, 102, 341 S.E.2d 603, 608 (1986).
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Opinion of the Court
believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm
to himself or herself or another.” See id. The Stand Your Ground Doctrine overlaps
with the Castle Doctrine because the Stand Your Ground Doctrine also applies in
Castle Doctrine scenarios, i.e., self-defense situations within the home. See id. So if
the Castle Doctrine presumption applies, deadly force is presumed necessary, and
you need not retreat. See id. Said differently: If you reasonably believe an intruder
is unlawfully entering your home, you have a presumed right to use deadly force
under the Castle Doctrine, id. § 14-51.2(b), and you need not retreat under the Stand
Your Ground Doctrine, id. § 14-51.3(a).
In State v. Benner, the North Carolina Supreme Court discussed both doctrines
and contemplated the possibility of excessive force. 380 N.C. 621, 638, 869 S.E.2d
199, 210 (2022). In Benner, the defendant shot and killed the victim while the victim
was in the defendant’s home. Id. at 625, 869 S.E.2d at 202. A jury convicted the
defendant of first-degree murder, and the defendant appealed, arguing the trial court
erred by failing to give him a “complete self-defense instruction.” Id. at 629, 869
S.E.2d at 205. The Court analyzed both section 14-51.2 and section 14-51.3 and
stated that it is a:
well-established legal principle that, even though a
defendant attacked in his own home is entitled to stand his
ground, to repel force with force, and to increase his force,
so as not only to resist, but also to overcome the assault,
such an entitlement would not excuse the defendant if he
used excessive force in repelling the assault.
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Opinion of the Court
Id. at 636, 869 S.E.2d at 209 (purgandum). The Court continued: “the proportionality
rule inherent in the requirement that the defendant not use excessive force continues
to exist even in instances in which a defendant is entitled to stand his or her ground.”
Id. at 636, 869 S.E.2d at 209.
Although the Benner Court addressed an in-home self-defense scenario, its
excessive-force language pertained only to the Stand Your Ground Doctrine. See id.
at 636, 869 S.E.2d at 209. As mentioned, the Stand Your Ground Doctrine applies to
in-home scenarios, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a), and the Benner Court spoke in Stand
Your Ground terms: “the proportionality rule inherent in the requirement that the
defendant not use excessive force continues to exist even in instances in which a
defendant is entitled to stand his or her ground,” Benner, 380 N.C. at 636, 869 S.E.2d
at 209 (emphasis added).
In Walker, this Court discussed Benner and stated: “That decision makes clear
that the use of deadly force cannot be excessive and must still be proportional even
when the defendant has no duty to retreat and is entitled to stand his ground . . . .”
Walker, 286 N.C. App. at 447, 880 S.E.2d at 738 (emphasis added). In other words,
the Benner prohibition of excessive force concerns the Stand Your Ground Doctrine,
not the Castle Doctrine. See id. at 447, 880 S.E.2d at 738. We agree.
This Court went on to compare the Castle Doctrine and the Stand Your Ground
Doctrine. We said, “the castle doctrine statute does not obviate the proportionality
requirement inherent to lethal self-defense; instead, it simply presumes that the
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Opinion of the Court
proportionality requirement is satisfied under specific circumstances.” Id. at 448, 880
S.E.2d at 739. Then concerning the Stand Your Ground Doctrine, we said the
defendant “could use deadly force against the victim under Subsection 14-51.3(a) only
if it was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm, i.e., if it was
proportional.” Id. at 449, 880 S.E.2d at 739.
Put together: Under the Castle Doctrine, excessive force is impossible unless
the State rebuts the Castle Doctrine presumption, but under the Stand Your Ground
Doctrine, excessive force is possible if the defendant acts disproportionately. See id.
at 448–49, 880 S.E.2d at 739. So in Castle Doctrine scenarios, unless the State rebuts
the Castle Doctrine presumption, a jury cannot find that a defendant used excessive
force. See id. at 448–49, 880 S.E.2d at 739.
