In re Masek Family Trust , 312 Neb. 94 ( 2022 )


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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    312 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE MASEK FAMILY TRUST
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 94
    In re Charles and Patricia Masek Family Trust.
    Barry Masek, individually and as Administrator
    of the Estate of Patricia Masek, deceased,
    appellee, v. Mark Masek and Dianne
    Yahiro, appellants.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed July 29, 2022.    No. S-21-552.
    1. Trusts: Equity: Appeal and Error. Trust administration matters are
    reviewed for error appearing on the record, absent an equity question or
    question of law, which are instead reviewed de novo.
    2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. For errors appearing on the record, the
    inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by com-
    petent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
    3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a ques-
    tion of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an
    independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court
    below.
    4. Trusts: Liability. A beneficiary is not personally liable to a trust unless
    an exception applies. One such exception includes instances where the
    trust suffered a loss resulting from a breach of trust in which the benefi-
    ciary participated.
    5. Trusts. A beneficiary participates in a breach of trust if the beneficiary
    performs, or joins in performing, an act the beneficiary knows is a
    breach. Mere knowledge of, or consent to, the breach, without more, is
    insufficient to constitute participation.
    6. Trusts: Liability. A person is a de facto trustee, and can be liable for
    breach, where the person has (1) assumed the office of trustee under a
    color of right or title and (2) exercised the duties of the office.
    Appeal from the County Court for Gage County: Steven B.
    Timm and Linda A. Bauer, Judges. Reversed and remanded
    for further proceedings.
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    IN RE MASEK FAMILY TRUST
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    312 Neb. 94
    Matt Catlett, of Law Office of Matt Catlett, for appellants.
    Douglas W. Ruge II for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Heavican, C.J.
    INTRODUCTION
    In October 2020, the Gage County Court found that Mark
    Masek and Dianne Yahiro (Dianne), appellants, had commit-
    ted breach of trust and had taken trust assets, and it ordered
    damages against appellants by default judgment. Appellants
    filed a special appearance and motion for new trial on the
    issues of lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency of proc­
    ess, and insufficiency of service of process under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-516.01
     (Cum. Supp. 2020). Appellants additionally
    alleged the eight enumerated grounds for new trial as provided
    by 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1142
     (Reissue 2016).
    On June 7, 2021, the county court denied appellants’ motion,
    finding that proper notice had been given to them; that the
    court had personal jurisdiction over them; and that, in the alter-
    native, appellants had otherwise waived the right to challenge
    personal jurisdiction by requesting a new trial. The county
    court also found that appellants did not establish any statutory
    grounds for a new trial under § 25-1142. Appellants filed an
    appeal, at which time we moved this case to our docket.
    Because the county court did not explain its basis for finding
    appellants liable for breach of trust, we reverse, and remand for
    further proceedings.
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    Charles and Patricia Masek created the Charles and Patricia
    Masek Family Trust in 1993 (Family Trust). The trust named
    Charles and Patricia as initial cotrustees and provided that
    upon death, resignation, or disability of either grantor, the
    remaining grantor would become the sole trustee. The Family
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    Trust also provided that upon the death of either grantor, the
    trust would become irrevocable and any assets placed in the
    trust would be divided between a marital share and a fam-
    ily share. Upon the death of both grantors, the family share
    would consist of all assets remaining in the trust estate. The
    Family Trust declared that Charles and Patricia had five living
    children: Barry Masek, Mark, Dianne, Colleen Masek (now
    known as Colleen Eames), and Richard Masek. The Family
    Trust named three of the living children—Barry, Mark, and
    Dianne—as successor cotrustees.
    Upon Charles’ death in 2000, Patricia became the sole
    trustee, the Family Trust became irrevocable, and the prop-
    erty within the trust estate was divided into the marital and
    family shares. Patricia registered the Family Trust in Gage
    County, Nebraska, in November 2000 and petitioned the court
    to amend the Family Trust to provide that all five of her chil-
    dren be cotrustees. All five children signed their approval of
    this amendment, which was approved by the court in December
    2000. That same month, Patricia granted an interest in several
    hundred acres of farmland to her children. The Masek children
    then formed the Masek Children’s Trust (Children’s Trust) and
    placed the land into the Children’s Trust. The Children’s Trust
    specified that in the event the Family Trust was depleted prior
    to Patricia’s death, the trustee of the Children’s Trust could
    draw upon trust assets to care for and benefit Patricia.
