Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. State ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •     Nebraska Advance Sheets
    780	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    CONCLUSION
    We conclude that Melanie is entitled to a face-to-face hear-
    ing at the Department’s local office under 475 Neb. Admin.
    Code, ch. 1, § 007, but not under the Due Process Clause. She
    is not a prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees under
    42 U.S.C. § 1988, because she lost on the merits of her claim
    under federal law. We reverse, and remand for further pro-
    ceedings on Melanie’s request for a declaration of rights under
    475 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 1, § 007, and injunctive relief
    within the scope of such declaration.
    Affirmed in part, and in part reversed and
    remanded for further proceedings.
    Archer Daniels Midland Company, appellant, v.
    State of Nebraska et al., appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed April 23, 2015.    No. S-14-724.
    1.	 Taxation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews decisions
    rendered by the Tax Equalization and Review Commission for errors appearing
    on the record.
    2.	 Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors appear-
    ing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision conforms
    to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is not arbitrary, capricious,
    or unreasonable.
    3. 	 Taxation: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews questions of law aris-
    ing during appellate review of decisions by the Tax Equalization and Review
    Commission de novo on the record.
    4.	 Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which
    an appellate court resolves independently of the lower tribunal.
    5.	 ____: ____. Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning,
    and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of
    statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.
    6.	 Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Appeal and Error. In discerning the meaning of
    a statute, an appellate court must determine and give effect to the purpose and
    intent of the Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the statute
    considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense.
    7.	 Statutes. If the language of a statute is clear, the words of such statute are the
    end of any judicial inquiry regarding its meaning.
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO. v. STATE	781
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 780
    8.	 ____. A court will construe statutes relating to the same subject matter together
    so as to maintain a consistent and sensible scheme, giving effect to every
    provision.
    9.	 Statutes: Taxation. Tax exemption provisions are to be strictly construed, and
    their operation will not be extended by construction.
    10.	 Property: Taxation. Property which is claimed to be exempt must clearly come
    within the provision granting exemption from taxation.
    11.	 Property: Taxation: Time. The exemption provisions in Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 77-5725(8)(c) (Reissue 2009) impose a mandatory statutory deadline for the
    filing of the prescribed form.
    12.	 Administrative Law: Taxation: Equity: Legislature. The Tax Equalization and
    Review Commission is an agency whose only equitable powers are those con-
    ferred upon it by the Legislature.
    13.	 Stipulations. In Nebraska, parties are free to make stipulations that govern their
    rights, and such stipulations will be respected and enforced by courts so long as
    the agreement is not contrary to public policy or good morals.
    Appeal from the Tax Equalization and Review Commission.
    Affirmed.
    James G. Powers, Patrick D. Pepper, and Nicholas K.
    Niemann, of McGrath, North, Mullin & Kratz, P.C., L.L.O.,
    for appellant.
    Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and L. Jay Bartel for
    appellees.
    Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack,
    Miller-Lerman, and Cassel, JJ.
    Miller-Lerman, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    After the Department of Revenue (the Department)
    rejected the claim of Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), the
    Nebraska Tax Commissioner denied ADM’s protest seek-
    ing a personal property tax exemption under the Nebraska
    Advantage Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-5701 et seq. (Reissue
    2009) (the Act) for the year 2010 because the claim was not
    timely filed. ADM appealed to the Tax Equalization Review
    Commission (TERC). TERC affirmed. ADM now appeals to
    this court, assigning that TERC erred when it concluded that
    it did not have authority to apply the doctrine of “substantial
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    782	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    compliance” to ADM’s untimely filings and when it con-
    cluded that it did not have equitable authority to enter orders
    of remand or mandamus to the Tax Commissioner for further
    consideration of issues relating to the hearing officer. We
    agree with TERC that there is no basis or authority to apply
    the doctrine of substantial compliance to vary the terms of the
    mandatory statutory deadlines and that ADM’s untimely claim
    was properly denied. We further determine that by stipulation,
    ADM waived the issue relating to the hearing officer, and that
    TERC did not err when it afforded no relief. Accordingly,
    we affirm.
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    The parties stipulated to the controlling facts in this case.
    ADM is a corporation that at all times relevant to these
    proceedings has been engaged in business in the State of
    Nebraska and is a taxpayer under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2753
    (Reissue 2009). Pursuant to the Act, ADM applied for and
    entered into an agreement (the Agreement) with the Tax
    Commissioner with the aim of using incentives set forth in
    the Act for a project in Platte County, Nebraska. The personal
    property for which ADM seeks exemption from ad valorem
    taxes is generally described as involving agricultural process-
    ing equipment.
