Elliott v. Dep't of Transp. ( 2023 )


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  •                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
    No. COA23-390
    Filed 5 December 2023
    Caldwell County, No. 19CVS1560
    SASHA ROSE ELLIOTT and JEREMY LEE OACHS, Plaintiffs,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant.
    Appeal by plaintiffs from order entered 9 January 2022 by Judge Jacqueline D.
    Grant in Caldwell County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 November
    2023.
    Sigmon, Clark, Mackie, Hanvey & Ferrell, P.A., by Andrew J. Howell, for the
    plaintiff-appellant.
    Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Matthew
    Baptiste Holloway, for the defendant-appellee.
    TYSON, Judge.
    Sasha Rose Elliott and Jeremy Lee Oachs (collectively “Plaintiffs”) appeal from
    an order entered concluding: inter alia, (1) the Department of Transportation (“DOT”)
    had not taken a compensable interest in Plaintiffs’ property through inverse
    condemnation; (2) Plaintiffs were not entitled to any compensation from DOT; and (3)
    dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims. We affirm.
    I.     Background
    Plaintiffs acquired a parcel of real property located at 6149 Laytown Road in
    ELLIOTT V. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    Lenoir in July 2018. The parcel measures approximately 38.96 acres and contains
    Plaintiffs’ single-family dwelling. Plaintiffs have lived on the property with their
    children since acquiring the parcel. The parcel is accessed through a gravel driveway,
    which rises and runs up a slope with a stream running along the base of the slope.
    DOT acquired a new right-of-way to convert Laytown Road from a dirt road
    into a two-lane paved highway. This right-of-way extends into and through where
    Plaintiffs’ driveway connects to Laytown Road. DOT’s agreement with Plaintiffs’
    predecessors-in-title released DOT from all claims of damages by reason of acquiring
    and improving said right-of-way.
    Sometime before 2017, a prior landowner, without involvement or help from
    DOT, installed eight concrete blocks directly on top of a slope on the driveway. Each
    of these blocks weighed an average of 3,600 lbs. Between 2017 and 2018, at the
    request of a prior owner, DOT installed gabion baskets filled with earth or rocks to
    support the abutment between Laytown Road and the driveway. The baskets were
    not located on the slope that later failed.
    Plaintiffs noticed cracking and an opening in the ground at the connection of
    the driveway with Laytown Road. DOT performed maintenance work on a culvert
    near the driveway and placed large stone riprap on the fill side of the embankment
    beside the driveway in March 2019.
    A three-day continuous rain event (“rain event”) caused the slope of the
    driveway to collapse in June 2019 and rendered Plaintiffs’ driveway unusable.
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    ELLIOTT V. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    Several other slides occurred on Laytown Road during the rain event. A significant
    portion of Plaintiffs’ driveway collapsed down the fill side of the embankment on 8
    June 2019.
    Plaintiffs filed a complaint demanding a jury trial and alleged inverse
    condemnation by DOT on 26 November 2019. DOT filed an answer, a motion to
    dismiss, and a motion for a hearing pursuant to 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-108
     (2021) to
    determine all issues other than damages.
    Following hearings on 12 July 2022 and 30 September 2022 without a jury, the
    trial court entered an order concluding DOT had not taken a compensable interest in
    Plaintiffs’ property and Plaintiffs were not entitled to any compensation. The court
    dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint. Plaintiffs appeal.
    II.      Jurisdiction
    Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(1) (2021).
    III.   Issues
    Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by: (1) concluding Plaintiffs’ expert
    testimony was not supported by sufficient facts or data; (2) giving weight to DOT’s
    witnesses, who did not offer credible evidence; and (3) eliminating their access to
    Laytown Road. Plaintiffs do not assert or argue any error from the trial court
    conducting the hearings and making findings without submitting disputed facts and
    evidence to resolution by a jury.
    IV.      Standard of Review
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    ELLIOTT V. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    “[W]hen the trial court sits without a jury, the standard of review on appeal is
    whether . . . competent evidence support[s] the trial court’s findings of fact and
    whether the conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts.” Anthony Marano
    Co. v. Jones, 
    165 N.C. App. 266
    , 267-68, 
    598 S.E.2d 393
    , 395 (2004) (citation omitted).
    Unchallenged findings of fact are binding upon appeal. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings
    v. Caccuro, 
    212 N.C. App. 564
    , 567, 
    712 S.E.2d 696
    , 699 (2011). “The trial court’s
    conclusions of law are reviewed de novo[.]”         Strikeleather Realty & Invs. Co. v.
    Broadway, 
    241 N.C. App. 152
    , 160, 
    772 S.E.2d 107
    , 113 (2015) (citation and quotation
    marks omitted).
    V.     Inverse Condemnation
    Inverse condemnation actions are governed by 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-111
    . “Any
    person whose land or compensable interest therein has been taken by an intentional
    or unintentional act or omission of the Department of Transportation and no
    complaint and declaration of taking has been filed by said Department of
    Transportation may . . . file a complaint in the superior court[.]” 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-111
     (2021).
    A taking under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as an
    “entering upon private property for more than a momentary period and, under the
    warrant . . . of legal authority, devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally
    appropriating or injuriously affecting it in such a way as substantially to oust the
    owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.” Ledford v. Highway
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    ELLIOTT V. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    Comm., 
    279 N.C. 188
    , 190–91, 
    181 S.E.2d 466
    , 468 (1971). North Carolina courts and
    precedents recognize “[d]amage to land which inevitably or necessarily flows from a
    public construction project results in an appropriation of land for public use.”
    Robinson v. N.C. Dept. of Transportation, 
    89 N.C. App. 572
    , 574, 
    366 S.E.2d 492
    , 493
    (1988) (citing City of Winston–Salem v. Ferrell, 
    79 N.C. App. 103
    , 
    338 S.E.2d 794
    (1986)).
    Our Supreme Court has held: “[p]arties to a condemnation proceeding must
    resolve all issues other than damages at a hearing pursuant to N.C.[Gen. Stat.] § 136-
    108.” Dep’t of Transp. v. Rowe, 
    351 N.C. 172
    , 175, 
    521 S.E.2d 707
    , 709 (1999). 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-108
     provides:
    After the filing of the plat, the judge, upon motion and 10
    days’ notice by either the Department of Transportation or
    the owner, shall, either in or out of term, hear and
    determine any and all issues raised by the pleadings other
    than the issue of damages, including, but not limited to, if
    controverted, questions of necessary and proper parties,
    title to the land, interest taken, and area taken.
    
