Oversen v. Jaeger , 2020 ND 190 ( 2020 )


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  •                Filed 09/04/20 by Clerk of Supreme Court
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    
    2020 ND 190
    Kylie Michelle Oversen, individually and
    in her capacity as Chairwoman of the
    Democratic-Non-Partisan League Party
    of North Dakota, and Jason Anderson,
    a candidate nominated by the Democratic
    -Non-Partisan League Party of North Dakota
    for the statewide elective office of
    North Dakota Insurance Commissioner,                         Petitioners
    v.
    Alvin Jaeger, in his capacity as
    North Dakota Secretary of State,                             Respondent
    No. 20200234
    WRIT DENIED.
    Per Curiam. Justice VandeWalle filed a dissenting opinion.
    David C. Thompson, Grand Forks, ND, for petitioners.
    Matthew A. Sagsveen, Solicitor General, Office of the Attorney General,
    Bismarck, ND, for respondent.
    Oversen, et al. v. Jaeger
    No. 20200234
    Per Curiam.
    [¶1] Kylie Oversen, individually and as chairwoman of the Democratic-Non-
    Partisan League Party of North Dakota, and Jason Anderson, as a candidate
    nominated by the Democratic-Non-Partisan League Party of North Dakota for
    the statewide elective office of North Dakota Insurance Commissioner,
    petitioned this Court to exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a writ of
    mandamus directing Secretary of State Alvin Jaeger to accept and certify
    Anderson for inclusion on the November 3, 2020 general election ballot for the
    office of insurance commissioner. Oversen and Anderson argue there is a
    vacancy on the ballot for that position and Jaeger is required to place
    Anderson’s name on the ballot as the nominated and endorsed Democratic-
    NPL party candidate for the office under N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-18(4). We conclude
    Jaeger correctly applied North Dakota law by refusing to include Anderson on
    the general election ballot. We deny the petition.
    I
    [¶2] This case stems from Berg v. Jaeger, 
    2020 ND 178
    , __ N.W.2d __, and we
    will not repeat the facts except as necessary to resolve the issues raised in this
    petition.
    [¶3]  On April 2, 2020, Travisia Jonette Minor, A/K/A Travisia Martin, filed
    an affidavit of candidacy, statement of interest, and certificate of endorsement
    with Jaeger requesting she be placed on the June 9, 2020 primary election
    ballot as a Democratic-NPL party candidate for North Dakota Insurance
    Commissioner. In the affidavit of candidacy, Martin certified she met the
    requirements to hold the office of insurance commissioner. Jaeger placed
    Martin on the primary election ballot as a Democratic-NPL party candidate for
    insurance commissioner. Martin won the Democratic-NPL primary and
    placement as the party’s candidate on the general election ballot.
    1
    [¶4] On July 9, 2020, Rick Berg, as a resident and elector of this state, and as
    chairman of the North Dakota Republican Party, petitioned this Court for a
    writ of mandamus directing Jaeger to remove Martin from the general election
    ballot. Berg argued Martin could not meet the constitutionally mandated five
    year residency requirement necessary to hold the office of insurance
    commissioner.
    [¶5] On August 26, 2020, this Court granted a writ of injunction restraining
    Jaeger from placing Martin’s name on the November 3, 2020 general election
    ballot. Berg, 
    2020 ND 178
    , ¶ 31. We concluded N.D. Const. art. V, § 4 requires
    a person to have been a resident of this state for the five years preceding the
    election to be eligible to hold elective office in the executive branch. Id. at ¶ 11.
    We adopted the district court’s finding that Martin will not have been a North
    Dakota resident for the five years preceding the 2020 general election. Id. at ¶
    15. We held, “Martin is not eligible to hold the office of insurance commissioner,
    and it would be erroneous to place her name on the ballot. We therefore enjoin
    Jaeger from placing Martin’s name on the general election ballot.” Id. at ¶ 30.
    [¶6] On August 26, 2020, Jaeger sent Oversen an email explaining N.D.C.C.