    The Agreement provided, inter alia, that ADM would be eli-
    gible for exemption from personal property tax if it met “mini-
    mum levels of employment and investment” before December
    31, 2009. The Agreement further provided:
    (c) To receive the property tax exemptions, the tax-
    payer shall annually file a claim for exemption with the
    . . . Tax [Commissioner] and with the county assessor in
    each county in which the taxpayer is requesting exemp-
    tion on or before May 1.
    ....
    (ii) The form and supporting schedules [to claim
    the exemption] shall be prescribed by the . . . Tax
    [Commissioner] and shall list all property for which
    exemption is being sought.
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO. v. STATE	783
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 780
    The Tax Commissioner prescribed “Form 5725X” as the form
    for claiming exemption from personal property taxes. See,
    § 77-5725(8)(c); 350 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 43, § 003.01A
    (2009). Because May 1, 2010, fell on a Saturday, the dead-
    line for ADM to file Form 5725X was May 3. See 350 Neb.
    Admin. Code, ch. 43, § 003.01C (2009).
    ADM accomplished the necessary hiring and investing prior
    to December 31, 2009. ADM built three facilities in Platte
    County: a dry-mill ethanol plant, a wet-mill ethanol plant, and
    a cogeneration electrical production plant. The taxable values
    of these properties totaled $431,236,152.
    ADM reported its compliance with the Agreement to the
    offices of the Tax Commissioner and the Platte County asses-
    sor (the Assessor), and those agencies took measures to review
    ADM’s compliance. The Department conducted an audit of
    ADM, and the Assessor’s office had multiple conversations
    with ADM’s property tax manager concerning the poten-
    tial exemptions.
    Prior to May 3, 2010, ADM filed a series of Nebraska per-
    sonal property tax returns with the Assessor and notified the
    Assessor that the filings related to ADM’s property exemption
    under the Act.
    On May 7, 2010, ADM filed three Forms 5725X with
    both the Department’s property assessment division and the
    Assessor. They were dated May 1, 2010.
    On May 20, 2010, the Department issued a “Notice of
    Late Filing of Claim for Exemption of Personal Property” to
    ADM. The notice cited Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-1229(2) (Reissue
    2009) and stated, “Failure to timely file the required forms
    shall cause the forfeiture of the exemption for the tax year.”
    The notice continued, “Your late filing acts as a waiver of
    the exemption for tax year 2010” with respect to the sub-
    ject property.
    On May 27, 2010, ADM filed three amended Forms 5725X
    with the Department’s property assessment division and the
    Assessor.
    ADM filed a protest and requested a hearing. It specifically
    petitioned for redetermination of the Department’s conclusion
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    784	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    that ADM’s personal property tax exemption claim for the
    2010 tax year had not been timely filed.
    On June 23, 2010, prior to the hearing, ADM filed a motion
    to recuse the hearing officer, for the reason that the hearing
    officer was engaged as a volunteer attorney and member of
    the advisory board of a public interest organization which had
    expressed dissatisfaction with the Act.
    After ADM filed the motion for recusal, the hearing officer
    sent an e-mail message to counsel for the Department stating
    in part: “I am sorry to bother you but is there any precedent for
    the substance of [ADM’s recusal] motion? . . . Is the problem
    because of any association, past or present? Or continuing?
    Thanks so much.”
    Counsel for the Department disclosed the e-mail message
    to ADM’s counsel. On June 30, 2010, ADM filed a second
    motion to recuse the hearing officer, based on the e-mail
    message, contending that the e-mail was an impermissible
    ex parte communication requiring recusal. The hearing offi-
    cer heard argument on the two recusal motions and denied
    both motions.
    After the rulings on the recusal motions, the parties filed
    with the Department an “Amended and Restated Stipulation of
    Facts and Issue,” dated July 27, 2010. With respect to the issue,
    the parties stipulated and agreed as follows:
    IT IS FURTHER STIUPLATED AND AGREED by
    and between all parties to this stipulation that the only
    question at issue in this matter (and any appeal thereof) is
    whether ADM is eligible for a 2010 personal property tax
    exemption under the . . . Act based on those documents
    and records filed by ADM with the State of Nebraska
    and/or Platte County, Nebraska and ADM’s correspond­
    ence with the State of Nebraska and/or Platte County,
    Nebraska, and the other communications between ADM,
    the State of Nebraska, and/or Platte County, Nebraska,
    based on testimony at the hearing.