    Around 2014, appellants moved Patricia and Richard, who
    had special needs and could not live on his own, to Illinois to
    live with Dianne. By this time, Patricia had reportedly been
    diagnosed with progressive dementia and Alzheimer’s disease.
    According to siblings Barry and Colleen, appellants moved
    Patricia and Richard without first informing Barry and Colleen
    of the move.
    In October 2015, Colleen filed a petition to remove Patricia
    as trustee of the Family Trust, alleging that Patricia was unable
    to administer the trust effectively. Colleen further asked the
    court to remove all successor cotrustees and appoint a qualified
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    corporate fiduciary as successor trustee. Colleen stated that she
    believed it would be impossible for all currently named suc-
    cessor cotrustees to agree due to a separate and then-pending
    action regarding the Children’s Trust.
    In May 2016, the court found that the interests of justice
    did not require court intervention; that the terms of the trust
    prevailed, which required certain procedures be done to find
    Patricia unfit to be trustee; and that such terms had not been
    fulfilled. As a result, Patricia was not removed as trustee.
    Within a year after Patricia and Richard were moved to
    Illinois, the relationship between Barry and Colleen on one
    hand and appellants on the other, which had not been harmo-
    nious to begin with, further deteriorated. Barry and Colleen
    claim they were barred from communicating with Patricia
    and Richard, despite their best efforts, for a period of almost
    5 years. Colleen filed an action for guardianship in Illinois to
    locate Patricia. Despite an Illinois court order demanding that
    Patricia be produced, Patricia was not produced and the court
    issued a warrant to locate Patricia.
    In December 2019, Barry and Colleen filed a joint peti-
    tion for accounting in Gage County, alleging that they had not
    received an accounting from Patricia as trustee since January
    2014. Hearings regarding this petition were scheduled for
    March 12, 2020. A copy of this petition and the notice of
    hearing was emailed to Brian Koerwitz as counsel for Dianne,
    Mark, and Richard and to Christopher Bartling as counsel
    for Patricia. Koerwitz filed a motion to withdraw as counsel,
    which was granted on January 13.
    On February 28, 2020, Bartling filed a motion to withdraw
    as counsel for Patricia. Bartling stated that he had attempted to
    contact Patricia without success; that he had not directly com-
    municated with Patricia since 2016; and that Mark, as durable
    power of attorney for Patricia, had requested Bartling withdraw
    as counsel.
    In early March 2020, Barry was contacted by an Illinois
    police department. Richard had died on March 1, and Dianne
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    and her husband had brought Richard’s body to a crematory
    so that Patricia could give consent to cremate Richard. The
    crematory contacted the police, who then contacted Barry
    and Colleen.
    On March 6, 2020, an Illinois circuit court issued an order in
    which it found an emergency basis existed for the appointment
    of a temporary guardian for the estate and person of Patricia
    for reasons including, but not limited to, concerns expressed by
    a detective about Patricia’s safety, Dianne’s failure to appear or
    produce Patricia despite court order, Dianne’s failure to present
    Patricia for a visit with her guardian ad litem, and the fact that
    Patricia was hospitalized with signs of bruising. The Illinois
    court then named Barry as temporary guardian for a duration
    of 60 days, which would expire May 5.
    In her response to Bartling’s motion to withdraw as coun-
    sel, Colleen notified the Gage County Court of these Illinois
    proceedings. Colleen alleged that Mark’s power of attorney for
    Patricia had been suspended by the Illinois court.
    At the March 12, 2020, hearing on Colleen’s petition,
    Bartling informed the court that he had been unable to con-
    tact Patricia by any means. Colleen’s counsel responded that
    Bartling should not be allowed to withdraw at that time, due to
    the ongoing guardianship proceedings in Illinois, and provided
    further detail to the court of recent events. The county court
    took the matter under advisement and set a further hearing on
    the matter of withdrawal for May 18.
