State v. Burleson ( 2023 )


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  •               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA23-212
    Filed 17 October 2023
    McDowell County, Nos. 21CRS050486, 21CRS000336-37
    STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
    v.
    TOMMY LYNN BURLESON
    Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 3 May 2022 by Judge Peter B.
    Knight in McDowell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20
    September 2023.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Special Deputy Attorney General G. Mark
    Teague, for the State-Appellee.
    Shawn R. Evans for Defendant-Appellant.
    COLLINS, Judge.
    Defendant Tommy Lynn Burleson appeals from the trial court’s judgment
    entered upon guilty verdicts of drug-related crimes and having obtained habitual
    felon status. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to
    suppress and his motion to dismiss the substantive charges. The trial court did not
    err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress because the trial court’s findings of
    fact resolved the material conflicts in the evidence and are supported by competent
    evidence, and those findings of fact support its conclusions of law. Furthermore, the
    STATE V. BURLESON
    Opinion of the Court
    trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss because there was
    sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that Defendant constructively
    possessed the controlled substances. Accordingly, we find no error.
    I.      Background
    On 6 April 2021, Defendant and Wesley Rogers were driving from Fairview
    Road towards Harmony Grove Road in a burgundy truck when they approached a
    driver’s license checkpoint conducted by the McDowell County Sheriff’s Department.
    Rogers was in the driver’s seat, and Defendant was in the front passenger seat.
    McDowell County Sheriff’s Deputy Robert Watson asked Rogers if he had a driver’s
    license, and Rogers stated that he did not. Watson told Rogers to pull off into a thrift
    store parking lot where another officer would issue Rogers a citation.
    As the citation was being issued, Watson approached the truck and spoke with
    Rogers and Defendant.      Watson asked if either Rogers or Defendant were on
    probation; Rogers stated that he was on probation, and Defendant stated that he was
    not. Watson asked Rogers “if there was anything in the vehicle that was illegal that
    he should not have and for consent to search the vehicle.” Rogers gave Watson verbal
    consent to search the truck. Watson directed Rogers to exit the truck and Watson
    conducted a pat down of Rogers for weapons.
    Watson then directed Defendant to exit the truck. As Defendant was exiting
    the truck, Watson noted the odor of marijuana. Watson asked to conduct a pat down
    of Defendant, and Defendant consented. Defendant then began reaching into his
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    STATE V. BURLESON
    Opinion of the Court
    pocket, and Watson observed that Defendant’s right hand was cupped. Watson asked
    Defendant to “open his hands up flat where [he] could see that there was nothing in
    them.” Defendant turned away from Watson and “made a throwing motion with [his]
    right hand.” At that point, Watson detained Defendant “for the safety of officers and
    other persons on and around the scene.” Watson asked Defendant if he had thrown
    anything, and Defendant stated that he had thrown a marijuana blunt. Watson
    placed Defendant in front of his patrol car located behind the truck.
    McDowell County Sheriff’s Deputy Jonathan Carter watched Rogers and
    Defendant while Watson searched the truck. Watson discovered a small bag of a leafy
    green substance between the passenger seat and center console; a small bag of a leafy
    green substance in the top of the center console; and a bag of a white crystalline
    substance, which was confirmed to be approximately 38 grams of methamphetamine,
    underneath the center console. Watson advised Defendant that he was under arrest
    and placed him in the back seat of Carter’s patrol vehicle. Defendant told Carter on
    the way to the magistrate’s office that he and Rogers were going to pick up the drugs
    and sell them but asserted that the drugs belonged to Rogers.
    Defendant was indicted for trafficking in methamphetamine by possession,
    trafficking in methamphetamine by transportation, possession with intent to sell or
    deliver methamphetamine, and for having obtained habitual felon status. Defendant
    filed a motion to suppress, alleging that “[t]he detention, questioning and search of
    the Defendant on the alleged date were conducted by law enforcement officers
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    STATE V. BURLESON
    Opinion of the Court
    without valid consent of the owner or any occupant of the vehicle and without
    reasonable suspicion[.]” After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion by written
    order entered 28 April 2022.
    The matter came on for trial on 2 May 2022. At the close of the State’s
    evidence, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges for insufficient evidence. The trial
    court denied the motion. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all charges, and the
    trial court sentenced Defendant to an active term of 117 to 153 months of
    imprisonment. Defendant appealed.
    II.   Discussion
    A. Motion to Suppress
    Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress.
    Specifically, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to address
    conflicting testimony between him and Watson in its findings of fact.
