In re Interest of Becka P. , 296 Neb. 365 ( 2017 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    06/23/2017 01:13 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    296 Nebraska R eports
    IN RE INTEREST OF BECKA P. ET AL.
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 365
    In   re I nterest of
    Becka P. et al., children
    18 years of age.
    under
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Robert P.
    and Veronica M., appellants.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed April 7, 2017.     Nos. S-16-646 through S-16-648.
    1.	 Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction. An appellate court reviews juvenile
    cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently
    of the juvenile court’s findings.
    2.	 Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does
    not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a
    matter of law.
    3.	 Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. In a juvenile case,
    as in any other appeal, before reaching the legal issues presented for
    review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
    jurisdiction over the matter before it.
    4.	 Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
    (Reissue 2016), the three types of final orders which may be reviewed
    on appeal are (1) an order which affects a substantial right and which
    determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order affecting
    a substantial right made during a special proceeding, and (3) an order
    affecting a substantial right made on summary application in an action
    after judgment is rendered.
    5.	Juvenile Courts: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A proceed-
    ing before a juvenile court is a “special proceeding” for appellate
    purposes.
    6.	 Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A substantial right is an essential
    legal right, not a mere technical right.
    7.	 Juvenile Courts: Parental Rights: Final Orders: Time. Whether a
    substantial right of a parent has been affected by an order in juvenile
    court litigation is dependent upon both the object of the order and the
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    Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets
    296 Nebraska R eports
    IN RE INTEREST OF BECKA P. ET AL.
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 365
    length of time over which the parent’s relationship with the juvenile may
    reasonably be expected to be disturbed.
    8.	 Constitutional Law: Parental Rights. Parents have a fundamental lib-
    erty interest in directing the education of their children.
    9.	 Parental Rights: Final Orders: Time: Appeal and Error. Orders
    which temporarily suspend a parent’s custody, visitation, or education
    rights for a brief period of time do not affect a substantial right and are
    therefore not appealable.
    10.	 Parental Rights: Final Orders: Time. An order appointing an educa-
    tional surrogate which has no limitation on its duration or scope is not
    a temporary order, but, rather, one which affects the parents’ substantial
    right to direct the education of their child.
    11.	 Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Generally, once an appeal has been
    perfected to an appellate court, the trial court is divested of its jurisdic-
    tion to hear a case involving the same matter between the same parties;
    however, there is statutory authority allowing the juvenile court to retain
    or continue jurisdiction while appeals are pending.
    12.	 Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Parental Rights: Appeal and Error.
    Although a juvenile court retains jurisdiction over a juvenile while an
    appeal is pending, such continuing jurisdiction is not without limits;
    for example, the continuing jurisdiction of a juvenile court pending an
    appeal does not include the power to terminate parental rights.
    13.	 Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error.
    Pending an appeal from an adjudication, the juvenile court does not have
    the power to enter a permanent dispositional order.
    14.	 Juvenile Courts: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. The extent of the
    juvenile court’s jurisdiction over a juvenile while an appeal is pending
    must be determined by the facts of each case.
    15.	 ____: ____: ____. A juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction to issue
    and rule upon an order to show cause seeking enforcement of a previous
    order while the order of adjudication is pending on appeal.
    16.	 Juvenile Courts: Contempt. Juvenile courts, whether separate juvenile
    courts or county courts sitting as juvenile courts, are courts of record
    with the statutory authority to punish contemptuous conduct.
    Appeals from the County Court for Garden County: R andin
    Roland, Judge. Affirmed.
    Michael R. Snyder, of Snyder & Hilliard, P.C., L.L.O., for
    appellants.
    Philip E. Pierce, Garden County Attorney, for appellee.
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    IN RE INTEREST OF BECKA P. ET AL.
    Cite as 
    296 Neb. 365
    Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy,
    K elch, and Funke, JJ.
    Stacy, J.
