State v. Hanson , 2023 ND 46 ( 2023 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    IN THE OFFICE OF THE
    CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
    MARCH 16, 2023
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    
    2023 ND 46
    State of North Dakota,                                  Plaintiff and Appellee
    v.
    Dacotah Ryder Hanson,                               Defendant and Appellant
    No. 20220215
    Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Northwest Judicial
    District, the Honorable Joshua B. Rustad, Judge.
    AFFIRMED.
    Opinion of the Court by McEvers, Justice.
    Nathan K. Madden, Assistant State’s Attorney, Williston, ND, for plaintiff and
    appellee; submitted on brief.
    Richard E. Edinger, Fargo, ND, for defendant and appellant.
    State v. Hanson
    No. 20220215
    McEvers, Justice.
    [¶1] Dacotah Ryder Hanson appeals from a criminal judgment entered after
    a jury found him guilty of leaving the scene of an accident involving death and
    manslaughter. Hanson argues the State commenting on his right not to testify
    created reversible error. Hanson also argues the evidence was insufficient to
    support the criminal convictions. We affirm.
    I
    [¶2] On November 28, 2018, a fatal motor vehicle rollover occurred near
    Tioga, North Dakota. Officers responded and observed a pickup truck lying on
    its passenger’s side in the middle of a field. Officers also observed a deceased
    male lying outside the passenger’s side door of the truck. The truck was
    registered to Hanson.
    [¶3] At trial, law enforcement testified Hanson’s cell phone and pack of
    cigarettes were located in a field near the truck. Further evidence was
    presented, including handprints and other markings on the roof and driver’s
    side door, showing the driver had climbed out of the truck by the driver’s side.
    The markings led from the truck to the direction of Hanson’s residence. During
    closing argument, the State commented on Hanson’s lack of an explanation for
    his theory of the case. Part of Hanson’s defense theory suggested he was not
    the driver. The State asked how Hanson could have possibly extricated himself
    from underneath someone who is pinned under a truck. The defense objected
    on the grounds that the State was “coming dangerously close to saying the
    defendant needed to testify.” The objection was overruled. The jury found
    Hanson guilty of leaving the scene of an accident involving death and
    manslaughter. Hanson appeals.
    II
    [¶4] Hanson argues the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by
    improperly commenting during closing argument on his right not to testify.
    1
    [¶5] “It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that a prosecutor may
    not comment on a defendant’s failure to testify in a criminal case.” State v.
    Jennewein, 
    2015 ND 192
    , ¶ 18, 
    867 N.W.2d 665
     (citations omitted). “A comment
    on the silence of a defendant is an improper comment on the right to remain
    silent in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the [United
    States] Constitution.” State v. Ebach, 
    1999 ND 5
    , ¶ 15, 
    589 N.W.2d 566
    ; see
    also N.D. Const. art. I, § 12; N.D.C.C. § 29-21-11. This Court reviews de novo a
    claim of a constitutional rights violation. Jennewein, at ¶ 18.
    [¶6] In Jennewein, we explained:
    Generally, a statement that certain evidence is uncontroverted or
    unrefuted or uncontradicted does not constitute a comment on the
    accused’s failure to testify where the record indicates that persons
    other than the accused could have offered contradictory testimony.
    In analyzing a claim that a particular comment was
    impermissible, we ask: “Was the language used manifestly
    intended to be, or was it of such character that the jury would
    naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of
    the accused to testify?” If an impermissible comment was made,
    we must be able to declare the error was harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt after considering the entire record to affirm the
    conviction.
    
    2015 ND 192
    , ¶ 18 (cleaned up).
    [¶7] Here, the State commented on Hanson’s lack of an explanation for his
    theory of the case. During closing argument, the State argued:
    MR. MADDEN: So how’d Dacotah get out from under somebody
    who’s pinned by a 1969 Ford Truck? That’s a lot of weight to bench
    press; isn’t it? But the defense doesn’t have an explanation for how
    the Defendant supposedly extricated himself.
    MR. SKEES: Objection, Your Honor. The State’s coming
    dangerously close to saying that the Defendant needed to testify.
    MR. MADDEN: No. I am not. I’m just saying that they never
    provided an explanation. They tossed the thing out and didn’t
    provide an explanation.
    2
    THE COURT: Well, overruled, but noted.
    [¶8] In his opening statement, Hanson offered an explanation that he was not
    the one driving the vehicle when the rollover occurred. During closing
    argument, the State asked how Hanson could have possibly extricated himself
    from underneath someone who is pinned under a truck. The State’s comment
    was not improper because the State did not comment on Hanson’s failure to
    testify, nor was the comment intended to be a comment on Hanson’s failure to
    testify. Instead, the State’s comment focused on the inconsistencies present in
    Hanson’s case. See Ebach, 
    1999 ND 5
    , ¶ 15 (holding a prosecutor’s statement
    drawing attention to inconsistent testimony given at trial was not a statement
    requiring reversal); United States v. Bentley, 
    561 F.3d 803
    , 813 (8th Cir. 2009)
    (same, finding the comments neither “manifest the prosecutor’s intention” to
    comment on Bentley’s silence at trial, nor would the jury “naturally take them
    as a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify”). We are not convinced the
    State’s comment here was improper.
    III
    [¶9] Hanson argues insufficient evidence exists to support the criminal
    convictions. After reviewing the record, we conclude substantial evidence
    exists for a jury to draw a reasonable inference that Hanson was the driver of
    the vehicle. We summarily affirm under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(3).
    IV
    [¶10] We have considered the remaining issues and arguments raised by
    Hanson and conclude them to be either without merit or unnecessary to our
    decision. The criminal judgment is affirmed.
    [¶11] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
    Daniel J. Crothers
    Lisa Fair McEvers
    Jerod E. Tufte
    Douglas A. Bahr
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20220215

Citation Numbers: 2023 ND 46

Judges: McEvers, Lisa K. Fair

Filed Date: 3/16/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/16/2023