State v. Harstad ( 2020 )


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  •                Filed 06/29/20 by Clerk of Supreme Court
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    
    2020 ND 151
    State of North Dakota,                                 Plaintiff and Appellee
    v.
    Mackenzie Marie Harstad,                           Defendant and Appellant
    No. 20190400
    Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Northeast Central
    Judicial District, the Honorable John A. Thelen, Judge.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.
    Megan J. K. Essig, Assistant State’s Attorney, Grand Forks, ND, for plaintiff
    and appellee.
    Rhiannon L. Gorham, Grand Forks, ND, for defendant and appellant.
    State v. Harstad
    No. 20190400
    Jensen, Chief Justice.
    [¶1] Mackenzie Harstad appeals from a district court’s judgment ordering
    restitution for unrecovered personal property. The personal property was in a
    vehicle at the time the vehicle was stolen, but was not in the vehicle seven days
    later when Harstad was arrested for, and charged with, possession of the stolen
    vehicle. Harstad was not charged with the theft of the vehicle. Harstad argues
    the district court abused its discretion by ordering restitution for the
    unrecovered personal property because there is no immediate and intimate
    causal connection between the criminal conduct and the loss of the personal
    property. We reverse and remand for a redetermination of the amount of
    restitution.
    I
    [¶2] Harstad was charged with and pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen
    vehicle, in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-23-02(3). The State sought an order for
    restitution for towing expenses and the value of missing gas, a license plate,
    and several unrecovered items of personal property located in the victim’s
    vehicle at the time the vehicle was stolen.
    [¶3] Harstad agreed to restitution for the towing expenses and the value of
    the gas and license plate, but contested the imposition of restitution for the
    unrecovered items of personal property. Harstad argued she could not be held
    responsible for the missing personal property because she was only convicted
    of possessing the stolen vehicle and there is no immediate and intimate causal
    connection between her criminal conduct of possessing the stolen vehicle and
    the loss of the personal property. The district court ordered Harstad to pay
    restitution in the amount of $2,104, which included the value of the
    unrecovered items of personal property. Harstad appealed the court’s
    restitution award.
    1
    II
    [¶4] Harstad argues the district court abused its discretion in awarding
    restitution for the unrecovered property in the vehicle at the time the vehicle
    was stolen. District courts possess a wide degree of discretion when
    determining restitution awards. State v. Walker, 
    2019 ND 292
    , ¶ 5, 
    936 N.W.2d 45
    (citing State v. Rogers, 
    2018 ND 244
    , ¶ 23, 
    919 N.W.2d 193
    ). “A
    district court’s award of restitution to a crime victim is made under N.D. Const.
    Art I, § 25(1)(n) and N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08.”
    Id. [¶5] “In
    analyzing whether to order restitution, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08(1)(a)
    requires the district court to consider the ‘reasonable damages sustained by
    the victim.’” State v. Carson, 
    2017 ND 196
    , ¶ 6, 
    900 N.W.2d 41
    . Section
    12.1-32-08(1), N.D.C.C., limits damages to those directly related to the
    criminal offense and expenses actually incurred as a direct result of the
    defendant’s criminal action. This Court has interpreted “directly related” and
    “direct result” as requiring an immediate and intimate causal connection
    between the criminal conduct and the damages or expenses for the restitution
    imposed upon the defendant. Carson, at ¶ 6 (quoting State v. Pippin, 
    496 N.W.2d 50
    , 52-53 (N.D. 1993)).
    [¶6] “Section 25(1)(n), N.D. Const. Art I, provides crime victims, ‘[t]he right
    to full and timely restitution in every case and from each offender for all losses
    suffered by the victim as a result of the criminal or delinquent conduct.’” State
    v. Bruce, 
    2018 ND 45
    , ¶ 11, 
    907 N.W.2d 773
    . Section 25(1)(n) does not change
    the restitution that a district court may order under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-
    08(1)(a).
    Id. (citing State
    v. Kostelecky, 
    2018 ND 12
    , ¶ 12, 
    906 N.W.2d 77
    ).
    [¶7] When reviewing a restitution order, we look to whether the district court
    acted within the limits set by statute, which is a standard similar to our abuse
    of discretion standard. Kostelecky, 
    2018 ND 12
    , ¶ 6, 
    906 N.W.2d 77
    (quoting
    State v. Tupa, 
    2005 ND 25
    , ¶ 3, 
    691 N.W.2d 579
    ). “A district court abuses its
    discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner,
    if its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a
    reasonable determination, or if it misinterprets or misapplies the law.”
    Id. We review
    questions of law de novo in determining whether the district court
    2
    abused its discretion through misapplication or misinterpretation of the law.
    Id. III [¶8]
    Harstad argues the district court ordering restitution for unrecovered
    personal property located in the vehicle at the time the vehicle was stolen goes
    beyond the limits set by N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08(1). She asserts the loss of the
    personal property is not “directly related” to or a “direct result” of her
