Champion v. Hall County , 309 Neb. 55 ( 2021 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    06/04/2021 09:09 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    309 Nebraska Reports
    CHAMPION v. HALL COUNTY
    Cite as 
    309 Neb. 55
    Eddy Champion and Fraternal Order of
    Police Lodge No. 78, appellants, v.
    Hall County, Nebraska,
    et al., appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed April 23, 2021.    No. S-20-481.
    1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question that does not
    involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
    of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion indepen-
    dent of the lower court’s decision.
    2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The right of appeal in this state is purely
    statutory; unless a statute provides for an appeal from the decision of a
    quasi-judicial tribunal, such right does not exist.
    3. Judgments: Final Orders: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error.
    Proceedings in error under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1901 to 25-1908
    (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2020) provide a means of judicial review
    of the judgments and final orders of tribunals exercising judicial func-
    tions and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court.
    4. Judgments: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. A petition in error in the
    district court to review a judgment or final order of an inferior tribunal
    is in its nature an independent proceeding having for its purpose the
    removal of the record from an inferior to a superior tribunal to deter-
    mine whether the judgment or final order entered is in accordance with
    the law.
    5. Appeal and Error: Words and Phrases. A petition in error is the
    removal of proceedings from one court or tribunal to another for review.
    6. Judgments: Appeal and Error. A petition in error is designed to review
    the decision of the inferior tribunal and is not to act as a super legisla-
    tive or administrative agency to come to an independent conclusion.
    7. Administrative Law. When exercising rulemaking, administrative agen-
    cies act in a quasi-legislative capacity.
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    CHAMPION v. HALL COUNTY
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    8. ____. When administrative agencies are called upon to make factual
    determinations and thus adjudicate, they act in a quasi-judicial capacity.
    9. ____. When any tribunal, board, or officer is required to conduct a hear-
    ing and receive evidence, it exercises “judicial functions” in determining
    questions of fact.
    10. ____. If the decision made by any tribunal, board, or officer is purely
    discretionary after an evaluation of facts, it is a decision of policy or a
    political decision rather than judicial.
    11. Administrative Law: Words and Phrases. A function is quasi-judicial
    when the law, in words or by implication, commits to any officer the
    duty of looking into facts, and acting upon them, not in a way which it
    specifically directs, but after a discretion in its nature judicial.
    12. Administrative Law: Appeal and Error. The mere act of deciding
    a question of adjudicative fact after an evidentiary hearing, when the
    law has not contemplated the entity and any power to exercise judicial
    functions, does not render any tribunal’s, board’s, or officer’s decision
    reviewable in district court by petition in error.
    13. Judgments: Final Orders. Only when the law, by word or implication,
    authorizes the judicial function will the result of that exercise be either
    a “judgment rendered” or “final order” for purposes of Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 25-1901 (Reissue 2016).
    14. Actions: Words and Phrases. The term “action” is a comprehensive
    one, and is applicable to almost any proceeding in a court of justice by
    which an individual pursues that remedy which the law affords.
    15. Final Orders: Words and Phrases. A “special proceeding” occurs
    where the law confers a right and authorizes a special application to a
    court to enforce the right.
    16. Contracts: Legislature: Administrative Law: Judgments: Final
    Orders: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Regardless of whether col-
    lective bargaining is generally legislatively authorized, the adjudicatory
    procedures set forth in a collective bargaining agreement for a commit-
    tee that was never expressly contemplated by the Legislature do not
    establish any tribunal, board, or officer inferior in jurisdiction to the
    district court, which is capable of rendering judgments and final orders
    in the exercise of judicial functions for purposes of review by petition
    in error.
    Appeal from the District Court for Hall County: John H.
    Marsh, Judge. Affirmed.
    Thomas P. McCarty, of Keating, O’Gara, Nedved & Peter,
    P.C., L.L.O., for appellants.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    309 Nebraska Reports
    CHAMPION v. HALL COUNTY
    Cite as 
    309 Neb. 55
    Ashley H. Connell and Erin Ebeler Rolf, of Woods &
    Aitken, L.L.P., for appellees.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Freudenberg, J.
    I. NATURE OF CASE
    The question presented in this appeal is whether a grievance
    committee of a county with fewer than 150,000 inhabitants
    exercised “judicial functions” for purposes of the petition in
    error statute, 1 when, after a hearing involving the presentation
    of sworn testimony and other evidence, conducted pursuant to
    procedures in the applicable collective bargaining agreement
    giving the aggrieved party the right to an evidentiary hearing,
    the committee decided, under largely undisputed facts, that
    the managerial and disciplinary rights of the applicable collec-
    tive bargaining agreement permitted the director of the county
    department of corrections to exclude a correctional officer from
    working overtime unarmed transport shifts, as a consequence
    of a prior disciplinary action removing that officer from trans-
    port duty. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over
    the petition in error, because no statute specifically requires
    an evidentiary hearing before such a grievance committee and
    the grievance committee decided matters of law concerning
    the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement rather than
    matters of disputed fact.
