Chatterjee v. Chatterjee ( 2023 )

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
03/10/2023 09:06 AM CST
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJEE
Cite as 313 Neb. 710Apurba Chatterjee, third-party plaintiff,
appellee and cross-appellee, v. Indraja
Chatterjee, appellee and cross-appellant,
and Indraneel Chatterjee, third-party
defendant, appellant.
___ N.W.2d ___
Filed March 10, 2023. No. S-22-194.
1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question which does
not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a
matter of law.
2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. The meaning and interpretation of statutes
are questions of law for which an appellate court has an obligation to
reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by
the court below.
3. Standing: Jurisdiction. A party must have standing before a court can
exercise jurisdiction, and either a party or the court can raise a question
of standing at any time during the proceeding.
4. Standing: Jurisdiction: Parties. Standing refers to whether a party had,
at the commencement of the litigation, a personal stake in the outcome
of the litigation that would warrant a court’s exercise of its subject mat-
ter jurisdiction and remedial powers on that party’s behalf.
5. Standing: Parties. To have standing, the plaintiff must have some
legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of
the controversy.
6. ____: ____. A plaintiff does not generally have standing to bring a case
on behalf of a third party.
7. ____: ____. The focus of the standing inquiry is not whether the claim
the plaintiff advances has merit; it is on whether the plaintiff is the
proper party to assert the claim.
8. Parent and Child: Paternity: Presumptions: Evidence. The presump-
tion set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-377 (Cum. Supp. 2022) may be
rebutted by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence.
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CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJEE
Cite as 313 Neb. 710Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Marlon
A. Polk, Judge. Vacated and dismissed.
Jeffrey A. Wagner, of Wagner, Meehan & Watson, L.L.P., for
appellant.
Scott Hahn and David Pontier, of Koenig | Dunne, P.C.,
L.L.O., for appellee Apurba Chatterjee.
Francis E. Younes, of High & Younes, L.L.C., for appellee
Indraja Chatterjee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Heavican, C.J.
INTRODUCTION
Indraneel Chatterjee appeals and Indraja Chatterjee cross-
appeals from the district court’s order establishing paternity of
the minor children in Apurba Chatterjee. We vacate the order
and dismiss.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Apurba filed a complaint on March 18, 2020, citing Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 43-1401 et seq. (Reissue 2016 & Cum. Supp.
2018), seeking to establish paternity, custody, and support.
He alleged that Indraja was pregnant with twins and that
based on the approximate date of conception, he believed he
might be the biological father of the children. He also sought
genetic testing in that complaint. Apurba, despite sharing a
last name with husband and wife Indraneel and Indraja, is not
related to them. Subsequently, Apurba moved to add Indraneel
as a third-party defendant and sought to file an amended
complaint.
Apurba’s motion for genetic testing of the twins was
granted, as was his motion to add Indraneel as a party and his
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CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJEE
Cite as 313 Neb. 710motion to file an amended complaint. That complaint prayed,
as had the original complaint, that if testing showed that
Apurba was the biological father, Indraneel be disestablished
as the twins’ father and an order establishing Apurba’s pater-
nity be entered, as well as an order setting forth custody, par-
enting time, and support.
The twins were born in June 2020. At the time of the births,
Indraneel and Indraja were married. Genetic testing was per-
formed, and on June 11, results were returned indicating that
there was a 99.9-percent statistical probability that Apurba was
the biological father of the minor children. Based on informa-
tion provided by Indraneel and Indraja at the hospital where
the children were born, birth certificates for the minor children
were issued on July 6, 2020, naming Indraneel as the chil-
dren’s father.
On March 21, 2022, a decree of paternity, custody, and sup-
port was entered by the district court. That decree found that
Indraja was the children’s biological mother and that Apurba
was the children’s biological father. The court ordered joint
legal and physical custody of the children, set forth a parenting
plan and vacation schedule, and made several orders surround-
ing support and expenses, including ordering Apurba to pay
$833 per month in child support.