    Following the hearing, the Tax Commissioner denied the
    petition for redetermination. The Tax Commissioner agreed
    with the Department’s conclusion that because ADM’s per-
    sonal property tax exemption claim for the 2010 tax year was
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO. v. STATE	785
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 780
    not timely filed, denial of the exemption as to the subject prop-
    erty was required.
    ADM appealed to TERC. Prior to the hearing on the mer-
    its, ADM raised the recusal issue in the form of a motion for
    remand and writ of mandamus seeking an appointment of an
    unbiased hearing officer. TERC denied the motion.
    Following the hearing on the merits of the appeal, in its
    order dated July 18, 2014, TERC discussed the recusal issue,
    explaining its understanding that it had no express authority
    to order a remand. As to the merits of ADM’s appeal, TERC
    affirmed the Tax Commissioner’s determination that the sub-
    ject property was not exempt from taxation for the year 2010.
    TERC reviewed the relevant filing provisions of the Act,
    noted that the filings were not timely, and cited case law stat-
    ing, inter alia, that statutes relating to exemptions ought to
    be strictly construed. TERC observed that it does not gener-
    ally have equitable powers and, therefore, does not have the
    authority to render equitable decisions without express con-
    stitutional or statutory authority. In this regard, it noted that
    its power to hear appeals “‘as in equity’” had been repealed
    by 2007 Neb. Laws, L.B. 167, § 6. TERC, therefore, rejected
    ADM’s suggestion to the effect that ADM had substantially
    complied with filing requirements and that its claim should be
    deemed timely. TERC stated it “found no authority to conclude
    that ADM substantially complied with the filing requirements
    of the Act” when ADM undisputedly filed the required forms
    after the mandatory statutory deadline.
    ADM appeals.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    ADM generally claims, restated, that TERC erred when it
    affirmed the Tax Commissioner’s determination that the sub-
    ject property was not exempt from taxation for the year 2010.
    It specifically claims that TERC erred when it concluded (1)
    it did not have authority to apply the doctrine of substantial
    compliance to ADM’s untimely filing and (2) it did not have
    authority to enter orders of remand or mandamus to the Tax
    Commissioner for further consideration of issues relating to
    the hearing officer.
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    786	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    [1-3] An appellate court reviews decisions rendered by
    TERC for errors appearing on the record. Lozier Corp. v.
    Douglas Cty. Bd. of Equal., 
    285 Neb. 705
    , 
    829 N.W.2d 652
    (2013). When reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on
    the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the decision
    conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and
    is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. 
    Id. An appellate
    court reviews questions of law arising during appellate review
    of decisions by TERC de novo on the record. 
    Id. [4] Statutory
    interpretation is a question of law, which an
    appellate court resolves independently of the lower tribunal.
    See Republic Bank v. Lincoln Cty. Bd. of Equal., 
    283 Neb. 721
    ,
    
    811 N.W.2d 682
    (2012).
    ANALYSIS
    TERC Correctly Concluded That the Late Filing
    of the Forms Required by the Act Resulted
    in Forfeiture of the Tax Exemption.
    The statutory framework under the Act controls the outcome
    in this case. Timely filing of the right form in the right place is
    required to properly claim a property tax exemption.
    There seems to be no dispute that ADM satisfied the
    investment and hiring requirements of the Act, and the Tax
    Commissioner and the Assessor reviewed ADM’s compliance.
    In order to obtain the exemption under the Act, ADM was
    required to file Form 5725X with the Tax Commissioner and
    the Assessor on or before May 3, 2010, and the terms of the
    Agreement are to the same effect. See, § 003.01A (prescribing
    Form 5725X); § 77-5725(8)(c) (setting May 1 as annual dead-
    line); 350 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 43, § 003.01B (2009) (copies
    to be filed with Tax Commissioner and Assessor); § 003.01C
    (providing for filing on next business day). However, ADM
    did not file the Forms 5725X with the Tax Commissioner and
    Assessor until May 7.
    ADM claims that TERC erred when it concluded that TERC
    did not have authority to apply the doctrine of substantial
    compliance to ADM’s untimely filing for the exemption. Upon
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO. v. STATE	787
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 780
    our de novo review, we find no error. Thus, we conclude that
    TERC did not err when it affirmed the Tax Commissioner’s
    order which determined that the subject property was not
    exempt from taxation for the year 2010.
    Under the statutory scheme, the Tax Commissioner has been
    authorized to “adopt and promulgate all rules and regulations
    necessary to carry out the purposes of the . . . Act.” § 77-5733.
    With respect to the proper form, the Tax Commissioner pre-
    scribed the “Claim for Nebraska Personal Property Exemption,”
    Form 5725X as the required form for claiming the exemption.