    possession of the stolen vehicle because an immediate and intimate causal
    connection does not exist between her criminal conduct of possessing the stolen
    vehicle and the loss of the personal property.
    [¶9] This Court has previously held that a defendant convicted of possession
    of stolen property cannot be held liable to make restitution for losses a victim
    incurred as a result of a burglary, committed by someone other than the
    defendant, including unrecovered personal property and cash. State v. Pippin,
    496 NW.2d 50, 53 (N.D. 1993). In Pippin, this Court reversed a restitution
    order requiring a defendant, who was convicted of possessing stolen property
    from a burglary, to pay damages for unrecovered property from the same
    burglary which was not in the possession of the defendant.
    Id. We did
    recognize the defendant could be held liable if stolen property in the
    defendant’s possession was returned damaged to its owners or damages were
    sustained as result of temporary loss of use of the property.
    Id. Our holding
    in Pippin was guided by our conclusion there was not an immediate and
    intimate causal connection between the criminal conduct of possessing stolen
    property and the loss of other personal property during the burglary.
    Id. [¶10] The
    State argues our decision in Pippin supports the restitution ordered
    in this case because a connection between Harstad and the unrecovered
    personal property can be reasonably inferred from the record. The State
    argues this Court recognized that a sufficient inference of a connection can
    arise when the property possessed by the defendant once contained the items
    which were not recovered. In this case, the State contends the inference of a
    connection arises because the unrecovered personal property was inside the
    3
    vehicle when it was stolen. The State cites to the following discussion in Pippin
    as support for its argument:
    The damages for the unrecovered property are not immediately
    connected to Joan’s conduct. Moreover, a close causal connection
    between Joan’s act and the missing property cannot reasonably be
    inferred from the record. For example, the record does not show
    that one or more of the items Joan possessed once contained other
    items which were not recovered. See State v. Mead, 
    67 Wash. App. 486
    , 
    836 P.2d 257
    (Wash.Ct.App. 1992) [reasonable to infer from
    possession of display cases in which coin collection was kept, that
    loss of coins resulted from possession].
    Pippin, 496 NW.2d 50, 53 (N.D. 1993).
    [¶11] Our reference of the Washington Court of Appeals decision in Mead was
    not part of the holding necessary for our decision in Pippin, was dictum, and
    lacks formal precedential value. We also note the Washington Court of
    Appeals subsequently distinguished its decision in Mead from a case involving
    circumstances similar to those presented in this case. State v. Tetters, 
    81 Wash. App. 478
    , 
    914 P.2d 784
    (Wash.Ct.App. 1996) (concluding the damages
    for unrecovered personal property originally located in a stolen vehicle were
    not directly related to the possession of the stolen vehicle). We decline to
    extend our prior reference to the Washington Court of Appeals decision in
    Mead to the facts of this case.
    [¶12] The State also cites to our recent decision finding a sufficient connection
    between the criminal conduct of possessing stolen property and damage to that
    same property. State v. Walker, 
    2019 ND 292
    , ¶ 12, 
    936 N.W.2d 45
    . In Walker,
    this Court affirmed a restitution order requiring the defendant, who was
    convicted of possessing a stolen motorcycle, to pay restitution for the damages
    to the motorcycle.
    Id. We concluded
    the district court acted within limits set
    by N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-08(1) because the restitution was for damages to the
    property that the criminal offense was based on.
    Id. Citing Pippin,
    we
    recognized damage to the stolen property possessed by the defendant or
    compensation for the loss of the use of the stolen property was sufficiently
    4
    connected to the criminal act to support an order for restitution.
    Id. at ¶
    9. We
    decline to extend our holding in Walker to the circumstances of this case.
    [¶13] Section 12.1-32-08(1), N.D.C.C., limits restitution in this case to the loss
    that was directly related to Harstad’s criminal conduct, the possession of the
    stolen vehicle. There is nothing in the record to indicate an immediate causal
    connection between the unrecovered items in the vehicle at the time it was
    stolen and Harstad’s conviction for possession of the stolen vehicle. We
    conclude the district court abused its discretion awarding restitution for the
    unrecovered property located in the vehicle at the time the vehicle was stolen.
    IV
    [¶14] The district court abused its discretion awarding restitution for the
    unrecovered property located in the vehicle at the time the property was stolen.
    We reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for a determination of the
    appropriate amount of restitution, excluding the unrecovered property located
    in the vehicle at the time the vehicle was stolen.
    [¶15] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
    Lisa Fair McEvers
    Daniel J. Crothers
    Gerald W. VandeWalle
    Jerod E. Tufte
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20190400

Judges: Crothers, Daniel John

Filed Date: 6/29/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/29/2020