Here, the trial court instructed the jury based on NCPJI 308.80, but added the
following language:
A defendant does not have the right to use excessive force.
The defendant had the right to use only such force as
reasonably appeared necessary to the defendant under the
circumstances to protect the defendant from death or great
bodily harm. In making this determination you should
consider the circumstances as you find them to exist from
the evidence including the size, age, and strength of the
defendant as compared to the victim; the fierceness of any
assault upon the defendant; and whether the victim
possessed a weapon.
Defendant argues the trial court’s jury instruction incorrectly stated the law
by including language explaining the excessive-force prohibition. Defendant argues
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Opinion of the Court
the Castle Doctrine provides her with a rebuttable presumption that deadly force is
authorized, and since no force exceeds deadly force, excessive force is impossible
where the State fails to rebut the presumption. We agree with Defendant.
Here, when the trial court conclusively stated that “[D]efendant does not have
the right to use excessive force,” the trial court concluded that the State rebutted the
Castle Doctrine presumption. But whether the State successfully rebutted the Castle
Doctrine presumption was for the jury to decide, as a matter of fact, and the
remainder of the equation was a matter of law. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(b). If
the jury determined the question of fact—whether deadly force was authorized
because the State failed to rebut the presumption—in the affirmative, Defendant, as
a matter of law, did not use excessive force when she shot Victim. See id.The trial court could have instructed the jury this way: If the State rebutted
the Castle Doctrine presumption, Defendant could not use excessive force to protect
herself; but if the State failed to rebut the presumption, the proportionality of
Defendant’s force was irrelevant. See id. Therefore, the trial court erred by
categorically stating that Defendant “d[id] not have the right to use excessive force.”
See id. If this case only concerned the Stand Your Ground Doctrine, the excessive-
force instruction may have sufficed. See Benner, 380 N.C. at 636, 869 S.E.2d at 209.
But because this case concerns the Castle Doctrine, the excessive-force instruction
was erroneous. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2(b).
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Opinion of the Court
Further, by stating that Defendant “d[id] not have the right to use excessive
force,” it is probable that the trial court confused the jury. Indeed, shortly after the
trial court instructed the jury, a juror asked the court if it could “repeat the last,” to
which the court replied, “[i]t is confusing.” A special verdict form may have helped
the jury discern the nuanced issues arising from the different self-defense doctrines.
Because the trial court’s instruction was both erroneous and confusing, there
is a reasonable possibility that the jury would have reached a different result if it
received a proper instruction. See Castaneda, 196 N.C. App. at 116, 674 S.E.2d at
712. Thus, Defendant was prejudiced by the instruction and is therefore entitled to
a new trial. See id. at 116, 674 S.E.2d at 712.
V. Conclusion
We hold the trial court erred when it instructed the jury, and there was a
reasonable possibility of a different result had the trial court correctly instructed the
jury. Therefore, we vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for a new trial.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
Judge STADING concurs.
Judge HAMPSON dissents in a separate opinion.
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No. COA22-866 – State v. Phillips
HAMPSON, Judge, dissenting.
The Castle Doctrine, applied as a statutory defense, must be viewed in the
context of the statutory scheme in which it is found and read together with its
accompanying statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.2 (Home, workplace, and motor
vehicle protection; presumption of fear of death or serious bodily harm.); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-51.3 (Use of force in defense of person; relief from criminal or civil liability);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.4 (Justification for defensive force not available). It is not a
stand-alone defense but is rather integrated into a defense of justification—or the
right to stand one’s ground—in defense of person or property. Specifically, N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-51.3 first provides: “A person is justified in using force, except deadly force,
against another when and to the extent that the person reasonably believes that the
conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s
imminent use of unlawful force.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-51.3(a). That statute further
provides two instances where deadly force may be justified:
a person is justified in the use of deadly force and does not
have a duty to retreat in any place he or she has the lawful
right to be if either of the following applies:
(1) He or she reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm
to himself or herself or another.