    Also during this March 12, 2020, hearing, Benjamin Murray,
    counsel for appellants in litigation concerning the Children’s
    Trust, was present in the courtroom and was addressed by the
    court. When addressed, Murray specified that he was “not on
    the [F]amily [T]rust,” and only “on the [C]hildren’s [T]rust.” A
    separate hearing concerning the Children’s Trust began imme-
    diately after the conclusion of this hearing.
    On May 11, 2020, Barry filed a motion to amend the plead-
    ings. On May 18, Bartling was granted withdrawal after the
    court noted that a guardian had been appointed for Patricia,
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    apparently referring to the Illinois proceedings. However, doc-
    uments in the record indicate that Patricia did not have a guard-
    ian as of May 5.
    In June 2020, the court entered a proposed order in which
    it granted Barry’s motion to amend. Barry then filed on June
    24 the “Barry M. Masek Amended Petition for Removal
    of Trustee(s), Surcharge/Damages for Injunctive Relief,
    Declaring Amendments Void and Accounting.” This amended
    petition alleged that appellants had blocked access to Patricia
    and the records of the Family Trust; had amended the Family
    Trust and appointed one or more of themselves as trustee; and
    had utilized trust assets for themselves, misappropriated trust
    assets, or disposed of assets of the Family Trust contrary to
    its terms.
    The amended petition prayed for damages and attorney
    fees pursuant to the Nebraska Uniform Trust Code (NUTC);
    removal of appellants as trustees; an accounting of the trust’s
    activities and a surcharge judgment against appellants for
    any misappropriations; an order declaring null and void any
    amendments to the Family Trust since 2010, including any
    appointment of trustees other than Patricia; imposition of a
    lien or constructive trust on the assets of the Family Trust;
    and injunctive relief against appellants to prevent them from
    acting as trustees, managing trust affairs, or misappropriating
    trust assets.
    On the same day the amended petition was filed, Barry filed
    a praecipe for service requesting the court to issue a summons
    for personal or residential service on Dianne at her residence in
    Illinois and on Mark at his residence in California. The record
    does not indicate whether the summonses were issued.
    On July 2, 2020, the same Illinois court that previously
    named Barry as temporary guardian for Patricia entered a new
    order appointing Barry as a perpetual plenary guardian and
    conservator for Patricia.
    An evidentiary hearing regarding the Family Trust was
    scheduled for September 21, 2020. A notice of this hearing
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    was mailed to Mark at his California address and emailed to
    Murray. Douglas Ruge, counsel for Barry, filed an affidavit
    of service with the court wherein he affirmed that appellants
    were mailed a copy of the amended petition at their residential
    addresses by certified and first-class postage prepaid mail on
    August 11. Ruge affirmed that these addresses were recorded
    in court documents and had been verified as appellants’ resi-
    dential addresses. Ruge also affirmed that Murray was emailed
    a copy which was not returned as undeliverable.
    Mail was addressed to Dianne at “4539 Lee Avenue” instead
    of “4549 Lee Avenue.” Though the correct address was written
    over the incorrect address in an attempt to resolve the error,
    the correction made the final number illegible. This mail was
    returned as “Not Deliverable as Addressed.” Other mail sent
    to Dianne, properly addressed to “4549 Lee Avenue,” was not
    returned as undeliverable. Certified mail addressed to Mark
    at “4856 Bernal Ave” included a return receipt, which was
    returned unsigned, but otherwise did not indicate that the mail-
    ing was undeliverable. “USPS Tracking” for this certified mail
    shows that the item was delivered to this address and left with
    an individual.
    At the evidentiary hearing on September 21, 2020, Barry and
    Colleen were present with their attorneys. An attorney, who
    was the trustee of the Children’s Trust, had been appointed as
    guardian ad litem for Patricia and was present at the hearing
    in that capacity. Appellants were not present, nor were they
    represented by counsel.
    Ruge submitted evidence showing that he had mailed notice
    to all parties and that notice of this hearing was given to
    Murray. Specifically, Ruge provided email correspondence
    between Murray and himself regarding Patricia, where Ruge
    inquired about the Family Trust proceedings and Murray stated,
    “I am not representing [appellants] in that case and I do not
    know if they intend to retain counsel. I’ll shoot them an email
    and see if I can get you an answer.”
