Nebuda v. Dodge Cty. Sch. Dist. 0062 ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •     Nebraska Advance Sheets
    740	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    Richard J. Nebuda et al., appellants, v.
    Dodge County School District 0062
    (Scribner-Snyder Community Schools)
    in the State of Nebraska, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed April 23, 2015.    No. S-14-477.
    1.	 Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court independently reviews ques-
    tions of law decided by a lower court.
    2.	 Statutes. The meaning and interpretation of a statute presents a question of law.
    3.	 Judgments: Justiciable Issues. A justiciability issue that does not involve a
    factual dispute presents a question of law.
    4.	 Moot Question: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Although mootness does not
    always preclude appellate jurisdiction, it is a justiciability doctrine that weighs
    against rendering a decision that will no longer have an impact on a live dispute
    between the parties.
    5.	 Moot Question. Mootness refers to events occurring after the filing of a suit
    which eradicate the requisite personal interest in the dispute’s resolution that
    existed at the beginning of the litigation.
    6.	 Moot Question: Words and Phrases. A moot case is one which seeks to deter-
    mine a question that no longer rests upon existing facts or rights—i.e., a case in
    which the issues presented are no longer alive.
    7.	 Moot Question. The central question in a mootness analysis is whether changes
    in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation have forestalled any
    occasion for meaningful relief.
    8.	 ____. A case is not moot if a court can fashion some meaningful form of relief,
    even if that relief only partially redresses the prevailing party’s grievances.
    9.	 Injunction: Intent. Injunctive relief is intended to prevent future harm and is not
    available when the act complained of is already completed.
    10.	 Moot Question: Injunction. A court’s inability to grant injunctive relief does not
    necessarily render a claim for declaratory relief moot.
    11.	 Declaratory Judgments: Justiciable Issues. A plaintiff’s interest in a declara-
    tory judgment action must be more than the satisfaction of having a court declare
    that the defendant’s conduct was wrong. The declaration must be relevant to a
    live controversy or threat of harm.
    12.	 Moot Question. A case becomes moot when the issues initially presented in
    litigation cease to exist or the litigants lack a legally cognizable interest in the
    litigation’s outcome.
    13.	 ____. Unless an exception applies, a court or tribunal must dismiss a moot case
    when changed circumstances have precluded it from providing any meaningful
    relief because the litigants no longer have a legally cognizable interest in the
    dispute’s resolution.
    14.	 ____. Nebraska recognizes a public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.
    15.	 Moot Question: Appeal and Error. Under the public interest exception to moot-
    ness, an appellate court can review an otherwise moot case if it involves a matter
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    NEBUDA v. DODGE CTY. SCH. DIST. 0062	741
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 740
    affecting the public interest or when other rights or liabilities may be affected by
    its determination.
    16.	   ____: ____. When determining whether a case involves a matter of public inter-
    est, an appellate court considers (1) the public or private nature of the question
    presented, (2) the desirability of an authoritative adjudication for future guidance
    of public officials, and (3) the likelihood of future recurrence of the same or a
    similar problem.
    17.	   ____: ____. A party’s strategic mistakes do not preclude an appellate court’s
    review under the public interest exception to mootness when the issues on appeal
    require a generic statutory analysis instead of a fact-specific inquiry unique to
    the parties.
    18.	   Statutes: Appeal and Error. Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, an
    appellate court gives words in a statute their ordinary meaning.
    19.	   Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will not
    look beyond a statute to determine the legislative intent when the words are plain,
    direct, or unambiguous.
    20.	   Bonds: Words and Phrases. Generally, a governmental entity’s issuing of
    bonds refers to its offering and delivery of certificates of indebtedness for sale
    in a market to raise money for improvements—not to executing an instrument of
    indebtedness to a single lender.
    21.	   Statutes: Judicial Construction: Legislature: Presumptions: Intent. When
    judicial interpretation of a statute has not evoked a legislative amendment,
    an appellate court presumes that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court’s
    interpretation.
    Appeal from the District Court for Dodge County: Geoffrey
    C. Hall, Judge. Affirmed.
    Jovan W. Lausterer, of Bromm, Lindahl, Freeman-Caddy &
    Lausterer, for appellants.