    II. BACKGROUND
    Eddy Champion, a corrections officer with the Hall County
    Department of Corrections (Department), filed a grievance
    in relation to the denial of overtime working unarmed trans-
    port after Champion was subjected to discipline that included
    the indefinite removal from “transport duty.” The parties
    1
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1901 (Reissue 2016).
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    CHAMPION v. HALL COUNTY
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    followed the grievance procedures set forth as part of a col-
    lective bargaining agreement between the Department, as the
    employer, and the Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 78
    (FOP), as representative of employee correctional officers and
    corporals of the Department. The collective bargaining agree-
    ment was signed by the president of the FOP and the chair­
    person of the Hall County Board of Corrections and Hall
    County Board of Supervisors. Following an evidentiary hear-
    ing before the Hall County Grievance Committee (Grievance
    Committee) and its written decision denying the grievance,
    Champion filed a petition in error, which the district court dis-
    missed for lack of jurisdiction.
    1. Disciplinary Action
    On January 18, 2019, following an administrative hearing,
    the director of the Department (Director) disciplined Champion
    for sending 48 fellow employees a post on social media he
    had written alluding to a “‘story’” he had to tell about the
    Department’s lying to employees’ families and tricking them in
    order to get information and “‘what they want.’” This revolved
    around the Department’s attempt to get employees’ family
    members’ contact information in order to plan a surprise appre-
    ciation project for its officers.
    The Director determined that the post sent to fellow employ-
    ees was in violation of the staff code of conduct provision that
    states, “Staff shall refrain from participating in the spreading
    of rumors, innuendo, or other unfounded information which
    may have a hurtful or negative effect on other employees, the
    Department or any county agency.”
    As part of Champion’s discipline, he was “removed from
    transport duty indefinitely effective immediately.”
    2. Management and Disciplinary Rules Under
    Collective Bargaining Agreement
    In taking this disciplinary measure, the Director relied
    on article 3 of the collective bargaining agreement, which
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    provided: “All management rights, functions, responsibilities
    and authority not specifically limited by the express terms of
    this Agreement are retained by the Employer and remain exclu-
    sively within the rights of the Employer.”
    This article further specified that management rights
    included, but were “not limited” to,
    [t]he right to direct and arrange working forces including
    the right to hire, examine, classify, promote or not to pro-
    mote, train, transfer, assign, and retain employees; main-
    tain discipline and control and use of Department prop-
    erty; suspend, demote, discharge or take other disciplinary
    action against employees; and to relieve employees from
    duty due to lack of work, lack of funds, a decision to
    subcontract or discontinue Department operations or other
    legitimate reasons.
    The rights identified in article 3 “are not in any way intended
    to be exclusive, but are merely intended to illustrate the rights
    retained by the Employer.”
    The Director also relied on article 11 of the collective bar-
    gaining agreement, which gives the Director the “full discre-
    tion and authority to impose disciplinary action.”
    Article 11 lists progressive discipline measures that “may
    be used, depending on the particular situation and severity
    of the infraction.” These begin with an oral warning and end
    with suspension. They do not specify a restriction from cer-
    tain duties.
    Article 11 provides: “In most instances this procedure shall
    be followed. However, in instances of flagrant or repeated vio-
    lations suspension or termination may be used.” But article 11
    then continues:
    The . . . Director and the Employer reserves [sic] the
    right to investigate, make judgments, and take appropriate
    disciplinary action in each individual incident. The level
    of severity of any infraction and the level and type of dis-
    cipline to be imposed is solely at the discretion of the . . .
    Director and the Employer.
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    CHAMPION v. HALL COUNTY
    Cite as 
    309 Neb. 55
    3. Grievance
    Champion did not file a grievance immediately from this
    disciplinary action. However, he subsequently filed an infor-
    mal, and later a formal, grievance in relation to the denial of
    overtime for unarmed transport shifts that the Director denied
    pursuant to the disciplinary action.
    (a) General Grievance Procedure Under
    Collective Bargaining Agreement
    Grievance procedures set forth in the collective bargain-
    ing agreement state that they must begin with an informal
    resolution process involving a problem-solving meeting. If
    the aggrieved party is not satisfied with the response from the
    informal resolution process, the aggrieved party may submit
    the problem, in writing, to the Director, who must respond in
    writing within 14 days. Thereafter, the aggrieved party may
    present the appealed grievance to the Grievance Committee.
    Under the collective bargaining agreement, the Grievance
    Committee is to consist of two or more members of the Hall
    County Board of Corrections appointed by the county board
    chairperson.
    (b) Factual Allegations
    Champion’s grievance alleged that on February 1, 2019,
    an overtime requirement for an unarmed transport position
    developed and was posted in advance. Champion was the most
    senior officer to request to work the shift, but was denied the
    opportunity. At the time of the grievance, Champion had been
    denied a total of two unarmed transport shifts for which he was
    the most senior officer to sign up.
    (c) Overtime Provisions of Collective
    Bargaining Agreement
    Champion asserted that these denials violated article 22,
    section 7, of the collective bargaining agreement. Article
    22, section 7, provides: “When an overtime requirement is
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    CHAMPION v. HALL COUNTY
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    309 Neb. 55
    identified in advance, the Department may post the opening
    and allow staff to sign up. The senior officer will be scheduled
    and expected to work the overtime.”
