Great Plains Livestock v. Midwest Ins. Exch. , 312 Neb. 367 ( 2022 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    09/23/2022 09:07 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    312 Nebraska Reports
    GREAT PLAINS LIVESTOCK V. MIDWEST INS. EXCH.
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 367
    Great Plains Livestock Consulting, Inc.,
    and Ki Fanning, appellants, v.
    Midwest Insurance Exchange,
    Inc., et al., appellees.
    ___ N.W. ___
    Filed September 2, 2022.    No. S-21-722.
    1. Standing: Jurisdiction: Pleadings: Evidence: Appeal and Error. If a
    motion challenging a court’s subject matter jurisdiction is filed after the
    pleadings stage, and the court holds an evidentiary hearing and reviews
    evidence outside the pleadings, it is considered a “factual challenge.”
    Where the trial court’s decision to dismiss for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction is based on a factual challenge, the court’s factual findings
    are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.
    2. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Aside from any factual findings, the
    trial court’s ruling on subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo,
    because it presents a question of law.
    3. Appeal and Error. The grant or denial of a stay of proceedings is
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
    4. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Subject matter jurisdiction is the
    power of a tribunal to hear and determine a case in the general class or
    category to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with
    the general subject matter involved.
    5. Jurisdiction: Courts. Ripeness is one component of subject matter
    jurisdiction; its fundamental principle is that courts should avoid entan-
    gling themselves, through premature adjudication, in abstract disagree-
    ments based on contingent future events that may not occur at all or may
    not occur as anticipated.
    6. ____: ____. A determination with regard to ripeness depends upon the
    circumstances in a given case and is a matter of degree.
    7. Actions: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. An appellate court uses a
    two-part inquiry to determine ripeness: (1) the fitness of the issues for
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    GREAT PLAINS LIVESTOCK V. MIDWEST INS. EXCH.
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 367
    judicial decision and (2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court
    consideration.
    8. Negligence: Proof. To prevail in a negligence action, a plaintiff must
    prove the defendant’s duty not to injure the plaintiff, breach of duty,
    proximate causation, and damages.
    9. Courts: Actions. Courts inherently possess the power to stay proceed-
    ings when required by the interests of justice.
    Appeal from the District Court for Cass County: Michael A.
    Smith, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
    Andrew D. Weeks, of Baylor Evnen, L.L.P., for appellants.
    Brien M. Welch and David A. Blagg, of Cassem, Tierney,
    Adams, Gotch & Douglas, for appellee Midwest Insurance
    Exchange, Inc.
    Sean A. Minahan and Patrick G. Vipond, of Lamson, Dugan
    & Murray, L.L.P., for appellees UNICO Group, Inc., and Sean
    Krueger.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Funke, Papik,
    and Freudenberg, JJ., and Kozisek, District Judge.
    Funke, J.
    INTRODUCTION
    Great Plains Livestock Consulting, Inc., and its president,
    Ki Fanning (collectively Great Plains), appeal the order of the
    district court for Cass County, Nebraska, which dismissed its
    complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Great Plains
    alleged that Midwest Insurance Exchange, Inc. (Midwest), as
    well as UNICO Group, Inc., and agent Sean Krueger (col-
    lectively UNICO), negligently failed to transfer or procure
    an errors and omissions insurance policy, which, had it been
    in place, would have covered the costs of defense and settle-
    ment or judgment for two lawsuits filed against Great Plains
    in another state. The district court found that Great Plains’
    complaint is not ripe because Midwest’s and UNICO’s liabil-
    ity and Great Plains’ damages are currently unknown and
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    GREAT PLAINS LIVESTOCK V. MIDWEST INS. EXCH.
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 367
    because Great Plains may never be found liable in the lawsuits
    against it. Great Plains appeals. We reverse, and remand for
    further proceedings.
    BACKGROUND
    In early 2018, Great Plains had an errors and omissions
    policy underwritten by Capitol Specialty Insurance Corporation
    (Cap Specialty) through Midwest when it approached UNICO
    for assistance in procuring various insurance coverages. The
    record on appeal does not disclose what, if any, agreements
    the parties reached regarding coverage at that time, but Great
    Plains notified Midwest on April 18, 2018, that it was mov-
    ing its errors and omissions policy. Great Plains subsequently
    obtained an errors and omissions policy underwritten by
    Lloyd’s London Syndicate 2987 (Lloyd’s) through UNICO on
    or about November 11, 2019. This policy was renewed on or
    about November 11, 2020.
