Butler Cty. Landfill v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Supervisors ( 2018 )


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    05/18/2018 09:09 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    299 Nebraska R eports
    BUTLER CTY. LANDFILL v. BUTLER CTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 422
    Butler County Landfill, Inc., appellee,
    v. Butler County Board of
    Supervisors, appellant.
    __ N.W.2d ___
    Filed March 23, 2018.    No. S-17-276.
    1.	 Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question
    which does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate
    court as a matter of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a
    conclusion independent from the lower court’s decision.
    2.	 Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues
    presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine
    whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.
    3.	 ____: ____. Where a lower court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
    adjudicate the merits of a claim, issue, or question, an appellate court
    also lacks the power to determine the merits of the claim, issue, or ques-
    tion presented to the lower court.
    4.	 Political Subdivisions: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A district
    court order setting aside, annulling, vacating, or reversing a siting
    approval decision in a review pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-1712
    (Reissue 2012) is a final order.
    5.	 Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. An appellate court and the tribu-
    nal appealed from do not have jurisdiction over the same case at the
    same time.
    6.	 Political Subdivisions: Jurisdiction: Time: Appeal and Error. A
    failure to comply with the requirement under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-1712
    (Reissue 2012) to petition for a hearing before the district court within
    60 days after notice of the siting body’s decision deprives the district
    court of jurisdiction to review a siting approval decision.
    Appeal from the District Court for Butler County: M ary C.
    Gilbride, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
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    BUTLER CTY. LANDFILL v. BUTLER CTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS
    Cite as 
    299 Neb. 422
    Kristopher J. Covi and Steven P. Case, of McGrath, North,
    Mullin & Kratz, P.C., L.L.O., and Julie L. Reiter, Butler
    County Attorney, for appellant.
    Robert H. Epstein and Ryan C. Hardy, of Spencer Fane,
    L.L.P., and Stephen D. Mossman, of Mattson Ricketts Law
    Firm, for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, K elch, and
    Funke, JJ.
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    The Butler County Board of Supervisors (the Board)
    appeals from the order of the district court for Butler County
    which reversed the Board’s decision to deny an application by
    Butler County Landfill, Inc. (BCL), to expand its solid waste
    disposal landfill area located in Butler County, Nebraska. We
    conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter
    the February 7, 2017, order from which this appeal is taken
    and that, consequently, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.
    We therefore vacate the district court’s order and dismiss
    this appeal.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    BCL, a wholly owned subsidiary of Waste Connections
    of Nebraska, Inc., operates a solid waste landfill located in
    Butler County near David City, Nebraska. The landfill has
    been in existence since 1986, and an expansion of the landfill
    was approved in 1992 which allowed it to accept solid waste
    from other counties. The record indicates that by 2015, BCL
    was accepting solid waste from 15 to 20 counties in eastern
    Nebraska and some additional counties outside Nebraska.
    BCL determined that it needed to expand the solid waste
    landfill area in Butler County. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-1701
    to 13-1714 (Reissue 2012) are the statutes that govern sit-
    ing approval procedures for solid waste disposal areas and
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    solid waste processing facilities. These statutes indicate that if
    denied, an applicant for siting approval can reapply after the
    passage of 2 years. See § 13-1711.
    As required by § 13-1702, BCL filed a request for siting
    approval with the Board on July 6, 2015. In its request, BCL
    asserted, inter alia, that as the scope of the area it served has
    expanded, the amount of solid waste it accepted had increased.
    BCL asserted that in the mid-1990’s, it had accepted approxi-
    mately 100,000 tons of solid waste per year; that by 2015, it
    accepted approximately 550,000 tons of solid waste per year;
    and that it projected that by 2020, it would receive 800,000
    tons of solid waste per year. The size of the expanded landfill
    approved in 1992 was 144.79 acres. In the July 6 request, BCL
    sought approval to further expand into a 160-acre parcel of
    land it had purchased that was contiguous to the south side of
    its existing landfill.
