ConAgra Foods v. Zimmerman ( 2014 )


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  •                         Nebraska Advance Sheets
    CONAGRA FOODS v. ZIMMERMAN	81
    Cite as 
    288 Neb. 81
    V. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons discussed, we affirm the judgment of the
    district court in all respects.
    Affirmed.
    ConAgra Foods, Inc., appellant, v.
    Ryan J. Zimmerman, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed May 9, 2014.     No. S-13-375.
    1.	 Injunction: Equity: Appeal and Error. An action for injunction sounds
    in equity. On appeal from an equity action, an appellate court tries factual
    questions de novo on the record and, as to questions of both fact and law, is
    obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the conclusion reached by the
    trial court.
    2.	 Rules of Evidence. In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules apply, the
    admissibility of evidence is controlled by the Nebraska Evidence Rules; judicial
    discretion is involved only when the rules make discretion a factor in determin-
    ing admissibility.
    3.	 Evidence. Determining the relevancy of evidence is a matter entrusted to the
    discretion of the trial court.
    4.	 Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error. An erroneous exclusion of evidence is
    reversible only if the complaining litigant was prejudiced by the exclusion of
    such evidence.
    5.	 Injunction: Equity. An injunction lies in equity.
    6.	 Equity. Equity is not a rigid concept, and its principles are not applied in
    a vacuum.
    7.	 ____. Equity is determined on a case-by-case basis when justice and fairness
    so require.
    8.	 Injunction. An injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and it ordinarily should
    not be granted unless the right is clear, the damage is irreparable, and the remedy
    at law is inadequate to prevent a failure of justice.
    9.	 Injunction: Trespass. An injunction against trespassing will be granted where
    the nature and frequency of trespasses are such as to prevent or threaten the sub-
    stantial enjoyment of the rights of possession and property in land.
    10.	 Injunction: Proof. The party seeking an injunction must establish by a prepon-
    derance of the evidence every controverted fact necessary to entitle him or her
    to relief.
    11.	 Criminal Law. As a general rule, the prosecution of criminal offenses is nor-
    mally a complete and sufficient remedy at law.
    12.	 Criminal Law: Injunction: Equity. Where acts complained of are in violation
    of the criminal law, courts of equity will not, on that ground alone, interfere by
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    82	288 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    injunction to prevent their commission, as they will not exercise their power for
    the purpose of enforcing criminal laws.
    13.	 ____: ____: ____. A court of equity may properly afford injunctive relief where
    there has been a continuing and flagrant course of violations of the law, even
    though these acts may be subject to criminal prosecution.
    14.	 Evidence: Words and Phrases. Relevant evidence means evidence having any
    tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter-
    mination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without
    the evidence.
    15.	 Evidence: Proof. For evidence to be relevant, all that must be established is a
    rational, probative connection, however slight, between the offered evidence and
    a fact of consequence.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: James T.
    Gleason, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
    Heidi A. Guttau-Fox and Christopher R. Hedican, of Baird
    Holm, L.L.P., for appellant.
    Michael J. Wilson, of Schaefer Shapiro, L.L.P., for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack,
    and Cassel, JJ.
    McCormack, J.
    NATURE OF CASE
    ConAgra Foods, Inc. (ConAgra), appeals the district court’s
    denial of injunctive relief. ConAgra argues that the violent
    nature of Ryan J. Zimmerman’s alleged trespass warrants
    injunctive relief enjoining Zimmerman from having any con-
    tact with ConAgra and its employees and restraining him from
    ConAgra property.
    BACKGROUND
    At approximately 5 a.m. on November 10, 2012, a white
    male drove a vehicle onto ConAgra’s main campus in down-
    town Omaha, Nebraska. The man fired a gun five times at
    two window washers working on ConAgra property and then
    drove away.
    On November 13, 2012, police arrested Zimmerman for
    the incident. The two window washers reviewed the photo-
    graphs from television news reports and the Omaha World-
    Herald newspaper and positively identified Zimmerman
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    CONAGRA FOODS v. ZIMMERMAN	83
    Cite as 
    288 Neb. 81
    as the shooter. Zimmerman’s estranged wife is a manager
    at ConAgra.