    In late 2020, Great Plains was named a third-party defend­
    ant in two lawsuits filed in the Iowa district court for Emmet
    County based on consulting work it had performed for Spencer
    Ag Center, LLC (Spencer Ag). The parties to the two lawsuits
    were different, but both lawsuits complained of negligence
    and breach of implied warranty of fitness by Spencer Ag
    customers. These customers named Spencer Ag a third-party
    defendant, and Spencer Ag, in turn, asserted third-party claims
    against Great Plains, alleging Great Plains had provided the
    feed ration formulas and feed products to the customers. As of
    this appeal, the Iowa lawsuits are pending.
    Between early December 2020 and the end of February
    2021, Great Plains submitted claims and requests for a tender
    of defense and indemnification related to the Iowa lawsuits to
    Midwest, UNICO, Cap Specialty, and Lloyd’s. All claims and
    requests were denied.
    Subsequently, on March 24, 2021, Great Plains brought a
    declaratory judgment action against Midwest, UNICO, Cap
    Specialty, and Lloyd’s to ascertain whether any policy effective
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    GREAT PLAINS LIVESTOCK V. MIDWEST INS. EXCH.
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 367
    between Great Plains and the insurers covered the events under-
    lying the Iowa lawsuits. It also sought recovery of the costs of
    the Iowa lawsuits and of its declaratory judgment action.
    Great Plains filed a separate negligence lawsuit against
    Midwest and UNICO alleging they had a duty to transfer or
    procure an errors and omissions policy for it and breached this
    duty by failing to ensure the requested policy was in place.
    Great Plains further alleged that Midwest’s and UNICO’s
    breach of duty had “caused” and “will continue to cause” it
    damages because it had to retain counsel at its own expense to
    defend the Iowa lawsuits; it will also have to pay any judgment
    entered against it in the lawsuits. Great Plains asserted these
    costs would have been covered under the requested errors and
    omissions policy.
    UNICO moved to dismiss Great Plains’ negligence com-
    plaint for failure to state a claim under Neb. Ct. R. Pldg.
    § 6-1112(b)(6). UNICO based this motion primarily on the fact
    that “[Great Plains] currently do[es] not and cannot provide
    . . . the amount of defense cost or potential judgments against
    [Great Plains] in the two Iowa lawsuits.” As such, UNICO
    argued, Great Plains’ “alleged damages are speculative” and its
    complaint is not ripe.
    Great Plains filed a statement of disputed facts in opposition
    to UNICO’s motion to dismiss, asserting that it had already
    incurred attorney fees of approximately $4,000 in the Iowa
    lawsuits and $16,000 in its declaratory judgment and negli-
    gence actions. Great Plains also moved to stay proceedings on
    its negligence complaint pending the resolution of the Iowa
    lawsuits. In so doing, Great Plains asserted that the full extent
    of its damages is “contingent” on the outcome of these law-
    suits, but “not speculative.”
    The district court held a hearing on June 21, 2021, at which
    the parties to the declaratory judgment action essentially
    agreed that Great Plains did not have errors and omissions
    coverage for the Iowa lawsuits. The hearing also touched on
    Great Plains’ motion to stay, with Midwest’s and UNICO’s
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    GREAT PLAINS LIVESTOCK V. MIDWEST INS. EXCH.
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 367
    position being that Great Plains’ negligence complaint is
    “premature” and “not ripe” and should be dismissed, not
    stayed. They proposed that Great Plains “bring an action in
    negligence or a contribution indemnity” “when and if they
    do have any damages in the Iowa case[s].” However, Great
    Plains expressed concern about dismissal with the option to
    refile later insofar as its claims could be seen to involve pro-
    fessional negligence subject to a 2-year statute of limitations,
    rather than ordinary negligence subject to a 4-year statute
    of limitations.
    The district court subsequently issued an order on August 2,
    2021, dismissing Great Plains’ negligence complaint on ripe-
    ness grounds. In relevant part, the order stated:
    The liability of [Midwest and Unico] to [Great Plains] is
    currently unknown as is the amount of any damages. In
    fact, there may not ever be a finding of liability in the
    Iowa litigation. As any claim of [Great Plains] is entirely
    dependent on the outcome of the Iowa litigation, the case
    is not fit for a judicial decision at this time, and there is
    no showing of a hardship to [Great Plains] by withholding
    the court’s decision in the case.