Indraneel appeals from this determination, and Indraja cross-
appeals. We moved this case to our docket through our power
to regulate the docket of this court and the Nebraska Court
of Appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Indraneel assigns that the district court erred in failing to
grant his motion to dismiss. On cross-appeal, Indraja assigns
that the district court erred in (1) denying Indraneel’s motion to
dismiss, (2) denying Indraja’s motion to dismiss, (3) granting
Apurba’s partial motion for summary judgment, and (4) exer-
cising jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action.
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CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJEE
Cite as 313 Neb. 710STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] A jurisdictional question which does not involve a fac-
tual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
of law. 1
[2] The meaning and interpretation of statutes are questions
of law for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach
an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by
the court below. 2
ANALYSIS
This appeal raises the question of whether Nebraska’s pater-
nity statutes allow for an alleged father to establish paternity
over a child born to a married couple. In addition to the argu-
ment by both Indraneel and Indraja that the district court erred
in establishing paternity in Apurba, Indraja contends that the
district court lacked jurisdiction over Apurba’s request.
We understand Indraja’s contention as challenging Apurba’s
standing to seek the establishment of paternity. We agree and
conclude that as a stranger to the marriage of Indraneel and
Indraja, Apurba lacked standing to challenge the legitimacy
of children born to the marriage. We accordingly dismiss this
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Civil proceedings to establish the paternity of a child are
governed by §§ 43-1411 and 43-1411.01. Section 43-1411
sets out the circumstances under which a paternity action may
be instituted and identifies who may institute such an action.
Section 43-1411 provides in relevant part:
A civil proceeding to establish the paternity of a
child may be instituted, in the court of the district
where the child is domiciled or found or, for cases
under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, where
1
State on behalf of Marcelo K. & Rycki K. v. Ricky K., 300 Neb. 179, 912
N.W.2d 747 (2018).
2
State on behalf of Miah S. v. Ian K., 306 Neb. 372, 945 N.W.2d 178(2020).
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CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJEE
Cite as 313 Neb. 710the alleged father is domiciled, by (1) the mother or the
alleged father of such child, either during pregnancy
or within four years after the child’s birth, unless (a) a
valid consent or relinquishment has been made pursuant
to sections 43-104.08 to 43-104.25 or section 43-105 for
purposes of adoption or (b) a county court or separate
juvenile court has jurisdiction over the custody of the
child or jurisdiction over an adoption matter with respect
to such child pursuant to sections 43-101 to 43-116 or
(2) the guardian or next friend of such child or the state,
either during pregnancy or within eighteen years after the
child’s birth.
Conversely, civil proceedings to disestablish paternity are
governed by § 43-1412.01, which provides in relevant part:
An individual may file a complaint for relief and the
court may set aside a final judgment, court order, admin-
istrative order, obligation to pay child support, or any
other legal determination of paternity if a scientifically
reliable genetic test performed in accordance with sec-
tions 43-1401 to 43-1418 establishes the exclusion of the
individual named as a father in the legal determination.
Apurba argues, simply stated, that he is the alleged father
to the children whose paternity is at issue in this case and
that thus, he can, under § 43-1411, maintain an action to
establish his paternity. He argues that he need not disestablish
Indraneel’s paternity because it was never legally established.
Apurba further contends that the results of the DNA test show
he is the biological father of Indraja’s children by a likelihood
of over 99 percent and that thus, a rebuttable presumption
exists under § 43-1415 that he is their father.
[3-7] A party must have standing before a court can exer-
cise jurisdiction, and either a party or the court can raise
a question of standing at any time during the proceeding. 3
3
Alpha Wealth Advisors v. Cook, ante p. 237, 983 N.W.2d 526 (2023).
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CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJEE
Cite as 313 Neb. 710Standing refers to whether a party had, at the commencement
of the litigation, a personal stake in the outcome of the litiga-
tion that would warrant a court’s exercise of its subject matter
jurisdiction and remedial powers on that party’s behalf. 4 To
have standing, the plaintiff must have some legal or equitable
right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the contro­
versy. 5 A plaintiff does not generally have standing to bring
a case on behalf of a third party. 6 The focus of the standing
inquiry is not whether the claim the plaintiff advances has
merit; it is on whether the plaintiff is the proper party to
assert the claim. 7
We agree with Apurba that Indraneel’s paternity was never
“legally” established and thus is not capable of being disestab-
lished by § 43-1412.01. 8 But we disagree that Apurba other-
wise has standing to challenge Indraneel’s status as the father
of Indraja’s children.
