State v. Rodriguez ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                                 FILED
    IN THE OFFICE OF THE
    CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
    MAY 12, 2022
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    
    2022 ND 102
    State of North Dakota,                                Plaintiff and Appellant
    v.
    Antoinette Rose Rodriguez,                           Defendant and Appellee
    No. 20210359
    Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District,
    the Honorable Steven E. McCullough, Judge.
    AFFIRMED.
    Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.
    Nicholas S. Samuelson (argued) and SheraLynn Ternes (on brief), Assistant
    State’s Attorneys, Fargo, ND, for plaintiff and appellant.
    Leah R. Carlson, West Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellee.
    State v. Rodriguez
    No. 20210359
    Crothers, Justice.
    [¶1] The State appeals from an order dismissing a criminal child neglect
    charge against Antoinette Rodriguez. The State argues Rodriguez had
    sufficient notice of the charge against her, and the district court erred when it
    dismissed the amended information against Rodriguez. We affirm, concluding
    the court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the amended information.
    I
    [¶2] In November 2021, the State filed an amended information charging
    Rodriguez with child neglect, a class C felony. The State alleged that from
    January 1, 2020 to January 27, 2021, Rodriguez failed to provide proper
    parental care necessary for a child’s physical, mental or emotional health.
    Rodriguez moved to dismiss the charge, claiming the amended information was
    insufficient to advise her of the charge against her.
    [¶3] The district court granted Rodriguez’s motion, concluding the amended
    information lacked the specificity to provide Rodriguez with adequate notice of
    the charge against her. The court concluded the amended information
    prejudiced Rodriguez’s ability to prepare her defense or to protect herself
    against additional prosecution. The court dismissed the amended information
    without prejudice.
    II
    [¶4] The State argues the district court abused its discretion by dismissing
    the amended information. Rodriguez claims the court properly dismissed the
    charge.
    A
    [¶5] The right to appeal is jurisdictional, and we will consider the
    appealability of an order sua sponte even if the parties do not question
    appealability. Everett v. State, 
    2017 ND 93
    , ¶ 6, 
    892 N.W.2d 898
    . “The State’s
    1
    right to appeal must be expressly granted by statute.” State v. Brown, 
    2021 ND 226
    , ¶ 5, 
    967 N.W.2d 797
     (quoting State v. Mitchell, 
    2021 ND 93
    , ¶ 5, 
    960 N.W.2d 788
    ). In a criminal case the State is authorized to appeal from “[a]n
    order quashing an information or indictment or any count thereof.” N.D.C.C. §
    29-28-07(1). “We have consistently held that an order dismissing a criminal
    complaint, information, or indictment is the equivalent of an order quashing
    an information or indictment and is therefore appealable under the statute.”
    State v. Gwyther, 
    1999 ND 15
    , ¶ 11, 
    589 N.W.2d 575
    .
    [¶6] The State’s Jurisdictional Statement asserts the district court’s order
    dismissing the amended information without prejudice is appealable under
    N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(1). Rodriguez does not argue otherwise. In Gwyther, this
    Court first considered “whether an order dismissing a criminal information
    without prejudice is appealable” under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(1). 
    1999 ND 15
    ,
    ¶ 9. We held, “Because the statute does not specifically limit appealability to
    an order quashing with prejudice, we conclude an order dismissing a
    complaint, information, indictment, or any count thereof, with or without
    prejudice, is appealable under N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(1).” Gwyther, ¶ 11.
    [¶7] The State appealed the district court’s order rather than refiling the
    information within the statute of limitations. See N.D.C.C. § 29-04-02 (stating
    “a prosecution for any felony other than murder must be commenced within
    three years after its commission”). Under this Court’s interpretation of
    N.D.C.C. § 29-28-07(1) in Gwyther, which nobody argues we should revisit, we
    have jurisdiction over the State’s appeal.
    B
    [¶8] We review a district court’s dismissal of a criminal information under an
    abuse of discretion standard. Brown, 
    2021 ND 226
    , ¶ 6. A court abuses its
    discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious manner, if
    it misinterprets or misapplies the law or if its decision is not the product of a
    rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination. State v. Newark,
    
    2017 ND 209
    , ¶ 6, 
    900 N.W.2d 807
    .
    2
    [¶9] Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1), a criminal information “must name or
    otherwise identify the defendant, and must be a plain, concise, and definite
    written statement of the essential facts constituting the elements of the offense
    charged.” The information also must provide a citation to the statute the
    defendant allegedly violated. 
    Id.