    Robert P. and Veronica M. appeal from orders of the county
    court for Garden County, sitting as a juvenile court, appointing
    an “educational surrogate” after Robert and Veronica refused
    to complete consent forms necessary to authorize speech and
    language and early childhood development assessments previ-
    ously ordered by the court. We affirm.
    FACTS
    Robert and Veronica are the parents of Becka P.; Robert
    P., Jr. (Robert Jr.); and Thomas P. In December 2015, the
    State filed juvenile petitions, alleging the children—who were
    ages 4, 2, and 1, respectively—came within the meaning of
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247
    (3)(a) (Supp. 2015) due to the faults
    and habits of their parents. The cases were consolidated for
    trial, and the juvenile court entered orders finding the allega-
    tions of the petitions were true as to all three children. The
    orders of adjudication placed custody of the children with the
    Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
    and, among other things, ordered a “language and speech
    assessment” for Becka and an “early childhood development
    assessment” for Robert Jr. and Thomas. All assessments were
    to be conducted on the children by an “Educational Services
    Unit” (ESU).
    The parents appealed the adjudication orders in all three
    cases. The appeals were consolidated, and on October 19, 2016,
    the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the adjudications in
    an unpublished memorandum opinion in cases Nos. A-16-351
    through A-16-353. The mandate issued November 23.
    While the parents’ appeals were pending before the Court
    of Appeals, the county attorney charged with enforcing court
    orders filed an “Affidavit and Application for Order to Show
    Cause” in the juvenile court. This application asked that the
    parents and DHHS be ordered to appear and show cause why
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    IN RE INTEREST OF BECKA P. ET AL.
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    they should not be held in contempt for failing to comply with
    the assessments previously ordered by the court. The record
    indicates the court issued an order to show cause in each of
    the three cases and consolidated the matters for purposes of
    the hearing.
    A show cause hearing was held in May 2016. Evidence
    introduced by the State showed the parents had signed the
    informed consent forms needed by the ESU to proceed with
    the assessments, but had added language indicating their sig-
    natures were not voluntary, and had refused to consent to the
    release of information between the ESU and the programs it
    uses to conduct the evaluations. As such, the ESU did not con-
    sider the consent forms sufficient to permit the assessments to
    be performed and the evaluations to be completed. There was
    evidence that DHHS had not signed the consent forms, but that
    pertinent regulations precluded DHHS from signing such con-
    sents for children who are wards of the State.
    After hearing the evidence, the court declined to make any
    finding of contempt and instead decided to appoint an “educa-
    tional surrogate” to authorize the necessary consents. The fol-
    lowing colloquy took place on the record:
    THE COURT: . . . I’m going to appoint [an] educa-
    tional surrogate for all three children. There are no limita-
    tions on that whatsoever . . . .
    ....
    [Parents’ counsel]: — I assume before you appoint . . .
    a surrogate, you’ll give a short time for [the parents] to
    sign [the] documents?
    THE COURT: Okay. No. We’re done. She’s a surro-
    gate. . . .
    [Parents’ counsel]: Okay.
    THE COURT: Because I’m not going to come back
    here when they refuse to do something in the future.
    ....
    . . . I’m not going to find anyone in contempt. I don’t
    think it’s necessary.
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    IN RE INTEREST OF BECKA P. ET AL.
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    296 Neb. 365
    ....
    . . . I’m going to appoint [an attorney] as the surrogate
    to have educational rights for all three children.
    As I understand from the testimony presented today,
    that will allow the evaluations to go through. . . .
    I believe the adjudications are up on appeal. I think we
    have a status hearing set just to monitor how the appeal
    is progressing.
    ....
    . . . We’ll schedule it for August 4th at 2:00 p.m. And
    if we’re still waiting for an appellate decision at that time,
    we’ll certainly entertain a motion to continue that out
    probably for another month or so to monitor the ruling.
    All prior orders not in conflict are continued. Court’s
    adjourned.