Apurba relies on § 43-1411 and argues that on the basis
of statements made by Indraja and the results of the DNA
test ordered by the court, he is the alleged father of Indraja’s
children. But even assuming the truth of these allegations, the
children do not meet the definition of a child for purposes of
§ 43-1411. Put simply, Apurba focuses on whether he is an
alleged father without also considering that his standing is lim-
ited by the term “child.”
And that term, for purposes of §§ 43-1401 to 43-1418,
means “a child under the age of eighteen years born out of
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Cf. Erin W. v. Charissa W., 297 Neb. 143, 897 N.W.2d 858 (2017),
disapproved on other grounds, State on behalf of Kaaden S. v. Jeffrey T.,
303 Neb. 933, 932 N.W.2d 692 (2019).
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CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJEE
Cite as 313 Neb. 710wedlock.” 9 A “[c]hild born out of wedlock” shall mean “a
child whose parents were not married to each other at the time
of its birth, except that a child shall not be considered as born
out of wedlock if its parents were married at the time of its
conception but divorced at the time of its birth.” 10
[8] Because of the operation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-377(Cum. Supp. 2022), these children are not considered to be
born out of wedlock. Section 42-377 sets forth the legal pre-
sumption of the legitimacy of children, providing:
Children born to the parties, or to either spouse, in a
marriage relationship which may be dissolved or annulled
pursuant to sections 42-347 to 42-381 shall be legitimate
unless otherwise decreed by the court, and in every case
the legitimacy of all children conceived before the com-
mencement of the suit shall be presumed until the con-
trary is shown.
We have held that the presumption set forth in § 42-377 may
be rebutted by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. 11
Under the operation of § 42-377, Indraja’s children are
presumed to be legitimate and do not meet the definition of
children born out of wedlock. This decision is consistent with
prior case law.
In State on behalf of Miah S. v. Ian K., 12 we interpreted
§§ 43-1401(1) and 43-1411 as dictating that a child born dur-
ing a marriage was not “born out of wedlock” as defined by
§ 43-1401(2). There, the State sought to invoke § 43-1411
to establish the biological paternity of an outsider to a mar-
riage to which a child had been born. This court explained
that the definitions of “[c]hild” 13 and “[c]hild born out of
9
§ 43-1401(1).
10
§ 43-1401(2).
11
See Alisha C. v. Jeremy C., 283 Neb. 340, 808 N.W.2d 875 (2012).
12
State on behalf of Miah S. v. Ian K., supra note 2.
13
§ 43-1401(1).
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CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJEE
Cite as 313 Neb. 710wedlock” 14 were, by the opening clause of § 43-1401, 15
expressly applied to § 43-1411. Although the holding was lim-
ited to a § 43-1411 action brought by the State, the reasoning
applies equally here.
And where a statute has been judicially construed and that
construction has not evoked an amendment, it will be pre-
sumed that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court’s deter-
mination of the Legislature’s intent. 16 This principle applies
here to stand for the continued validity of our interpretations of
§§ 43-1401 and 43-1411, neither of which has been amended
in any way that might contradict our decision in State on
behalf of Miah S.
Moreover, we are unpersuaded by Apurba’s reliance on
Gomez v. State ex rel. Larez, 17 where we were asked to deter-
mine whether a married woman could seek to establish pater-
nity in someone other than her husband. In that case, a mar-
ried woman gave birth to a child she alleged was fathered by
Ralph Gomez, who was not her husband. The married woman
sought, through action of the State, to have the paternity estab-
lished in Gomez. Gomez objected to the court’s jurisdiction,
arguing that a married woman could not bring an action for
paternity. Gomez seemed to acknowledge that the language
of the definition itself did not support his position, but he
nevertheless contended that the Legislature did not intend for
married women to assert and prove that their child was born
out of wedlock.
We disagreed. We set forth the history of the statute setting
forth the establishment of paternity, noting that upon enact-
ment “‘any woman’” could maintain a suit for paternity; by
14
§ 43-1401(2).