    As required by § 13-1706, the Board, on October 28, 2015,
    held a public hearing on BCL’s request. Part of the purpose of
    a public hearing under § 13-1706 is to “develop a record suf-
    ficient to form the basis of an appeal of the decision.” At the
    public hearing, the Board heard testimony by representatives
    of BCL and by members of the public, including those who
    favored and those who opposed BCL’s request.
    Following the public hearing and a written comment period
    which served to supplement the record of the public hearing,
    the Board met on December 14, 2015, to deliberate BCL’s
    request. At that meeting, the Board considered, inter alia, the
    statutory criteria for siting approval set forth in § 13-1703,
    which provides that “[s]iting approval shall be granted only
    if the proposed area or facility meets all of” six specified
    criteria. The record of the deliberations shows that the Board
    considered in turn whether each criterion had been shown.
    At the end of the Board’s discussion of each criterion, a poll
    was taken of the seven supervisors as to whether each super-
    visor thought that specific criterion had been met. Based on
    the polling of supervisors during the meeting, all supervisors
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    agreed that three of the six criteria had been met, and all
    supervisors agreed that one criterion had not been met. With
    respect to the two remaining criteria, the votes were split,
    with a majority voting in each case that the criteria had not
    been met.
    At the end of the discussion, based on the polling as to
    each criterion, a supervisor moved to deny the application,
    another supervisor seconded the motion, and the Board unani-
    mously voted to deny the application. The supervisors there-
    after signed a document titled “Decision Regarding Siting
    Approval,” which set forth the procedures that had been fol-
    lowed with regard to BCL’s application and which concluded
    that “[b]ased upon the finding that [BCL] has failed to meet
    all criteria required to be met under [§] 13-1703 it was moved
    . . . and seconded . . . that the [BCL application] be denied.
    Upon roll call vote, the motion was unanimously passed.” This
    December 14, 2015, written decision did not specify which
    criteria were not met and did not further set forth reasons for
    the decision.
    On February 10, 2016, BCL filed a petition in the district
    court for Butler County seeking judicial review, pursuant to
    § 13-1712, of the Board’s denial of its siting application. At
    a hearing on the petition held on March 21, the district court
    received into evidence a transcript of the public hearing held
    October 28, 2015; the exhibits received at the public hearing; a
    transcript of the Board’s December 14, 2015, meeting; and the
    Board’s decision dated December 14, 2015.
    After an additional hearing, the district court on June 17,
    2016, filed a journal entry in which it referred to § 13-1712,
    which requires that “the district court shall consider the writ-
    ten decision and reasons for the decision of the . . . county
    board and the transcribed record of the hearing held pursu-
    ant to [§] 13-1706.” The court concluded that in addition to
    a written decision and a transcript of the public hearing, the
    statute required the Board to “make a written statement of the
    reasons for its decision.” The court stated that in this case, the
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    Board “simply found that [BCL] had failed to demonstrate the
    statutory requirements but did not specify any of its reasons
    for reaching that conclusion.” Although the district court’s
    jurisdiction was conferred under § 13-1712, rather than under
    the Administrative Procedure Act, the court cited cases under
    the Administrative Procedure Act regarding a failure “to make
    findings of fact and conclusions of law.” The court concluded
    its June 17 journal entry with the following paragraph, which
    was titled “Remand”:
    The failure of the [B]oard to make specific fact find-
    ings as required by statute, necessitates that the order
    entered December 14, 2015 be set aside and the matter
    remanded to the . . . Board . . . with directions to make
    findings of fact supporting the order which they shall
    issue within thirty days of this remand.
    For completeness, we note that because we lack jurisdiction
    over this appeal, we make no comment regarding the cor-
    rectness of the district court’s reading of the requirements of
    § 13-1712.
    On July 14, 2016, the Board filed in the district court a
    “Notice of Compliance” stating that it had complied with
    the court’s order. The Board attached to the filing a certi-
    fied copy of a resolution passed by the Board on July 13
    in which it stated that it had denied BCL’s application by
    a unanimous vote and that it was adopting findings of fact
    “in further support of its denial” of BCL’s application. In a
    document attached to the resolution, the Board stated that
    the supervisors unanimously determined that BCL satisfied
    three criteria, that the supervisors unanimously determined
    that BCL failed to satisfy one criterion, and that a majority of
    the supervisors determined that BCL failed to satisfy the two
    remaining criteria. The Board set forth its reasons for each of
    these determinations.
