State on behalf of Connor H. v. Blake G. ( 2014 )


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  •     Nebraska Advance Sheets
    246	289 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    not subject to such a challenge. Therefore, Dubray could
    not show prejudice from counsel’s purported failure to chal-
    lenge the hospital statement. Thus, I agree with the majority
    that Dubray has not shown ineffective assistance of counsel
    regarding his various admissions.
    Wright, J., joins in this concurrence.
    State    of Nebraska on behalf of Connor H., a minor child,
    appellee, v. Blake G., appellee, and Amanda H.,
    now known as A manda G., third -party
    defendant and appellant.
    In re Change of Name of Connor H., by and
    through his next friend, A manda G.
    Amanda G., appellant, v. Blake G., appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed October 10, 2014.      Nos. S-13-995, S-13-1000.
    1.	 Minors: Names: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews a trial court’s
    decision concerning a requested change in the surname of a minor de novo on the
    record and reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of the trial court.
    2.	 Minors: Names. The question of whether the name of a minor child should be
    changed is determined by what is in the best interests of the child.
    3.	 Minors: Names: Proof. The party seeking the change in surname has the burden
    of proving that the change in surname is in the child’s best interests.
    4.	 Minors: Names. Substantial welfare is related to best interests, because a change
    in surname is in a child’s best interests only when the substantial welfare of the
    child requires the name to be changed.
    5.	 ____: ____. In Nebraska, there is no preference for a surname—paternal or
    maternal—in name change cases; rather, the child’s best interests is the sole
    consideration.
    6.	 ____: ____. Nonexclusive factors to consider in determining whether a change
    of surname is in a child’s best interests are (1) misconduct by one of the child’s
    parents; (2) a parent’s failure to support the child; (3) parental failure to maintain
    contact with the child; (4) the length of time that a surname has been used for
    or by the child; (5) whether the child’s surname is different from the surname
    of the child’s custodial parent; (6) a child’s reasonable preference for one of the
    surnames; (7) the effect of the change of the child’s surname on the preservation
    and development of the child’s relationship with each parent; (8) the degree of
    community respect associated with the child’s present surname and the proposed
    surname; (9) the difficulties, harassment, or embarrassment that the child may
    experience from bearing the present or proposed surname; and (10) the identifica-
    tion of the child as a part of a family unit.
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    STATE ON BEHALF OF CONNOR H. v. BLAKE G.	247
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    289 Neb. 246
    7.	 Names: Child Custody: Presumptions. No presumption exists in favor of the
    surname desired by a custodial parent, even if the parent has sole legal and physi-
    cal custody of the child.
    8.	 Names. Name-change decisions are to be made on a case-by-case basis.
    Appeals from the District Court for Johnson County: Daniel
    E. Bryan, Jr., Judge. Judgment in No. S-13-995 reversed, and
    cause remanded with direction. Judgment in No. S-13-1000
    affirmed.
    Marc J. Odgaard, of Hanson, Hroch & Kuntz, for appellant.
    Diane L. Merwin, of Fankhauser, Nelsen, Werts, Ziskey &
    Merwin, P.C., for appellee Blake G.
    Heavican, C.J., Wright, Connolly, Stephan, McCormack,
    Miller-Lerman, and Cassel, JJ.
    Cassel, J.
    INTRODUCTION
    This appeal addresses the surname of a child born out of
    wedlock and given his mother’s maiden surname. After the
    mother married and began using her husband’s surname, both
    parents sought to change the child’s surname—the father pro-
    posing his surname and the mother requesting her married
    surname. The district court granted the father’s request, giving
    preference to the paternal surname and using a “substantial
    evidence” standard. But the child’s best interests, without any
    presumption favoring either parent’s surname, is the control-
    ling standard. Upon our de novo review, we conclude that the
    evidence was insufficient to show that a change in the child’s
    surname was in his best interests.
    BACKGROUND
    Connor H. was born out of wedlock to Blake G. and Amanda
    H., now known as Amanda G., in October 2008. Blake signed
    the birth certificate, which listed Amanda’s maiden surname
    as Connor’s surname. Amanda made the decision to use her
    maiden surname as Connor’s surname, and Blake testified
    that he was “[n]ot really” allowed any input in that decision.
    Blake and Amanda ceased living together prior to Connor’s
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    birth, and Amanda has been Connor’s custodial parent since
    his birth.
