State v. Ross , 899 N.W.2d 209 ( 2017 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    06/16/2017 09:12 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    296 Nebraska R eports
    STATE v. ROSS
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 923
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    Michael L. Ross, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed June 16, 2017.    No. S-16-131.
    1.	 Postconviction: Constitutional Law: Appeal and Error. In appeals
    from postconviction proceedings, an appellate court reviews de novo a
    determination that the defendant failed to allege sufficient facts to dem-
    onstrate a violation of his or her constitutional rights or that the record
    and files affirmatively show that the defendant is entitled to no relief.
    2.	 Postconviction: Appeal and Error. Whether a claim raised in a post-
    conviction proceeding is procedurally barred is a question of law. When
    reviewing a question of law, an appellate court resolves the question
    independently of the lower court’s conclusion.
    3.	Postconviction: Constitutional Law. An evidentiary hearing on a
    motion for postconviction relief must be granted when the motion
    contains factual allegations which, if proved, constitute an infringe-
    ment of the movant’s rights under the Nebraska or federal Constitution.
    However, if the motion alleges only conclusions of fact or law, or the
    records and files in the case affirmatively show that the movant is
    entitled to no relief, no evidentiary hearing is required.
    4.	 ____: ____. Postconviction relief is a very narrow category of relief
    available only to remedy prejudicial constitutional violations.
    5.	 Postconviction: Appeal and Error. A motion for postconviction relief
    cannot be used to secure review of issues which were or could have
    been litigated on direct appeal.
    6.	 Postconviction: Effectiveness of Counsel: Appeal and Error. When a
    defendant is represented both at trial and on direct appeal by the same
    lawyer, the defendant’s first opportunity to assert ineffective assistance
    of counsel is in a motion for postconviction relief.
    7.	 ____: ____: ____. To establish a right to postconviction relief based
    on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant has the
    burden, in accordance with Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 104
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    STATE v. ROSS
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 923
    S. Ct. 2052, 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
    (1984), to show that counsel’s perform­
    ance was deficient; that is, counsel’s performance did not equal that
    of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law. Next, the
    defendant must show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the
    defense in his or her case.
    8.	 Effectiveness of Counsel. Under the framework of Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
    (1984),
    a court may address the two elements, deficient performance and preju-
    dice, in either order.
    9.	 ____. Counsel’s failure to raise novel legal theories or arguments or to
    make novel constitutional challenges in order to bring a change in exist-
    ing law does not constitute deficient performance.
    10.	 Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Effectiveness of Counsel. The
    Constitution guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a com-
    petent attorney. It does not ensure that defense counsel will recognize
    and raise every conceivable constitutional claim.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Duane
    C. Dougherty, Judge. Affirmed.
    Gerald L. Soucie for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Kimberly A.
    Klein for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy,
    K elch, and Funke, JJ.
    Stacy, J.
    After a jury trial, Michael L. Ross was convicted of three
    counts, including violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1212.04
    (Supp. 2009). We affirmed Ross’ convictions on direct appeal,1
    and he moved for postconviction relief. The district court
    denied his motion without conducting an evidentiary hear-
    ing. In this appeal, Ross contends he should have received an
    evidentiary hearing on his allegations (1) that § 28-1212.04
    is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to him and
    1
    State v. Ross, 
    283 Neb. 742
    , 
    811 N.W.2d 298
    (2012).
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    STATE v. ROSS
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    (2) that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for
    failing to preserve constitutional challenges to § 28-1212.04.
    We conclude Ross’ arguments are without merit, and affirm
    the denial of postconviction relief.
    FACTS
    The facts of the underlying crimes are fully set forth in
    Ross’ direct appeal.2 As relevant here, Ross argues the district
    court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on his motion
    for postconviction relief. His arguments are premised on the
    constitutionality of § 28-1212.04, which at the time of his
    crime prohibited
    [a]ny person, within the territorial boundaries of any
    city, incorporated village, or county containing a city of
    the metropolitan class or primary class [from] unlawfully,
    knowingly, and intentionally or recklessly discharg[ing] a
    firearm, while in or in the proximity of any motor vehicle
    that such person has just exited, at or in the general direc-
    tion of any person, dwelling, building, structure, [or]
    occupied motor vehicle . . . .
    Violation of § 28-1212.04 is a Class IC felony.
    Ross’ trial counsel did not move to quash the information
    charging a violation of § 28-1212.04 and did not raise any
    argument that the statute was unconstitutional. After a jury
    trial, Ross was convicted of violating § 28-1212.04, as well as
    other felonies. Ross appealed his convictions, asserting that the
    evidence was insufficient. He was represented on appeal by the
    same counsel, who did not raise any issue regarding the consti-
    tutionality of § 28-1212.04.
    After his convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal,
    Ross moved for postconviction relief. As relevant to this
    appeal, Ross alleged that § 28-1212.04 is both facially uncon-
    stitutional and unconstitutional as applied to him, based on
    theories of special legislation and equal protection. Generally,
    2
    