    After the Board adopted the resolution on July 13, 2016,
    BCL did not file a new petition for judicial review pursuant
    to § 13-1712. Nevertheless, after the Board filed its notice of
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    BUTLER CTY. LANDFILL v. BUTLER CTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS
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    compliance, the district court held a hearing on October 25 and
    received briefing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court
    stated that it was taking the matter under advisement.
    On February 7, 2017, the district court filed an order in
    which it reversed the Board’s decision to deny the application
    and remanded the matter to the Board with directions for the
    Board to approve BCL’s application. In the February 7 order,
    the court specifically addressed each of the three criteria that
    the Board or a majority of the Board had determined BCL
    had not met. The court cited evidence from the record and
    determined as to each criterion that the Board’s finding that
    the criterion was not met was in error. The court concluded
    that the Board’s denial of BCL’s application “was not based
    on competent evidence in the record, was contrary to law and
    was arbitrary and capricious.” The court further concluded that
    based on the application, the record, and the relevant evidence,
    the Board should have approved BCL’s application. The court
    therefore reversed the Board’s order denying BCL’s applica-
    tion and remanded the matter to the Board with directions to
    approve the application.
    The Board appeals the February 7, 2017, order.
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    The Board claims that the district court erred when it deter-
    mined that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it
    denied BCL’s application.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a fac-
    tual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
    of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclu-
    sion independent from the lower court’s decision. Campbell v.
    Hansen, 
    298 Neb. 669
    , 
    905 N.W.2d 519
    (2018).
    ANALYSIS
    [2,3] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review,
    it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
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    jurisdiction over the matter before it. Rafert v. Meyer, 
    298 Neb. 461
    , 
    905 N.W.2d 30
    (2017). Where a lower court lacks subject
    matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a claim, issue, or
    question, an appellate court also lacks the power to determine
    the merits of the claim, issue, or question presented to the
    lower court. Kozal v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 
    297 Neb. 938
    , 
    902 N.W.2d 147
    (2017).
    Prior to our moving this case to our docket, the Nebraska
    Court of Appeals conducted a jurisdictional review. Following
    that review, the Court of Appeals issued an order to show
    cause in which it stated that a question existed “as to how BCL
    came back before the District Court following the court’s June
    17[, 2016,] order vacating the December 14, 2015 decision and
    remand back to the Board.” The Court of Appeals stated that
    there was no indication in the record on appeal that BCL had
    filed a new petition in the district court after the Board issued
    its findings of fact and restated its decision to deny BCL’s
    application. The Court of Appeals further stated that there was
    a question whether a second petition was necessary given the
    nature of the district court’s remand. In its response to the
    order to show cause, BCL conceded that no second petition
    had been filed, but BCL asserted that a second petition was
    not necessary. Based on BCL’s response, the Court of Appeals
    directed the parties “to include and address in their briefs the
    issue of whether a second petition was required following
    the District Court’s order requiring the Board to make find-
    ings of facts and the Board’s subsequent compliance with the
    Court’s order.”
    The parties briefed the jurisdictional issue, and we granted
    BCL’s petition to bypass the Court of Appeals. We now con-
    sider the jurisdictional issue. As explained below, we conclude
    that we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal, because the
    district court did not have jurisdiction when it entered the
    February 7, 2017, order, from which the Board appeals. The
    district court’s June 17, 2016, order returned jurisdiction to
    the Board, and the district court was divested of jurisdiction.
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    After the Board acted on the district court’s order, BCL took
    no action to again vest jurisdiction in the district court, and
    as a consequence, the district court’s rulings after its June 17
    remand were issued without authority.
    As noted above, BCL filed a timely petition under § 13-1712
    for the district court to review the Board’s December 14, 2015,
    order denying BCL’s application. The district court took action
    on that petition on June 17, 2016, when it determined that
    the Board had failed to make specific written findings of fact
    which the court believed were required by statute. The court
    thereby effectively concluded that the Board’s order did not
    conform to the law. The court therefore ordered the Board’s
    December 14, 2015, order to be “set aside and the matter
    remanded to the . . . Board . . . with directions to make findings
    of fact supporting the order which they shall issue within thirty
    days of this remand.” In the order, the district court “set aside”
    the Board’s order and remanded the matter to the Board for
    further action, but the district court did not explicitly purport
    to reserve jurisdiction in itself.