    The order did not address Great Plains’ motion for a stay.
    Midwest filed its own motion to dismiss on August 4, 2021,
    because it was unclear whether the earlier order applied to
    Midwest. In its motion, Midwest asserted Great Plains’ com-
    plaint “is based on a theoretical contingency” that it may be
    entitled to contribution or indemnity from Midwest if judg-
    ment is entered against it in the Iowa lawsuits. Midwest further
    asserted that “[a]t this stage, any claims for contribution and
    indemnity or for damages are speculative at best.”
    The district court also granted this motion, “consistent with”
    its earlier ruling on UNICO’s motion to dismiss. The language
    of the order was the same as that in the earlier order, and Great
    Plains’ motion to stay was not addressed.
    Great Plains appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, and
    we moved the matter to our docket.
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    GREAT PLAINS LIVESTOCK V. MIDWEST INS. EXCH.
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 367
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Great Plains assigns, restated, that the district court erred in
    finding that its negligence complaint is not ripe and in declin-
    ing to stay proceedings pending the resolution of the Iowa
    lawsuits.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1,2] If a motion challenging a court’s subject matter juris-
    diction is filed after the pleadings stage, and the court holds
    an evidentiary hearing and reviews evidence outside the plead-
    ings, it is considered a “factual challenge.” 1 Where the trial
    court’s decision to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
    tion is based on a factual challenge, the court’s factual findings
    are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 2 But aside
    from any factual findings, the trial court’s ruling on subject
    matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo, because it presents a
    question of law. 3
    [3] The grant or denial of a stay of proceedings is reviewed
    for an abuse of discretion. 4
    ANALYSIS
    Ripeness
    Great Plains argues that in dismissing its complaint on
    ripeness grounds, the district court “focus[ed] only on the
    prospective settlements or judgments in the two Iowa cases”
    and ignored the costs Great Plains has already incurred in
    defending the Iowa lawsuits and bringing the declaratory judg-
    ment and negligence actions. 5 Midwest and UNICO counter
    that Great Plains’ claims “currently require litigating abstract
    1
    See North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 
    311 Neb. 33
    , 
    970 N.W.2d 461
    (2022).
    2
    Hawley v. Skradski, 
    304 Neb. 488
    , 
    935 N.W.2d 212
     (2019).
    3
    
    Id.
    4
    Hawkins v. Delgado, 
    308 Neb. 301
    , 
    953 N.W.2d 765
     (2021).
    5
    Brief for appellants at 8.
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    GREAT PLAINS LIVESTOCK V. MIDWEST INS. EXCH.
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    312 Neb. 367
    issues of future and contingent outcomes that may or may not
    occur or may not occur as anticipated,” given that the Iowa
    lawsuits are ongoing and Great Plains has not yet been found
    liable for any act or omission. 6 They also argue that Great
    Plains’ own motion to stay proceedings “betrays” that its neg-
    ligence complaint is not ripe. 7
    We agree with Great Plains that the district court erred in
    dismissing its negligence complaint on ripeness grounds given
    the facts and circumstances of this case. The district court based
    its decision on its view that Midwest’s and UNICO’s “liabil-
    ity” and Great Plains’ “damages” are “currently unknown,”
    and “there may not ever be a finding of liability in the Iowa
    litigation.” The district court is correct that there are numerous
    unknowns regarding the claims pending against Great Plains
    in Iowa, including whether Great Plains will be found lia-
    ble. However, despite these unknowns, the elements of Great
    Plains’ negligence complaint as to its attorney fees already
    incurred in defending the Iowa lawsuits are not conjectural or
    hypothetical. Our finding that Great Plains’ complaint is ripe
    is based upon these costs; we offer no opinion regarding the
    other damages alleged in the complaint.
    [4-6] Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal
    to hear and determine a case in the general class or category
    to which the proceedings in question belong and to deal with
    the general subject matter involved. 8 Ripeness is one compo-
    nent of subject matter jurisdiction; its fundamental principle
    is that courts should avoid entangling themselves, through
    premature adjudication, in abstract disagreements based on
    contingent future events that may not occur at all or may
    not occur as anticipated. 9 A determination regarding ripeness
    6
    Brief for appellee UNICO at 10.
    7
    Id. at 13.