    Champion asserted that the Director lacked the power under
    the collective bargaining agreement to remove him from trans-
    port duty, because the “disciplinary actions” described in arti-
    cle 11 therein referred only to oral warnings, written warnings,
    suspension without pay, suspensions with pay, and discharge.
    They did not refer to the removal of what Champion described
    as “negotiated contractual benefits and rights.” Further,
    Champion asserted that the overtime provision of article 22,
    section 7, was an express term of the agreement that specifi-
    cally limited the Director’s management rights.
    Champion sought to distinguish armed transport postings
    from unarmed transport officer postings, stating:
    To be sure, [the] Director . . . generally had the right
    to reassign . . . Champion to a post other than his armed
    transport post. And, this was a significant change for . . .
    Champion, who was assigned to the armed transport post
    following testing and a competitive selection process. By
    assigning . . . Champion back to a non-transport post,
    [the] Director . . . placed . . . Champion in the same
    position as other officers who are not armed transport
    officers; and all of those other officers not assigned as
    armed transport officers have the right to work unarmed
    transport officer overtime shifts based upon seniority.
    Champion also thought it arbitrary and capricious to deprive
    him from working as an unarmed transport officer, because
    it had no logical relationship with the actions for which he
    was disciplined.
    (d) Director’s Denial of Grievance
    On March 15, 2019, the Director denied the formal griev-
    ance. The Director noted that transport duty is considered to
    be a “‘plum’” position that was appropriate to take away in
    light of the seriousness of Champion’s inappropriate behavior.
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    CHAMPION v. HALL COUNTY
    Cite as 
    309 Neb. 55
    And other overtime, not involving transport duties, was still
    available to Champion.
    4. Grievance Committee Review
    Champion and the FOP appealed to the Grievance Committee
    and sought a hearing pursuant to article 8, section 4, of the bar-
    gaining agreement.
    (a) Committee Review Procedures Under
    Collective Bargaining Agreement
    The collective bargaining agreement sets forth that the
    Grievance Committee shall consist of two or more members of
    the Hall County Board of Corrections appointed by the county
    board chairperson. A meeting of the Grievance Committee
    shall take place in a timely manner after the notice of appeal,
    and it shall furnish the aggrieved party of its disposition in
    writing within 14 days.
    The agreement further states: “At a grievance hearing held
    at the request of an employee,” certain procedures “will be
    used.” These include that the hearing will be conducted by
    an attorney who will serve as the hearings officer, who “will
    be responsible for insuring that the evidence is presented in
    an orderly fashion and that all participants are treated with
    respect.” The aggrieved party shall present evidence first, with
    the employer able to ask questions of the aggrieved party or the
    aggrieved party’s witness at the end of the aggrieved party’s
    presentation. The employer shall then present evidence, and
    the aggrieved party may ask questions of the employer or its
    witnesses. Both parties shall designate one person to speak
    on their behalf and to ask questions of the other party or wit-
    nesses, and the parties may give a brief statement summarizing
    their respective positions at the end of the presentation of all
    the evidence. The Grievance Committee “shall not ask ques-
    tions but may, through the Hearings Officer, ask for clarifica-
    tion of statements or evidence.” At the end of the hearing, the
    Grievance Committee “shall privately deliberate” before issu-
    ing its written decision concerning the grievance.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    309 Nebraska Reports
    CHAMPION v. HALL COUNTY
    Cite as 
    309 Neb. 55
    (b) Joint Stipulation of Facts
    Before the scheduled hearing, the parties filed with the
    Grievance Committee a joint stipulation of facts. They stip­
    ulated that the collective bargaining agreement was in effect
    and applied to Champion. They stipulated that before January
    18, 2019, Champion worked as a corrections officer with the
    additional duty of armed transport. To qualify to work as armed
    transport, Champion had been selected through an examination
    process that included competitive testing and psychological
    examination. The parties stipulated that on several occasions
    beginning on or about February 1, Champion was the most
    senior correctional officer to request to work overtime trans-
    port shifts made generally available to the “day shift” officers
    after the overtime had first been offered to and declined by
    the armed transport officers. But he was denied the overtime.
    A total of 76.5 overtime hours were at issue, and the parties
    agreed as to the rate of compensation for those hours in the
    event the Grievance Committee found Champion was entitled
    to them.
    (c) Hearing
    The Grievance Committee held a hearing on May 22, 2019.
    At the hearing, Champion offered exhibit 1, a copy of the
    stipulated facts, along with its attachments “A” through “D,”
    which represented the collective bargaining agreement, the
    Director’s predisciplinary letter, the final disposition of dis-
    ciplinary action, and the appeal letter. Champion also offered
    exhibit 2, which contained emails reflecting denials of over-
    time. Pursuant to a joint stipulation, the exhibits were received.
    Champion called several witnesses, including himself, who
    were sworn in before testifying at the hearing.