    After the show cause hearing, the court entered an order in
    each child’s case which provided that a particular attorney was
    “appointed as educational surrogate for the minor child herein
    and shall have all educational rights for the minor child.”
    Robert and Veronica timely appealed from the May 2016
    orders appointing an educational surrogate in each child’s case.
    We moved these appeals to our docket on our own motion pur-
    suant to our statutory authority to regulate the caseloads of the
    appellate courts of this state.1
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Robert and Veronica assign, consolidated and restated, that
    the juvenile court erred in (1) ordering them to show cause why
    they should not be held in contempt, and subsequently appoint-
    ing an educational surrogate, while appeals of the adjudications
    were pending in the Court of Appeals and (2) appointing an
    educational surrogate in a civil contempt proceeding without
    giving them an opportunity to purge their contempt by com-
    pleting the assessment consent forms.
    1
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106
    (3) (Reissue 2016).
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    IN RE INTEREST OF BECKA P. ET AL.
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    296 Neb. 365
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on
    the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the
    juvenile court’s findings.2
    [2] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a factual
    dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law.3
    ANALYSIS
    Orders A ppointing Educational
    Surrogate Were Final Orders
    [3] The State argues the orders appointing an educational
    surrogate were not final, appealable orders. In a juvenile case,
    as in any other appeal, before reaching the legal issues pre-
    sented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to deter-
    mine whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.4
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2
    ,106.01(1) (Reissue 2016) gives
    appellate courts jurisdiction to review “[a]ny final order or
    judgment entered by a juvenile court . . . .” No one argues that
    the orders appointing an educational surrogate are judgments
    under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1301
     (Reissue 2016), so whether
    we have jurisdiction to review the juvenile court’s orders
    depends on whether Robert and Veronica have appealed from
    final orders.
    [4,5] Under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
     (Reissue 2016), the
    three types of final orders which may be reviewed on appeal
    are (1) an order which affects a substantial right and which
    determines the action and prevents a judgment, (2) an order
    affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding,
    and (3) an order affecting a substantial right made on summary
    application in an action after judgment is rendered.5 Because
    2
    In re Interest of Danaisha W. et al., 
    287 Neb. 27
    , 
    840 N.W.2d 533
     (2013).
    3
    
    Id.
    4
    
    Id.
    5
    In re Interest of Karlie D., 
    283 Neb. 581
    , 
    811 N.W.2d 214
     (2012); In re
    Adoption of Amea R., 
    282 Neb. 751
    , 
    807 N.W.2d 736
     (2011).
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    IN RE INTEREST OF BECKA P. ET AL.
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    a proceeding before a juvenile court is a “special proceeding”
    for appellate purposes,6 the pertinent inquiry is whether the
    order appointing an educational surrogate affected a substantial
    right. We conclude it did.
    [6,7] A substantial right is an essential legal right, not a
    mere technical right.7 Whether a substantial right of a parent
    has been affected by an order in juvenile court litigation is
    dependent upon both the object of the order and the length of
    time over which the parent’s relationship with the juvenile may
    reasonably be expected to be disturbed.8 This court has consid-
    ered both the object and duration of the orders at issue here,
    and we conclude the orders affect a substantial right.
    [8] The object of the orders appointing an educational sur-
    rogate is the fundamental right of Robert and Veronica to
    direct the education of their children. The U.S. Supreme Court
    has recognized parents have a fundamental liberty interest
    in directing the education of their children.9 And this court
    has recognized there “can be no doubt that the object of [an
    order prohibiting a parent from homeschooling her child] is
    of sufficient importance to affect a substantial right.”10 Here,
    although the educational surrogate was appointed to address
    the parents’ refusal to consent to court-ordered assessments,
    the orders gave the surrogate “all educational rights for the
    minor child” and the court clarified on the record that “[t]here
    are no limitations on [the appointment] whatsoever . . . .”
    6
    In re Interest of Walter W., 
    274 Neb. 859
    , 
    744 N.W.2d 55
     (2008).