    § 16.1-11-18(6)(d) states a vacancy occurs when a candidate “[c]eases to be
    qualified to serve, if elected, as otherwise provided by law[,]” the candidate
    must have been qualified at some earlier point but is no longer qualified, the
    Supreme Court determined Martin was not qualified when she was on the
    primary ballot, and therefore she cannot cease to be qualified and no vacancy
    exists according to law. He further stated the only way another candidate could
    be included on the ballot was if they submit a nominating petition to run as an
    independent candidate with at least 1,000 signatures and the candidacy
    paperwork before 4:00 p.m. on August 31, 2020.
    [¶7] On August 28, 2020, Oversen filed the Democratic-NPL Executive
    Committee’s certificate of cause of vacancy and nomination, stating Jaeger’s
    removal of Martin’s name from nomination created a vacancy on the general
    election ballot for the office of insurance commissioner and the committee was
    endorsing Jason Anderson as the substitute Democratic-NPL endorsed
    2
    candidate. She also submitted Anderson’s affidavit of candidacy, statement of
    interest, and the Democratic-NPL certificate of endorsement.
    [¶8] On August 31, 2020, Oversen submitted an updated certificate of cause
    of vacancy and nomination and other forms for Anderson’s candidacy. Jaeger
    has refused to place Anderson’s name on the general election ballot as the
    Democratic-NPL party candidate for insurance commissioner. Jaeger explained a
    political party may not fill a vacancy after the primary election unless one of
    four criteria listed in N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-18(6) is satisfied. In this instance, the
    criteria at issue is N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-18(6)(d) which states a vacancy may be
    filled when a candidate “[c]eases to be qualified to serve, if elected, as otherwise
    provided by law.” Jaeger asserts the candidate must have been initially
    qualified and subsequently cease to be qualified. He contends that our
    determination in Berg establishes that Martin was not qualified when she was
    on the primary ballot and as a result she cannot cease to be qualified. On
    August 31, 2020, Oversen and Anderson petitioned this Court for a writ of
    mandamus to compel Jaeger to accept and certify Democratic-NPL party
    insurance commissioner candidate Anderson for inclusion on the November 3,
    2020 general election ballot.
    II
    [¶9] Article VI, § 2, of the North Dakota Constitution gives this Court the
    authority to issue, hear, and determine original and remedial writs as may be
    necessary to properly exercise its jurisdiction. This Court’s authority is
    discretionary and we will determine for ourselves whether to exercise our
    jurisdiction. Bolinske v. Jaeger, 
    2008 ND 180
    , ¶ 4, 
    756 N.W.2d 336
    . “[T]he
    power to exercise our original jurisdiction extends only to those cases where
    the questions presented are publici juris and affect the sovereignty of the state,
    the franchises or prerogatives of the state, or the liberties of its people.” Berg,
    
    2020 ND 178
    , ¶ 7 (quoting Riemers v. Jaeger, 
    2018 ND 192
    , ¶ 5, 
    916 N.W.2d 113
    ). “The interest of the state must be primary, not incidental, and the public
    must have an interest or right that is affected.” Berg, at ¶ 7 (quoting Riemers,
    at ¶ 5).
    3
    [¶10] A writ of mandamus may be issued to compel the performance of an act
    which the law specifically requires a state official to perform. N.D.C.C. § 32-
    34-01. “A petitioner for a writ of mandamus must show a clear legal right to
    performance of the act sought to be compelled and must establish no plain,
    speedy, and adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.” Berg, 
    2020 ND 178
    , ¶ 9 (quoting Riemers, 
    2018 ND 192
    , ¶ 7). The law must require an act
    to be done to be enforceable by mandamus. Berg, at ¶ 9.
    III
    [¶11] Oversen and Anderson argue N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-18(4) requires Jaeger
    to place Anderson on the ballot as the Democratic-NPL endorsed candidate
    because they complied with statutory requirements. They claim once Oversen
    submitted the certificate of cause of vacancy and nomination, Jaeger did not
    have discretion to refuse to certify the new nomination. They further assert
    Jaeger wrongfully refused to certify the replacement nomination by
    erroneously interpreting N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-18(6)(d).