    James B. Gessford, Gregory H. Perry, and Derek A.
    Aldridge, of Perry, Guthery, Haase & Gessford, P.C., L.L.O.,
    for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack,
    Miller-Lerman, and Cassel, JJ.
    Connolly, J.
    SUMMARY
    After the voters in the appellee school district rejected a
    bond proposal to build an addition, the school district entered
    into a lease-purchase agreement with Scribner Bank to finance
    an addition. The appellants, residents and taxpayers in the
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    742	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    district, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The taxpayers
    contend that the agreement violates Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-10,105
    (Reissue 2012).
    After a trial, the district court denied relief and dismissed
    the taxpayers’ complaint. It concluded that under § 79-10,105,
    we have upheld the use of lease-purchase agreements to
    make school improvements without the voters’ approval if
    the project is not funded by bonded debt. The court found
    that the school district had not funded the project through
    bonded indebtedness.
    Because the addition has been completed, we address
    the issues presented under the public interest exception to
    the mootness doctrine. We conclude that a lease-purchase
    agreement is not the issuance of a bond under § 79-10,105.
    We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    Dodge County School District 0062, Scribner-Snyder
    Community Schools, is a Class III school district. At some
    point in 2009, the State Fire Marshal declared that the high
    school building had several safety concerns and code deficien-
    cies. The marshal gave the district until January 2014 to make
    corrections. The district’s superintendent worked with an archi-
    tectural firm and construction manager to obtain cost estimates
    for their work on improvements and then made recommenda-
    tions to the board for a bond proposal.
    In March 2012, the voters rejected a $7.5 million bond
    proposal to construct additional classrooms and renovate the
    existing building. Afterward, the district asked the construc-
    tion company and architectural firm to modify its project. The
    new plan called for adding an additional six classrooms in a
    detached preengineered metal building. The estimated con-
    struction cost was $623,000. The district did not submit a bond
    proposal to the voters for the modified project. The school
    board president testified that the district had funds to pay for
    the modified project but that it could not have done so without
    borrowing money to pay its monthly bills.
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    NEBUDA v. DODGE CTY. SCH. DIST. 0062	743
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 740
    In June 2012, the school board passed a resolution to
    authorize the superintendent to create a nonprofit “leasing”
    corporation, which would be controlled by the district, to
    make the improvements and lease the building back to the
    district. The superintendent and two school board members
    served as the corporation’s board of directors. The resolution
    stated that it did not constitute the board’s final approval of
    the project’s financing or the leasing corporation’s issuance
    of any bond obligations. In July, the school board authorized
    a lease-purchase agreement with the leasing corporation. The
    leasing corporation’s board then approved a resolution autho-
    rizing the corporation to issue “certificates of participation” to
    a bond underwriter to solicit buyers. The leasing corporation
    intended to raise a maximum principal of $750,000 through
    bonds with a maximum interest rate of 3 percent. When
    the underwriter sought interested buyers (primarily banks),
    Scribner Bank expressed interest in “buying” the entire lease-
    purchase agreement.
    In October 2012, the school board received construction
    bids and the taxpayers filed their complaint, alleging that the
    lease-purchase agreement with the leasing corporation violated
    § 79-10,105. They sought a declaration that the district’s lease-
    purchase agreement was unlawful and an injunction barring
    the district from taking action in furtherance of the agreement.
    They did not seek a temporary restraining order.
    On November 1, 2012, the district changed course and
    entered into a lease-purchase agreement with Scribner Bank,
    which agreed to finance the project (the addition and its
    equipment). The leasing corporation never issued any bond
    certificates. The new lease-purchase agreement called for the
    district to lease the building site to the bank so that the bank
    could make and pay for the improvements, with the district
    acting as the bank’s agent in making the improvements. The
    bank agreed to pay the costs of the project up to $750,000.
    The district was unconditionally obligated to pay the “Base
    Rentals” and “Additional Rentals.” The base rental payments
    were set out in a schedule to repay $750,000 in principal
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    744	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    plus interest. The parties incorporated the legal fees and
    underwriter fees for the original bond program into the prin-
    cipal indebtedness. The additional rental payments were the
    district’s obligations to pay for taxes, utilities, insurance, and
    legal fees.