    § 003.01A.
    Having identified the proper form, we next consider the Act
    to determine the filing deadline for Form 5725X. At the time of
    ADM’s claim, § 77-5725(8)(c) (now recodified and amended
    as § 77-5725(8)(d) (Cum. Supp. 2014)) provided, in part:
    In order to receive the property tax exemptions allowed
    by . . . this section, the taxpayer shall annually file a
    claim for exemption with the Tax Commissioner on or
    before May 1. The form and supporting schedules shall
    be prescribed by the Tax Commissioner and shall list all
    property for which exemption is being sought under this
    section. A separate claim for exemption must be filed
    for each project and each county in which property is
    claimed to be exempt. A copy of this form must also be
    filed with the county assessor in each county in which the
    applicant is requesting exemption. The Tax Commissioner
    shall determine the eligibility of each item listed for
    exemption . . . .
    Reference to the May 1 deadline appears elsewhere in the Act
    and regulations. See, e.g., § 77-1229(2).
    Consequences of a failure to timely file are found in the
    language of § 77-1229(2), which addresses the procedure for
    filing with the Assessor to obtain the personal property exemp-
    tion at issue. Section 77-1229(2) provides:
    Any person seeking a personal property exemption pursu-
    ant to . . . the . . . Act shall annually file a copy of the
    forms required pursuant to . . . the [A]ct with the county
    assessor in each county in which the person is requesting
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    788	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    exemption. The copy shall be filed on or before May 1.
    Failure to timely file the required forms shall cause the
    forfeiture of the exemption for the tax year.
    (Emphasis supplied.)
    The consequences of an untimely filing are also addressed
    in agency regulations which, having been adopted by the
    Department and filed with the Secretary of State, have the effect
    of statutory law. See Middle Niobrara NRD v. Department of
    Nat. Resources, 
    281 Neb. 634
    , 
    799 N.W.2d 305
    (2011). Those
    regulations provide that failure to timely file Form 5727X with
    the Tax Commissioner “shall constitute a waiver of the exemp-
    tion.” § 003.01B. Those regulations further provide that no
    extension of time shall be granted for filing Form 5727X and
    supporting schedules. § 003.01C.
    [5-8] Statutory language is to be given its plain and ordi-
    nary meaning, and an appellate court will not resort to inter-
    pretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which
    are plain, direct, and unambiguous. Bridgeport Ethanol v.
    Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 
    284 Neb. 291
    , 
    818 N.W.2d 600
    (2012). In discerning the meaning of a statute, we must
    determine and give effect to the purpose and intent of the
    Legislature as ascertained from the entire language of the stat-
    ute considered in its plain, ordinary, and popular sense. 
    Id. If the
    language of a statute is clear, the words of such statute are
    the end of any judicial inquiry regarding its meaning. 
    Id. A court
    will construe statutes relating to the same subject matter
    together so as to maintain a consistent and sensible scheme,
    giving effect to every provision. See State v. Piper, 
    289 Neb. 364
    , 
    855 N.W.2d 1
    (2014).
    [9,10] This court has previously considered tax exemption
    provisions and stated that they are to be strictly construed
    and that their operation will not be extended by construction.
    See Bridgeport Ethanol v. Nebraska Dept. of 
    Rev., supra
    .
    Property which is claimed to be exempt must clearly come
    within the provision granting exemption from taxation. 
    Id. Significantly, in
    TERC cases, we have required strict compli-
    ance with statutory time requirements. See, e.g., Republic Bank
    v. Lincoln Cty. Bd. of Equal., 
    283 Neb. 721
    , 
    811 N.W.2d 682
    (2012) (determining that despite unclear deadline language in
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO. v. STATE	789
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 780
    taxpayer form, TERC did not obtain subject matter jurisdiction
    because deadline for filing appeal was controlled exclusively
    by statute, and that appeal was not timely filed).
    [11] We review the exemption provisions in § 77-5725 as
    well as the remainder of the Act and the implementing regula-
    tions in light of the foregoing principles of statutory construc-
    tion. In so doing, it is clear that the provisions impose a man-
    datory statutory deadline for the filing of Form 5725X which
    we are not free to ignore.
    In its order, TERC correctly noted that the required fil-
    ing deadline was May 1, 2010, which, because it fell on a
    Saturday, was extended to Monday, May 3. See § 003.01C.
    TERC stated that the “evidence in this appeal is undisputed
    that ADM did not file the required Form 5725X with both the
    . . . Assessor and the . . . Department . . . until May 7, 2010,
    four days after the statutorily required filing deadline of May
    3, 2010.” The evidence included the Agreement, which is con-
    sistent with the Act and in which ADM agreed to file its claim
    with the Tax Commissioner and Assessor on or before May 1.