    (i) Champion’s Testimony
    In addition to the facts stated in the stipulation and the his-
    torical facts reflected in the exhibits, Champion testified that
    from 2010 to 2016, he had been assigned to a full-time trans-
    port officer post with the Department. He had to go through
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    CHAMPION v. HALL COUNTY
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    a special interview and training process to qualify for that posi-
    tion, because it entailed carrying a weapon.
    After 2016, there was less demand for transport and he was
    reassigned “back to shift,” though he still worked some armed
    transport duties. Champion explained that as an armed trans-
    port officer, an unarmed transport officer sometimes accompa-
    nied him. Champion described that there always had to be at
    least two corrections officers for transports, but only one had
    to be armed.
    (ii) FOP President’s Testimony
    The FOP president, a fellow corrections officer, also testi-
    fied on behalf of Champion. He testified that in his experience
    as the vice president and then president of the FOP for the prior
    5 years, he was unaware of overtime ever being denied as part
    of a disciplinary action.
    (iii) Director’s Testimony
    Champion called the Director to testify, who acknowledged
    that the overtime in question was available to every regular
    corrections officer on the day shift with the sole exception
    of Champion. Champion is the only officer the Director has
    removed from a transport position and the only person whose
    discipline has involved the denial of overtime related to cer-
    tain duties.
    The Director described that nontransport officers during
    their regular shifts often do unarmed transport duties. The
    Director stated that while he considered employment termina-
    tion as a possible sanction for Champion’s behavior, he decided
    against it. And he was unable to consider a general demotion,
    because Champion did not hold any rank. He did not believe
    a suspension to be adequate, because it lasts a short period of
    time and is soon forgotten. So, the Director decided that the
    removal from certain duties was an appropriate compromise
    short of termination of employment and similar to demotion.
    He wanted to send a message not just to Champion, but to
    other employees.
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    CHAMPION v. HALL COUNTY
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    While the disciplinary letter did not specifically refer to
    overtime, the Director saw no distinction between Champion’s
    regular shifts and overtime work in relation to the discipli­
    nary prohibition of working transport. The Director observed
    that when he suspends an employee, that employee cannot get
    around the financial consequences of that discipline by work-
    ing overtime while suspended.
    (iv) Opening and Closing Arguments
    Both parties made opening and closing arguments at the
    hearing.
    Champion argued that article 11 of the collective bargaining
    agreement establishes a scheme of progressive discipline that
    the Director failed to implement. Further, he argued that article
    22, section 7, entitled him, as the senior officer signing up, to
    posted overtime, without any express exception for discipli­
    nary action. This, he argued, limited the Director’s manage-
    ment rights.
    Champion asserted that taking away the opportunity to work
    overtime was not set forth in the bargaining agreement as a
    disciplinary action and that if overtime could be taken away
    as a matter of discipline, then so could things such as health
    insurance or leave time. While Champion acknowledged that
    the Director had the authority to generally reassign Champion
    from transport duties, which is an armed transport position,
    he argued that was different from depriving him of unarmed
    transport overtime that has been made generally available to
    day shift corrections officers who are not posted to transport.
    Such overtime, he said, is merely a “ride along with the armed
    transport officer.”
    In its closing argument, the Department summarized that
    the case came down to “a dispute of two facts,” which the
    Department described as (1) whether the discipline was limited
    to removing Champion from a transport “post” and (2) what
    the Director’s management rights are.
    The Department pointed out that the issue presented was
    not whether disciplinary action was appropriate, which was
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    not grieved. The Department described the transport work as
    involving a lot of free time on the clock, and thus a “plum
    position.” The discipline the Director imposed did not distin-
    guish between armed and unarmed transport and was not lim-
    ited to a transport “post,” which Champion did not in any event
    have; rather, the disciplinary measure deprived Champion of
    all transport duties.
    The Department argued that the deprivation of the ability to
    work transport duties, both armed and unarmed, both during
    regular shifts and overtime, was an “effective way of man-
    aging disciplinary problems.” The Department asserted that
    while there was a list in the collective bargaining agreement
    of some examples of acceptable disciplinary measures, noth-
    ing therein limited managerial rights to traditional disciplinary
    actions. To the contrary, the collective bargaining agreement
    generally gave the Director sole discretion in determining
    the level and type of discipline to be imposed. Finally, the
    Department asserted that the Director acted reasonably in tak-
    ing away transport duties as a means of imposing discipline
    akin to demotion.
    (d) Grievance Committee’s Decision
    The Grievance Committee voted to enter into an execu-
    tive session, following which the members voted to return to
    regular session to vote. The Grievance Committee then unani-
    mously voted that the Director acted within his rights pursu-
    ant to the bargaining agreement. The Grievance Committee
    issued a written decision on May 31, 2019, denying the
    grievance and affirming the Department’s denial of the over-
    time opportunities.
    The Grievance Committee described in its decision that the
    historical facts were not in dispute. And it specifically found
    no merit to Champion’s argument that indefinite suspension
    violated a progressive disciplinary scheme, noting that under
    the bargaining agreement, such a scheme was discretionary.
    The Grievance Committee made no findings regarding the
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    intent of the parties in entering into the collective bargain-
    ing agreement.