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    IN RE MASEK FAMILY TRUST
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    Barry then testified, producing statements and other finan-
    cial documents detailing how assets held by the Family Trust
    had been depleted between 2015 and 2021. He explained that
    the assets were withdrawn either by Patricia for the benefit of
    appellants or by appellants on behalf of Patricia as her power
    of attorney. Barry also testified about the circumstances of
    Patricia’s move to live with Dianne, about Richard’s death
    and the guardianship proceedings that had occurred in Illinois
    shortly thereafter, and about his experience as a certified public
    accountant and how that experience helped him collect infor-
    mation and trace trust assets after they were withdrawn from a
    trust account.
    After this evidentiary hearing, the county court filed an
    order on October 23, 2020. An order nunc pro tunc was entered
    on October 29, superseding and replacing the original order
    while retaining the original effective date of October 23. A
    comparison of the original and nunc pro tunc orders indicates
    that the body of the order was unchanged, but that the certifi-
    cate of service removed Richard as a party receiving notice. As
    noted elsewhere, Richard had died months earlier.
    In its October 2020 order, the court found that proper
    notice was given to the parties; that the court had personal
    and subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and the case;
    that appellants began exercising control over the Family Trust
    accounts in 2015; and that large amounts of money totaling
    $1,276,858 were taken out of these accounts beginning in
    2015, including $7,000 monthly payments to Dianne, pay-
    ments for the benefit of Dianne’s children that other grand-
    children did not receive, and wire transfers to Panama where
    Dianne had been traveling. By the time of the hearing, the
    assets of the Family Trust had been depleted and Patricia’s
    only resources to support herself were her Social Security and
    teachers’ retirement payments.
    The court then granted the amended petition with respect
    to the surcharge and damages causes of action, entering judg-
    ment against appellants jointly and severally for $1,276,858
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    plus costs in favor of Barry as guardian and conservator for
    Patricia, as well as trustee and beneficiary of the Family Trust.
    The court also awarded attorney fees to Barry in the amount
    of $10,306.25. The court denied relief for the other causes of
    action alleged in the amended petition, finding that the account-
    ing cause of action was covered by the ruling for the damages
    and surcharge actions, there was no evidence of improper
    substitution of trustees, and injunctive relief was unnecessary
    because there was no evidence that the Family Trust had been
    improperly amended.
    Four days after entry of this order, on November 2, 2020,
    appellants filed a motion requesting a new trial for lack of per-
    sonal jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, and insufficiency
    of service of process. The motion then listed eight enumer-
    ated grounds for a new trial as set forth in § 25-1142, without
    specifically alleging facts under any of those subsections.
    This motion was filed by Murray, which signified his first
    official appearance in the Family Trust proceedings as counsel
    for appellants.
    In April 2021, Barry filed an application for revivor of judg-
    ment, in which he notified the court that Patricia had died and
    that he had been named administrator of Patricia’s estate. Barry
    asked that the court revive the October judgment in Barry’s
    name as administrator of Patricia’s estate. The court thereafter
    granted Barry’s request and revived the judgment “in [Barry’s]
    name as Administrator and Representative for the Estate of
    Patricia Masek, deceased.”
    In June 2021, the court denied appellants’ motion. The court
    found that in regard to the service issues, all parties had been
    subject to the jurisdiction of the court for the past 20 years
    pursuant to the registration of the Family Trust, character-
    izing appellants’ arguments regarding notice and jurisdiction
    as “disingenuous.” The court also found it was apparent from
    the affidavits of service that appellants had actual notice of the
    trial and that Murray had received notice and had represented
    appellants in the concurrent Children’s Trust litigation. The
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    court concluded that notice and jurisdiction were proper but,
    alternatively, concluded that jurisdiction had been waived by
    appellants’ filing a motion and that appellants had failed to
    establish statutory grounds for granting such new trial.