    We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress to determine “whether
    competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether the
    findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” State v. Jackson, 
    368 N.C. 75
    , 78, 
    772 S.E.2d 847
    , 849 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “When supported by
    competent evidence, the trial court’s factual findings are conclusive on appeal, even
    where the evidence might sustain findings to the contrary.” State v. Hall, 
    268 N.C. App. 425
    , 428, 
    836 S.E.2d 670
    , 673 (2019) (citation omitted). Unchallenged findings
    of fact are binding on appeal. State v. Fizovic, 
    240 N.C. App. 448
    , 451, 770 S.E.2d
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    STATE V. BURLESON
    Opinion of the Court
    717, 720 (2015). A trial court is only required to make findings of fact resolving
    material conflicts in evidence; a conflict is material if it affects the outcome of the
    suppression motion. See State v. Bartlett, 
    368 N.C. 309
    , 312, 
    776 S.E.2d 672
    , 674
    (2015).
    We review the trial court’s conclusions of law de novo. State v. Wiles, 
    270 N.C. App. 592
    , 595, 
    841 S.E.2d 321
    , 325 (2020). Under de novo review, this Court considers
    the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower court.
    State v. Biber, 
    365 N.C. 162
    , 168, 
    712 S.E.2d 874
    , 878 (2011).
    Here, the trial court made the following findings of fact:
    8. The court finds the testimony of both Deputy Watson
    and Deputy Carter to be credible.
    ....
    10. On April 6, 2021, the Defendant was a passenger in a
    vehicle driven by Wesley Rogers and that vehicle was
    stopped pursuant to a checkpoint . . . .
    11. Deputy Watson operated the checkpoint according to
    the checkpoint plan . . . .
    12. The driver, Wesley Rogers, acknowledged to Deputy
    Watson that he did not have a valid driver’s license.
    13. Deputy Watson asked Wesley Rogers to pull his vehicle
    over to the side of the road where they engaged in
    conversation about the search of the vehicle.
    14. Deputy Watson asked if either Mr. Rogers or the
    Defendant were on probation, to which Mr. Rogers
    responded that he was, and the Defendant responded that
    he was not.
    15. Wesley Rogers gave Deputy Watson verbal consent to
    search the vehicle.
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    STATE V. BURLESON
    Opinion of the Court
    16. Mr. Rogers was asked to exit the vehicle and was
    patted down for weapons, which Mr. Rogers gave Deputy
    Watson consent to do.
    17. Due to the search of the vehicle, Deputy Watson asked
    the Defendant to exit the vehicle.
    18. At that time, Deputy Watson noted the odor of
    marijuana.
    19. The Defendant then consented to a search of his
    person.
    20. Deputy Watson observed the Defendant putting his
    hands into his garment pockets and that the Defendant’s
    right hand was cupped.
    21. Deputy Watson asked the Defendant to open his hand
    and then the Defendant threw a marijuana blunt onto the
    ground.
    22. At that time, the Defendant was then detained by
    Deputy Watson for the safety of officers and other persons
    on and around the scene.
    23. The Defendant was then placed in front of Deputy
    Watson’s patrol car.
    24. Deputy Watson then continued to search the vehicle
    pursuant to the consent given by Wesley Rogers.
    25. Marijuana was found in the vehicle as well as what
    appeared to be 38 grams of what appeared to be
    methamphetamine.
    26. At that point, Wesley Rogers was placed under arrest
    and contested his arrest and placement into custody. Mr.
    Rogers indicated that the drugs were not his and that he
    should not be arrested.
    ....
    28. Deputy Carter came to the area where the Defendant
    was standing in front of the patrol car due to officer safety.
    ....
    30. Deputy Carter heard Wesley Rogers state that he had
    given consent to the search, allegedly, because “he did not
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    STATE V. BURLESON
    Opinion of the Court
    know the drugs were in there”.
    31. Deputy Watson advised the Defendant that he was
    being placed under arrest and then placed the Defendant
    into Deputy Carter’s patrol vehicle.
    32. On the way to the magistrate’s office and without
    questioning from Deputy Carter, the Defendant made the
    statement to Deputy Carter that he and Mr. Rogers picked
    up the drugs and were going to sell them, but that the
    drugs belonged to Mr. Rogers.
    33. However, Deputy Carter did not ask the Defendant any
    questions to elicit the above statement.
    34. The Defendant testified that he heard the deputies ask
    Mr. Rogers for consent to search the pickup truck driven by
    Mr. Rogers and occupied by the Defendant.
    35. The Defendant testified that Mr. Rogers never gave
    consent for the officers to search the vehicle, however the
    court finds his testimony to be noncredible.