    TERC concluded that “the required filings were not made until
    after the statutorily required filing deadlines [and] that the Tax
    Commissioner’s decision” was not arbitrary or unreasonable.
    TERC’s decision affirming the ruling of the Tax Commissioner
    was supported by the applicable law and evidence.
    Notwithstanding the acknowledged lateness of its filings,
    ADM urged TERC to apply the equitable doctrine of substan-
    tial compliance to effectively extend the statutory deadline.
    ADM claims TERC erred when it rejected this suggestion. We
    conclude TERC did not err.
    [12] TERC is an agency whose only equitable powers are
    those conferred upon it by the Legislature. See Creighton St.
    Joseph Hosp. v. Tax Eq. & Rev. Comm., 
    260 Neb. 905
    , 
    620 N.W.2d 90
    (2000). We find no statutory language that would
    have allowed TERC to deviate from the mandatory deadline
    clearly set forth in the Act. To the contrary, as noted by TERC,
    L.B. 167, § 6, repealed the statutory provision which had
    authorized TERC to hear appeals “‘as in equity.’”
    Our conclusion that TERC did not have authority to apply
    the doctrine of substantial compliance to the untimely filing
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    790	290 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    is reinforced by the language of the statutes and regulations
    pertaining to late filings. As noted in our recitation above, the
    relevant provisions regarding the consequences of untimely
    filings provide variously that a “[f]ailure to timely file the
    required forms shall cause the forfeiture of the exemption for
    the tax year,” § 77-1229(2); no extensions of time to file Form
    5725X shall be granted, § 003.01C; and failure to timely file
    Form 5725X “shall constitute a waiver of the exemption,”
    § 003.01B. Construing the deadline and forfeiture provisions
    together, there is no basis to ignore the filing schedule set by
    the Legislature in order to grant relief to ADM. We conclude
    that TERC did not err when it declined to apply the doc-
    trine of substantial compliance to ADM’s untimely filings and
    when it affirmed the order of the Tax Commissioner denying
    ADM’s protest.
    The Parties’ Amended Stipulation
    Waived the Recusal Issue.
    ADM asks this court to address its recusal claim and con-
    sider whether TERC erred when it determined it did not have
    authority to enter orders of remand or mandamus to the Tax
    Commissioner for further consideration of the issue relating
    to the hearing officer. Because we conclude that ADM waived
    this issue, we do not reach this claim of error.
    As stated above, ADM filed two motions for recusal which
    were denied. After those rulings, ADM stipulated and agreed
    that “the only question at issue in this matter (and any appeal
    thereof) is whether ADM is eligible for a 2010 personal prop-
    erty tax exemption” under the Act.
    [13] In Nebraska, parties are free to make stipulations that
    govern their rights, and such stipulations will be respected
    and enforced by courts so long as the agreement is not con-
    trary to public policy or good morals. Lincoln Lumber Co. v.
    Lancaster, 
    260 Neb. 585
    , 
    618 N.W.2d 676
    (2000). See, also,
    Shearer v. Shearer, 
    270 Neb. 178
    , 
    700 N.W.2d 580
    (2005)
    (stating that parties are bound by stipulations voluntarily
    made and that relief from such stipulations is warranted
    only under exceptional circumstances); Malerbi v. Central
    Reserve Life, 
    225 Neb. 543
    , 
    407 N.W.2d 157
    (1987) (stating
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO. v. STATE	791
    Cite as 
    290 Neb. 780
    that stipulation was equivalent of pretrial order and that party
    which stipulated to issues to be tried could not complain on
    appeal that other issues should have been included).
    We conclude that ADM is bound by its stipulation to limit
    the issues in this matter—including on appeal—to its entitle-
    ment to the claimed 2010 personal property tax exemption,
    thereby excluding consideration of the issue regarding the
    hearing officer on appeal. In any event, given the clear pro-
    visions of the Act and implementing regulations requiring
    rejection of ADM’s untimely claimed exemption, there is no
    basis to expect a different outcome at the Department or at
    TERC; nor is it reasonable to expect that a ruling contrary to
    our decision discussed above would be upheld on appeal to
    this court.
    CONCLUSION
    Because ADM did not timely file its claim for a personal
    property tax exemption for the subject property for the year
    2010, ADM is not entitled to the exemption, and TERC did not
    err when it affirmed the order of the Tax Commissioner which
    denied ADM’s protest. Accordingly, we affirm.
    Affirmed.