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    he alleged § 28-1212.04 is special legislation in violation
    of Neb. Const. art. III, § 18, because it criminalizes behav-
    ior in certain geographic areas but not in others. He alleged
    § 28-1212.04 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
    and Nebraska Constitutions for essentially the same reason,
    and because the areas of enforcement resulted in the statute’s
    being disproportionately applied against African-Americans
    and other minorities.
    Ross also alleged he received ineffective assistance of trial
    and appellate counsel because counsel failed to “investigate,
    allege, research, present, argue, and thereby preserve” the
    constitutional claims. Ross alleged he was prejudiced by his
    trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to quash because either
    the district court would have granted the motion based on the
    unconstitutionality of § 28-1212.04 or the constitutional issues
    would have been preserved for appeal and the appellate court
    would have found § 28-1212.04 unconstitutional.
    The district court denied postconviction relief without con-
    ducting an evidentiary hearing. It found Ross’ direct chal-
    lenges to the constitutionality of § 28-1212.04 were procedur-
    ally barred because those challenges could have been raised at
    trial or on direct appeal. And, relying on State v. Sanders,3 it
    found Ross’ counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise or
    preserve constitutional challenges to § 28-1212.04. In Sanders,
    we expressly held trial counsel was not ineffective for failing
    to raise a constitutional challenge to § 28-1212.04, because
    counsel cannot perform in a deficient manner by failing to
    raise novel legal arguments or assert changes to existing law.
    Ross filed this timely appeal.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Ross assigns, restated and consolidated, that the district
    court erred in (1) denying an evidentiary hearing on his allega-
    tion that § 28-1212.04 is facially unconstitutional, in violation
    3
    State v. Sanders, 
    289 Neb. 335
    , 
    855 N.W.2d 350
    (2014).
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    of Neb. Const. art. III, § 18; (2) denying an evidentiary hearing
    on his allegation that § 28-1212.04 is facially unconstitutional
    on equal protection grounds because it treats identical geo-
    graphic areas differently; (3) denying an evidentiary hearing
    on his allegation that § 28-1212.04 is facially unconstitutional
    on equal protection grounds because it discriminates against
    African-Americans; (4) denying an evidentiary hearing on
    his allegation that the § 28-1212.04 is unconstitutional as
    applied to him; and (5) denying an evidentiary hearing on his
    allegation that he received ineffective assistance of trial and
    appellate counsel when counsel failed to move to quash the
    amended information.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] In appeals from postconviction proceedings, an appel-
    late court reviews de novo a determination that the defendant
    failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate a violation of his
    or her constitutional rights or that the record and files affirma-
    tively show that the defendant is entitled to no relief.4
    [2] Whether a claim raised in a postconviction proceeding
    is procedurally barred is a question of law.5 When reviewing a
    question of law, an appellate court resolves the question inde-
    pendently of the lower court’s conclusion.6
    ANALYSIS
    [3] An evidentiary hearing on a motion for postconvic-
    tion relief must be granted when the motion contains factual
    allegations which, if proved, constitute an infringement of the
    movant’s rights under the Nebraska or federal Constitution.
    However, if the motion alleges only conclusions of fact or
    law, or the records and files in the case affirmatively show
    4
    State v. Nolan, 
    292 Neb. 118
    , 
    870 N.W.2d 806
    (2015); State v. Cook, 
    290 Neb. 381
    , 
    860 N.W.2d 408
    (2015).
    5
    State v. Harris, 
    292 Neb. 186
    , 
    871 N.W.2d 762
    (2015); State v. Thorpe,
    