    The Grievance Committee did, however, suggest that the
    suspension from transport duty assignments be subject to
    review by the Director after a specific period of time and that
    his decision to continue the suspension or terminate employ-
    ment should be communicated to Champion in writing.
    5. Petition in Error
    Champion and the FOP timely filed a petition in error with
    the district court for Hall County, filing therewith a praecipe
    for transcript and bill of exceptions in accordance with Neb.
    Rev. Stat. § 25-1905 (Reissue 2016). The respondents were
    named as Hall County, Nebraska; the Department; the Hall
    County Board of Corrections; and the Grievance Committee
    (collectively Hall County).
    Champion and the FOP assigned as error the Grievance
    Committee’s denial of his grievance in the following respects:
    (1) failing to properly interpret, apply, and enforce article
    22, section 7, of the collective bargaining agreement, which
    entitled Champion, as the most senior officer, to work the
    overtime shifts; (2) concluding that the Director had author-
    ity under the bargaining agreement to bar an employee from
    receiving the benefits of article 22, section 7, of the bargain-
    ing agreement as a form of “disciplinary action” or “other
    disciplinary action” under the bargaining agreement; (3) fail-
    ing to define or interpret the bargaining agreement’s phrase
    “disciplinary action” or “other disciplinary action” in article 3
    as limited to traditional forms of disciplinary action, discipli­
    nary actions expressly recognized under the bargaining agree-
    ment, and disciplinary actions established by the past practice
    and custom of the parties (none of which allegedly include
    the denial of negotiated overtime rights); (4) interpreting the
    management rights provisions in article 3 of the bargaining
    agreement as superseding the overtime provisions in article
    22, section 7, of the bargaining agreement; (5) failing to give
    full force and effect to article 3’s limiting language that “[a]ll
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    management rights, functions, responsibilities and authority
    not specifically limited by the express terms of this Agreement
    are retained by the Employer and remain exclusively within
    the rights of the Employer”; (6) interpreting the disciplinary
    provisions in article 11 of the bargaining agreement as super-
    seding the overtime provisions in article 22, section 7, of the
    bargaining agreement; (7) concluding that article 11 of the
    bargaining agreement authorized the Director to bar Champion
    from working the overtime shifts at issue; and (8) acting in an
    arbitrary and capricious manner by disregarding the facts and
    circumstances of the case and the substantive rules of the col-
    lective bargaining agreement.
    Hall County generally admitted all the factual allegations of
    the petition that did not involve interpretation of the bargain-
    ing agreement. As affirmative defenses, Hall County alleged
    that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could
    be granted, was barred by the doctrine of unclean hands,
    and was barred by Champion and the FOP’s failure to miti-
    gate damages.
    The district court dismissed the petition in error for lack of
    jurisdiction. The district court observed that review by petition
    in error under § 25-1901 is for “[a] judgment rendered or final
    order made by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judi-
    cial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court . .
    . .” Further, the district court noted that we have said any tribu-
    nal, board, or officer exercises a judicial function if it decides
    a dispute of adjudicative fact or if a statute requires it to act in
    a judicial manner. 2
    The court reasoned that no statute required the Grievance
    Committee to act in a judicial manner. And, citing to Kropp
    v. Grand Island Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 2 3 and Hawkins v.
    2
    Medicine Creek v. Middle Republican NRD, 
    296 Neb. 1
    , 
    892 N.W.2d 74
    (2017).
    3
    Kropp v. Grand Island Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 
    246 Neb. 138
    , 
    517 N.W.2d 113
     (1994).
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    City of Omaha, 4 the district court reasoned that the Grievance
    Committee did not in this instance decide a dispute of adjudi-
    cative fact, because the facts were not in dispute and neither
    party asserted that the collective bargaining agreement was
    ambiguous. Instead, the Grievance Committee solely deter-
    mined questions of law relating to the meaning of the collec-
    tive bargaining agreement and its application to the undisputed
    facts. Therefore, the Grievance Committee did not exercise
    judicial functions.
    Champion and the FOP appeal.
    III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Champion and the FOP assign that the district court erred
    (1) in holding it had no jurisdiction over the petition in error,
    “because the [Grievance] Committee was required, under a
    bargaining agreement, to conduct an adversarial evidentiary
    hearing and, in fact, did so,” and “in relying upon Kropp v.
    Grand Island Pub. School Dist. No. 2, 
    246 Neb. 138
    , 
    517 N.W.2d 113
     (1994) and Hawkins v. City of Omaha, 
    261 Neb. 943
    , 
    627 N.W.2d 118
     (2001) to the extent this Court
    determines overruling these cases is necessary to reverse the
    District Court’s decision” and (2) “when it assumed, without
    deciding, that the bargaining agreement is unambiguous and
    that the [Grievance] Committee was not required to decide an
    adjudicative fact.”
    IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual
    dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law,
    which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion inde-
    pendent of the lower court’s decision. 5
    4
    Hawkins v. City of Omaha, 
    261 Neb. 943
    , 
    627 N.W.2d 118
     (2001).
    5
    See McEwen v. Nebraska State College Sys., 
    303 Neb. 552
    , 
    931 N.W.2d 120
     (2019).
