State v. Tompkins , 2023 ND 61 ( 2023 )

FILED
IN THE OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
MARCH 31, 2023
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2023 ND 61State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee
v.
Brandon Todd Tompkins, Defendant and Appellant
No. 20220270
Appeal from the District Court of Stutsman County, Southeast Judicial
District, the Honorable Troy J. LeFevre, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Opinion of the Court by Jensen, Chief Justice.
Frederick R. Fremgen, State’s Attorney, Jamestown, ND, for plaintiff and
appellee.
Drew J. Hushka (argued) and Luke T. Heck (on brief), Fargo, ND, for defendant
and appellant.
State v. Tompkins
No. 20220270
Jensen, Chief Justice.
[¶1] Brandon Tompkins appeals his convictions for driving under the
influence (“DUI”) and actual physical control (“APC”). Tompkins asserts the
district court erred by providing jury instructions merging the offenses of
driving or being in actual physical control while under the influence of an
intoxicating liquor and refusal to submit to a chemical test, which allowed the
jury to convict Tompkins without unanimously agreeing Tompkins committed
a singular criminal act. We conclude the offenses of driving or being in actual
physical control while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor are
separate offenses from the offense of refusal to submit to a chemical test and
the jury instructions improperly merged the offenses together. We reverse and
remand for a new trial.
I
[¶2] Tompkins was arrested for suspicion of DUI. The arresting officer
requested Tompkins submit to a chemical test to determine his blood alcohol
content. Tompkins refused to submit to a chemical test. The State charged
Tompkins with violating:
North Dakota Century Code section 39-08-01(1)(b), and/or 39-08-
01(1)(e) by driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle
on a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public
has a right of access for vehicular use in this state when the
Defendant either: []was under the influence of an intoxicating
liquor; and/or []refused to submit to a chemical test of his breath[.]
[¶3] The day before trial and after the deadline for filing pretrial motions had
passed, Tompkins filed a motion in limine to dismiss the charges arguing the
complaint failed to state an offense and was duplicitous. The State responded
to the motion by requesting leave to amend its complaint and the district court
granted the State’s request. The State amended its complaint to charge
Tompkins with two counts. Count 1 alleged Tompkins committed DUI by being
“under the influence of an intoxicating liquor; and/or []refused to submit to a
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chemical test[.]” Count 2 alleged Tompkins committed APC by being “under
the influence of an intoxicating liquor; and/or []refused to submit to a chemical
test[.]”
[¶4] When subsequently presented with the jury instructions and the verdict
form during the trial, Tompkins objected arguing the instructions and verdict
form improperly defined being under the influence and refusal to submit to a
chemical test as alternative means to commit DUI and APC. The jury
instructions read as follows:
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
A person may not drive a vehicle on a highway or on public
or private areas to which the public has a right of access for
vehicular use, if:
1. The person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor;
or
2. After the Defendant was directed by a law enforcement
officer to submit to a chemical test of the Defendant’s blood,
breath, or urine to determine the alcohol concentration or
presence of other drugs, or combination thereof, in the
Defendant’s blood, breath, or urine; the Defendant refused
to submit to the test.
....
ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL
No person shall be in actual physical control of a vehicle
upon a highway, street, or on public or private areas to which the
public has a right of access for vehicular use in this State if:
1) The person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor; or
2) The person refuses to submit to a chemical test, or tests,
of the person’s breath to determine the alcohol concentration
at the direction of a law enforcement officer. A person is “in
actual physical control” of a vehicle when the vehicle is
operable and a person is in a position to manipulate one or
more of the controls of the vehicle that cause it to move or
affect its movement in some manner or direction. Whether
the Defendant was in actual physical control is a question of
fact for you to decide.
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The district court overruled the objection. The jury convicted Tompkins of both
DUI and APC. The district court vacated the guilty verdict on Count 2, APC.
II
[¶5] The State asserts Tompkins failed to preserve the issue on appeal
because Tompkins was required to raise the issue prior to trial and failed to
file a timely pretrial motion. The district court may set a deadline for the
parties to make pretrial motions. N.D.R.Crim.P. 12(c)(1). The court can
consider an untimely motion if the party shows good cause. N.D.R.Crim.P.