    Blake and Amanda entered into a stipulation regarding
    paternity, child support, and other matters. On December 1,
    2009, the district court entered a judgment, styled as an order,
    granting Amanda sole legal and physical custody of Connor,
    granting Blake reasonable rights of visitation, and ordering
    Blake to pay child support.
    In December 2011, Amanda married. She then changed her
    surname to that of her husband.
    On January 28, 2013, Blake filed a complaint to modify the
    December 2009 judgment. He alleged that a material change in
    circumstances had occurred and requested, among other things,
    that Connor’s surname be changed to Blake’s surname.
    On August 12, 2013, Amanda initiated a separate case by
    filing a petition for name change. She alleged that it was in
    Connor’s best interests to change his surname from Amanda’s
    maiden surname to her married surname.
    The district court heard both matters in October 2013. At
    that time, Connor was 4 years old and enrolled in preschool.
    Evidence established that Connor had leukemia and that he
    was covered under Amanda’s insurance. Both parents were
    involved in his medical care.
    Blake was able to build a strong relationship with Connor
    despite their different surnames. Connor referred to Blake as
    “‘Dad.’” Amanda was supportive of Blake’s relationship with
    Connor and allowed Blake additional visitation at times. Blake
    testified that he exercised his visitation rights and paid child
    support. At the time of trial, he was current on child support,
    but he had been in arrears until approximately May 2011.
    Blake attended Connor’s T-ball games and school activities.
    Blake also took Connor hunting and fishing and to watch foot-
    ball games. Connor knew his paternal grandparents and was
    involved with both of Blake’s brothers.
    Amanda wished to change Connor’s surname to match her
    married surname. Because Amanda, Connor’s stepfather, and
    Connor’s half sister have the same surname, Amanda thought
    that Connor “would feel more part of the family and feel like
    he belongs if he could have the same last name as everybody
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    that he lives with.” Amanda testified that Connor asked about
    her last name and that of his half sister and that he knew he
    had a different last name. As it pertained to Amanda’s state
    of mind and not for the truth of the matter, the court allowed
    Amanda to testify that Connor had told her that he would like
    his last name to be Amanda’s married surname. Amanda testi-
    fied that Connor loves his stepfather and that Connor has a
    great relationship with his stepgrandparents, who live in the
    same town.
    Following the presentation of evidence, the district court
    stated:
    Well, the Court doesn’t find that there’s evidence to
    change [Connor’s surname] to [Amanda’s married sur-
    name]. I think that’s like a de facto adoption. I’m not
    going to do that; that would just simply be wrong.
    Now, the evidence here is that the dad has had a good
    contact with the child, the natural father, and he’s kept
    contact with the child. There’s no reason to be changing
    the name to a stepfather’s name.
    The question really comes down to whether or not
    there’s evidence supplied that it would be in the best
    interest of the child to change the name at all.
    Now, mom says there is because she has changed her
    name now from [her maiden surname to her married
    surname]. And, of course, in the case of [Amanda’s]
    name change request, I’m not going to find it’s in the
    best interest to change it to [Amanda’s married sur-
    name], so I’m going to deny [Amanda’s] application in
    that regard.
    The father — the natural father’s allegation under
    the paternity law to change the name to the — to his
    name I’m going to find is probably in the best interest
    of the minor child. Now, that may be considered an old-­
    fashioned statement, but, on the other hand, I think there’s
    substantial evidence here in this sense. Now, substantial
    evidence defined in Nebraska’s law is — actually, it
    comes down to being more than a scintilla and less than
    a preponderance, which is interesting because the name
    “substantial” means that it would be substantial but, yet,
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    that’s the definition. I deal with that definition every day
    and in dealing with appeals and so forth.
    But the Court is going to find that there’s been primary
    contact; the contact with the natural father has been good
    with the minor child. And since mom’s name has already
    been changed, [her maiden surname] no longer is really
    relevant to this young man, and so if he was going to
    take a name, it would seem to me it would be in the best
    interest to take the natural father’s name instead of tak-
    ing what would be — in the Court’s thinking would be a
    stepfather’s name.
    On October 15, 2013, the district court entered an order
    in the paternity case changing Connor’s surname to Blake’s
    surname. On October 28, the district court entered a judgment
    denying Amanda’s separate petition for change of name. The
    court found that changing Connor’s surname to Amanda’s
    married surname “would amount to a de facto adoption”
    and that granting the petition would not be in the child’s
    best interests.