    The agreement provided that the lease term ended in
    November 2019 or upon the earliest of four events: (1) the
    month in which the district paid its base rental obligation; (2)
    August 31 of any fiscal year in which the district failed to
    appropriate payments toward its obligations; (3) the date on
    which the district purchased the leased property by paying for
    the base rentals and additional rentals; or (4) upon the district’s
    default on its obligations. If a default occurred, the district’s
    accrued obligations continued and it lost the right to possess
    the leased property. It agreed to vacate the site and return the
    equipment to the bank if it defaulted. The attorney who pre-
    pared the lease-purchase agreement testified as a bond expert
    for the district and stated that the agreement did not constitute
    a bond. But he admitted that the interest paid to the bank was
    tax-exempt income for the bank, just like the interest paid
    on bonds.
    In a separate project construction agreement, the bank
    agreed to make the planned improvements, with the school
    district acting as its agent. The bank did not participate in the
    design and work decisions. In a site lease agreement, the dis-
    trict leased the school building and the property underlying the
    proposed addition to the bank for $1 for the entire lease period.
    In this agreement, the district warranted that the site was not
    subject to any encumbrances and not threatened by environ-
    mental hazards. Before signing these agreements, the district
    paid for surveying work and an environmental study. It had
    also paid for an architectural firm’s services. On November
    12, 2012, the school board explicitly abandoned its plan to
    finance the project through its leasing corporation by repeal-
    ing the authorizing resolution. On the same day, the construc-
    tion company and the architectural firm signed addendums to
    their agreements with the school district. They acknowledged
    that the district had assigned its rights and obligations under
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    NEBUDA v. DODGE CTY. SCH. DIST. 0062	745
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 740
    the original agreements to the bank and would be working as
    the bank’s agent.
    The project was completed in August 2013, before the trial
    began in September. The evidence showed that the detached
    building was built in sections at a factory, assembled at the site,
    and set in a permanent foundation. The district planned to pay
    its obligations within 4 to 5 years. It was making payments out
    of a special building fund at the time of trial but intended to
    make payments out of its general funds.
    After a bench trial, the court issued an order that denied
    relief for the taxpayers and dismissed their complaint. The
    court concluded that the Legislature had acquiesced in this
    court’s interpretations of § 79-10,105 in George v. Board
    of Education1 and Foree v. School Dist. No. 7.2 It reasoned
    that in Foree, we did not interpret § 79-10,105 to preclude
    a school from entering into a lease-purchase agreement for
    school improvements. The court further noted that in Banks
    v. Board of Education of Chase County,3 this court held that
    architectural fees are general expenses, not building expendi-
    tures that a school district must submit to the voters. It stated
    that the taxpayers would have been better served by a transpar-
    ent discussion and input from the taxpayers and that the school
    board’s actions appeared to be a “back-door effort to circum-
    vent the will of the voters.” But it concluded that we have held
    “the lease purchase of a school building is allowed without the
    vote of the people if the project is not funded by bonded debt.”
    It concluded that because there was no evidence that this had
    occurred, the taxpayers’ claim failed.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    The taxpayers assign, restated and reduced, that the district
    court erred as follows:
    1
    George v. Board of Education, 
    210 Neb. 127
    , 
    313 N.W.2d 259
    (1981).
    2
    Foree v. School Dist. No. 7, 
    242 Neb. 166
    , 
    493 N.W.2d 625
    (1993).
    3
    Banks v. Board of Education of Chase County, 
    202 Neb. 717
    , 
    277 N.W.2d 76
    (1979).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    746	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    (1) considering the school district’s safety concerns and
    code deficiencies;
    (2) failing to consider that before the district entered into its
    lease-purchase agreement with Scribner Bank, it had entered
    into or approved an architectural agreement, construction
    agreement, final construction design, site survey, environmen-
    tal study, and construction bids;
    (3) failing to consider testimony that the district could not
    relocate significant parts of the project;
    (4) considering the district’s attempt to retroactively rescind
    its prior acts;
    (5) concluding that the Legislature had acquiesced in this
    court’s decision in George4 when that decision preceded the
    1985 amendment to § 79-10,105;
    (6) concluding that the Legislature had acquiesced in Banks5
    when Banks preceded the 1985 amendment to § 79-10,105;
    (7) failing to conclude that Foree6 is distinguishable and
    does not apply to lease-purchase agreements for the construc-
    tion of a school building;
    (8) finding that the lease-purchase agreement here was not
    funded by bonded debt;
    (9) concluding that our case law permits a school dis-
    trict to construct a school building through a lease-purchase
    agreement;
    (10) admitting exhibit 47, because it contains legal conclu-
    sions by an attorney for the school district, and overruling the
    taxpayers’ objections to legal conclusions by an attorney testi-
    fying for the district.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1-3] We independently review questions of law decided
    by a lower court.7 The meaning and interpretation of a statute
    4
    George, supra note 1.