    Appellants appealed from the denial of their motion, and we
    moved this case to our docket.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Appellants assign that the county court (1) lacked subject
    matter jurisdiction because Patricia was an indispensable party
    but was not served and did not voluntarily appear; (2) erred in
    denying their joint “Special Appearance and Motion for New
    Trial” because process and service of process were insuffi-
    cient; (3) erred in denying their joint “Special Appearance and
    Motion for New Trial” because the county court lacked per-
    sonal jurisdiction over them; (4) lacked subject matter jurisdic-
    tion over the amended petition because Colleen did not sign it;
    (5) assuming the amended petition was properly characterized
    as one brought under the NUTC to remedy a breach of trust by
    appellants, issued a judgment contrary to its own findings; (6)
    erred in entering judgment in favor of “Barry . . . as Guardian
    and Conservator for Patricia . . . , Trustee and Beneficiary of
    the Charles and Patricia Masek Family Trust”; and (7) entered
    a judgment which was not sustained by the evidence.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1,2] Trust administration matters are reviewed for error
    appearing on the record, absent an equity question or question
    of law, which are instead reviewed de novo. 1 For errors appear-
    ing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms
    to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither
    arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. 2
    1
    See, In re William Zutavern Revocable Trust, 
    309 Neb. 542
    , 
    961 N.W.2d 807
     (2021); In re Trust of Shire, 
    299 Neb. 25
    , 
    907 N.W.2d 263
     (2018).
    2
    See In re William Zutavern Revocable Trust, supra note 1.
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    [3] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for
    which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an inde-
    pendent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below. 3
    ANALYSIS
    Jurisdiction, Notice, and Governing Rules
    On appeal, appellants contend that (1) Patricia was not
    served with proper notice of the proceedings and, as an indis-
    pensable party to this action as trustee, the county court was
    deprived of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) their motion should
    be treated as a motion to vacate a default judgment and that
    the amended petition should be treated as a civil complaint for
    conversion of trust property, such that the rules of civil proce-
    dure would govern in place of the NUTC; (3) the county court
    lacked personal jurisdiction over appellants because process
    and service of process were insufficient and because minimum
    contacts did not exist to warrant application of Nebraska’s
    long-arm statute; (4) the county court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction because Colleen did not sign the amended petition
    and because the Family Trust is not valid where the documents
    which created and amended the trust do not include a descrip-
    tion of its subject matter or a method to ascertain its subject
    matter; (5) the county court erred in entering judgment in favor
    of Barry as guardian and conservator of Patricia because the
    trust itself would be entitled to judgment; and (6) the county
    court’s judgment was not sustained by the evidence because
    the evidence “concerned only Patricia’s personal funds, not
    Trust funds.” 4
    We have considered each of these issues and find each is
    without merit. However, we find merit to appellants’ fifth
    assigned error, that the county court issued a judgment contrary
    to its own findings, and now turn to that argument.
    3
    Chaney v. Evnen, 
    307 Neb. 512
    , 
    949 N.W.2d 761
     (2020).
    4
    Brief for appellants at 38.
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    Findings in Support of Judgment
    Appellants contend that the county court’s judgment was
    contrary to that court’s own findings because the court found
    that Barry had met his burden of proof for the claims regard-
    ing damages and surcharge for breach of trust, but also found
    “[t]here was no evidence presented that there had been any
    improper substitution of trustees” or that “the Trust had been
    improperly amended,” indicating that appellants were not trust-
    ees. Because appellants were not trustees, they assert they can-
    not be held liable for breach of trust.
    Under the NUTC, breach of trust is defined as a “viola-
    tion by a trustee of a duty the trustee owes to a beneficiary,” 5
    and claims can be brought against that trustee for any actions
    constituting a breach. 6 The NUTC does not, however, indicate
    whether a beneficiary can be held liable for breach of trust.
    [4,5] According to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which
    has been previously utilized to supplement or interpret the
    NUTC, 7 a beneficiary is not personally liable to a trust unless
    an exception applies. 8 One such exception includes instances
    where “the trust suffered a loss resulting from a breach of
    trust in which the beneficiary participated.” 9 Commentary fur-
    ther provides:
    A beneficiary owes a duty to the other beneficiaries not
    to participate in a breach of trust. If a beneficiary partici-
    pates in a breach of trust, causing a loss to the trust . . . ,
    the beneficiary is personally liable to the trust for all or
    part of the loss, as appropriate. . . .