    7
    In re Interest of Octavio B. et al., 
    290 Neb. 589
    , 
    861 N.W.2d 415
     (2015).
    8
    
    Id.
    9
    See, Troxel v. Granville, 
    530 U.S. 57
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 2054
    , 
    147 L. Ed. 2d 49
    (2000); Washington v. Glucksberg, 
    521 U.S. 702
    , 
    117 S. Ct. 2258
    , 
    138 L. Ed. 2d 772
     (1997); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 
    268 U.S. 510
    , 
    45 S. Ct. 571
    , 
    69 L. Ed. 1070
     (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 
    262 U.S. 390
    , 
    43 S. Ct. 625
    , 
    67 L. Ed. 1042
     (1923).
    10
    In re Interest of Cassandra B. & Moira B., 
    290 Neb. 619
    , 625, 
    861 N.W.2d 398
    , 403 (2015).
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    IN RE INTEREST OF BECKA P. ET AL.
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    296 Neb. 365
    We are persuaded on this record that the object of the orders
    appointing an educational surrogate is of sufficient importance
    to affect a substantial right.
    [9] The second prong of the substantial right analysis
    requires consideration of the length of time over which the
    parent-child relationship may reasonably be expected to be dis-
    turbed.11 Orders which temporarily suspend a parent’s custody,
    visitation, or education rights for a brief period of time do not
    affect a substantial right and are therefore not appealable.12
    [10] Here, neither the language of the orders appointing the
    educational surrogate nor the court’s remarks on the record
    denote a temporary interruption of the parents’ rights to direct
    the education of their children. To the contrary, the court’s
    remarks indicate the educational surrogate was appointed with
    “no limitations on that whatsoever” and the court wanted
    the appointment to continue in case the parents “refuse to
    do something in the future.” Because there was no limit on
    the duration or scope of the educational surrogate’s appoint-
    ment, we conclude these were not temporary orders, but,
    rather, orders which affected the parents’ substantial right to
    direct the education of their child.13 The orders were therefore
    final orders, and we proceed to consider the errors assigned
    on appeal.
    Robert and Veronica challenge the appointment of an educa-
    tional surrogate on two grounds. First, they argue the juvenile
    court lacked jurisdiction to issue or rule upon the orders to
    show cause while the adjudications were pending on appeal.
    Next, they argue the orders appointing an educational surrogate
    were improper sanctions for civil contempt, because they were
    not afforded “an opportunity to purge their contempt by sign-
    ing the testing authorization forms.” We consider each argu-
    ment in turn.
    11
    
    Id.
    12
    
    Id.
    13
    See 
    id.
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    Juvenile Court H ad Jurisdiction
    to Issue and Rule Upon
    Orders to Show Cause
    Robert and Veronica argue the juvenile court was with-
    out power to issue orders to show cause or appoint an edu-
    cational surrogate while their appeals of the adjudications
    were pending before the Court of Appeals. They contend the
    appeal divested the juvenile court of jurisdiction to issue or
    rule upon the orders to show cause. In this regard, Robert
    and Veronica do not contend that the surrogate was unneces-
    sary or that the ordered assessments were unrelated to the
    basis for adjudication. Nor do they challenge the juvenile
    court’s authority to appoint an educational surrogate gener-
    ally. Rather, they assign and argue that because the adjudica-
    tion appeals were pending, the juvenile court lacked authority
    to take any action.
    [11-15] Nebraska case law generally holds that once an
    appeal has been perfected, the trial court is divested of its juris-
    diction to hear a case involving the same matter between the
    same parties.14 However, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-2
    ,106 (Reissue
    2016) provides in relevant part:
    When a juvenile court proceeding has been insti-
    tuted before a county court sitting as a juvenile court,
    the original jurisdiction of the county court shall con-
    tinue until the final disposition thereof and no appeal
    shall stay the enforcement of any order entered in the
    county court. After appeal has been filed, the appel-
    late court, upon application and hearing, may stay any
    order, judgment, or decree on appeal if suitable arrange-
    ment is made for the care and custody of the juvenile.