    5
    Banks, supra note 3.
    6
    Foree, supra note 2.
    7
    See Kelliher v. Soundy, 
    288 Neb. 898
    , 
    852 N.W.2d 718
    (2014).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    NEBUDA v. DODGE CTY. SCH. DIST. 0062	747
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 740
    presents a question of law.8 A justiciability issue that does not
    involve a factual dispute also presents a question of law.9
    ANALYSIS
    Taxpayers’ Claims Are Moot
    [4] Although mootness does not always preclude appellate
    jurisdiction,10 it is a justiciability doctrine that weighs against
    rendering a decision that will no longer have an impact on a
    live dispute between the parties.11 So we first address the dis-
    trict’s claim that the taxpayers’ claims on appeal are moot. It
    argues that the taxpayers never sought a temporary restraining
    order to stop the project from proceeding and that injunctive
    relief could no longer bar any district actions. Additionally, the
    district argues that the taxpayers’ request for declaratory relief
    is moot because they did not seek repayment of any illegally
    expended funds under the lease-purchase agreement.
    [5-8] Mootness refers to events occurring after the filing
    of a suit which eradicate the requisite personal interest in the
    dispute’s resolution that existed at the beginning of the litiga-
    tion.12 A moot case is one which seeks to determine a ques-
    tion that no longer rests upon existing facts or rights—i.e., a
    case in which the issues presented are no longer alive.13 The
    central question in a mootness analysis is whether changes
    in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation
    have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.14 A case
    is not moot if a court can fashion some meaningful form of
    8
    See McDougle v. State ex rel. Bruning, 
    289 Neb. 19
    , 
    853 N.W.2d 159
          (2014).
    9
    Blakely v. Lancaster County, 
    284 Neb. 659
    , 
    825 N.W.2d 149
    (2012).
    10
    See, e.g., In re Interest of Elizabeth S., 
    282 Neb. 1015
    , 
    809 N.W.2d 495
          (2012).
    11
    See, Blakely, supra note 9; 13B Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal
    Practice and Procedure § 3533 (2008).
    12
    Blakely, supra note 9.
    13
    
    Id. 14 In
    re Interest of Nathaniel M., 
    289 Neb. 430
    , 
    855 N.W.2d 580
    (2014).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    748	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    relief, even if that relief only partially redresses the prevailing
    party’s grievances.15
    [9] In Rath v. City of Sutton,16 we addressed a mootness
    problem arising from the plaintiff’s unsuccessful action to
    enjoin a city’s construction project because the city had unlaw-
    fully awarded the contract to a contractor who did not submit
    the lowest bid. While the case was pending on appeal, the
    project was completed. We explained that injunctive relief is
    intended to prevent future harm and is not available when the
    act complained of is already completed. So, “any opinion on
    the court’s denial of injunctive relief would be ‘worthless.’ . . .
    Simply put, we lack the power, ‘once a bell has been rung, to
    unring it.’”17 We concluded that the plaintiff’s claim for injunc-
    tive relief was moot.
    [10] We also explained that a court’s inability to grant
    injunctive relief does not necessarily render a claim for declar-
    atory relief moot. But we rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
    he was entitled to declaratory relief because if he prevailed, he
    could then seek to recover funds that the city paid out under
    an illegal contract. We concluded that he was required to spe-
    cifically allege in his complaint that he was entitled to recoup
    the funds and had not done so. Thus, the declaratory judgment
    claim was also moot because the declaration would have been
    advisory, with no effect on the plaintiff’s rights.