    [¶12] Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to determine the
    legislature’s intent. Laufer v. Doe, 
    2020 ND 159
    , ¶ 11, 
    946 N.W.2d 707
    . We look
    at the plain language of the statute and give each word its plain, ordinary, and
    commonly understood meaning, unless it is specifically defined. N.D.C.C. § 1-
    02-02. Statutes must be construed as a whole to determine the legislature’s
    intent and are harmonized to give meaning to related provisions. Jangula v.
    N.D. Dep’t. of Transp., 
    2016 ND 116
    , ¶ 11, 
    881 N.W.2d 639
    . Under N.D.C.C. §
    1-02-07, a specific provision in a statute controls a general provision if the two
    conflict and cannot be reconciled. See Rocky Mountain Steel Founds., Inc. v.
    Brockett Co., LLC, 
    2018 ND 96
    , ¶ 11, 
    909 N.W.2d 671
    . “We presume the
    legislature did not intend an absurd or ludicrous result or unjust consequences,
    and we construe statutes in a practical manner, giving consideration to the
    context of the statutes and the purpose for which they were enacted.” Laufer,
    at ¶ 11 (citation omitted).
    [¶13] Section 16.1-11-18, N.D.C.C., governs the filling of a vacancy that occurs
    in a nomination for a party office, stating:
    4
    4. If a vacancy occurs in a slate of statewide candidates after the
    candidates have been nominated at the primary election, the
    proper state executive committee may fill any vacancy by filing a
    certificate of nomination with the secretary of state. The chairman
    and secretary of the committee shall make and file with the
    secretary of state a certificate setting forth the cause of the
    vacancy, the name of the person for whom the new nominee is to
    be substituted, the fact that the committee was authorized to fill
    vacancies, and any further information as may be required to be
    given in an original certificate of nomination. When such a
    certificate is filed, the secretary of state shall certify the new
    nomination and the name of the person who has been nominated
    to fill the vacancy in place of the original nominee to the various
    auditors. If the secretary of state already has forwarded the
    certificate, the secretary of state forthwith shall certify to the
    auditors the name and address of the new nominee, the office the
    new nominee is nominated for, the party or political principle the
    new nominee represents, and the name of the person for whom the
    new nominee is substituting. Failure to publish the name of a new
    nominee does not invalidate the election.
    ....
    6. A vacancy in a nomination following a primary election may not
    be filled according to subsection 4 or 5 unless the nominated
    candidate:
    a. Dies;
    b. Would be unable to serve, if elected, as a result of a
    debilitating illness;
    c. Ceases to be a resident of the state or an individual
    nominated for legislative office will not be a resident of the
    legislative district at the time of the election; or
    d. Ceases to be qualified to serve, if elected, as otherwise
    provided by law.
    Vacancies to be filled according to the provisions of this section
    may be filled not later than the sixty-fourth day prior to the
    election.
    [¶14] Section 16.1-11-18(4), N.D.C.C., states a political party executive
    committee may fill any vacancy in a slate of statewide candidates, if a vacancy
    occurs after the candidates have been nominated at the primary election, by
    5
    filing a certificate of nomination with the secretary of state. The statute further
    provides the secretary of state shall certify the new nomination and the name
    of the person who has been nominated to fill the vacancy in place of the original
    nominee to the various auditors after the certificate of nomination has been
    filed. However, N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-18(4) must be read together with N.D.C.C.
    § 16.1-11-18(6), which defines four circumstances under which a vacancy may
    be filled under subsection 4. We conclude Jaeger was not required to place
    Anderson’s name on the general election ballot without considering whether
    one of the circumstances under N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-18(6) applies.
    [¶15] For purposes of this petition we assume without deciding a vacancy
    exists. Oversen and Anderson do not argue any of the provisions under
    N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-18(6) apply other than subsection (6)(d). As noted above,
    subsection (6)(d) provides a vacancy in a nomination following a primary
    election may not be filled unless the nominated candidate “[c]eases to be
    qualified to serve, if elected, as otherwise provided by law.”