    36. Paragraph six of the affidavit filed December 6, 2021,
    signed by the Defendant under oath before the clerk of
    court, states “Defendant was made to exit the vehicle by
    Deputy Watson. Without consent of the Defendant,
    Defendant was patted down and searched by Deputy
    Watson. Defendant, as well as Wesley Adam Rogers were
    charged by Deputy Watson with multiple criminal
    offenses.”
    37. The testimony of the Defendant is contradictory to the
    sworn affidavit in that the defendant stated under oath at
    this hearing that he gave Deputy Watson consent to search
    his person.
    Defendant does not challenge any findings of fact and they are thus binding on
    appeal. See Fizovic, 240 N.C. App. at 451, 770 S.E.2d at 720. Rather, Defendant
    argues that the trial court erred by failing to make additional findings of fact
    resolving conflicting testimony between Watson and himself.
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    STATE V. BURLESON
    Opinion of the Court
    Watson testified that he asked Rogers or Defendant if either were on probation
    and whether “there was anything in the vehicle that was illegal that he should not
    have and for consent to search the vehicle.” Defendant testified that while he was
    still in the truck, Watson asked him, “Are there anything I need to know about in the
    truck?” Defendant argues that “[t]he trial court made no findings about this, making
    it impossible for this Court to properly analyze this issue to determine of (sic) Mr.
    Burleson was detained and whether he was questioned without a Miranda warning.”
    However, the trial court found that Watson’s testimony was credible and, in doing so,
    resolved any testimonial conflicts in Watson’s favor.      Moreover, even assuming
    arguendo that Watson asked Defendant whether there was “anything [he] need[ed]
    to know about in the truck[,]” neither Defendant nor Watson testified that Defendant
    made incriminating statements in response to this question. Rather, Defendant’s
    statement that “he and Mr. Rogers picked up drugs and were going to sell them” was
    made spontaneously and without questioning from Watson after Watson had
    searched the truck. See State v. Burton, 
    251 N.C. App. 600
    , 607, 
    796 S.E.2d 65
    , 70-71
    (2017) (“It is well established that spontaneous statements made by an individual
    while in custody are admissible despite the absence of Miranda warnings.” (quotation
    marks, brackets, and citation omitted)).
    The trial court’s findings of fact resolved the material conflicts in the evidence
    and support the trial court’s conclusions of law that “[t]he stop of the vehicle driven
    by Wesley Rogers and occupied by Tommy Burleson, the Defendant, was lawful” and
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    STATE V. BURLESON
    Opinion of the Court
    that “[t]he search of the vehicle by Deputy Watson was authorized and lawful.”
    Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress.
    B. Motion to Dismiss
    Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss
    because the State “failed to present sufficient incriminating circumstances which
    would have allowed a jury to make an inference of constructive possession.”
    We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. State v. Chavis,
    
    278 N.C. App. 482
    , 485, 
    863 S.E.2d 225
    , 228 (2021). “In ruling on a motion to dismiss,
    the trial court need determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each
    essential element of the crime and that the defendant is the perpetrator.” State v.
    Chekanow, 
    370 N.C. 488
    , 492, 
    809 S.E.2d 546
    , 549 (2018) (quotation marks and
    citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
    mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Rivera, 
    216 N.C. App. 566
    , 568, 
    716 S.E.2d 859
    , 860 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
    “In making its determination, the trial court must consider all evidence
    admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State,
    giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any
    contradictions in its favor.”   Chekanow, 
    370 N.C. at 492
    , 
    809 S.E.2d at 549-50
    (quotation marks and citation omitted). Any contradictions or discrepancies in the
    evidence are for the jury to decide. State v. Wynn, 
    276 N.C. App. 411
    , 416, 
    856 S.E.2d 919
    , 923 (2021).
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    STATE V. BURLESON
    Opinion of the Court
    Here, Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to sell or deliver
    methamphetamine pursuant to 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95
    (a)(1), and trafficking in
    methamphetamine by possession and by transportation pursuant to 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95
    (h)(3b). To convict a defendant of possession with intent to sell or deliver
    methamphetamine, the State must prove that the defendant (1) possessed,
    (2) methamphetamine, (3) with intent to sell or deliver methamphetamine. State v.
    Blagg, 
    377 N.C. 482
    , 489, 
    858 S.E.2d 268
    , 274 (2021). To convict a defendant of
    trafficking in methamphetamine, the State must prove that the defendant
    (1) knowingly possessed or transported methamphetamine, and (2) that the amount
    possessed was greater than 28 grams. State v. Shelman, 
    159 N.C. App. 300
    , 305, 
    584 S.E.2d 88
    , 93 (2003).