12(c)(3). Tompkins’ motion in limine asserted the complaint was defective
because it failed to state an offense and was duplicitous. Motions asserting
there is a duplicitous defect in the indictment, information, or complaint must
be made before trial. N.D.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(3)(B)(i). The State responded to the
motion requesting leave to amend the complaint. The court granted the State’s
request to amend the complaint.
[¶6] Tompkins’ motion was untimely and the district court was not required
to resolve the motion. However, the district court resolved the motion by
entering an order granting the State’s request to amend the complaint made
in response to Tompkins’ motion in limine. By granting the State’s request to
amend the complaint, the district court implicitly found good cause and
exercised its discretion to resolve the untimely motion.
[¶7] Tompkins’ motion in limine asserted the complaint was defective for two
reasons. First, that the complaint improperly charged Tompkins with DUI and
APC as one offense. Second, that the complaint provided Tompkins could be
guilty of DUI and APC if he was found to be under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or refused a chemical test. Pursuant to the district court’s order
resolving the motion in limine, the State was allowed to amend the complaint.
The State’s amendment alleged two counts. Count 1 alleged Tompkins
committed DUI by being “under the influence of an intoxicating liquor; and/or
[]refused to submit to a chemical test[.]” Count 2 alleged Tompkins committed
APC by being “under the influence of an intoxicating liquor; and/or []refused to
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submit to a chemical test[.]” The amended complaint resolved the first issue
raised in the motion in limine by separating the offense of DUI from the offense
of APC, but failed to correct the second issue by allowing a conviction for DUI
or APC to include either being under the influence or refusing to submit to a
chemical test.
[¶8] The case proceeded to trial and Tompkins objected to the jury
instructions and verdict form. “To preserve an issue concerning jury
instructions for review, a defendant must request an instruction as required by
N.D.R.Crim.P. 30(a) or object to an instruction as required by N.D.R.Crim.P.
30(c).” State v. Roberts, 2021 ND 235, ¶ 11, 968 N.W.2d 183 (quoting State v.
Mertz, 2012 ND 145, ¶ 9, 818 N.W.2d 782). N.D.R.Crim.P. 30(c)(1) requires a
party to object to jury instructions on the record and state distinctly the matter
objected to and the grounds of the objection. Tompkins complied with the
requirements of Rule 30(c)(1).
[¶9] Here, Tompkins filed an untimely pretrial motion. The district court
exercised its discretion to rule on the motion and allowed the State to amend
the complaint to correct the alleged deficiencies. The amended complaint
corrected one of the alleged deficiencies, but failed to correct the second alleged
deficiency. When Tompkins was presented with the proposed jury instructions
and verdict form during the trial, it became apparent the State was not
addressing the second error alleged in his earlier motion. Tompkins timely
objected to the instructions and verdict form. We conclude, under the
circumstances presented in this case, Tompkins preserved the issue for appeal.
III
[¶10] Tompkins argues the jury instructions misstate the applicable law by
allowing the jury to convict Tompkins of DUI and APC without unanimously
agreeing whether Tompkins was under the influence or refused to submit to a
chemical test. Tompkins argues committing DUI or APC by being under the
influence of an intoxicating substance are separate offenses from refusing a
chemical test and not alternative methods of proving the same crime.
[¶11] This Court has recognized the following:
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Jury instructions must correctly and adequately inform the jury of
the applicable law and must not mislead or confuse the jury. We
view the instructions as a whole to determine if they correctly and
adequately inform the jury. A court errs if it refuses to instruct the
jury on an issue that has been adequately raised, but the court may
refuse to give an instruction that is irrelevant or inapplicable.
State v. Pulkrabek, 2017 ND 203, ¶ 6, 900 N.W.2d 798 (quoting State v.
Martinez, 2015 ND 173, ¶ 8, 865 N.W.2d 391).