15
§ 43-1401 (“[f]or purposes of sections 43-1401 to 43-1418”).
16
Bogue v. Gillis, 311 Neb. 445, 973 N.W.2d 338 (2022).
17
Gomez v. State ex rel. Larez, 157 Neb. 738, 61 N.W.2d 345 (1953).
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CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJEE
Cite as 313 Neb. 7101875, the Legislature had revised the statutory language to
provide a cause of action for “‘any unmarried woman,’” and in
1941, the Legislature passed another statutory revision indicat-
ing that “‘any woman’” could make such a complaint. 18 It was
apparent from this history that a married woman could assert
a claim for paternity on the basis of a child fathered by a man
who was not her husband and that this child was to be consid-
ered as one born out of wedlock.
While Gomez stands for the proposition that a married
woman could attempt to establish paternity in someone other
than her husband, it does not opine as to whether a stranger to
a marriage could do so. We conclude that one cannot. Given
the statutory presumption in favor of the legitimacy of children
born during the parties’ marriage, and the lack of statutory
protection provided to parties outside of that relationship, we
determine that Nebraska’s existing statutes prioritize the mari-
tal relationship.
We agree with the dissent’s observation that situations like
this one present difficult policy decisions. But it is the function
of the Legislature, through the enactment of statutes, to declare
what is the law and public policy of this state. 19 In another
context, we have said that we highlight competing policy
arguments “not to choose one side or the other, but to observe
that once the Legislature has enacted a statute, the resolution
of those arguments is not our job.” 20 Here, the parties essen-
tially dispute whether biology or marital status is paramount.
Ultimately, that policy question belongs to the Legislature and
not with this court. As such, we hold that Apurba lacks stand-
ing to seek a finding of paternity and that his petition must
be dismissed.
18
Id., 157 Neb. at 743, 744, 61 N.W.2d at 348.
19
Bogue v. Gillis, supra note 16.
20
Id. at 461, 973 N.W.2d at 348.
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CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJEE
Cite as 313 Neb. 710CONCLUSION
The decision of the district court establishing paternity in
Apurba is vacated, and his petition seeking the establishment
of paternity is dismissed.
Vacated and dismissed.
Funke, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion of the court.
I agree with the majority’s finding that Indraneel Chatterjee’s
paternity of the minor children has not been established, but I
disagree with the majority’s finding that Apurba Chatterjee has
no standing to bring his paternity action, which he filed prior
to the birth of the minor children. Instead, I would find that
because he is an “alleged father” under the relevant statute and
because the minor children are “children born out of wedlock,”
Apurba has standing to bring this action.
Nebraska law, via Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-377 (Cum. Supp.
2022), creates a presumption that a married mother’s husband
is the father of her child if the child is born during the mar-
riage. The presumption “merely creates a default assumption
absent sufficient evidence to the contrary” 1 and may be rebut-
ted by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. 2 With the
advent of genetic testing, this marital presumption of paternity
can now be overcome by scientifically reliable evidence that
the husband is not the biological father of the child. 3 Genetic
testing can also establish paternity of children born out of
wedlock. 4 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1411 (Reissue 2016) provides,
as relevant, that a civil proceeding to establish the paternity
of a child may be brought by an “alleged father.” At issue
is whether the presumption in § 42-377 operates to eclipse
1
Alisha C. v. Jeremy C., 283 Neb. 340, 356, 808 N.W.2d 875, 887 (2012).
2
Alisha C., supra note 1.
3
Id.4
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CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJEE
Cite as 313 Neb. 710the standing granted to an “alleged father” by § 43-1411.
Unlike the majority, I believe that it does not.