    On November 15, 2012, ConAgra filed its complaint seeking
    a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a
    1-year permanent injunction enjoining Zimmerman from hav-
    ing any contact with ConAgra. ConAgra also served a “bar and
    ban” letter upon Zimmerman.
    The district court entered a temporary restraining order.
    Zimmerman answered the complaint, and a hearing was held
    on ConAgra’s request for permanent injunction.
    At the hearing, ConAgra offered 21 exhibits. Exhibits 1
    through 6 consisted of three petitions/affidavits for protection
    orders filed by Zimmerman’s estranged wife and the three
    protection orders granted by the district court. Exhibits 7 and
    11 through 14 are printouts containing Zimmerman’s criminal
    history which were obtained from “JUSTICE,” Nebraska’s
    online trial court case management system. The exhibits also
    show that Zimmerman had posted bond for the charges asso-
    ciated with the alleged shooting. The district court sustained
    Zimmerman’s relevancy objections on all of these exhibits.
    Exhibit 8 is the “bar and ban” letter sent to Zimmerman
    by ConAgra. Exhibits 17 and 18 are the affidavits of the win-
    dow washers, identifying Zimmerman as the shooter. Exhibit
    19 is the affidavit from ConAgra security, and exhibit 21
    is the complaint filed in this action. Each of these exhibits
    was admitted.
    On April 1, 2013, the district court dissolved the tempo-
    rary injunction and denied ConAgra’s request for a permanent
    injunction. The district court relied on Cox v. Sheen1 for the
    proposition that a single trespass does not give rise to injunc-
    tive relief. ConAgra appealed, and we moved the case to
    our docket.2
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    ConAgra assigns that the district court erred in (1) sustain-
    ing Zimmerman’s relevancy objections to exhibits 1 through 6
    1
    Cox v. Sheen, 
    82 Neb. 472
    , 
    118 N.W. 125
    (1908).
    2
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    84	288 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    and 11 through 14, (2) holding that Zimmerman’s trespass was
    insufficient for injunctive relief, and (3) denying the perma-
    nent injunction.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] An action for injunction sounds in equity. On appeal
    from an equity action, an appellate court tries factual questions
    de novo on the record and, as to questions of both fact and law,
    is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the conclu-
    sion reached by the trial court.3
    [2-4] In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules
    apply, the admissibility of evidence is controlled by the
    Nebraska Evidence Rules; judicial discretion is involved only
    when the rules make discretion a factor in determining admis-
    sibility.4 Determining the relevancy of evidence is a matter
    entrusted to the discretion of the trial court.5 An erroneous
    exclusion of evidence is reversible only if the complaining liti-
    gant was prejudiced by the exclusion of such evidence.6
    ANALYSIS
    The issue presented by this appeal is whether ConAgra met
    its burden in establishing that Zimmerman is likely to trespass
    again and that the existing remedies at law are inadequate
    to remedy such a trespass. After reviewing the record, the
    uncontroverted facts sufficiently demonstrate that Zimmerman
    will again trespass in flagrant violation of criminal law upon
    ConAgra’s property. Therefore, justice requires a 1-year per-
    manent junction.
    [5-7] An injunction lies in equity.7 Equity is not a rigid con-
    cept, and its principles are not applied in a vacuum.8 Rather,
    3
    State ex rel. City of Alma v. Furnas Cty. Farms, 
    266 Neb. 558
    , 
    667 N.W.2d 512
    (2003).
    4
    State v. Ely, 
    287 Neb. 147
    , 
    841 N.W.2d 216
    (2014).
    5
    Id.
    6
    Sturzenegger v. Father Flanagan’s Boys’ Home, 
    276 Neb. 327
    , 
    754 N.W.2d 406
    (2008).
    7
    See Lambert v. Holmberg, 
    271 Neb. 443
    , 
    712 N.W.2d 268
    (2006).