    [11,12] In sum, a plaintiff’s interest in a declaratory judg-
    ment action must be more than the satisfaction of having a
    court declare that the defendant’s conduct was wrong. The
    declaration must be relevant to a live controversy or threat of
    harm. A case becomes moot when the issues initially presented
    in litigation cease to exist or the litigants lack a legally cogni-
    zable interest in the litigation’s outcome.18
    As in Rath, we cannot provide any relief to the taxpay-
    ers. Injunctive relief is not available to them because the
    15
    Blakely, supra note 9.
    16
    Rath v. City of Sutton, 
    267 Neb. 265
    , 
    673 N.W.2d 869
    (2004).
    17
    
    Id. at 273,
    673 N.W.2d at 880 (citations omitted).
    18
    State v. Johnson, 
    287 Neb. 190
    , 
    842 N.W.2d 63
    (2014).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    NEBUDA v. DODGE CTY. SCH. DIST. 0062	749
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 740
    construction under the lease-purchase agreement that they chal-
    lenged was already completed by the time of trial. And like the
    taxpayer in Rath, they did not allege that they were entitled
    to recoup any illegal expenditures. Because declaratory relief
    would not affect a live controversy, the taxpayers no longer
    have a cognizable interest in the appeal.
    Public Interest Exception
    to Mootness A pplies
    [13,14] Unless an exception applies, a court or tribunal
    must dismiss a moot case when changed circumstances have
    precluded it from providing any meaningful relief because
    the litigants no longer have a legally cognizable interest in
    the dispute’s resolution.19 Nebraska recognizes a public inter-
    est exception to the mootness doctrine,20 and we consider its
    application here.
    [15,16] Under the public interest exception to mootness,
    we can review an otherwise moot case if it involves a matter
    affecting the public interest or when other rights or liabilities
    may be affected by its determination.21 When determining
    whether a case involves a matter of public interest, we consider
    (1) the public or private nature of the question presented, (2)
    the desirability of an authoritative adjudication for future guid-
    ance of public officials, and (3) the likelihood of future recur-
    rence of the same or a similar problem.22
    In Rath, we concluded that the public interest exception
    applied to two issues presented by the appeal: (1) the proof
    required to establish an irreparable harm based on an alleged
    illegal expenditure of public funds and (2) the meaning of the
    statutory phrase “lowest responsible bidder.” We concluded
    that a decision on the proof question was obviously of para-
    mount importance to Nebraska’s taxpayers and would provide
    needed guidance because we had not previously decided the
    19
    Professional Firefighters Assn. v. City of Omaha, 
    282 Neb. 200
    , 
    803 N.W.2d 17
    (2011).
    20
    See 
    id. 21 In
    re Trust Created by Nabity, 
    289 Neb. 164
    , 
    854 N.W.2d 551
    (2014).
    22
    In re Interest of Thomas M., 
    282 Neb. 316
    , 
    803 N.W.2d 46
    (2011).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    750	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    question. We further concluded that the issue was likely to
    recur because taxpayers frequently filed suits to enjoin ille-
    gal expenditures.
    Similarly, we concluded that (1) the statutory interpretation
    question was of a public nature, because competitive bidding
    statutes exist to protect the public and the taxpayer had com-
    menced the suit on behalf of the public; (2) our interpreta-
    tion would provide guidance to all state entities and officials
    charged with procuring products and services; and (3) the issue
    was likely to recur because of frequent disputes over pub-
    lic contracting.
    [17] Finally, in Rath, we rejected the city’s argument that
    we should not apply the exception because the taxpayer failed
    to take actions to prevent the claim from becoming moot. We
    concluded that a party’s strategic mistakes do not preclude our
    review under the public interest exception to mootness when
    the issues on appeal require a generic statutory analysis instead
    of a fact-specific inquiry unique to the parties.
    This reasoning from Rath also applies here. The meaning
    of § 79-10,105 unquestionably involves a matter affecting the
    public interest because it governs whether taxpayers in every
    school district can be taxed for capital improvements without
    their approval of the expenditure. Although we previously
    considered this issue in Foree, the taxpayers argue that Foree
    is factually distinguishable. Finally, despite the district’s argu-
    ment in its brief, at oral argument, its attorney stated that many
    school districts have used lease-purchase agreements to make
    capital improvements and that others are looking for further
    guidance from this decision. We conclude that the requirements
    for the public interest exception to mootness are satisfied and
    address the merits of the taxpayers’ appeal.