[¶12] The language of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01 unambiguously provides
committing DUI or APC by being under the influence of an intoxicating liquor
and refusing to submit to a chemical test are separate offenses and not
alternative methods of committing DUI or APC. Section 39-08-01(1) reads as
follows:
1. A person may not drive or be in actual physical control of any
vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which
the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if any
of the following apply:
a. That person has an alcohol concentration of at least eight
one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the time of the
performance of a chemical test within two hours after the
driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle.
b. That person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
c. That person is under the influence of any drug or
substance or combination of drugs or substances to a degree
which renders that person incapable of safely driving.
d. That person is under the combined influence of alcohol
and any other drugs or substances to a degree which renders
that person incapable of safely driving.
e. That individual refuses to submit to any of the following:
(1) A chemical test, or tests, of the individual’s blood,
breath, or urine to determine the alcohol concentration
or presence of other drugs, or combination thereof, in
the individual’s blood, breath, or urine, at the direction
of a law enforcement officer under section 39-06.2-10.2
if the individual is driving or is in actual physical
control of a commercial motor vehicle; or
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(2) A chemical test, or tests, of the individual’s blood,
breath, or urine to determine the alcohol concentration
or presence of other drugs, or combination thereof, in
the individual’s blood, breath, or urine, at the direction
of a law enforcement officer under section 39-20-01.
f. Subdivision e does not apply to an individual unless the
individual has been advised of the consequences of refusing
a chemical test consistent with the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of North Dakota.
. . . If the individual violated subdivisions a, b, c, or d of this
subsection and subdivision e of this subsection and the
violations arose from the same incident, for purposes of
suspension or revocation of an operator’s license, the
violations are deemed a single violation and the court shall
forward to the department of transportation only the
conviction for driving under the influence or actual physical
control.
[¶13] Subsection (e) of N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(1) is exclusive of subsection (b) of
N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(1). Subsection (e) defines the offense of refusal to submit
to a chemical test. N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(1)(e). Subsection (b) defines the offenses
of driving or being in actual physical control while under the influence of an
intoxicating liquor. N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(b). Driving or being in actual physical
control while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor requires a party to
be under the influence of alcohol. Refusal to submit to a chemical test requires
only a refusal to take a test when asked and does not require the party to be
under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, refusal to submit to a chemical test
is a separate offense from driving or being in actual physical control while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
[¶14] Section 39-08-01(1), N.D.C.C., supports this conclusion:
If the individual violated subdivisions a, b, c, or d of this
subsection and subdivision e of this subsection and the
violations arose from the same incident, for purposes of
suspension or revocation of an operator’s license, the
violations are deemed a single violation and the court shall
forward to the department of transportation only the
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conviction for driving under the influence or actual physical
control.
The statute unambiguously provides subsection (b) and subsection (e) are
separate offenses for the purposes of the statute and only treated as a single
violation when reported to the department of transportation.
[¶15] The jury instructions allowed the jury to find Tompkins guilty of both the
offense of driving and the offense of being in actual physical control by finding
Tompkins was either under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or refused to
submit to a chemical test. The North Dakota Constitution requires all verdicts
in criminal cases to be unanimous. N.D. Const. art. I, § 13. The instructions
allowed the jury to convict Tompkins without unanimously agreeing what was
the singular criminal act Tompkins committed. Because refusal to submit to a
chemical test is a separate offense from driving or being in actual physical
control while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor, the jury was
required to unanimously agree as to which criminal act Tompkins committed;
whether he was under the influence of an intoxicating liquor or whether he
refused to submit to a chemical test. The jury instructions incorrectly described
the law and allowed the jury to convict Tompkins without unanimously
agreeing whether Tompkins refused a chemical test or had been under the
influence of an intoxicating liquor.
[¶16] “If, as a whole, an instruction is erroneous, relates to a central subject in
the case, and affects a substantial right of the accused, we will reverse for that
error.” State v. Marshall, 531 N.W.2d 284, 287 (N.D. 1995). As described above,
the instructions were erroneous. The jury instructions provided the jury with
the law applicable to convict Tompkins, but did not require the jury to
unanimously agree as to the criminal act Tompkins committed. Therefore, the
jury instructions violated Tompkins’ constitutional right and constitute
reversible error. N.D. Const. art. 1, § 13.
IV
[¶17] Section 39-08-01(1), N.D.C.C., provides that refusal to submit to a
chemical test and driving or being in actual physical control while under the
7
influence of an intoxicating liquor are separate offenses. The jury instructions
impermissibly allowed the jury to convict Tompkins without unanimously
agreeing as to the singular criminal act Tompkins committed. We reverse the
judgment and remand for a new trial.
[¶18] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr
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