    8
    
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    equity is determined on a case-by-case basis when justice and
    fairness so require.9
    [8-10] An injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and it
    ordinarily should not be granted unless the right is clear, the
    damage is irreparable, and the remedy at law is inadequate to
    prevent a failure of justice.10 An injunction against trespassing
    will be granted where the nature and frequency of trespasses
    are such as to prevent or threaten the substantial enjoyment
    of the rights of possession and property in land.11 The party
    seeking an injunction must establish by a preponderance of the
    evidence every controverted fact necessary to entitle him or her
    to relief.12
    [11-13] As a general rule, the prosecution of criminal
    offenses is normally a complete and sufficient remedy at law.13
    We have stated that where acts complained of are in violation
    of the criminal law, courts of equity will not, on that ground
    alone, interfere by injunction to prevent their commission, as
    they will not exercise their power for the purpose of enforc-
    ing criminal laws.14 However, a court of equity may properly
    afford injunctive relief where there has been a continuing and
    flagrant course of violations of the law, even though these acts
    may be subject to criminal prosecution.15 For instance, we have
    upheld injunctive relief against a husband and wife who oper-
    ated a private home school in continuing and flagrant violation
    of the State Department of Education’s rules and regulations
    and Nebraska statutes.16
    In cases involving serious violence, other courts have
    granted an injunction if there is a risk that the serious violent
    9
    
    Id. 10 See
    id.
    11
    See 
    id.
    12
    Riha 
    v. FirsTier Bank, 
    248 Neb. 785
    , 
    539 N.W.2d 632
    (1995).
    13
    See City of New York v. Andrews, 
    186 Misc. 2d 533
    , 
    719 N.Y.S.2d 442
          (2000).
    14
    See State, ex rel. Spillman, v. Heldt, 
    115 Neb. 435
    , 
    213 N.W. 578
    (1927).
    15
    State ex rel. Douglas v. Wiener, 
    220 Neb. 502
    , 
    370 N.W.2d 720
    (1985).
    16
    
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    86	288 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    act will be repeated again. For example, in Emma Goldman
    Clinic v. Holman,17 injunctive relief was granted against a
    protestor who had undertaken aggressive demonstrations for
    more than a year outside of a clinic that performed abortions
    and who made threatening comments in a local newspaper.
    The court held that the plaintiffs lacked an adequate remedy
    to prevent the protestor from harming the clinic and its staff.
    The court thus placed restrictions on the protestor’s actions to
    help prevent such harm. And in State ex rel. Dobbs v. Burche,18
    injunctive relief was granted after a landlord had raped one
    female tenant and had repeatedly harassed others. These cases,
    along with our precedent, indicate that an injunction can be
    granted, even when the criminal law is implicated, if the tres-
    pass is likely to be repeated in flagrant violation of the crimi-
    nal law.
    [14,15] But before addressing whether Zimmerman is likely
    to trespass again, we must determine whether the district court
    abused its discretion in sustaining Zimmerman’s relevancy
    objections to exhibits 1 through 6 and 11 through 14. Relevant
    evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the
    existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determi-
    nation of the action more probable or less probable than it
    would be without the evidence.19 For evidence to be relevant,
    all that must be established is a rational, probative connec-
    tion, however slight, between the offered evidence and a fact
    of consequence.20
    We find the excluded exhibits to be relevant evidence.
    Exhibits 1 through 6 and exhibit 11 demonstrate that
    Zimmerman’s wife has had protection orders against him. The
    evidence establishes that Zimmerman’s estranged wife works
    at ConAgra and that Zimmerman has previously harassed
    her. Therefore, the exhibits provide the relevant evidence
    17
    Emma Goldman Clinic v. Holman, No. 05-2097, 
    2006 WL 3436221
    (Iowa
    App. Nov. 30, 2006) (unpublished disposition listed in table of “Decisions
    Without Published Opinions” at 
    728 N.W.2d 60
    (Iowa App. 2006)).
    18
    State ex rel. Dobbs v. Burche, 
    729 N.W.2d 431
    (Iowa 2007).
    19
    Karel v. Nebraska Health Sys., 
    274 Neb. 175
    , 
    738 N.W.2d 831
    (2007).