    After the Board complied with the order and filed its notice
    of compliance in the district court, the parties and the district
    court proceeded upon the apparent assumption that the district
    court had acquired jurisdiction at the time BCL had filed its
    petition for review of the December 14, 2015, order and that
    the district court continued to exercise jurisdiction. Given
    certain inferences in the language of the June 17, 2016, order,
    this assumption might have seemed reasonable; on remand, the
    Board acted within the timeframe set forth by the court in the
    June 17 order, and the court promptly continued with proceed-
    ings in the case after the Board gave notice of its compliance.
    However, the assumption does not comport with the facts or
    applicable law, and we must therefore determine in this case
    which body—the district court or the Board—had jurisdiction
    at what time.
    [4] We note first that the court in the June 17, 2016,
    order stated that the Board’s failure to make findings of fact
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    “necessitate[d] that the order entered December 14, 2015 be
    set aside and the matter remanded” to the Board. Black’s Law
    Dictionary 1580 (10th ed. 2014) defines “set aside” as “to
    annul or vacate (a judgment, order, etc.).” It has been stated
    that in an appeal to the district court by petition in error
    pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1901 to 25-1908 (Reissue
    2016), a judgment of the district court reversing an inferior
    tribunal is a final order. See County of Douglas v. Burts, 
    2 Neb. Ct. App. 90
    , 
    507 N.W.2d 310
    (1993) (citing Tootle, Hosea
    & Co. v. Jones, 
    19 Neb. 588
    , 
    27 N.W. 635
    (1886)). We simi-
    larly conclude that a district court order setting aside, annul-
    ling, vacating, or reversing a siting approval decision in a
    review pursuant to § 13-1712 is a final order. In Tri-County
    Landfill v. Board of Cty. Comrs., 
    247 Neb. 350
    , 
    526 N.W.2d 668
    (1995), we held that in conformity with Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 25-1911 (Reissue 2016), in an appeal of a siting approval
    case under §§ 13-1701 to 13-1714, a judgment rendered
    or final order made by the district court may be reversed,
    vacated, or modified for errors appearing on the record.
    Applying the foregoing principles of law, the district court’s
    June 17, 2016, order, which vacated the Board’s decision,
    was a judgment under § 13-1712, and when it was not timely
    appealed, it became final.
    In further support of our jurisdictional analysis, we note
    that the district court remanded the matter to the Board, and
    when the Board entered an order in compliance with the order
    of remand, the district court lost its power to further modify
    its order and, by extension, lost its power to act on this case.
    We have said:
    The jurisdiction of the supreme court over its own
    judgments and orders is, in general, the same as that
    of any other court of record, and hence it may alter or
    modify such judgments or orders and correct its mandates
    accordingly at any time during the term at which they
    are rendered, unless its mandate has been filed and acted
    upon in the lower court prior to the end of the term.
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    Horton v. State, 
    63 Neb. 34
    , 38, 
    88 N.W. 146
    , 147 (1901).
    Likewise, when the district court remands a matter and the
    body to which the matter was remanded acts on that order, the
    district court’s power to modify its order ceases. See County of
    Douglas v. 
    Burts, supra
    .
    [5] Finally, we observe that it would be inconsistent with
    our jurisprudence for the Board and the district court to have
    jurisdiction over the matter at the same time. As a general
    proposition, an appellate court and the tribunal appealed from
    do not have jurisdiction over the same case at the same time.
    Currie v. Chief School Bus Serv., 
    250 Neb. 872
    , 
    553 N.W.2d 469
    (1996). See State Bank of Beaver Crossing v. Mackley,
    
    118 Neb. 734
    , 735, 
    226 N.W. 318
    , 318 (1929) (“[i]t is not
    conceivable that both the supreme court and the district court
    could at the same time have jurisdiction of this cause”). See,
    also, County of Douglas v. 