    3. § 79-10,105 Does Not R equire Voter
    Approval for All Lease-Purchase
    Agreements Exceeding $25,000
    Despite the taxpayers’ multiple assignments of error, the cen-
    tral issue in this appeal is whether the district’s lease-purchase
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    NEBUDA v. DODGE CTY. SCH. DIST. 0062	751
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 740
    contract with Scribner Bank to finance capital improvements
    violated § 79-10,105, which provides the following:
    The school board or board of education of any public
    school district may enter into a lease or lease-purchase
    agreement for the exclusive use of its individual jurisdic-
    tion for such buildings or equipment as the board deter-
    mines necessary. Such lease or lease-purchase agreements
    may not exceed a period of seven years, except that lease-
    purchase agreements entered into as part of an energy
    financing contract pursuant to section 66-1065 may not
    exceed a period of thirty years. All payments pursuant to
    such leases shall be made from current building funds or
    general funds. No school district shall directly or indi-
    rectly issue bonds to fund any such lease-purchase plan
    for a capital construction project exceeding twenty-five
    thousand dollars in costs unless it first obtains a favor-
    able vote of the legal voters pursuant to Chapter 10,
    article 7. This section does not prevent the school board
    or board of education of any public school district from
    refinancing a lease or lease-purchase agreement without
    a vote of the legal voters for the purpose of lowering
    finance costs regardless of whether such agreement was
    entered into prior to July 9, 1988.
    (Emphasis supplied.)
    The taxpayers’ argument focuses on the italicized language
    in the above quote, which was added in 1985 to the precursor
    of § 79-10,105.23 They argue that through this amendment,
    the Legislature intended to bar school districts from using
    lease-purchase agreements as a way to avoid requirements for
    voter approval of construction projects that cost more than
    $25,000. They point to senators’ arguments during the 1985
    floor debate that they contend support their interpretation. And
    they argue that the definition of a “bond” broadly includes a
    23
    See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-4,154 (Reissue 1981); 1996 Neb. Laws, L.B. 900,
    § 751 (renumbering statute); Legislative Journal, 89th Leg., 1st Sess.
    1974-76 (Apr. 30, 1985) (adding amendment language to L.B. 633).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    752	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    “certificate or evidence of a debt on which the issuing com-
    pany or governmental body promises to pay the bondholders a
    specified amount of interest for a specified length of time, and
    to repay the loan on the expiration date.”24
    The school district contends that under our decision in
    Foree, the 1985 amendment’s restriction applies only when
    a school district directly or indirectly issues bonds to fund a
    lease-purchase plan for a capital construction project, which
    did not happen here. The taxpayers counter that Foree is
    distinguishable because the school district used a lease-­
    purchase agreement to acquire modular units, not to construct
    a building.
    [18,19] Absent a statutory indication to the contrary, we give
    words in a statute their ordinary meaning.25 We will not look
    beyond a statute to determine the legislative intent when the
    words are plain, direct, or unambiguous.26 So we first consider
    whether the meaning of the 1985 amendment to the precursor
    of § 79-10,105 is clear from the text itself: “No school dis-
    trict shall directly or indirectly issue bonds to fund any such
    lease-purchase plan for a capital construction project exceed-
    ing twenty-five thousand dollars in costs unless it first obtains
    a favorable vote of the legal voters pursuant to Chapter 10,
    article 7.”
    Section 79-10,105 is one of many statutes dealing with a
    school district’s “Site and Facilities Acquisition, Maintenance,
    and Disposition.”27 It is true that neither § 79-10,105 nor any
    of the other statutes in this section define the word “bond” for
    applying the 1985 restriction on the issuing of bonds. But we
    disagree for three reasons that the word “bond” in the amend-
    ment has the broad meaning that the taxpayers assign to it.
    First, the taxpayers’ interpretation of § 79-10,105 is contrary
    to statutory interpretation principles. If the Legislature had
    meant for school districts to obtain the voters’ approval before
    24
    See Black’s Law Dictionary 178 (6th ed. 1990).