    20
    
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    CONAGRA FOODS v. ZIMMERMAN	87
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    of why Zimmerman may trespass again. Exhibit 12 is a
    JUSTICE report which demonstrated that Zimmerman was out
    on bond at the time of the hearing. Its relevance is obvi-
    ous—if Zimmerman was held in jail for the shooting, he could
    not possibly trespass while incarcerated. Exhibit 13, another
    JUSTICE report, shows the charges Zimmerman faced from
    this incident. And finally, exhibit 14 is a JUSTICE report
    which shows that Zimmerman had a pending stalking charge
    at the time of the hearing, for which he had pled not guilty.
    Exhibits 13 and 14 provide a relevant connection between the
    past actions of Zimmerman and the likelihood he will trespass
    again, while also demonstrating his flagrant disregard for the
    criminal law.
    After reviewing all of the relevant exhibits, we find that
    ConAgra established by a preponderance of the evidence
    every controverted fact necessary to entitle it to injunctive
    relief. The preponderance of the evidence established that
    ConAgra has a clear right to exclude Zimmerman from its
    private property, and Zimmerman provided no evidence to
    the contrary. The record also established that the damage
    could be irreparable should another similar trespass occur.
    And finally, the preponderance of the evidence established
    that the current remedies at law are inadequate to prevent a
    failure of justice because, despite possible criminal sanctions,
    all of the admitted evidence indicates that it is more likely
    than not that the trespass will be repeated. It is uncontro-
    verted that Zimmerman fired his gun on ConAgra property. It
    is uncontroverted that his estranged wife works at ConAgra
    and that she had previously requested and received protec-
    tion orders against Zimmerman. The record demonstrates that
    Zimmerman flagrantly violated at least one of his estranged
    wife’s protection orders when he entered onto her work prem-
    ises at ConAgra on November 10, 2012. After being arrested
    for the shooting, Zimmerman was released on bail and was
    thus capable of trespassing again.
    This evidence supported ConAgra’s argument that
    Zimmerman will again trespass on ConAgra property to
    harass and possibly harm his estranged wife, which could
    result in irreparable damage to ConAgra property and its
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    88	288 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    employees. Through his deplorable actions, Zimmerman has
    demonstrated that he is willing to flagrantly violate the crimi-
    nal laws of this state in order to trespass upon ConAgra prop-
    erty. Although Zimmerman’s prior criminal actions raise real
    doubts on the efficacy of a permanent injunction preventing
    Zimmerman from again trespassing onto ConAgra property,
    we do not feel comfortable standing by idly when justice calls
    for action. Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order and
    remand the cause with directions to grant a 1-year perma-
    nent injunction.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons discussed, we hold that the district court
    erred in denying injunctive relief to ConAgra. We remand with
    directions, consistent with this opinion, to enter a 1-year per-
    manent injunction against Zimmerman.
    R eversed and remanded with directions.
    Miller-Lerman, J., not participating.
    Cassel, J., dissenting.
    ConAgra’s request for a 1‑year injunction was prompted
    by a single event of trespass including criminal behavior. The
    majority now permits ConAgra to judicially obtain a special,
    extraordinary remedy denied to it by the Legislature. Further,
    equity has long denied injunctive relief for single instances of
    trespass or completed, past acts. And for over 100 years, this
    court has held that equity will not enjoin actions constitut-
    ing criminal offenses. The majority departs from this long‑­
    established precedent without explaining a principled distinc-
    tion between this case and the hundreds, if not thousands, of
    instances annually involving assaultive or violent behavior. I
    respectfully dissent.
    The majority concludes that the uncontroverted facts suf-
    ficiently demonstrate that Zimmerman will again trespass upon
    ConAgra’s property. This conclusion overstates the record.
    The record contains no evidence indicating that Zimmerman’s
    trespass was anything more than a single incident of violence.
    There is no evidence that Zimmerman had ever undertaken
    similar acts in the past or threatened ConAgra with future harm.
    While the record establishes that Zimmerman’s wife had made
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    CONAGRA FOODS v. ZIMMERMAN	89
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    288 Neb. 81
    allegations of harassment in the past and that Zimmerman had
    a pending stalking charge against him, such evidence provides
    no basis on which to conclude that Zimmerman posed a threat
    of future harm to ConAgra.