(2) Under the circumstances permitted pursuant to G.S.
14-51.2.
Id. These subsections, together, create the basis for the so-called “Stand-Your-
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HAMPSON, J., dissenting
Ground” defense. Both rely on a central unifying principle for justifying the use of
deadly force in defense of person or property: the person “reasonably believes that
such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm[.]” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-51.3(a)(1). Unlike subsection 1, however, under subsection 2—by reference
to section 14-51.2—when a lawful occupant of a home, motor vehicle, or workplace
knowingly applies deadly force in defense against an unlawful breaking or entering
or removal of a person, the lawful occupant is entitled to a presumption that they
reasonably feared imminent death or serious bodily harm. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
51.2(b) As such, both subsections apply the same “reasonable belief” standard, but
under subsection 2, the lawful occupant’s belief is presumptively reasonable unless
and until the State overcomes that presumption.
Indeed, we have previously observed the Castle Doctrine Statute—N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-51.2—“functions by creating a presumption of reasonable fear of imminent
death or serious bodily harm in favor of a lawful occupant of a home, which in turn
justifies the occupant’s use of deadly force.” State v. Austin, 279 N.C. App. 377, 382,
865 S.E.2d 350, 355, rev. denied, 871 S.E.2d 519 (N.C. 2022). While N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 14-51.2 provides the same self-defense protections to one acting in defense of person
or property, it broadens the traditional notion of self-defense by removing the burden
from a defendant to prove key elements of traditional self-defense. Id. at 380, 865
S.E.2d at 353.
In effect, this provision eliminates the needs for lawful
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HAMPSON, J., dissenting
occupants of a home to show that they reasonably believed
the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent
death or serious bodily injury to themselves or others—a
requirement of traditional self-defense. Instead, that belief
is presumed when the statutory criteria are satisfied.
Id. at 382-83, 865 S.E.2d at 355.
Hence, the Castle Doctrine Statute “simply provides that a lawful occupant of
a home, workplace, or motor vehicle is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that
deadly force is reasonable when used against someone who had or was unlawfully
breaking into that location or kidnapping someone from that location.” State v.
Walker, 286 N.C. App. 438, 448, 880 S.E.2d 731, 739, rev. denied 887 S.E.2d 879 (N.C.
2023). “In other words, the castle doctrine statute does not obviate the
proportionality requirement inherent to lethal self-defense; instead, it simply
presumes that the proportionality requirement is satisfied under specific
circumstances.” Id. Moreover, “the castle doctrine’s rebuttable presumption is not
limited to the five scenarios listed in the statute.” Austin, 279 N.C. App. at 384, 865
S.E.2d at 356. Viewed correctly, “the castle doctrine . . . is effectively a burden-
shifting provision, creating a presumption in favor of the defendant that can then be
rebutted by the State.” Id. “[I]f the State presents substantial evidence from which
a reasonable juror could conclude that a defendant did not have a reasonable fear of
imminent death or serious bodily harm, the State can overcome the presumption and
create a fact question for the jury.” Id.
This is consistent with how our State Supreme Court has applied the stand-
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HAMPSON, J., dissenting
your-ground principles. Indeed, our Supreme Court continues to acknowledge that
the statutory Castle Doctrine Defense and Stand-Your-Ground laws track
consistently with the respective common law defenses including: “the well-
established legal principle that, even though a defendant attacked in his own home
is ‘ “entitled to stand his ground, to repel force with force, and to increase his force,
so as not only to resist, but also to overcome the assault,” ’ such an entitlement ‘
“would not excuse the defendant if he used excessive force in repelling the assault,” ’
” State v. Benner, 380 N.C. 621, 636, 869 S.E.2d 199, 209 (2022) (quoting State v.