We need not, for purposes of our standing analysis, deter-
mine whether Apurba has established paternity by clear, sat-
isfactory, and convincing evidence. As we have previously
explained, because standing focuses “‘on the party, not the
claim itself,’” when considering standing, “the legal and fac-
tual validity of the claim presented must be assumed.” 5 And
assuming that Apurba’s claim has merit and that he would be
entitled to establish paternity, he is the proper party to assert
that claim and request such relief. 6
In Heiden v. Norris, 7 asserted grandparents filed a complaint
to establish grandparent visitation with minor children after
the children’s mother died and visitation was granted. The
children’s father appealed, arguing that the district court erred
in finding that the asserted grandparents had standing to bring
the action. 8 In particular, the children’s father argued that the
asserted grandparents, who had raised the children’s mother,
lacked standing to bring the action under Nebraska’s grandpar-
ent visitation statutes because they were not the “biological
or adoptive parent[s] of [the children’s] biological or adoptive
parent” as required by those statutes. 9 In rejecting this argu-
ment, we explained:
[The children’s father] conflates standing with the mer-
its of the [asserted grandparents’] claim. Under the doc-
trine of standing, a court may decline to determine the
merits of a legal claim because the party advancing it is
not properly situated to be entitled to its judicial deter-
mination. But as we have said previously, the focus of
5
See Heiden v. Norris, 300 Neb. 171, 174, 912 N.W.2d 758, 761 (2018).
6
Cf. Heiden, supra note 5.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
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CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJEE
Cite as 313 Neb. 710the standing inquiry is “on the party, not the claim itself.”
For that very reason, in considering standing, the legal and
factual validity of the claim presented must be assumed.
Here, if the [asserted grandparents’] assertions that they
are grandparents within the meaning of [the applicable
statute] and entitled to visitation under the statute are
assumed to be valid, it becomes plain that the [asserted
grandparents] are the proper parties to bring such a claim
and thus have standing. 10
After concluding that the asserted grandparents did have stand-
ing, we addressed the merits of their claim and concluded that
they were not “grandparents” under the statute and were not
entitled to grandparent visitation. 11 We vacated the order of
visitation, remanding the cause with directions to dismiss. 12
Heiden should inform our standing analysis in the pres-
ent case. In his amended complaint, Apurba alleged that he
engaged in sexual intercourse with Indraja Chatterjee; that,
as a result, Indraja became pregnant with twins; that he is
the twins’ biological father; and that Indraja told him that he
is the twins’ biological father. Apurba requested, inter alia,
genetic testing of the minor children to establish his paternity,
the results of which did in fact favor his paternity.
Under § 43-1411, an “alleged father” may bring a civil
action to “establish the paternity of a child.” For purposes of
§ 43-1411, a “[c]hild” is a “child under the age of eighteen
years born out of wedlock.” 13 A “[c]hild born out of wedlock”
is defined as a child whose “parents were not married to each
other” at the time of the child’s birth. 14 When an individual
brings a paternity action as an “alleged father of [a] child
10
Id. at 174-75, 912 N.W.2d at 761.
11
Id. at 175, 912 N.W.2d at 761.
12
See Heiden, supra note 5.
13
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1401 (Reissue 2016).
14
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Cite as 313 Neb. 710[born out of wedlock]” per § 43-1411, he is alleging that he
is a parent; he is alleging that under § 43-1401, he is one of
the “parents [who] were not married to each other” at the time
of the child’s birth. Here, if Apurba’s assertions that he is the
children’s biological parent and that he is entitled to estab-
lish his paternity are assumed to be valid, it becomes plain
that Apurba is the proper party to bring his claim and thus
has standing.
Accordingly, the applicable analysis should be as follows:
Section 42-377 provides a “default” presumption of paternity
that can be rebutted by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evi-
dence. 15 Section 43-1411 provides who can rebut the presump-
tion in establishing paternity, as well as where and how to do
so. Section 43-1411 expressly grants standing to an “alleged
father of such child.” In this case, the fact of consequence is
whether, under the plain language of the statute, Apurba quali-
fies as an alleged father, i.e., a parent not married to Indraja.
Statutory language must be given its plain and ordinary mean-
ing, and an appellate court will not resort to interpretation
to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain,
direct, and unambiguous. 16 Apurba plainly qualifies as an
alleged father. As this is apparent from the text of § 43-1411
and from his amended complaint, it should be the end of our
standing analysis.