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-108
     (2021). 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-108
     applies to both inverse
    and traditional condemnations. DeHart v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 
    195 N.C. App. 417
    ,
    419, 
    672 S.E.2d 721
    , 722 (2008) (“DOT then moved for a hearing pursuant to 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-108
     (2007) to determine ‘whether the Plaintiffs have had any interest
    or area of their property taken by the Defendant and/or whether the Plaintiffs have
    an inverse condemnation claim against the Defendant.’”).
    VI.    Plaintiffs’ Expert Testimony
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    ELLIOTT V. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in finding their expert, Jeffrey Brown’s,
    testimony was not credible. Plaintiffs seek for this Court to re-weigh the evidence
    presented before the trial court. “The trial court must determine what pertinent facts
    are actually established by the evidence before it, and it is not for an appellate court
    to determine de novo the weight and credibility to be given to evidence disclosed by
    the record on appeal.” Coble v. Coble, 
    300 N.C. 708
    , 712-13, 
    268 S.E.2d 185
    , 189
    (1980) (citations omitted).         Competent evidence supports the trial court’s
    unchallenged and binding findings and conclusions about credibility and weight
    accorded to the competing experts. Plaintiffs’ argument is overruled.
    VII.      DOT Witnesses
    Plaintiffs argue the trial court improperly credited DOT’s witness testimony.
    As established above, the “trial court must determine what pertinent facts are
    actually established by the evidence before it,” and it is not our role as an appellate
    court to reweigh the evidence. 
    Id. at 712
    , 
    268 S.E.2d at 189
    .
    It is the injured party’s burden at trial to establish their injury was sustained
    by the action of the opposing party. See Board of Education v. McMillan, 
    250 N.C. 485
    , 489, 
    108 S.E.2d 895
    , 898 (1959) (holding that the injured party has the burden
    of the issue on damages and must convince the jury by a greater weight of evidence
    that he has been damaged.).
    This burden applies to cases dealing with an overflow of water damaging a
    landowner’s property. Lea Co. v. N.C. Board of Transportation, 
    308 N.C. 603
    , 614,
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    ELLIOTT V. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    
    304 S.E.2d 164
    , 172 (1983) (holding that in order to recover for damages, the plaintiff
    had to show how the increased overflow of water was “such as was reasonably to have
    been anticipated by the State to be the direct result of the structures it built and
    maintained” (citation omitted)). Plaintiffs must show it was reasonably foreseeable
    for the State to anticipate the change in water movement at the time it undertook to
    erect a structure. 
    Id.
     Plaintiffs’ argument is overruled.
    VIII.    Plaintiffs Access to Laytown Road
    Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred by denying their access to Laytown Road
    without just compensation. Our statutes and precedents have long established “[a]n
    owner of land abutting a highway or street has the right of direct access from his
    property to the traffic lanes of the highway.” Dept. of Transportation v. Harkey, 
    308 N.C. 148
    , 151, 
    301 S.E.2d 64
    , 67 (1983); see 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-89.53
     (2021) (“When
    an existing street or highway shall be designated as and included within a controlled-
    access facility the owners of land abutting such existing street or highway shall be
    entitled to compensation for the taking of or injury to their easements of access.”).
    The State may not diminish, deprive, or take away this right away without just
    compensation to the property owner. Harkey, 308 N.C. at 151, 
    301 S.E.2d at 67
    .
    Governmental action eliminating all direct access to an abutting road is a
    taking and compensable as a matter of law. 
    Id. at 158
    , 
    301 S.E.2d at 71
    . Even if the
    State’s actions do not eliminate all direct access, a landowner may be entitled to
    compensation if his common law and statutory rights of access are substantially
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    ELLIOTT V. DEP’T OF TRANSP.
    Opinion of the Court
    interfered with by the State. Highway Comm. v. Yarborough, 
    6 N.C. App. 294
    , 302,
    
    170 S.E.2d 159
    , 165 (1969).
    Competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings and conclusion the
    collapse of Plaintiffs’ slope and driveway was not caused by or a result of DOT actions.
    Plaintiffs’ failed to show DOT’s actions denied Plaintiff of their physical and lawful
    access to Laytown Road. Plaintiffs’ argument is overruled.
    IX.    Conclusion
    Plaintiffs do not appeal nor argue the hearings were conducted and expert
    testimony and factual disputes on damages incurred were presented before the trial
    court without a jury as was demanded in their complaint. The evidence, taken as a
    whole, is competent to support the trial court’s findings of fact that the DOT’s experts’
    testimonies were more persuasive than Plaintiffs’ expert witness. These findings
    support the trial court’s conclusions of law. The order of the trial court is affirmed.
    It is so ordered.
    AFFIRMED.
    Judges MURPHY and COLLINS concur.
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-390

Filed Date: 12/5/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/5/2023