    Possession of a controlled substance may be either actual or constructive. State
    v. Nettles, 
    170 N.C. App. 100
    , 103, 
    612 S.E.2d 172
    , 174 (2005); see also State v. Diaz,
    
    155 N.C. App. 307
    , 313, 
    575 S.E.2d 523
    , 528 (2002). “A person has actual possession
    of a substance if it is on his person, he is aware of its presence, and either by himself
    or together with others he has the power and intent to control its disposition or use.”
    State v. Ferguson, 
    204 N.C. App. 451
    , 459, 
    694 S.E.2d 470
    , 477 (2010) (quotation
    marks and citations omitted). “Constructive possession occurs when a person lacks
    actual physical possession, but nonetheless has the intent and power to maintain
    control over the disposition and use of the substance.” State v. Acolatse, 
    158 N.C. App. 485
    , 488, 
    581 S.E.2d 807
    , 810 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
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    STATE V. BURLESON
    Opinion of the Court
    “Constructive possession depends on the totality of the circumstances in each
    case.” State v. Taylor, 
    203 N.C. App. 448
    , 459, 
    691 S.E.2d 755
    , 764 (2010) (citation
    omitted).   “Unless a defendant has exclusive possession of the place where the
    contraband is found, the State must show other incriminating circumstances
    sufficient for the jury to find a defendant had constructive possession.” State v.
    Miller, 
    363 N.C. 96
    , 99, 
    678 S.E.2d 592
    , 594 (2009) (citation omitted).        When
    determining whether other incriminating circumstances exist to support a finding of
    constructive possession, we consider, among other things: (1) “the defendant’s
    ownership and occupation of the property”; (2) “the defendant’s proximity to the
    contraband”; (3) “indicia of the defendant’s control over the place where the
    contraband is found”; (4) “the defendant’s suspicious behavior at or near the time of
    the contraband’s discovery”; and (5) “other evidence found in the defendant’s
    possession that links the defendant to the contraband.” Chekanow, 
    370 N.C. at 496
    ,
    
    809 S.E.2d at 552
     (citations omitted).
    As Defendant did not have exclusive possession of the truck in which the drugs
    were found, the State was required to provide evidence of other incriminating
    circumstances. Miller, 
    363 N.C. at 99
    , 
    678 S.E.2d at 594
    .
    When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the following other
    incriminating circumstances were sufficient to support a finding of constructive
    possession: Watson testified at trial that, after Rogers gave consent to search the
    truck, he directed Defendant to exit the truck and asked for consent to conduct a pat
    - 11 -
    STATE V. BURLESON
    Opinion of the Court
    down. Defendant “gave consent and then he immediately began reaching in his
    pockets.” Watson told Defendant to put his hands on the truck and noticed that
    Defendant’s “right hand was in the cupped form folded over like he was trying to hide
    something.” Watson asked Defendant to put his hands flat, and Defendant “turned
    away and made a throwing motion with his right hand and threw something.”
    At that time, Watson detained Defendant. Watson asked Defendant what he
    threw, and Defendant “stated that he threw a blunt.” Watson placed Defendant in
    front of his patrol car and began searching the truck. Watson began his search on
    the passenger side of the truck and “located a small bag of marijuana, a very small
    bag of marijuana, on top of the center console area.” Watson also found a “small bag
    of a green leafy substance, believed to be marijuana, that was in between the
    passenger seat and the center console area[.]”           Furthermore, “underneath that
    console there was a plastic bag with a white crystal like substance that weighed out
    to be 38 grams believed to be methamphetamine.”
    Defendant’s actions of cupping his hand, making a throwing motion with his
    back turned, and admitting to throwing a marijuana blunt, when viewed in
    conjunction with the subsequent discovery of marijuana and methamphetamine in
    the center console next to the passenger seat in which Defendant was sitting,
    constitute sufficient incriminating circumstances to support a finding of constructive
    possession. See State v. Butler, 
    147 N.C. App. 1
    , 12-13, 
    556 S.E.2d 304
    , 312 (2001)
    (holding that there were incriminating circumstances supporting an inference of
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    STATE V. BURLESON
    Opinion of the Court
    constructive possession where the defendant acted suspiciously by fleeing after seeing
    police, moving around like he was “struggling” at the location where the drugs were
    later found, and bending down “so that his arms and hands were not visible to the
    officers”).
    Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to
    dismiss.
    III.    Conclusion
    The trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to suppress because
    the trial court’s findings of fact resolved the material conflicts in the evidence and are
    supported by competent evidence, and those findings of fact support its conclusions
    of law. Furthermore, the trial court did not err by denying Defendant’s motion to
    dismiss because there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that
    Defendant constructively possessed the controlled substances. Accordingly, we find
    no error.
    NO ERROR.
    Judges TYSON and WOOD concur.
    - 13 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-212

Filed Date: 10/17/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/17/2023