Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions ( 2014 )


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  •                         Nebraska Advance Sheets
    VISOSO v. CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS	439
    Cite as 
    287 Neb. 439
    Odilon Visoso, also known as Adam Rodriguez,
    appellant, v. Cargill M eat Solutions, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed February 14, 2014.    No. S-13-454.
    1.	 Workers’ Compensation: Appeal and Error. A judgment, order, or award of
    the Workers’ Compensation Court may be modified, reversed, or set aside only
    upon the grounds that (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its
    powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not
    sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order,
    judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not
    support the order or award.
    2.	 Workers’ Compensation: Evidence: Appeal and Error. In testing the suf-
    ficiency of the evidence to support the findings of fact, the evidence must be
    considered in the light most favorable to the successful party, every contro-
    verted fact must be resolved in favor of the successful party, and the successful
    party will have the benefit of every inference that is reasonably deducible from
    the evidence.
    Appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Court: Daniel R.
    Fridrich, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
    Ryan C. Holsten and Leslie S. Stryker, Senior Certified Law
    Student, of Atwood, Holsten, Brown & Deaver Law Firm, P.C.,
    L.L.O., for appellant.
    Caroline M. Westerhold and Jenny L. Panko, of Baylor,
    Evnen, Curtiss, Grimit & Witt, L.L.P., for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack,
    and Miller-Lerman, JJ.
    Heavican, C.J.
    INTRODUCTION
    In a prior appeal, Odilon Visoso appealed the decision
    of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Court’s finding that
    he had failed to meet his burden of proving loss of earning
    capacity in his new community in Mexico and declining his
    claim for permanent impairment. We remanded the cause to
    permit Visoso to establish loss of earning capacity using the
    Schuyler, Nebraska, community where the injury occurred.
    On remand, the compensation court reviewed the previously
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    440	287 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    submitted earning capacity reports and found Visoso suffered
    a 45-­ercent loss of earning capacity. Visoso appeals. We
    p
    reverse, and remand.
    BACKGROUND
    Visoso, also known as Adam Rodriguez, began working for
    Cargill Meat Solutions (Cargill) in Schuyler in March 2006.
    On May 9, Visoso was injured when a quarter slab of beef
    fell from a conveyor belt hook onto Visoso’s head. Visoso’s
    initial medical treatment included physical therapy, chiroprac-
    tic services, pain medication, and steroid injections. Visoso
    eventually required surgery on his neck in October 2007, but
    continued to experience pain. After a trial in 2008, Visoso
    was awarded temporary total disability benefits. The Nebraska
    Court of Appeals affirmed the award.1
    In 2011, Cargill petitioned to discontinue the temporary dis-
    ability benefits because Visoso had reached maximum medi-
    cal improvement. Vocational rehabilitation counselor Karen
    Stricklett was appointed to provide a report on Visoso’s loss of
    earning capacity. While the modification action was pending,
    Visoso returned to Mexico.
    Stricklett prepared a preliminary report of Visoso’s loss of
    earning capacity based on the Schuyler area. In a followup
    report, Stricklett sought assistance in performing labor market
    research in the Chilpancingo, Guerrero, Mexico, area. The
    compensation court determined that the Chilpancingo area was
    the appropriate hub, but denied the request to compel Cargill to
    pay for market research because it found no reliable, relevant
    statistical information existed regarding that area.
    Around this time, Visoso retained another vocational reha-
    bilitation expert, Helen Long. Long provided a report conclud-
    ing that Visoso had sustained a 100-percent loss of earning
    capacity, regardless of his location. After Long’s report was
    submitted, Stricklett submitted a final report in which she
    maintained that she was unable to provide an analysis with a
    reasonable degree of certainty for the Chilpancingo area.
    1
    See Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions, 
    18 Neb. Ct. App. 202
    , 
    778 N.W.2d 504
          (2009).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    VISOSO v. CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS	441
    Cite as 
    287 Neb. 439
    The parties stipulated that Visoso had reached maximum
    medical improvement, so the compensation court terminated
    Cargill’s obligation to pay benefits for temporary disability.
    However, the compensation court found Visoso had failed to
    meet his burden of proving loss of earning capacity in his new
    community in Mexico and therefore declined Visoso’s claim
    for permanent impairment and loss of earning capacity. Visoso
    appealed. This court held:
    When no credible data exists for the community to which
    the employee has relocated, the community where the
    injury occurred can serve as the hub community. Therefore,
    we remand the cause to the Workers’ Compensation Court
    to allow Visoso to attempt to establish permanent impair-
    ment and loss of earning capacity using Schuyler as the
    hub community.2
    On remand, a single judge of the compensation court
    reviewed the existing earning capacity reports and found
    Stricklett’s earning capacity report was correct and had not
    been rebutted. The compensation court thus concluded Visoso
    had suffered a 45-percent loss of earning capacity. Visoso
    appeals this determination.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Visoso assigns, reordered, that the compensation court
    erred in (1) finding that the opinions of Stricklett were never
    rebutted and (2) failing to allow the parties to present new
    evidence regarding loss of earning capacity based on the
    Schuyler hub community.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] A judgment, order, or award of the Workers’
    Compensation Court may be modified, reversed, or set aside
    only upon the grounds that (1) the compensation court acted
    without or in excess of its powers; (2) the judgment, order, or
    award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not sufficient compe-
    tent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order,
    2
    Visoso v. Cargill Meat Solutions, 
    285 Neb. 272
    , 290, 
    826 N.W.2d 845
    , 860
    (2013).