    This court has consistently stated that when simple acts of
    trespass are involved, equity generally will not act.1 Rather,
    an injunction will be granted where the nature and frequency
    of trespasses are such as to prevent or threaten the substantial
    enjoyment of the rights of possession and property in land.2
    In trespass cases, equity looks to the nature of the injury
    inflicted, together with the fact of its constant repetition, or
    continuation, rather than to the magnitude of the damage
    inflicted, as the ground of affording relief.3 Thus, in Whipps
    Land & Cattle Co. v. Level 3 Communications,4 this court
    affirmed the denial of injunctive relief, because the record
    provided no basis on which to conclude that future trespasses
    might occur. In Whipps Land & Cattle Co., the plaintiff failed
    to articulate a reason why similar trespasses would occur in
    the future, but instead relied upon the absence of any reason
    to believe they would not occur. In other words, much like the
    instant case, the plaintiff was speculating on the prospect of
    future harm. This was not sufficient, according to the Whipps
    Land & Cattle Co. court, to warrant the extraordinary remedy
    of injunctive relief.5
    ConAgra is requesting this court to speculate that future
    trespasses may occur merely because Zimmerman’s estranged
    wife still works at ConAgra. But an injunction should be
    granted in only the clearest of cases.6 Mere speculation that a
    future trespass may occur is insufficient to meet this standard.
    ­
    1
    See, e.g., Lambert v. Holmberg, 
    271 Neb. 443
    , 
    712 N.W.2d 268
    (2006);
    Whipps Land & Cattle Co. v. Level 3 Communications, 
    265 Neb. 472
    , 
    658 N.W.2d 258
    (2003); Thomas v. Weller, 
    204 Neb. 298
    , 
    281 N.W.2d 790
          (1979).
    2
    See Lambert, supra note 1.
    3
    Id.
    4
    Whipps Land & Cattle Co., supra note 1.
    5
    Id.
    6
    See Lambert, supra note 1.
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    Zimmerman’s behavior, though thoroughly deplorable, com-
    prised only a single event, and ConAgra failed to prove that
    the act will be repeated.
    Additionally, this court has described the purpose of an
    injunction as the restraint of actions which have not yet been
    taken.7 Remedy by injunction is generally preventative, pro-
    hibitory, or protective, and equity will not usually issue an
    injunction when the act complained of has been committed
    and the injury has been done.8 The purpose of an injunction is
    not to afford a remedy for what is past but to prevent future
    mischief.9 Rights already lost and wrongs already perpetrated
    cannot be corrected by an injunction.10 Zimmerman’s trespass,
    albeit violent, is a completed, past act. And the record con-
    tains no evidence to support the majority’s conclusion that
    future trespasses are likely. Thus, the majority contravenes our
    well‑established precedent that an injunction is an inappropri-
    ate remedy for a completed, past act.
    Moreover, injunctive relief was not appropriate, because
    ConAgra was effectively seeking to enjoin Zimmerman from
    committing a future crime. The record shows that ConAgra
    sent Zimmerman a “bar and ban” letter after the shooting,
    informing him that he was no longer permitted to enter onto
    its property. Thus, any subsequent entry by Zimmerman would
    constitute a criminal trespass.11 It is well settled that equity,
    as a general rule, has no criminal jurisdiction.12 Where acts
    complained of are in violation of the criminal law, courts of
    equity will not, on that ground alone, interfere by injunction
    7
    See Professional Firefighters Assn. v. City of Omaha, 
    282 Neb. 200
    , 
    803 N.W.2d 17
    (2011).
    8
    Id.
    9
    
    Id. 10 Id.
    11
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28‑521 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
    12
    See, Florida v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 
    181 F.3d 1237
    (11th Cir. 1999);
    U.S. v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska, 
    135 F.3d 558
    (8th Cir. 1998);
    State ex rel. Meyer v. Weiner, 
    190 Neb. 30
    , 
    205 N.W.2d 649
    (1973); State,
    ex rel. Spillman, v. Heldt, 
    115 Neb. 435
    , 
    213 N.W. 578
    (1927); State v.
    Maltby, 
    108 Neb. 578
    , 
    188 N.W. 175
    (1922).