Francis, 252 N.C. 57, 60, 112 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1960)).2
Furthermore, here, while Defendant contends the trial court erred by giving
the “excessive force” instruction, Defendant’s argument ignores the trial court’s
repeated instructions squarely placing the burden of proof to overcome the defense of
habitation on the State. “We examine the instructions ‘as a whole’ to determine if
they present the law ‘fairly and clearly’ to the jury.” Austin, 279 N.C. App. at 385,
865 S.E.2d at 356 (quoting State v. Chandler, 342 N.C. 742, 751–52, 467 S.E.2d 636,
641 (1996)). “The purpose of a jury instruction ‘is to give a clear instruction which
2 The majority is, of course, correct that both Benner and Walker discuss these
principles in terms of “stand-your-ground” and not expressly in terms of defense of
habitation. However, I see that as an outgrowth of the fact that the justification defenses of
the statutory Castle Doctrine and defense of person both fall under the umbrella of a Stand-
Your-Ground law. The statutory Castle Doctrine simply provides an additional protection
to the lawful occupant of a dwelling, vehicle or workplace and places the burden on the
State to overcome the presumption.
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HAMPSON, J., dissenting
applies the law to the evidence in such manner as to assist the jury in understanding
the case and in reaching a correct verdict.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Smith, 360 N.C. 341,
346, 626 S.E.2d 258, 261 (2006). “An error in jury instructions ‘is prejudicial and
requires a new trial only if there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in
question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial.’
” Id. (quoting State v. Dilworth, 274 N.C. App. 57, 61, 851 S.E.2d 406, 409 (2020).
In this case, the trial court instructed the jury, “If the defendant assaulted the
victim to prevent a forcible entry into the defendant’s home or to terminate the
intruder’s unlawful entry the defendant’s actions are excused and the defendant is
not guilty.” “The State has the burden of proving to you from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful defense of the defendant’s
home.” After listing the circumstances in which Defendant would be justified in using
deadly force, the trial court further explained: “A lawful occupant within a home does
not have a duty to retreat from an intruder in these circumstances. Furthermore, a
person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person’s home is
presumed to be doing so with the intent to commit an unlawful act involving force or
violence.” The trial court then instructed specifically on the elements of the Castle
Doctrine statute:
In addition, absent evidence to the contrary, the lawful
occupant of a home is presumed to have held a reasonable
fear of imminent death or serious harm to herself or others
when using defensive force that is intended or likely to
cause death or serious bodily harm to another if both of the
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HAMPSON, J., dissenting
following apply. The person against whom the defensive
force was used was in the process of unlawfully and
forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered,
a home or if that person had removed or was attempting to
remove another person against that person’s will from the
home, and two, that the person who uses the defensive
force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and
forceful entry or forcible act was occurring or had occurred.
In charging the jury on returning its verdict on the offenses submitted, the trial court
instructed: “If you find from a reasonable doubt that the Defendant assaulted the
victim, you may return a verdict of guilty only if the State has also satisfied you
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful defense of the
defendant’s home.” “If you do not so find or have a reasonable doubt about whether
the State has proved any one or more of these things that the defendant would be
justified in defending the home, it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.”
Critically, Defendant does not contend the trial court erred in any of these
instructions. Taken as a whole, the trial court’s instructions adequately applied the
law to the evidence, emphasized the Castle Doctrine presumption, and mandated the
jury place the burden of proof on the State to prove Defendant was not justified in the
use of deadly force in the face of an intruder—such that there is not a reasonable
possibility, on the facts of this case, that the jury would have returned a different
verdict.
Here, Defendant was entitled to the statutory Castle Doctrine presumption.
Likewise, the State was entitled to attempt to rebut that presumption; including
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through evidence Defendant did not actually have a reasonable fear of imminent
death or serious bodily harm and the force exercised by Defendant was, in fact,
excessive under the factual circumstances of this case. See Austin, 279 N.C. App. at
384, 865 S.E.2d at 356. Thus, the trial court’s instruction on excessive force was not
erroneous. Therefore, there was no error at trial. Consequently, Defendant is not
entitled to a new trial. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
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