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    V. ANALYSIS
    [2,3] The question presented in this appeal is whether the
    district court had jurisdiction over Champion and the FOP’s
    petition in error. The right of appeal in this state is purely
    statutory; 6 unless a statute provides for an appeal from the
    decision of a quasi-judicial tribunal, such right does not exist. 7
    Proceedings in error under Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1901 to
    25-1908 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2020) provide a means
    of judicial review of the judgments and final orders of tribunals
    exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the
    district court. 8
    [4] A petition in error in the district court to review a judg-
    ment or final order of an inferior tribunal is in its nature an
    independent proceeding having for its purpose the removal of
    the record from an inferior to a superior tribunal to determine
    whether the judgment or final order entered is in accordance
    with the law. 9 Rather than a “review on appeal” under Neb.
    Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1911 to 25-1937 (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp.
    2020), 10 a petition in error is in the nature of a new action, in
    that a petition in error is required to be perfected, with a sum-
    mons required to be issued upon the written praecipe of the
    petitioner in error. 11 The subjects of a review on petition in
    error and an appeal are so distinctively different and dissimilar
    that the provisions of the statute relating to each question can-
    not be taken together and construed as if they were one law
    and effect given to every provision. 12
    6
    
    Id. 7
    Id.
    8
    Id.
    9
    Id.
    10
    See 
    id. 11
    See 
    id. 12
    From v. Sutton, 
    156 Neb. 411
    , 
    56 N.W.2d 441
     (1953).
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    [5,6] At the same time, a petition in error is not a right of
    action and does not exist at common law. 13 It is a legislatively
    created method of review. 14 Thus, a petition in error is in a
    broader sense an appeal, because it is the removal of proceed-
    ings from one court or tribunal to another for review. 15 The
    reviewing court may reverse, vacate, or modify the lower judi-
    cial tribunal’s judgment or final order for error on the record. 16
    In an error proceeding in the district court, that court must look
    to the transcript of the proceedings of the inferior tribunal filed
    with the petition in error to ascertain what happened there. 17
    Such a proceeding is ordinarily tried on the appropriate and
    relevant questions of law, set out in the petition in error and
    appearing in the transcript. 18 A petition in error is designed to
    review the decision of the inferior tribunal and is not to act
    as a super legislative or administrative agency to come to an
    independent conclusion. 19
    The governing petition in error statute, § 25-1901, provides
    in full:
    A judgment rendered or final order made by any tri-
    bunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions
    and inferior in jurisdiction to the district court may be
    reversed, vacated, or modified by the district court, except
    that the district court shall not have jurisdiction over
    (1) appeals from a juvenile court as defined in section
    43-245, (2) appeals from a county court in matters aris-
    ing under the Nebraska Probate Code or the Nebraska
    13
    See McEwen v. Nebraska State College Sys., 
    supra note 5
    .
    14
    See 
    id. 15
    See 
    id. 16
    See § 25-1901, § 25-1911, and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2733 (Reissue 2016).
    See, also, McEwen v. Nebraska State College Sys., 
    supra note 5
    .
    17
    In re Estate of Vance, 
    149 Neb. 220
    , 
    30 N.W.2d 677
     (1948).
    18
    
    Id. 19
    Andrews v. City of Fremont, 
    213 Neb. 148
    , 
    328 N.W.2d 194
     (1982).
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    Uniform Trust Code, in matters involving adoption or
    inheritance tax, or in domestic relations matters, or (3)
    appeals within the jurisdiction of the Tax Equalization
    and Review Commission.
    The parties dispute in this appeal whether the Grievance
    Committee was “exercising judicial functions.” But also neces-
    sarily presented is whether the Grievance Committee was any
    “tribunal, board, or officer . . . inferior in jurisdiction to the
    district court.” Finally, under the plain language of § 25-1901,
    the Grievance Committee’s decision must have been a “judg-
    ment rendered” or “final order” for it to be subject to review by
    a district court under a petition in error.
    [7-10] We describe an inferior tribunal, board, or officer’s
    rendition of a judgment or final order in the exercise of
    judicial functions as being “quasi-judicial.” 20 An administra-
    tive agency has been said to be a governmental authority,
    other than a court and other than a legislative body, which
    affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication
    or rulemaking. 21 When exercising rulemaking, administrative
    agencies act in a quasi-legislative capacity. 22 When adminis-
    trative agencies are called upon to make factual determina-
    tions and thus adjudicate, they act in a quasi-judicial capac­
    ity. 23 We have explained that when any tribunal, board, or
    officer is required to conduct a hearing and receive evidence,
    it exercises “judicial functions” in determining questions of
    fact. 24 In contrast, if the decision made by any tribunal,
    20
    See, e.g., In re Application of Olmer, 
    275 Neb. 852
    , 
    752 N.W.2d 124
    (2008); Nicholson v. Red Willow Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 0170, 
    270 Neb. 140
    , 
    699 N.W.2d 25
     (2005); Singleton v. Kimball County Board of
    Commissioners, 
    203 Neb. 429
    , 
    279 N.W.2d 112
     (1979); Moser v. Turner,
    
    180 Neb. 635
    , 
    144 N.W.2d 192
     (1966).