    Certainly, the beneficiary participates in a breach of
    trust if the beneficiary performs, or joins in performing,
    5
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-3890
     (Reissue 2016).
    6
    See, id.; 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-3891
     (Reissue 2016).
    7
    See, In re William Zutavern Revocable Trust, supra note 1; In re Trust of
    Shire, 
    supra note 1
    .
    8
    See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 104 (2012).
    9
    Id. at 90.
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    an act the beneficiary knows is a breach. . . . For example,
    a beneficiary has participated in a breach of trust if the
    beneficiary induced the misconduct knowing that it would
    or might be a breach of trust. However, mere knowledge
    of, or consent to, the breach, without more, is insufficient
    to constitute participation (though the beneficiary may be
    liable under the law of unjust enrichment for any resulting
    benefit received . . .). 10
    While the NUTC does not exclude beneficiary liability,
    neither does it provide a framework for analyzing beneficiary
    liability; hence, we find the Restatement’s analytical frame-
    work instructive for purposes of examining appellants’ actions
    in terms of the purported breaches of trust. Under this frame-
    work, it is possible that appellants committed breach of trust
    by participating in a breach by Patricia or, more specifically,
    by inducing Patricia to commit breach while she was in their
    care and control.
    [6] Alternatively, Barry contends that appellants acted as de
    facto trustees when they directed Patricia to withdraw funds
    from the trust for their benefit. The NUTC does not define
    de facto trustees, and we have not previously recognized de
    facto trustees as liable for breach of trust. However, courts in
    other jurisdictions have considered de facto trustee status in
    both corporate and trust law contexts and have concluded that
    a person is a de facto trustee, and can be liable for breach,
    where the person has (1) assumed the office of trustee under
    a color of right or title and (2) exercised the duties of the
    office. 11 While these factors do not appear to apply to the
    claims raised herein as none of Barry’s arguments assert that
    appellants assumed an office under color of right or title, it is
    10
    
    Id.,
     comment f. at 91.
    11
    See, In re Bankers Trust, 
    403 F.2d 16
     (7th Cir. 1968); Haynes v.
    Transamerica Corp., No. 16-cv-02934-KLM, 
    2018 WL 487841
     (D. Colo.
    Jan. 18, 2018); Rose v. Rose, 
    2013 Ark. App. 256
    , 
    427 S.W.3d 698
     (2013);
    In re Irrevocable Trust of McKean, 
    144 Wash. App. 333
    , 
    183 P.3d 317
    (2008).
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    possible that the county court entered judgment against appel-
    lants under this theory.
    Ultimately, the county court found that appellants did not
    improperly substitute trustees or improperly amend the trust,
    and yet, it also found appellants liable for the damages and sur-
    charge claims for breach of trust. While it is possible for this
    court to speculate as to which theories of liability may apply,
    it is not possible for this court to determine with clarity which
    theory was utilized by the county court below. For that reason,
    we cannot conclude whether the decision is or is not sustained
    by sufficient evidence such that a new trial would be warranted
    under § 25-1142(6). What we can determine is that the findings
    of the county court are in conflict with the relief granted and
    do not conform to the law.
    Accordingly, we reverse, and remand to the county court for
    further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including, but
    not limited to, conducting a hearing wherein the parties would
    have the opportunity to present evidence or arguments concern-
    ing appellants’ liability to the trust either as de facto trustees or
    by participating in a breach of trust committed by Patricia, or
    by inducing Patricia to commit breach while she was in their
    care and control.
    CONCLUSION
    While a majority of appellants’ claims are without merit, we
    conclude that their argument regarding the county court’s order
    being contrary to its own findings may have merit. However,
    it is not possible for this court to make such determination
    based on the record because of the conflict between the county
    court’s findings and the relief granted. We therefore reverse,
    and remand to the county court for further proceedings con­
    sistent with this opinion.
    Reversed and remanded for
    further proceedings.