    [¶16] Oversen and Anderson argue that this Court held Martin was not
    eligible, and that we did not hold that she was not qualified. They contend
    Martin was “qualified” by Jaeger as a candidate for the office of insurance
    commissioner when she was placed on the primary ballot, and she ceased to be
    qualified for that office by virtue of this Court’s decision in Berg, 
    2020 ND 178
    .
    [¶17] The words “cease” and “qualified” are not defined in the statute. When a
    word is not defined in the code, it is to be given its ordinary meaning. N.D.C.C.
    §§ 1-02-02 and -03. “Cease” is defined as “[t]o stop; to become extinct; to pass
    away; to come to an end; to suspend or forfeit. A cessation of activity.” Black’s
    Law Dictionary 202 (5th ed. 1979). “Qualified” is defined as “having complied
    with the specific requirements or precedent conditions (as for an office or
    employment): ELIGIBLE[.]” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 963
    (9th ed. 1988). See also Black’s Law Dictionary 1116-17 (5th ed. 1979) (defining
    “qualified” as “Adapted; fitted; entitled; susceptible; capable; competent;
    fitting; possessing legal power or capacity; eligible; as a ‘qualified voter’ (q.v.)”
    and defining “qualification” as “The possession by an individual of the
    6
    qualities, properties, or circumstances, natural or adventitious, which are
    inherently or legally necessary to render him eligible to fill an office or to
    perform a public duty or function.”).
    [¶18] In Berg, 
    2020 ND 178
    , ¶¶ 11, 15, 30, this Court held candidates seeking
    an elected office in the executive branch must have been a resident of this state
    for the five years preceding the election to office to be eligible, Martin will not
    have been a resident for the five years preceding the 2020 general election, and
    therefore she is not eligible to hold the office of insurance commissioner. Martin
    was not a resident for the required length of time, and therefore she was never
    eligible for the office. Martin never possessed the necessary qualifications to
    hold the office of insurance commissioner in this state. The ordinary meaning
    of “ceases to be qualified” requires that the candidate was once qualified and
    later stopped being qualified. Because Martin was never qualified to serve, the
    vacancy may not be filled under N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-18(6)(d).
    [¶19] Oversen and Anderson contend the above analysis improperly equates
    eligibility to hold office with qualification for the office. They contend our
    decision in Berg was limited to determining Martin’s eligibility for office and
    qualification for the office was independently established by Jaeger placing
    Martin on the primary ballot. This contention ignores the full text of N.D.C.C.
    § 16.1-11-18(6)(d) which provides “[c]eases to be qualified to serve, if elected,
    as otherwise provided by law.” The statute is unambiguous and the use of the
    term qualified is associated with eligibility through the use of the phrase “to
    serve.” The term qualified in subdivision (d) cannot be separated from the
    reference “to serve.” Here, we conclude the reference to “qualified to serve” in
    subdivision (d) is synonymous with “eligible to hold.”
    [¶20] Jaeger did not have a duty to place Anderson on the general election
    ballot for the office of insurance commissioner because none of the
    circumstances listed in N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-18(6) apply. Oversen and Anderson
    have not demonstrated they are entitled to a writ of mandamus.
    7
    IV
    [¶21] We deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.
    [¶22] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
    Daniel J. Crothers
    Lisa Fair McEvers
    Jerod E. Tufte
    VandeWalle, Justice, dissenting.
    [¶23] I respectfully dissent. Section 16.1-11-18(6)(d), N.D.C.C., provides a
    vacancy can be filled if a candidate “[c]eases to be qualified to serve, if elected,
    as otherwise provided by law.” I believe the use of the term qualified in
    subdivision (6)(d) is ambiguous and a reasonable interpretation is that Martin
    was qualified when she was placed on the primary ballot by the Secretary of
    State. She subsequently ceased to be qualified when we determined she was
    not eligible to hold the office of insurance commissioner in our prior case. I
    would err on the side of placing a candidate’s name on the ballot when
    ambiguity exists in a statute. Therefore, I dissent.
    [¶24] Gerald W. VandeWalle
    8