    21
    State ex rel. Stenberg v. Murphy, 
    247 Neb. 358
    , 
    527 N.W.2d 185
     (1995).
    22
    See 
    id. 23
    See 
    id. 24
    See Medicine Creek v. Middle Republican NRD, 
    supra note 2
    .
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    board, or officer is purely discretionary after an evaluation of
    facts, it is a decision of policy or a political decision rather
    than judicial. 25
    [11] One of the considerations for a petition in error is
    whether the decision being reviewed has taken place in a way
    that would create a record for meaningful appellate review, 26
    but we have explained that a function is not quasi-judicial
    whenever a hearing is required by statute to ascertain some fact
    relevant to the performance of a ministerial duty. 27 Instead, a
    function is quasi-judicial when the law, in words or by implica-
    tion, commits to any officer the duty of looking into facts, and
    acting upon them, not in a way which it specifically directs, but
    after a discretion in its nature judicial. 28
    No statute contemplates the existence of a Grievance Com­
    mittee, let alone commits to the Grievance Committee the
    duty to act in a judicial manner. The County Civil Service
    Commission Act 29 provides for a civil service commission
    to hear appeals from any employee who is discharged, sus-
    pended, or demoted in rank, 30 and the County Civil Service
    Act 31 provides there “shall” be a personnel policy board that
    has the power to review any grievance or case of discipli­
    nary action of a classified service employee. 32 These acts,
    25
    See Sarpy Cty. Bd. of Comrs. v. Sarpy Cty. Land Reutil., 
    9 Neb. App. 552
    ,
    
    615 N.W.2d 490
     (2000).
    26
    See Hawkins v. City of Omaha, 
    supra note 4
    .
    27
    See Singleton v. Kimball County Board of Commissioners, 
    supra note 20
    .
    See, also, Little v. Board of County Commissioners, 
    179 Neb. 655
    , 
    140 N.W.2d 1
     (1966).
    28
    State ex rel. School Dist. v. Ellis, 
    163 Neb. 86
    , 
    77 N.W.2d 809
     (1956).
    29
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-401 to 23-418 (Cum. Supp. 2020).
    30
    § 23-411.
    31
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-2517 to 23-2533 (Reissue 2012 & Cum. Supp.
    2020).
    32
    § 23-2522(5).
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    however, do not apply to counties such as Hall County with
    fewer than 150,000 inhabitants. 33
    Hall County is governed by Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-2534
    to 23-2544 (Reissue 2012). Section 23-2534 describes that
    the county board of any county with a population of less
    than 150,000 inhabitants “may” adopt policies and procedures
    pursuant to §§ 23-2534 to 23-2544 which concern employee
    hiring, advancement, training, career development, position
    classification, salary administration, fringe benefits, discharge,
    and other related activities. It also “may” have a personnel
    policy board that, if established, “shall” review any grievance
    or case of disciplinary action of a classified service employee
    when appealed by such employee in accordance with approved
    personnel rules and regulations and issue a determination that
    is binding on all parties concerned. 34
    The Grievance Committee is not Hall County’s personnel
    board. Thus, Champion and the FOP do not rely on §§ 23-2534
    to 23-2544 for the source of the Grievance Committee’s judi-
    cial power.
    Champion and the FOP instead direct us to the county
    board’s general, statutorily conferred powers to enter into con-
    tracts in relation to its concerns 35 and Nebraska’s Industrial
    Relations Act, 36 pursuant to which Champion and the FOP
    assert the Hall County Board of Supervisors, as the collec-
    tive bargaining agent, 37 entered into the collective bargaining
    agreement that specified the adjudicatory procedures utilized.
    Champion and the FOP then direct us to our prior state-
    ment that any tribunal, board, or officer exercises a judicial
    33
    § 23-2518(2).
    34
    § 23-2538(5).
    35
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 23-103 and 23-104 (Reissue 2012).
    36
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 48-801 to 48-839 (Reissue 2010 & Cum. Supp. 2020).
    37
    § 48-838.
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    function if a statute requires it to act in a judicial manner or if
    it decides a dispute of adjudicative fact. 38
    Hall County does not contest that it had the legislatively
    conferred power to enter into the collective bargaining agree-
    ment, but argues that such conferral was insufficient to estab-
    lish the Grievance Committee as having a statutory obligation
    to act in a judicial manner. Relying on the same proposition as
    Champion and the FOP, Hall County states its decision was not
    reviewable unless it decided questions of adjudicative facts.
    Champion and FOP’s disagreement centers on whether the
    Grievance Committee actually decided adjudicative facts.
    But we find that the decisive question of appellate juris-
    diction is not whether the Grievance Committee decided
    any question of adjudicative fact. The threshold question is
    whether the Legislature conferred quasi-judicial power in the
    first instance. If it did not, then the Grievance Committee’s
    decision, even if of adjudicative facts, was not a judgment
    rendered or final order made by any tribunal, board, or officer
    exercising judicial functions and inferior in jurisdiction to the
    district court.