    Burts, supra
    . We find this concept
    to be applicable as between the tribunal that tries a matter
    and the court that reviews or hears appeals from that tribu-
    nal’s decisions. In this case, the Board acted like a tribunal
    with regard to the siting approval decision under §§ 13-1701
    to 13-1714.
    [6] Returning to the facts in this case, the Board filed its
    decision to deny BCL’s application on December 14, 2015,
    and BCL vested jurisdiction in the district court when it filed
    its petition for review pursuant to § 13-1712. The district
    court lost jurisdiction when it set aside the Board’s order
    and remanded the matter to the Board on June 17, 2016.
    The Board necessarily had jurisdiction on July 13, when it
    adopted the resolution of that date. The record shows, and
    BCL concedes, that after the Board adopted the resolution
    on July 13, BCL did not within 60 days after notice of the
    decision file a new petition for a hearing before the district
    court, as required under § 13-1712. We hold that a failure to
    comply with the requirement under § 13-1712 to petition for
    a hearing before the district court within 60 days after notice
    of the siting body’s decision deprives the district court of
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    jurisdiction to review a siting approval decision. See, simi-
    larly, Schaffer v. Cass County, 
    290 Neb. 892
    , 
    863 N.W.2d 143
    (2015) (determining that failure to file appeal within 30 days
    of judgment or final order as required for review on petition in
    error under § 25-1901 deprives district court of jurisdiction to
    hear appeal). We note that § 13-1712 specifically requires “the
    applicant” to file a petition; hence, the Board’s act of filing its
    notice of compliance in the district court on July 14 could not
    satisfy the requirement under § 13-1712 that “the applicant
    . . . petition for a hearing.” We reject any suggestion that the
    Board’s filing of its notice of compliance in the district court
    caused the district court to reacquire jurisdiction after it had
    remanded the matter to the Board.
    As noted above, in Tri-County Landfill v. Board of Cty.
    Comrs., 
    247 Neb. 350
    , 
    526 N.W.2d 668
    (1995), we held that
    pursuant to § 25-1911, in an appeal siting approval case under
    §§ 13-1701 to 13-1714, a judgment rendered or final order
    made by the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modi-
    fied for errors appearing on the record. In an appeal authorized
    by § 25-1911, a party must follow the procedural requirements
    of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1912 (Reissue 2016), including the
    requirement to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the
    district court’s decision, in order to vest jurisdiction in the
    appellate courts. The notice of appeal in this case was filed in
    the district court on March 3, 2017. Such notice was obviously
    not timely to give this court jurisdiction to review the June 17,
    2016, order. Instead, the notice of appeal purports to appeal
    from the district court’s February 7, 2017, order. However,
    because the district court did not have jurisdiction to enter
    that order, we consequently do not have jurisdiction to hear
    this appeal.
    When an appellate court is without jurisdiction to act, the
    appeal must be dismissed. Kozal v. Nebraska Liquor Control
    Comm., 
    297 Neb. 938
    , 
    902 N.W.2d 147
    (2017). However, an
    appellate court has the power to determine whether it lacks
    jurisdiction over an appeal because the lower court lacked
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    jurisdiction to enter the order; to vacate a void order; and, if
    necessary, to remand the cause with appropriate directions. 
    Id. Having determined
    that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal,
    we vacate the district court’s February 7, 2017, order, which
    the district court was without jurisdiction to enter, and we
    remand the cause to the district court with directions to dismiss
    for lack of jurisdiction.
    CONCLUSION
    On June 17, 2016, the district court “set aside” the Board’s
    December 14, 2015, decision denying BCL’s siting application
    and remanded the matter to the Board to make findings of
    fact. As a result of this order, jurisdiction was returned to the
    Board. After the Board acted on the remand, no petition was
    filed that would have again vested the district court with juris-
    diction. We therefore conclude that the district court lacked
    jurisdiction to enter the February 7, 2017, order appealed in
    this case, and consequently, we lack jurisdiction over this
    appeal. As a result, we vacate the district court’s February 7,
    2017, order and dismiss this appeal.
    A ppeal dismissed.
    K elch, J., not participating in the decision.
    Wright, J., not participating.