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    to prevent their commission, as they will not exercise their
    power for the purpose of enforcing criminal laws.13 Since at
    least 1911, this court has recognized that equity will not inter-
    fere to punish crime.14
    The majority circumvents these principles, claiming that
    ConAgra has no adequate remedy at law. But the prosecution
    of criminal offenses is normally a complete and sufficient
    remedy at law.15 Thus, an injunction was not necessary to
    prevent a failure of justice, because any subsequent trespass
    would subject Zimmerman to criminal prosecution.
    The majority fails to explain how this case differs from
    hundreds, if not thousands, of assaultive crimes perpetrated
    annually in Nebraska. I see no principled basis in the majority
    opinion to distinguish this case from other cases. Undoubtedly,
    this precedent will prompt employers of victims to routinely
    seek injunctive relief merely for the sake of appearing to do
    something. The majority’s rationale for opening up the flood-
    gates to such cases is that it does not “feel comfortable stand-
    ing by idly when justice calls for action.” Although aspirations
    of justice are noble, courts apply law and equity. The major-
    ity’s discomfort strikes me as a poor basis for departing from
    the accumulated wisdom of over 100 years of precedent.
    Ultimately, the majority permits ConAgra to obtain special
    treatment from the courts where the Legislature has declined
    to authorize it. I do not believe that ConAgra’s status as
    a corporation or as a large and successful enterprise justi-
    fies the special treatment afforded by the majority’s decision.
    Injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy.16 The Legislature
    has provided injunctive relief for victims of domestic abuse17
    or victims of harassment,18 but ConAgra’s status as a victim’s
    13
    See Heldt, supra note 12.
    14
    See State v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 
    88 Neb. 669
    , 
    130 N.W. 295
    (1911).
    15
    See City of New York v. Andrews, 
    186 Misc. 2d 533
    , 
    719 N.Y.S.2d 442
          (2000).
    16
    See Bock v. Dalbey, 
    283 Neb. 994
    , 
    815 N.W.2d 530
    (2012).
    17
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42‑924 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
    18
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28‑311.09 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
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    92	288 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    employer clearly falls outside of the protections afforded by
    these statutes. This court has repeatedly emphasized that it is
    the Legislature’s function to declare the public policy of this
    state.19 And the court long ago recognized that equity will not
    enjoin the commission of a crime merely because the penalty
    seems to be inadequate, since the relief in such case must come
    from the Legislature.20 As the court said at that time, “If the
    punishment provided is not sufficient, recourse should be had
    to the [L]egislature, and not to the equity side of the courts.”21
    It is the Legislature’s prerogative to determine whether the
    extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief should be extended
    in the way that ConAgra seeks. Instead of deferring to the
    Legislature’s proper functioning, the majority’s decision pre-
    empts the Legislature’s role.
    I respectfully dissent.
    Stephan, J., joins in this dissent.
    19
    See, e.g., In re Invol. Dissolution of Wiles Bros., 
    285 Neb. 920
    , 
    830 N.W.2d 474
    (2013); In re Interest of Kendra M. et al., 
    283 Neb. 1014
    , 
    814 N.W.2d 747
    (2012); Bassinger v. Nebraska Heart Hosp., 
    282 Neb. 835
    ,
    
    806 N.W.2d 395
    (2011); City of Falls City v. Nebraska Mun. Power Pool,
    
    281 Neb. 230
    , 
    795 N.W.2d 256
    (2011); Bamford v. Bamford, Inc., 
    279 Neb. 259
    , 
    777 N.W.2d 573
    (2010); R & D Properties v. Altech Constr. Co.,
    
    279 Neb. 74
    , 
    776 N.W.2d 493
    (2009); Wilke v. Woodhouse Ford, 
    278 Neb. 800
    , 
    774 N.W.2d 370
    (2009); Davis v. Davis, 
    275 Neb. 944
    , 
    750 N.W.2d 696
    (2008).
    20
    See Maltby, supra note 12.
    21
    
    Id. at 584,
    188 N.W. at 178.
    Charles Rodgers, appellant, v.
    Nebraska State Fair, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed May 9, 2014.    No. S-13-651.
    1.	 Workers’ Compensation: Appeal and Error. A judgment, order, or award of
    the Workers’ Compensation Court may be modified, reversed, or set aside only
    upon the grounds that (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its
    powers; (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud; (3) there is not
    sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order,