    290 Neb. 149
    , 
    858 N.W.2d 880
    (2015).
    6
    State v. Molina, 
    279 Neb. 405
    , 
    778 N.W.2d 713
    (2010).
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    that the movant is entitled to no relief, no evidentiary hearing
    is required.7
    Constitutional Challenges A re
    Procedurally Barred
    [4,5] In his first four assignments of error, Ross alleges the
    district court erred in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing
    on his allegations raising direct constitutional challenges to
    § 28-1212.04. We conclude the district court properly found
    these allegations were procedurally barred, because they could
    have been raised at trial or on direct appeal. Postconviction
    relief is a very narrow category of relief available only to rem-
    edy prejudicial constitutional violations.8 A motion for postcon-
    viction relief cannot be used to secure review of issues which
    were or could have been litigated on direct appeal.9 We there-
    fore affirm the denial of postconviction relief as to the direct
    constitutional challenges.
    Counsel Was Not Ineffective
    [6] Although a motion for postconviction relief cannot be
    used to secure review of issues which were or could have been
    litigated on direct appeal, when a defendant was represented
    both at trial and on direct appeal by the same lawyer, the
    defendant’s first opportunity to assert ineffective assistance of
    counsel is in a motion for postconviction relief.10 Ross’ ineffec-
    tive assistance of counsel claim is properly before us.
    [7,8] To establish a right to postconviction relief based on
    a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant has
    7
    State v. Ware, 
    292 Neb. 24
    , 
    870 N.W.2d 637
    (2015); State v. Sellers, 
    290 Neb. 18
    , 
    858 N.W.2d 577
    (2015).
    8
    State v. Hessler, 
    282 Neb. 935
    , 
    807 N.W.2d 504
    (2011).
    9
    State v. Sellers, supra note 7; State v. Marshall, 
    269 Neb. 56
    , 
    690 N.W.2d 593
    (2005).
    10
    State v. Armendariz, 
    289 Neb. 896
    , 
    857 N.W.2d 775
    (2015); State v.
    Robinson, 
    285 Neb. 394
    , 
    827 N.W.2d 292
    (2013).
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    the burden, in accordance with Strickland v. Washington,11 to
    show that counsel’s performance was deficient; that is, coun-
    sel’s performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordi-
    nary training and skill in criminal law.12 Next, the defendant
    must show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the
    defense in his or her case.13 Under the Strickland v. Washington
    framework, a court may address the two elements, deficient
    performance and prejudice, in either order.14
    Ross makes a novel argument in this regard based on Hall v.
    State.15 In Hall, the defendant, after being convicted of second
    degree murder, attempted to challenge the constitutionality of
    the Nebraska homicide statutes via declaratory judgment. We
    held the procedure was improper because declaratory judgment
    does not lie where another equally serviceable remedy is avail-
    able. We stated:
    This [constitutional] issue could have been raised by
    conventional forms of remedy within the criminal pros-
    ecution. In a criminal prosecution, a defendant can bring
    a constitutional challenge to the facial validity of the stat-
    ute under which he or she is charged by filing a motion
    to quash or a demurrer. . . . In the event the defendant’s
    counsel fails to make such a challenge, the defendant can
    allege ineffective assistance of counsel either on direct
    appeal or in an action for postconviction relief.16
    Ross argues that this language from Hall established a rule
    that any time counsel fails to file a motion to quash challeng-
    ing the constitutionality of a statute, a defendant has a valid
    11
    Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
          (1984).
    12
    State v. Armendariz, supra note 10.
    13
    
    Id. 14 State
    v. Torres, 
    295 Neb. 830
    , 
    894 N.W.2d 191
    (2017).
    15
    Hall v. State, 
    264 Neb. 151
    , 
    646 N.W.2d 572
    (2002).
    16
    
    Id. at 158,
    646 N.W.2d at 578.
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    ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a postconviction
    action. We disagree. Hall simply recognized the proper proce-
    dure for raising a constitutional claim within a criminal pros-
    ecution—it spoke to the procedure for alleging such claims. It
    did not, as Ross suggests, presume the validity of such claims.
    Whenever a claim of ineffective assistance is raised, a court
    must analyze whether the defendant has sufficiently alleged
    deficient performance resulting in prejudice.17
    We focus here on whether Ross has sufficiently alleged that
    his trial and appellate counsel performed deficiently. Ross’
    postconviction motion alleged his counsel was deficient for
    failing to raise a constitutional challenge to § 28-1212.04.
    [9] We addressed a nearly identical postconviction claim
    in State v. Sanders.18 There, we held that trial counsel did not
    perform in a deficient manner when he failed to raise a con-
    stitutional challenge to § 28-1212.04. We reasoned “counsel’s
    failure to raise novel legal theories or arguments or to make
    novel constitutional challenges in order to bring a change in
    existing law does not constitute deficient performance.”19
    That same rationale applies to this case. Ross was tried in
    2010, and his direct appeal was decided in 2012. At that time,
    no appellate court had been presented with a constitutional
    challenge to § 28-1212.04. We decided Sanders 2 years later.
    Given our holding in Sanders that counsel’s failure to raise a
    novel constitutional challenge to § 28-1212.04 did not consti-
    tute deficient performance, we fail to see how Ross’ trial coun-
    sel could be found deficient for not asserting such a challenge
    even earlier.
    [10] “‘The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants only
    a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does not [e]nsure that
    defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable
    17
    See Strickland v. Washington, supra note 11.
    18
    State v. Sanders, supra note 3.
    19
    
    Id. at 343,
    855 N.W.2d at 357.
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    constitutional claim.’”20 Ross’ postconviction motion did not
    contain factual allegations which would constitute deficient
    performance under Strickland v. Washington. No evidentiary
    hearing was required.21
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we find Ross’ direct challenges to
    the constitutionality of § 28-1212.04 are procedurally barred.
    And we conclude his ineffective assistance of counsel claim
    does not entitle him to an evidentiary hearing, because the
    allegations cannot support a finding of deficient performance.
    We affirm the denial of postconviction relief.
    A ffirmed.
    20
    
    Id. at 342,
    855 N.W.2d at 356, quoting Engle v. Isaac, 
    456 U.S. 107
    , 
    102 S. Ct. 1558
    , 
    71 L. Ed. 2d 783
    (1982).
    21
    See, State v. Ware, supra note 7; State v. Sellers, supra note 7.