Interest of O.F. , 2024 ND 140 ( 2024 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA
2024 ND 140In the Interest of O.F., a Child
State of North Dakota, Petitioner and Appellee
v.
D.C., Father, Respondent and Appellant
and
O.F., Child; B.F., Mother, Respondents
No. 20240136
Appeal from the Juvenile Court of Ward County, North Central Judicial District, the
Honorable Kelly A. Dillon, Judicial Referee.
AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Tufte, Justice.
Rozanna C. Larson, State’s Attorney, Minot, N.D., for petitioner and appellee; submitted
on brief.
Rina Morales-Holmes, Minot, N.D., for respondent and appellant; submitted on brief.
Interest of O.F.
No. 20240136
Tufte, Justice.
[¶1] D.C. appeals from a district court order terminating his parental rights. On appeal,
he argues the district court abused its discretion by terminating his parental rights because
the court clearly erred in finding that O.F. has been in foster care for at least 450 out of the
previous 660 nights, that the conditions and causes of the need for protection are likely to
continue or will not be remedied, and that the child will suffer serious physical, mental,
moral, or emotional harm. We affirm the order terminating parental rights.
I
[¶2] O.F. was placed into the care of the Ward County Human Service Zone on June 15,
2022, and was adjudicated a child in need of protection on August 9, 2022. O.F. was
determined to still be a child in need of protection at the permanency hearing on June 8,
2023, and she was ordered to remain in care until June 8, 2024. The State filed a petition
to terminate parental rights on October 2, 2023. The adjudication hearing was held on
February 23, 2024. The district court terminated parental rights on April 8, 2024. D.C.
appeals.
II
[¶3] Section 27-20.3-20(1)(c), N.D.C.C., authorizes a juvenile court to terminate
parental rights if the child is in need of protection and the court finds:
(1) The conditions and causes of the need for protection are likely to
continue or will not be remedied and for that reason the child is
suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or
emotional harm; or
(2) The child has been in foster care, in the care, custody, and control of
the department or human service zone for at least four hundred fifty
out of the previous six hundred sixty nights[.]
[¶4] “A court’s decision to terminate an individual’s parental rights is a question of fact,
and that decision will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous. A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, no evidence exists to
support it, or if it is clear a mistake has been made.” In re M.R., 2015 ND 233, ¶ 6, 870
N.W.2d 175 (citations omitted). “We review a court’s exercise of its discretion to grant or
deny a parental-termination petition under the abuse of discretion standard.” Interest of
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J.C., 2024 ND 9, ¶ 22, 2 N.W.3d 228. “A court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary,
unconscionable, or unreasonable manner, if its decision is not the product of a rational
mental process leading to a reasonable determination, or if it misinterprets or misapplies
the law.” Id. (cleaned up).
III
[¶5] D.C. argues the district court’s finding that O.F. had been in care for 450 nights out
of the previous 660 nights was clearly erroneous because only 618 nights had passed at the
time of the hearing since O.F. had been placed into care. He argues N.D.C.C. § 27-20.3-
20(1)(c)(2) requires at least 660 nights to pass from the date the child is placed into care.
[¶6] “The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is fully reviewable on
appeal.” In re T.H., 2012 ND 38, ¶ 22, 812 N.W.2d 373. “In interpreting a statute, we look
at the plain language of the statute and give each word its plain and ordinary meaning
unless a contrary intention plainly appears.” Id.; see also N.D.C.C. § 1-02-02. If a statute
is ambiguous, we may look to extrinsic aids to interpret its meaning. A statute is ambiguous
if it is susceptible to different, rational meanings. T.H., at ¶ 22 (cleaned up); see also
N.D.C.C. § 1-02-39.
[¶7] Section 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2), N.D.C.C., reads: “The child has been in foster care, in
the care, custody, and control of the department or human service zone for at least four
hundred fifty out of the previous six hundred sixty nights[.]” The plain language of the
statute requires the child be in care for at least 450 nights. It does not require 660 nights to
have passed since placement of the child into care to satisfy the statute. D.C.’s
interpretation of the statute is not supported by a plain reading of the statute.
[¶8] The district court found “[O.F.] has been in foster care a total of 618 continuous
nights as of the date of the hearing. The State has satisfied the requirements of [N.D.C.C.
§ 27-20.3-20(1)(c)(2)].” O.F. was placed into care on June 15, 2023. The record shows, at
the time of the hearing, O.F. was placed into care 618 nights previous, and remained
continuously in care through the date of the hearing on February 23, 2024. O.F. was in care
618 of the previous 660 nights. The court’s finding that the State satisfied N.D.C.C. § 27-
20.3-20(1)(c)(2) is supported by the record.
IV
[¶9] D.C. argues the district court abused its discretion by terminating his parental rights.
He argues the court’s finding that the conditions and causes of the need for protection are
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likely to continue or will not be remedied and that the child will suffer serious physical,
mental, moral, or emotional harm is clearly erroneous. He argues incarceration alone is not
a reason to terminate. After review of the record, we conclude the district court’s finding
that the conditions and causes of the need for protection are likely to continue and that the
child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, or emotional harm is not
clearly erroneous. We further conclude the court’s finding that O.F. had been in care for
450 nights out of the previous 660 nights was clearly not erroneous. The district court did
not abuse its discretion by terminating parental rights. We summarily affirm the order
terminating parental rights under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(2) and (4).
[¶10] Jon J. Jensen, C.J.
Daniel J. Crothers
Lisa Fair McEvers
Jerod E. Tufte
Douglas A. Bahr
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