    25
    Coffey v. Planet Group, 
    287 Neb. 834
    , 
    845 N.W.2d 255
    (2014).
    26
    
    Id. 27 See
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 79-1094 to 79-10,136 (Reissue 2014).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    NEBUDA v. DODGE CTY. SCH. DIST. 0062	753
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 740
    entering into any lease-purchase agreement exceeding $25,000,
    it would have simply stated that. This supports the school dis-
    trict’s argument that the restriction is focused on the issuing
    of bonds.
    Moreover, the taxpayers’ interpretation of § 79-10,105—
    to include a lease-purchase agreement as the issuing of a
    bond—gives the amendment a nonsensical reading: “No school
    district shall directly or indirectly issue bonds [i.e., any instru-
    ment of indebtedness, including a lease-purchase agreement]
    to fund any such lease-purchase plan for a capital construc-
    tion project exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars” without
    voter approval.
    [20] Obviously, no district enters into a lease-purchase
    agreement to fund a lease-purchase agreement. So this inter-
    pretation renders the language absurd or the reference to the
    issuing of bonds meaningless, and we attempt to avoid both
    results when interpreting statutes.28 Because the taxpayers’
    broad interpretation of the word bond renders the amendment
    nonsensical, it illustrates that the restriction on the issuing of
    bonds has a different meaning than the word “bond” standing
    alone. That is, the word bond in this context does not mean
    any debt obligation. Government entities do not “issue” all
    instruments of debt. Generally, a governmental entity’s issuing
    of bonds refers to its offering and delivery of certificates of
    indebtedness for sale in a market to raise money for improve-
    ments—not to executing an instrument of indebtedness to a
    single lender.29
    Second, even if the amendment could be construed as
    ambiguous, the legislative history of the original 1985 bill to
    amend the statute does not support the taxpayers’ argument.
    It shows that the Legislature intended to preclude school
    28
    See, Stick v. City of Omaha, 
    289 Neb. 752
    , 
    857 N.W.2d 561
    (2015); In re
    Interest of Nedhal A., 
    289 Neb. 711
    , 
    856 N.W.2d 565
    (2014).
    29
    See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. City of Scottsboro, 
    238 Ala. 230
    , 
    190 So. 412
    (1939); Moore v. Vaughn, 
    167 Miss. 758
    , 
    150 So. 372
    (1933); Black’s
    Law Dictionary 217, 960 (10th ed. 2014); 64 Am. Jur. 2d Public Securities
    and Obligations § 165 (2011); 64A C.J.S. Municipal Corporations § 2118
    (2011).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    754	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    districts from creating nonprofit corporations to issue bonds
    for the district’s capital improvements without a bond election,
    which obligation the district repays through a lease-purchase
    agreement with its own corporation.30 But that did not happen
    here. It is true that the district attempted this maneuver, but
    the school board repealed the resolution that created its leasing
    corporation and abandoned that plan. The leasing corporation
    never issued any bond certificates to finance the construc-
    tion project.
    Third, and most important, the district court correctly con-
    cluded that the Legislature has acquiesced in our 1993 interpre-
    tation of § 79-10,105 in Foree. Although the taxpayers argue
    that the court erred in relying on our 1981 decision in George,
    because it preceded the 1985 amendment, the court correctly
    reasoned that understanding George was relevant to under-
    standing the holding in Foree.
    In George, the school district formed a “Building
    Corporation” that issued bonds for a school addition and then
    “donated” the addition to the school at the end of a 5-year lease
    term.31 We rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the school dis-
    trict had no power to issue bonds without the voters’ approval
    because the district had not issued any bonds. We also rejected
    the argument that the building corporation was a sham because
    the Legislature had specifically authorized this method of
    financing under the lease-purchase statute.
    After the 1985 amendment, we decided Foree.32 There,
    the school district entered into a 4-year “‘Equipment Lease/
    Purchase Agreement’” with a corporation for the “lease/­
    purchase of eight modular homes for use as classrooms.”33
    The taxpayer argued that the agreement was invalid under the
    30
    See, Introducer’s Statement of Intent, L.B. 50, Committee on Education,
    89th Leg., 1st Sess. (Mar. 18, 1985); Committee on Education Hearing,
    L.B. 50, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. 46 (Mar. 18, 1985); Floor Debates, 1st Sess.