But the majority forgoes a plain language analysis in its con-
struction of a fixed loop: The majority concludes that our statu-
tory presumption of legitimacy as applied to children born in a
marriage is rebuttable and, yet, operates to preclude interested
parties from rebutting it. In doing so, the majority inappropri-
ately shifts the focus of our standing analysis from Apurba to
the claim itself.
15
Alisha C., supra note 1, 283 Neb. at 356, 808 N.W.2d at 887.
16
Timothy L. Ashford, PC LLO v. Roses, ante p. 302, 984 N.W.2d 596(2023).
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Cite as 313 Neb. 710The majority contends that even if Apurba is an alleged
father, he lacks standing because the children do not meet the
definition of children born out of wedlock. The majority sug-
gests that our holding in State on behalf of Miah S. v. Ian K. 17
definitively determined that a child born during a marriage is
not a child born out of wedlock. The majority then applies the
doctrine of legislative acquiescence to indicate that the issue
has been fully resolved.
Though the language cited by the majority is found in State
on behalf of Miah S., perhaps our opinion was not as precise
as it could have been. In that case, we considered whether
the State had the statutory authority to establish paternity in a
putative father when the child was born during the marriage of
the mother and another man. We concluded that the child was
not a child on whose behalf the State was authorized to initi-
ate a civil proceeding to establish paternity under § 43-1411.
We made no determination as to whether a putative father had
standing to seek the establishment of paternity.
My concern with State on behalf of Miah S. is that we did
not address in it the earlier case of Gomez v. State ex rel.
Larez 18 in which we held that the mother of a child born out
of wedlock, within the meaning of our paternity statutes, may
be a married woman at the time of conception and birth of
the child. As such, the Gomez holding seems to indicate that
a child born during a marriage can be considered a child born
out of wedlock, which State on behalf of Miah S. fails to
address or reconcile. The majority opinion attempts to distin-
guish Gomez by noting that the movant in that case was the
biological mother instead of the biological father. However,
nothing within our paternity statutes articulates different stand-
ing rules for biological mothers and biological fathers. If
17
State on behalf of Miah S. v. Ian K., 306 Neb. 372, 945 N.W.2d 178(2020).
18
Gomez v. State ex rel. Larez, 157 Neb. 738, 61 N.W.2d 345 (1953).
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Cite as 313 Neb. 710the Legislature had wished to make such a distinction, it could
have easily done so in § 43-1411.
Because of our contradictory holdings in State on behalf of
Miah S. and Gomez, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
determine which of our conflicting interpretations of the phrase
“child born out of wedlock” the Legislature has acquiesced in.
The doctrine of legislative acquiescence generally holds that
“‘when an appellate court judicially construes a statute and
that construction fails to evoke an amendment, it is presumed
that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court’s determination
of the Legislature’s intent.’” 19 Here, however, we have judi-
cially construed the statutory text in two different ways, and
the most that can be said is that the Legislature has expressed
no opinion. As such, I respectfully disagree with the majority
opinion’s contention that the definition of a “child born out of
wedlock” is well-settled law.
When considering the definition of a “child born out of
wedlock,” I note that § 43-1401(2) defines the same as “a
child whose parents were not married to each other at the time
of its birth.” Here, the results of the genetic testing clearly
show that Apurba is the biological father of the minor chil-
dren. Further, the record is clear that Apurba was not married
to Indraja at the time of the conception or birth of the minor
children. Lastly, as the majority points out, there has been no
establishment of paternity in Indraneel. As such, under the
plain reading of the statute, I suggest that the minor children
meet the definition of children born out of wedlock because
their parents were not married at the time of their conception
or birth. So whether one focuses on the terms “alleged father”
or “child,” either way Apurba has standing to bring this action
to establish paternity.
I recognize that a factual situation like the one here presents
difficult policy considerations. However, the sole question
19
State v. Casterline, 290 Neb. 985, 988, 863 N.W.2d 148, 151 (2015).
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
313 Nebraska Reports
CHATTERJEE V. CHATTERJEE
Cite as 313 Neb. 710before this court is whether the statutes discussed above give
Apurba standing to attempt to establish paternity. Because I
believe these statutes are best read to provide him with such
standing, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion
finding otherwise.
Miller-Lerman and Papik, JJ., join in this dissent.