    [¶10] The State charged Rodriguez with child neglect under N.D.C.C. § 14-09-
    22.1(1). Under the statute a parent of a child is guilty of a class C felony if he
    or she “[f]ails to provide proper parental care or control, subsistence, education
    as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the child’s physical,
    mental, or emotional health, or morals.”
    [¶11] The State’s amended information against Rodriguez provided in part:
    “[O]n or about [January 1, 2020 to January 27, 2021], the
    defendant, ANTOINETTE ROSE RODRIGUEZ, a parent, adult
    family or household member, guardian, or other custodian of any
    child, willfully failed to provide proper parental care or control,
    subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control
    necessary for the child’s physical, mental, or emotional health or
    morals.”
    [¶12] The amended criminal information identified Rodriguez as the
    defendant and recited the language of N.D.C.C. § 14-09-22.1(1). In granting
    Rodriguez’s motion to dismiss, the district court concluded the amended
    information lacked the specificity to provide Rodriguez with adequate notice of
    the charge against her. The court noted Rodriguez had more than one child,
    and the amended information failed to provide specifics as to which child she
    allegedly neglected.
    [¶13] The State claims the district court erred in its analysis and the amended
    information was sufficient to put Rodriguez on notice of the charge against her.
    The State cites State v. Montplaisir, 
    2015 ND 237
    , ¶ 9, 
    869 N.W.2d 435
     to
    support its argument that an information is sufficient if it sets forth the offense
    in the words of the statute.
    3
    [¶14] In Montplaisir we stated, “Generally, an information is sufficient if it sets
    forth the offense in the words of the statute.” 
    2015 ND 237
    , ¶ 9 (citing Hamling
    v. United States, 
    418 U.S. 87
    , 117 (1974)). We did not hold a criminal
    information always will be sufficient if it describes the offense using words of
    the statute. We only noted in general that an information may be sufficient by
    using the statutory language of the offense. While an information may be
    sufficient by reciting the statutory language, the information also must satisfy
    the requirements of N.D.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) by providing the defendant a
    “written statement of the essential facts constituting the elements of the
    offense charged.”
    [¶15] The explanatory note to N.D.R.Crim.P. 7 provides:
    “The language employed in subdivision (c) is intended to provide
    the defendant with the Sixth Amendment protection to ‘be
    informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation . . . .’ With
    this view in mind, subdivision (c) is established for the benefit of
    the defendant and is intended simply to provide a means by which
    the defendant can be properly informed of the proceedings without
    jeopardy to the prosecution.”
    [¶16] The explanatory note to N.D.R.Crim.P. 7 states the rule “is an adaptation
    of Fed.R.Crim.P. 7.” “When a state rule is derived from a corresponding federal
    rule, the federal courts’ interpretation of the federal rule may be persuasive
    authority when interpreting our rule.” Johnson v. Menard, Inc., 
    2021 ND 19
    ,
    ¶ 10, 
    955 N.W.2d 27
    . When discussing indictments under Fed.R.Crim.P. 7, the
    Eighth Circuit requires a statement of the essential facts and a citation of the
    statute. United States v. Camp, 
    541 F.2d 737
    , 740 (8th Cir. 1976). The
    statement of facts and statutory citation are “separate requirements and not a
    restatement of one another.” 
    Id.
     “If citation of the statute were a statement of
    the facts, nothing beyond a citation would be necessary.” 
    Id.
    [¶17] Here, the State’s amended information failed to satisfy N.D.R.Crim.P.
    7(c)(1)’s requirement of a “plain, concise, and definite written statement of the
    essential facts constituting the elements of the offense charged.” The amended
    information said Rodriguez violated N.D.C.C. § 14-09-22.1(1) but provided no
    statement of essential facts explaining how she violated the statute. The State
    4
    claims either Rodriguez or the district court should have requested a bill of
    particulars under N.D.R.Crim.P. 7(f) if the amended information was not
    specific enough to advise Rodriguez of the charge against her. However, “it is a
    settled rule that a bill of particulars cannot save an invalid indictment.”
    Russell v. United States, 
    369 U.S. 749
    , 770 (1962).
    [¶18] In the documents filed with the amended information, the State
    established Rodriguez had more than one child. The amended information is
    unclear as to whether Rodriguez allegedly neglected one child or all of her
    children from January 1, 2020 to January 27, 2021. The amended information
    is not specific enough to allow Rodriguez to defend the charge against her or
    protect her from a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The district
    court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the amended information
    against Rodriguez.
    III
    [¶19] The parties’ remaining arguments are either without merit or are not
    necessary to our decision. The district court order is affirmed.
    [¶20] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
    Gerald W. VandeWalle
    Daniel J. Crothers
    Lisa Fair McEvers
    Jerod E. Tufte
    5