    8
    Davis v. Moats, 
    308 Neb. 757
    , 
    956 N.W.2d 682
     (2021).
    9
    See State ex rel. Wagner v. Evnen, 
    307 Neb. 142
    , 
    948 N.W.2d 244
     (2020).
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    GREAT PLAINS LIVESTOCK V. MIDWEST INS. EXCH.
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    depends upon the circumstances in a given case and is a mat-
    ter of degree. 10
    [7] In making this determination, we use a two-part inquiry:
    (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and (2) the
    hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. 11
    The fitness-for-decision inquiry goes to the court’s ability to
    visit an issue and safeguards against judicial review of hypo-
    thetical or speculative disagreements. 12 Generally, a case is ripe
    when no further factual development is necessary to clarify a
    concrete legal dispute susceptible to specific judicial relief,
    as distinguished from an advisory opinion regarding contin-
    gent future events. 13 The hardship inquiry, in turn, goes to the
    question of whether delayed review will result in significant
    harm. 14 “Harm” includes both the traditional concept of actual
    damages—pecuniary or otherwise—and also the heightened
    uncertainty and resulting behavior modification that may result
    from delayed resolution. 15
    For example, in City of Omaha v. City of Elkhorn, 16 we
    considered the issue of ripeness in a declaratory judgment
    action. In City of Omaha, the plaintiff sought a determination
    as to whether severance provisions in certain employment
    contracts that the defendant had entered into prior to being
    annexed by the plaintiff were enforceable. We determined
    that the declaratory judgment action was ripe despite the fact
    that a lawsuit challenging the validity of the annexation was
    still pending when the declaratory judgment action was filed.
    In so doing, we noted that the question of whether the sever-
    ance provisions ran afoul of the Nebraska Constitution was
    10
    Shepard v. Houston, 
    289 Neb. 399
    , 
    855 N.W.2d 559
     (2014).
    11
    See Stewart v. Heineman, 
    296 Neb. 262
    , 
    892 N.W.2d 542
     (2017).
    12
    
    Id.
    13
    Shepard v. Houston, supra note 10.
    14
    See Stewart v. Heineman, 
    supra note 11
    .
    15
    
    Id.
    16
    City of Omaha v. City of Elkhorn, 
    276 Neb. 70
    , 
    752 N.W.2d 137
     (2008).
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    “essentially legal in nature” and could be “resolved without
    further factual development.” 17 We also noted that deciding
    the case at this time would avoid delay and the unnecessary
    expenditure of judicial resources in relitigating this question
    and resolve the uncertainty about the severance provisions’
    enforceability. 18
    Similarly, in Shepard v. Houston, 19 we found that a declara-
    tory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of a
    statute which required that an inmate who refused to submit
    a DNA sample forfeit his good time credits was ripe, even
    though the statute would not be applied to the inmate until
    his release date. We noted that the question of whether the
    statute had impermissible retroactive effect as to the inmate
    was “essentially legal” and could be “resolved without fur-
    ther factual development.” 20 We also noted that although the
    inmate could change his mind, this possibility was “more
    speculative than the present reality,” given that he had already
    refused to submit a sample and professed he would continue
    to refuse. 21 In addition, we found that deciding the case at this
    time would avoid the waste of judicial resources in relitigating
    the issue, as well as potentially “significant hardship” to the
    inmate, who might otherwise be unlawfully detained after his
    release date. 22
    [8] We find that this case, like the declaratory actions in
    City of Omaha and Shepard, is ripe, because Great Plains’
    negligence complaint can be resolved without further factual
    development. As the plaintiff in a negligence action, Great
    Plains must prove Midwest’s and UNICO’s duty not to injure
    Great Plains, a breach of that duty, proximate causation, and
    17
    Id. at 82, 
    752 N.W.2d at 147
    .
    18
    
    Id.
    19
    Shepard v. Houston, supra note 10.
    20
    Id. at 407, 855 N.W.2d at 566.
    21
    Id. at 408, 855 N.W.2d at 567.
    22
    Id.