    3790-91 (Apr. 19, 1985) and 1st Sess. 4429-30 and 4436-37 (Apr. 30,
    1985).
    31
    George, supra note 
    1, 210 Neb. at 128
    , 313 N.W.2d at 260-61.
    32
    Foree, supra note 2.
    33
    
    Id. at 167,
    493 N.W.2d at 625.
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    NEBUDA v. DODGE CTY. SCH. DIST. 0062	755
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 740
    amended lease-purchase statute and that the Legislature had
    amended the statute in response to our decision in George.
    We concluded that even if the amendment was in response to
    George, the statute, as amended, still did not require the voters’
    approval of a lease-purchase agreement:
    The plaintiff’s principal contention seems to be that
    the provision requiring a favorable vote of the electorate
    for a direct or indirect issue of bonds to fund a lease-
    purchase agreement for a capital construction project
    exceeding $25,000 prohibits the defendant from enter-
    ing into its lease-purchase agreement for the modular
    units. . . .
    While the Legislature’s amendment to § 79-4,154 in
    1985 may have been in response to the George decision,
    it is clear that § 79-4,154 still authorizes school districts
    to acquire buildings or equipment through lease-purchase
    agreements. See George v. Board of 
    Education, supra
    .
    In the present case, no bonds were issued directly or
    indirectly by any party in order to fund the modular units.
    Furthermore, the defendants are not required to finance
    the lease/purchase of the modular units by bonds.34
    This passage shows that we rejected the taxpayer’s argu-
    ment that the lease-purchase agreement was an “indirect”
    bond. We implicitly interpreted the issuing of bonds to mean
    the issuing of certificates of indebtedness to be purchased
    by unknown investors in a market. We further stated that the
    funds for the lease payments were properly budgeted. In this
    regard, § 79-10,105, then and now, explicitly authorizes school
    districts to make payments under lease-purchase agreements
    “from current building funds or general funds.”
    Contrary to the taxpayers’ argument, Foree is not distin-
    guishable because we said the lease-purchase statute “autho-
    rizes school districts to acquire buildings or equipment through
    lease-purchase agreements.”35 In stating this, we focused on
    upholding the district’s challenged act—acquiring premade
    modular units. But the statutory language we were interpreting
    34
    
    Id. at 168-69,
    493 N.W.2d at 626-27 (emphasis supplied).
    35
    
    Id. at 169,
    493 N.W.2d at 626.
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    756	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    restricts issuing bonds “‘to fund any such lease-purchase plan
    for a capital construction project.’”36 So our reasoning logically
    applies to any capital construction project financed through a
    lease-purchase agreement.
    [21] When judicial interpretation of a statute has not evoked
    a legislative amendment, we presume that the Legislature has
    acquiesced in the court’s interpretation.37 We recognize that
    other statutes that authorize expenditures for a school district’s
    capital improvements require the voters’ approval to raise
    the funds.38 But any incongruity between these statutes and
    § 79-10,105 is a policy issue for the Legislature to resolve.
    Because it has not amended § 79-10,105 in response to Foree,
    we presume that it has decided the issue in accordance with
    that decision.
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude that the taxpayers’ claims for injunctive and
    declaratory relief are moot because they no longer have a cog-
    nizable interest in our resolution of the case. But because of
    the public nature of their dispute, we have resolved the issue
    presented under the public interest exception to the mootness
    doctrine. We conclude that § 79-10,105 does not prohibit a
    school district from entering into a lease-purchase agreement
    to finance a capital construction project, if it has not created
    a nonprofit corporation to issue bonds for the school district.
    Because that maneuver did not occur here, the district did not
    violate § 79-10,105 by entering into a lease-purchase agree-
    ment with the bank.
    Affirmed.
    36
    
    Id. at 168,
    493 N.W.2d at 626 (quoting § 79-4,154).
    37
    Lenz v. Central Parking System of Neb., 
    288 Neb. 453
    , 
    848 N.W.2d 623
          (2014).
    38
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 79-1098 (Reissue 2014) and 10-701 and 10-702
    (Reissue 2012).