    [12] Our statement referring to deciding a dispute of adju-
    dicative fact or a statute requiring an entity to act in a judicial
    manner has been made in contexts where a law contemplated
    the tribunal, board, or officer in question. The mere act of
    deciding a question of adjudicative fact after an evidentiary
    hearing, when the law has not contemplated the entity and
    any power to exercise judicial functions, does not render any
    tribunal’s, board’s, or officer’s decision reviewable in district
    court by petition in error. That would be an act of self-creation
    at odds with the concepts set forth in § 25-1901 of judgments,
    final orders, inferiority in jurisdiction to the district court, and
    judicial functions.
    38
    See Medicine Creek v. Middle Republican NRD, 
    supra note 2
    . See, also,
    Hawkins v. City of Omaha, 
    supra note 4
    .
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    [13-15] Only when the law, by word or implication, autho-
    rizes the judicial function will the result of that exercise be
    either a “judgment rendered” or “final order” for purposes
    of § 25-1901. A “judgment” is defined by Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 25-1301(1) (Cum. Supp. 2018) as “the final determination
    of the rights of the parties in an action.” The term “action” is
    a comprehensive one, and is applicable to almost any proceed-
    ing in a court of justice by which an individual pursues that
    remedy which the law affords. 39 A “final order” is defined by
    § 25-1902 as follows:
    (a) An order affecting a substantial right in an action,
    when such order in effect determines the action and pre-
    vents a judgment;
    (b) An order affecting a substantial right made during a
    special proceeding;
    (c) An order affecting a substantial right made on
    summary application in an action after a judgment is
    entered; and
    (d) An order denying a motion for summary judgment
    when such motion is based on the assertion of sovereign
    immunity or the immunity of a government official.
    There is no “final order” unless it is made either in the context
    of an action or a special proceeding. A “special proceeding”
    occurs where the law confers a right and authorizes a special
    application to a court to enforce the right. 40 A special proceed-
    ing includes every special statutory remedy that is not in itself
    an action. 41
    Entities thus cannot confer upon themselves the power to
    render a “judgment” or “final order” reviewable by a district
    court through an action for petition in error. The law must
    confer it. And the statutes upon which Champion and the
    39
    Gibson v. Sidney, 
    50 Neb. 12
    , 
    69 N.W. 314
     (1896) (emphasis supplied).
    40
    In re Claim of Roberts for Attorney Fees, 
    307 Neb. 346
    , 
    949 N.W.2d 299
    (2020) (emphasis supplied).
    41
    
    Id.
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    FOP rely for the conferral of quasi-judicial power upon the
    Grievance Committee have too tenuous a connection to the
    Grievance Committee and its designated functions for its deci-
    sions to be within the purview of the petition in error statutes.
    The county’s adoption of mandatory adjudicatory procedures
    in its exercise of a broad, discretionary authority to enter into
    collective bargaining agreements is not the equivalent of the
    law conferring a remedy to enforce a right.
    We observe that in Kropp v. Grand Island Pub. Sch. Dist.
    No. 2, 42 the statutorily conferred power was the ability to enter
    into collective bargaining agreements for the administration of
    grievances arising under the terms and conditions of employ-
    ment, and we decided that because the school board grievance
    committee was not required by statute to act in a judicial man-
    ner and did not decide a question of adjudicatory fact, there
    was no petition in error jurisdiction. We also observe that in the
    case of Turnbull v. County of Pawnee, 43 the Nebraska Court of
    Appeals held that because the county board of commissioners
    decided questions of adjudicative fact, there was jurisdiction
    under petition in error to review a decision of the board deny-
    ing a grievance in accordance with procedures established by a
    collective bargaining agreement.
    We do not view these cases as apposite to the case at bar.
    There is no statute that the parties direct us to that specifically
    contemplates, through collective bargaining or otherwise, the
    determinations of grievances by Hall County employees. And,
    unlike the Grievance Committee, the Legislature has specifi-
    cally contemplated boards of commissioners. 44 We disapprove
    of Turnbull to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.
    [16] We hold that regardless of whether collective bar-
    gaining is generally legislatively authorized, the adjudicatory
    42
    Kropp v. Grand Island Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 
    supra note 3
    .
    43
    Turnbull v. County of Pawnee, 
    19 Neb. App. 43
    , 
    810 N.W.2d 172
     (2011).
    44
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-297 (Reissue 2012).
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    procedures set forth in a collective bargaining agreement for
    a committee that was never expressly contemplated by the
    Legislature do not establish any tribunal, board, or officer
    inferior in jurisdiction to the district court, which is capable of
    rendering judgments and final orders in the exercise of judicial
    functions for purposes of review by petition in error. In such
    a case, the law, in words or by implication, has not committed
    to any entity the duty of looking into facts, and acting upon
    them, after a discretion that is in its nature judicial. Because
    no statute expressly contemplates the Grievance Committee, its
    decision was not reviewable by petition in error. Accordingly,
    the district court did not err when it dismissed the present peti-
    tion in error for lack of jurisdiction.
    VI. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the
    district court.
    Affirmed.