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    damages. 23 Midwest and UNICO focus their ripeness argument
    on the elements of duty and damages. Midwest asserts that
    resolution of the Iowa lawsuits is necessary to determine what,
    if any, duty it breached by “defining the parameters of the
    claims from which Midwest is charged with failing to protect
    Great Plains.” 24 Both Midwest and UNICO further assert that
    Great Plains’ damages are “too contingent or remote to sup-
    port present adjudication” 25 because (1) the costs of defending
    the Iowa lawsuits are “currently incomplete and contingent on
    [Great Plains’] continuing to defend [itself]” 26; (2) Great Plains
    has not been, and may never be, found liable in the Iowa law-
    suits; and (3) any act or omission for which Great Plains might
    be found liable may not be covered by the allegedly requested
    errors and omissions policy.
    As to the element of duty, we find that Great Plains’ com-
    plaint alleges a duty on the part of Midwest and UNICO that
    is neither conjectural or hypothetical nor dependent upon the
    outcome of the Iowa lawsuits. Midwest incorrectly relies on
    our decisions in U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. D S Avionics 27 and
    Harleysville Ins. Group v. Omaha Gas Appliance Co. 28 for
    the propositions that a declaratory judgment action regarding
    insurance coverage is premature when “there is [a pending]
    underlying action” involving “identical issues” and ripe only
    when “coverage can be determined separately from the under-
    lying action.” 29
    23
    See Susman v. Kearney Towing & Repair Ctr., 
    310 Neb. 910
    , 
    970 N.W.2d 82
     (2022).
    24
    Brief for appellee Midwest at 19.
    25
    Brief for appellee UNICO at 11.
    26
    Id. at 10.
    27
    U.S. Specialty Ins. Co. v. D S Avionics, 
    301 Neb. 388
    , 
    918 N.W.2d 589
    (2018), modified on denial of rehearing 
    302 Neb. 283
    , 
    923 N.W.2d 367
    (2019).
    28
    Harleysville Ins. Group v. Omaha Gas Appliance Co., 
    278 Neb. 547
    , 
    772 N.W.2d 88
     (2009).
    29
    Brief for appellee Midwest at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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    These arguments, however, miss the substance of Great
    Plains’ complaint, as well as the point of our earlier decisions
    cited above. Great Plains does not allege that Midwest failed
    to protect it from specific claims or failed to fulfill the duties
    of an insurer as to defense and indemnification. Rather, Great
    Plains alleges that Midwest and/or UNICO negligently failed
    to transfer or procure an errors and omissions policy, under
    which the insurer would have had certain duties to Great
    Plains. The determination of whether such a duty existed is not
    conjectural or hypothetical pending the outcome of the Iowa
    lawsuits; it can be determined in proceedings on Great Plains’
    negligence complaint.
    Similarly, as to the cases cited by Midwest, we note that
    this is a negligence suit, not a declaratory judgment action.
    Additionally, the Iowa lawsuits do not raise “identical issues”
    insofar as they concern Great Plains’ alleged negligence and
    breach of implied warranty of fitness as to feed ration formu-
    las and feed products, while this case concerns Midwest’s and
    UNICO’s alleged negligence in failing to transfer or procure
    an errors and omissions policy. We also note that Midwest has
    not pointed to any aspect of the allegedly requested insurance
    policy or the facts and circumstances of this case which would
    indicate that the actual outcome of the Iowa litigation, as
    opposed to the substance of the underlying claims and related
    facts, is necessary to determine whether the allegedly requested
    policy would cover these claims. 30
    30
    Compare Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Becker Warehouse, Inc., 
    262 Neb. 746
    ,
    
    635 N.W.2d 112
     (2001) (rejecting argument that court lacked subject
    matter jurisdiction over declaratory judgment action regarding whether
    insurance policy covered claims pending resolution of claims because
    determination could be made based on policy’s language), with Allstate
    Ins. Co. v. Novak, 
    210 Neb. 184
    , 
    313 N.W.2d 636
     (1981) (finding that
    declaratory judgment action regarding whether insurance policy covered
    claim could not be resolved until after claim was resolved because claim
    alleged intentional tort, and policy expressly excluded claims arising from
    intentional bodily injury).
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    In turning to the issue of damages, it is undisputed that
    Great Plains has defended itself in the Iowa lawsuits, instead
    of relying on an insurer to do so, as it would have done under
    the allegedly requested errors and omissions policy. We find
    that its alleged damages in this regard suffice for purposes of
    ripeness. Our recent decision in Susman v. Kearney Towing &
    Repair Ctr. 31 helps illustrate this.
