O'Neal v. State , 2023 ND 109 ( 2023 )


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  •                                                                               FILED
    IN THE OFFICE OF THE
    CLERK OF SUPREME COURT
    JUNE 8, 2023
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    IN THE SUPREME COURT
    STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
    
    2023 ND 109
    Jason Travis O’Neal,                                 Petitioner and Appellant
    v.
    State of North Dakota,                              Respondent and Appellee
    No. 20220353
    Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District,
    the Honorable Stephannie N. Stiel, Judge.
    AFFIRMED.
    Opinion of the Court by Crothers, Justice.
    Scott O. Diamond, Fargo, ND, for petitioner and appellant; submitted on brief.
    Brianna K. Kraft, Assistant State’s Attorney, Fargo, ND, for respondent and
    appellee; submitted on brief.
    O’Neal v. State
    No. 20220353
    Crothers, Justice.
    [¶1] Jason O’Neal appeals from a district court order denying his post-
    conviction relief application. O’Neal argues the court abused its discretion and
    erred by denying his application. We affirm.
    I
    [¶2] On August 24, 2020, O’Neal was charged with attempted murder. On
    April 19, 2021, O’Neal pleaded guilty to the charge of attempted murder and
    was sentenced to 15 years. On March 22, 2022, O’Neal filed an application for
    post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence and ineffective
    assistance of counsel. On October 14, 2022, a post-conviction evidentiary
    hearing was held. On December 1, 2022, the district court issued an order
    denying O’Neal’s application. O’Neal timely appealed.
    II
    [¶3] O’Neal argues he is entitled to post-conviction relief because new
    evidence was discovered after he pleaded guilty. He claims the district court
    abused its discretion by denying his application for post-conviction relief and
    he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea, receive appointment of new counsel,
    and receive a new trial.
    [¶4] Post-conviction relief is available under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(1)(e) when
    “[e]vidence, not previously presented and heard, exists requiring vacation of
    the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.” Applications based on
    newly discovered evidence are reviewed as a motion for a new trial based on
    newly discovered evidence under N.D.R.Crim.P. 33. The standard is well
    established:
    “Under N.D.R.Crim.P. 33(a), the trial court may grant a new trial
    to the defendant if required in the interests of justice. To prevail
    1
    on a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
    evidence, the defendant must show (1) the evidence was discovered
    after trial, (2) the failure to learn about the evidence at the time of
    trial was not the result of the defendant’s lack of diligence, (3) the
    newly discovered evidence is material to the issues at trial, and (4)
    the weight and quality of the newly discovered evidence would
    likely result in an acquittal. A motion for new trial based upon
    newly discovered evidence rests within the discretion of the trial
    court, and we will not reverse the court’s denial of the motion
    unless the court has abused its discretion. If the newly discovered
    evidence is of such a nature that it is not likely to be believed by
    the jury or to change the results of the original trial, the court’s
    denial of the new trial motion is not an abuse of discretion. A trial
    court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably,
    unconscionably, or when its decision is not the product of a rational
    mental process leading to a reasoned decision.”
    Kovalevich v. State, 
    2018 N.W.2d 184
    , ¶ 5, 
    915 N.W.2d 644
    .
    [¶5] O’Neal argues new evidence may have been discovered if the alleged
    weapon had been forensically tested. Specifically, he claims new evidence of an
    alternative perpetrator may have been discovered. The district court found
    O’Neal did not meet the burden for post-conviction relief based on new evidence
    because he knew before the trial about the potential evidence that could come
    from forensic testing of the weapon. The court’s findings are supported by the
    record; however those findings ignore the statutory threshold that new
    evidence “exists.” See N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-01(1)(e). Here, O’Neal only claimed
    new evidence may exist, or may have been discovered. Therefore, the district
    court did not abuse its discretion in denying O’Neal’s application for relief
    based on newly discovered evidence.
    III
    [¶6] O’Neal argues his court-appointed counsel was ineffective because she
    did not compel forensic testing on any evidence and pushed him toward a plea
    deal. Therefore, O’Neal claims the district court erred in denying his
    application for post-conviction relief. O’Neal claims he is entitled to withdraw
    his guilty plea, receive appointment of new counsel, and a new trial.
    2
    [¶7] To prove post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel
    an applicant must: “(1) show that counsel’s representation fell below an
    objective standard of reasonableness and (2) show that there is a reasonable
    probability that, but for the counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
    proceeding would have been different.” Bahtiraj v. State, 
    2013 ND 240
    , ¶ 9,
    
    840 N.W.2d 605
    ; see also Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 688, 694, 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
     (1984).
    [¶8] The standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in
    a post-conviction proceeding is well established:
    “Post-conviction relief proceedings are civil in nature and governed
    by the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. Flanagan v. State,
    
    2006 ND 76
    , ¶ 9, 
    712 N.W.2d 602
    . Whether a petitioner received
    ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact
    and is fully reviewable on appeal. Klose v. State, 
    2005 ND 192
    ,
    ¶ 10, 
    705 N.W.2d 809
    . Under N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a), the district court’s
    findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly
    erroneous. ‘A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by
    an erroneous view of the law, if it is not supported by any evidence,
    or if, although there is some evidence to support the finding, a
    reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake
    has been made.’ Heckelsmiller v. State, 
    2004 ND 191
    , ¶ 5, 
    687 N.W.2d 454
    .”
    Roe v. State, 
    2017 ND 65
    , ¶ 5, 
    891 N.W.2d 745
    .
    [¶9] O’Neal argues his counsel was ineffective because she did not request
    forensic testing of evidence. O’Neal’s counsel testified she did not request
    forensic testing on the weapon because it would not have been helpful to the
    defense. She said the State had sufficient evidence even without the weapon to
    prove the case against O’Neal beyond a reasonable doubt. Counsel also testified
    O’Neal wanted the weapon tested for the victim’s DNA but forensic testing for
    the victim’s DNA would not have been necessary because the victim’s injuries
    were not at issue in this matter. O’Neal’s counsel testified she did not request
    forensic testing on the other evidence because again it would not have been
    helpful to the defense. She said O’Neal’s DNA likely would have been on most
    of the evidence since he was living in the house where the victim was injured.
    3
    The district court found prior to O’Neal’s plea, O’Neal and his counsel had
    extensive discussions about the forensic testing and ultimately decided not to
    pursue this defense strategy.
    [¶10] O’Neal also argues his counsel was ineffective because she forced him
    into a plea deal. O’Neal does not offer any evidence to show his counsel forced
    him to take a plea deal. In fact, O’Neal testified his counsel was doing her job
    when she informed him the State had sufficient evidence against him and there
    were risks of going to trial. O’Neal also testified his counsel never stated he did
    not have a right to go to trial or that she did not want to go to trial.
    [¶11] Based on these facts, the district court found O’Neal did not meet the
    burden for post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The
    court’s findings were not induced by an erroneous view of the law and were
    supported by evidence. The court did not clearly err in finding O’Neal did not
    show his counsel’s representation was below the standard of reasonableness
    nor a reasonable probability that but for this alleged error the result would
    have been different.
    IV
    [¶12] The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding O’Neal did not
    meet the burden for post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence.
    The court also did not err in finding O’Neal did not meet the burden for relief
    based on ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the district court’s order
    denying O’Neal’s application for post-conviction relief.
    [¶13] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
    Daniel J. Crothers
    Lisa Fair McEvers
    Jerod E. Tufte
    Douglas A. Bahr
    4