    The county court shall continue to exercise supervision
    over the juvenile until a hearing is had in the appellate
    court and the appellate court enters an order making
    other disposition.
    14
    In re Interest of Tabatha R., 
    255 Neb. 818
    , 
    587 N.W.2d 109
     (1998).
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    IN RE INTEREST OF BECKA P. ET AL.
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    (Emphasis supplied). In In re Interest of Jedidiah P.,15 we
    explained that although a juvenile court retains jurisdiction
    over a juvenile while an appeal is pending, such continuing
    jurisdiction is not without limits. For example, the continu-
    ing jurisdiction of a juvenile court pending an appeal from an
    adjudication does not include the power to terminate parental
    rights16 or to enter a permanent dispositional order.17 As such,
    the extent of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction must be deter-
    mined by the facts of each case.18 The question presented here
    is whether, while the orders of adjudication were pending on
    appeal, the juvenile court had continuing jurisdiction to issue
    and rule upon orders to show cause seeking enforcement of its
    previous orders requiring a speech and language assessment.
    We conclude it did.
    [16] The juvenile court’s adjudication orders placed custody
    of the children with DHHS and, among other things, ordered
    that assessments be conducted by the ESU. When the State
    learned the assessments had not yet occurred because DHHS
    and the parents had refused to complete the necessary forms,
    the State sought to enforce the court’s orders by filing an affi-
    davit and application for order to show cause in each case.
    Juvenile courts, whether separate juvenile courts or county
    courts sitting as juvenile courts, are courts of record with the
    statutory authority to punish contemptuous conduct.19 Section
    43-2,106 expressly provides that “no appeal shall stay the
    enforcement of any order entered in the county court [sitting
    as a juvenile court].” Because the proceedings were enforcing
    15
    In re Interest of Jedidiah P., 
    267 Neb. 258
    , 
    673 N.W.2d 553
     (2004).
    16
    
    Id.,
     citing In re Interest of Joshua M. et al., 
    4 Neb. App. 659
    , 
    548 N.W.2d 348
     (1996), reversed in part on other grounds 
    251 Neb. 614
    , 
    558 N.W.2d 548
     (1997).
    17
    
    Id.,
     citing In re Interest of Andrew H. et al., 
    5 Neb. App. 716
    , 
    564 N.W.2d 611
     (1997).
    18
    
    Id.
    19
    In re Interest of Thomas M., 
    282 Neb. 316
    , 
    803 N.W.2d 46
     (2011).
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    previous orders of the juvenile court, we find no merit to the
    parents’ contention that the juvenile court lacked authority to
    issue or rule upon the orders to show cause while the orders of
    adjudication were on appeal.
    Orders A ppointing Educational
    Surrogate Were Not Premised
    on Finding of Contempt
    Robert and Veronica argue the juvenile court erred in impos-
    ing “an unconditional punishment of removal of educational
    rights in a civil contempt proceeding, without giving [them]
    an opportunity to purge their contempt by signing the testing
    authorization forms. The parents argue that the court imposed
    a punitive sanction in a civil contempt proceeding, and they
    suggest a proper sanction for civil contempt “should have
    allowed them to purge the contempt by . . . sign[ing] the
    [authorization] forms for the tests.”20
    This assignment of error assumes the court ordered the
    appointment of an educational surrogate as a sanction for a
    finding of civil contempt. But that is incorrect. The record
    shows the court specifically declined to find either the parents
    or DHHS in contempt of court for failing to complete the nec-
    essary authorizations. The orders appointing an educational
    surrogate were not imposed as a sanction for civil contempt,
    because there was no finding of contempt made by the court.
    We find this assignment of error is factually unsupported and
    therefore lacks merit.
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the juvenile court
    are affirmed.
    A ffirmed.
    20
    Brief for appellants at 9.