    Kearney Towing & Repair Ctr. involved a dispute over
    whether the statute of limitations on a claim for ordinary neg-
    ligence began to run from the time of the defendant’s alleged
    negligence in mounting and installing tires on a vehicle or
    from when the tread on one of the tires separated, causing
    the driver to lose control and the vehicle to roll over. 32 We
    found that the claim did not accrue—and the statute of limita-
    tions did not begin to run—until the accident occurred. 33 In
    reaching this conclusion, we noted that “under longstanding
    principles of justiciability, a party is not aggrieved and can-
    not institute and maintain suit if any element of that party’s
    claim depends upon abstract questions or issues that might
    arise in a hypothetical or fictitious situation or setting and
    may never come to pass.” 34 As such, the plaintiffs could
    not have brought and maintained suit when the tires were
    installed merely because they were among the broad group
    of persons who might suffer some harm in the future. 35 It
    was not until the tread failed and the vehicle rolled over—
    nearly 1 year after the tires were installed—that the plaintiffs
    suffered an injury and could initiate and maintain a suit for
    negligence. 36
    31
    Kearney Towing & Repair Ctr., 
    supra note 23
    .
    32
    
    Id.
    33
    
    Id.
    34
    
    Id. at 921
    , 970 N.W.2d at 91.
    35
    Kearney Towing & Repair Ctr., 
    supra note 23
    .
    36
    
    Id.
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    Great Plains’ current situation is not like that of the Kearney
    Towing & Repair Ctr. plaintiffs prior to their accident. Great
    Plains is not seeking damages in the event a claim is filed
    against it. Two such claims have already been filed, and the
    record shows that Great Plains had incurred approximately
    $4,000 in attorney fees in defending these claims as of June
    16, 2021. Midwest and UNICO effectively admitted as much
    at oral argument when they conceded that they would agree
    Great Plains’ complaint is ripe if all it sought to recover was
    the approximately $4,000 it had spent in defending the Iowa
    lawsuits through June 16. As this admission indicates, the
    unknowns that Midwest and UNICO point to do not pertain
    to the existence of damages as such, but, rather, the amount of
    damages—namely, the total costs of defending the Iowa law-
    suits, the amount of any settlement or judgment, and whether
    Great Plains is entitled to attorney fees for its declaratory judg-
    ment action in light of the prayer for relief in its negligence
    complaint and our decision in Tetherow v. Wolfe. 37
    Motion to Stay
    Great Plains also argues that the district court erred in not
    staying proceedings on its negligence complaint until the Iowa
    lawsuits are resolved. Midwest and UNICO variously counter
    that the district court lacked the power to stay proceedings
    once it found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that the issue
    is not properly before this court on appeal because the district
    court did not rule on Great Plains’ motion for a stay, and that
    Great Plains failed to provide any argument as to why the dis-
    trict court abused its discretion in granting “dismissal in lieu
    of a stay.” 38
    37
    Tetherow v. Wolfe, 
    223 Neb. 631
    , 
    392 N.W.2d 374
     (1986) (holding that
    one who through tort of another has been required to act in protection of
    his or her interests by bringing or defending action against third person is
    entitled to recover reasonable compensation for loss of time, attorney fees,
    and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred in earlier action).
    38
    Brief for appellee UNICO at 14.
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    [9] Stays are often used to regulate the court’s own proceed-
    ings or to accommodate the needs of parallel proceedings. 39
    Courts inherently possess the power to stay proceedings when
    required by the interests of justice. 40
    Because we reverse the district court’s finding that Great
    Plains’ complaint is not ripe, we express no opinion on whether
    Great Plains’ motion to stay has merit. In determining whether
    to exercise this power on remand, the trial court should bal-
    ance the competing needs of the parties, taking into account,
    among other things, the interest of the courts, the probability
    that the proceeding will work a constitutional violation on the
    movant, the presence or absence of hardship or inequity, and
    the burden of proof. 41
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude that Great Plains’ action was ripe. Accordingly,
    we reverse, and remand for further proceedings.
    Reversed and remanded for
    further proceedings.
    Stacy, J., not participating.
    39
    Jennifer T. v. Lindsay P., 
    298 Neb. 800
    , 
    906 N.W.2d 49
     (2018).
    40
    Kelley v. Benchmark Homes, Inc., 
    250 Neb. 367
    , 
    550 N.W.2d 640
     (1996),
    disapproved on other grounds, Webb v. American Employers Group, 
    268 Neb. 473
    , 
    684 N.W.2d 33
     (2004).
    41
    See 
    id.