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    442	287 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    judgment, or award; or (4) the findings of fact by the compen-
    sation court do not support the order or award.3
    ANALYSIS
    R ebuttal Evidence
    In his first assignment of error, Visoso claims the compensa-
    tion court erred in finding that the opinions of Stricklett were
    not rebutted.
    Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-162.01(3) (Reissue 2010),
    [a]ny loss-of-earning-power evaluation performed by a
    vocational rehabilitation counselor shall be performed
    by a counselor from the directory established pursuant
    to subsection (2) of this section and chosen or selected
    according to the procedures described in this subsection.
    It is a rebuttable presumption that any opinion expressed
    as the result of such a loss-of-earning-power evaluation
    is correct.
    In its order, the compensation court stated that it had
    reviewed the reports of Stricklett and Long. However, it does
    not appear from the order that the judge reviewed any other part
    of the record. The order notes that the court found Stricklett’s
    report to be more persuasive. The order also states that “Long
    never attacked any points made by . . . Stricklett or pointed out
    any errors in . . . Stricklett’s methods or conclusions. Given
    that . . . Long wrote her report before . . . Stricklett’s ultimate
    conclusions were published, it’s easy to see why.”
    Visoso argues there was evidence in the record rebutting the
    opinions of Stricklett. Specifically, he points to the deposition
    and trial testimony of Long.
    Long’s deposition and trial testimony were produced after
    Stricklett’s final report and include comments by Long regard-
    ing what she perceived as faults in Stricklett’s report. Thus, it
    appears there was at least some evidence in the record which
    was relevant but not considered on remand. Where, as here,
    the compensation court failed to weigh all of the evidence in
    making its factual findings, we are unable to determine on
    3
    Sellers v. Reefer Systems, 
    283 Neb. 760
    , 
    811 N.W.2d 293
    (2012).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    VISOSO v. CARGILL MEAT SOLUTIONS	443
    Cite as 
    287 Neb. 439
    review whether the findings of fact by the compensation court
    supported the order.
    Our holding is consistent with the approach taken by other
    jurisdictions presented with this issue. In American Mut. &c.
    Ins. Co. v. Williams,4 the Georgia Court of Appeals noted that
    “[w]henever the courts feel that in making findings of fact the
    [State Board of Workmen’s Compensation] has failed to weigh
    all the evidence, the practice has been to recommit the case to
    the board for further consideration.”5 We therefore remand this
    cause so that the compensation court may make a finding as to
    whether Stricklett’s report was rebutted after considering all of
    the evidence in the record.
    Sufficiency of Evidence
    in R ecord
    In Visoso’s second assignment of error, he asserts the com-
    pensation court erred in not allowing the parties to present new
    evidence of loss of earning capacity based on the Schuyler
    hub community. Visoso argues that the evidence previously
    submitted was not fully developed because the compensation
    court had determined the appropriate hub to be Chilpancingo
    and, because the evidence was not fully developed, that there
    was not sufficient evidence in the record to warrant the mak-
    ing of the order. Since we are remanding this cause under
    Visoso’s first assignment of error, we now consider his second
    assignment of error to determine whether the parties should be
    allowed to present additional evidence on remand.
    [2] This court has stated that among the limited grounds
    upon which an order of the compensation court may be
    modified, reversed, or set aside is that there is not sufficient
    competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of
    the order.6
    4
    American Mut. &c. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 
    133 Ga. App. 257
    , 259, 
    211 S.E.2d 193
    , 195 (1974).
    5
    Cf., Miller v. Lauridsen Foods, Inc., 
    525 N.W.2d 417
    (Iowa 1994); Swift
    & Co. v. Industrial Com., 
    150 Ill. App. 3d 216
    , 
    501 N.E.2d 752
    , 103 Ill.
    Dec. 435 (1986).
    6
    Sellers, supra note 3.
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    444	287 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    In testing the sufficiency of the evidence to support
    the findings of fact, the evidence must be considered in
    the light most favorable to the successful party, every
    controverted fact must be resolved in favor of the suc-
    cessful party, and the successful party will have the ben-
    efit of every inference that is reasonably deducible from
    the evidence.7
    Although the compensation court determined that Visoso’s
    new community was the appropriate hub to determine loss of
    earning capacity, evidence was also received into the record
    regarding loss of earning capacity based on the Schuyler area,
    including reports, depositions, and testimony. At the hear-
    ing on the application for modification, Cargill objected on
    relevance to all questions related to loss of earning power in
    the Schuyler area, but the compensation court overruled the
    objections and allowed the evidence. The reports submitted
    by both vocational rehabilitation experts contain analyses and
    conclusions for both Schuyler and Visoso’s new community in
    Mexico and do not in any way indicate that they are incom-
    plete as to the Schuyler area. Visoso has failed to identify what
    additional information was needed and not previously submit-
    ted into evidence.
    Contrary to the argument made by Visoso, the record in this
    case suggests that the evidence received regarding the Schuyler
    area was complete. We find that the evidence was sufficient to
    warrant an order by the compensation court and that no addi-
    tional evidence is needed on remand.
    CONCLUSION
    We reverse the decision of the compensation court and
    remand the cause for further reconsideration.
    R eversed and remanded.
    Cassel, J., not participating.
    7
    Frauendorfer v. Lindsay Mfg. Co., 
    263 Neb. 237
    , 244-45, 
    639 N.W.2d 125
    , 134 (2002).