    Amanda filed a timely appeal in each case. The parties
    agreed to consolidate the appeals for briefing, argument, and
    disposition. We moved the cases to our docket under our statu-
    tory authority to regulate the caseloads of the appellate courts
    of this state.1
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Amanda assigns, reordered, that the district court erred in
    denying her petition for name change and in granting Blake’s
    complaint to modify the decree, because the court (1) applied
    an incorrect burden of proof, (2) wrongfully gave preference to
    Blake’s surname, and (3) ignored evidence which supported the
    name change to Amanda’s married surname.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision con-
    cerning a requested change in the surname of a minor de novo
    1
    See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 2008).
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    on the record and reaches a conclusion independent of the find-
    ings of the trial court.2
    ANALYSIS
    Burden of P roof
    [2,3] The question of whether the name of a minor child
    should be changed is determined by what is in the best interests
    of the child.3 The party seeking the change in surname has the
    burden of proving that the change in surname is in the child’s
    best interests.4 Cases considering this question have granted a
    change of name only when the substantial welfare of the child
    requires the name to be changed.5
    [4] Amanda contends that the district court applied an incor-
    rect burden of proof. The court recognized that the question
    was whether there was evidence that a name change would
    be in the child’s best interests, but the court also referred to a
    “substantial evidence” standard, which it defined as “more than
    a scintilla and less than a preponderance.” Thus, the court may
    have conflated “substantial evidence” with the “substantial
    welfare” concept referred to in name-change cases. Substantial
    welfare is related to best interests, because a change in sur-
    name is in a child’s best interests only when the substantial
    welfare of the child requires the name to be changed.6 To the
    extent the court deviated from a best interests standard, it did
    so in error. But our review on appeal is de novo on the record.
    And in conducting our review, we will consider only whether
    the evidence established that Connor’s best interests necessitate
    a name change.
    2
    In re Change of Name of Slingsby, 
    276 Neb. 114
    , 
    752 N.W.2d 564
    (2008).
    3
    Id.
    4
    Id.
    5
    Id.
    6
    See, In re Change of Name of Slingsby, supra note 2; In re Change of
    Name of Andrews, 
    235 Neb. 170
    , 
    454 N.W.2d 488
    (1990); Cohee v. Cohee,
    
    210 Neb. 855
    , 
    317 N.W.2d 381
    (1982); Spatz v. Spatz, 
    199 Neb. 332
    , 
    258 N.W.2d 814
    (1977).
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    P reference for Paternal
    Surname
    Amanda argues that the district court wrongfully gave a
    preference to the surname of Blake, the biological father. She
    points to the following statement by the court: “[T]he natural
    father’s allegation under the paternity law to change the name
    to . . . his name I’m going to find is probably in the best inter-
    est of the minor child. Now, that may be considered an old-
    fashioned statement . . . .” It is not clear from this statement
    that the court accorded a preference for the paternal surname
    in making a best interests determination. But to the extent
    the court may have done so, we expressly disapprove of such
    a practice.
    [5] Over 30 years ago, we recognized that no automatic
    preference as to the surname of a child born in wedlock exists
    in Nebraska law.7 We likewise conclude that there should be
    no automatic preference as to the surname of a child born out
    of wedlock. We acknowledge that some courts have recog-
    nized a preference for the paternal surname.8 But other courts
    have rejected that practice.9 We conclude that in Nebraska,
    there is no preference for a surname—paternal or maternal—
    in name change cases; rather, the child’s best interests is the
    sole consideration.10
    7
    See Cohee v. Cohee, supra note 6.
    8
    See, e.g., D. R. S. v. R. S. H., 
    412 N.E.2d 1257
    (Ind. App. 1980); Burke v.
    Hammonds, 
    586 S.W.2d 307
    (Ky. App. 1979); Application of Tubbs, 
    620 P.2d 384
    (Okla. 1980).
    9
    See, e.g., Pizziconi v. Yarbrough, 
    177 Ariz. 422
    , 
    868 P.2d 1005
    (Ariz. App.
    1993); In re Marriage of Schiffman, 
    28 Cal. 3d 640
    , 
    620 P.2d 579
    , 
    169 Cal. Rptr. 918
    (1980); In re Marriage of Gulsvig, 
    498 N.W.2d 725
    (Iowa
    1993); Gubernat v. Deremer, 
    140 N.J. 120
    , 
    657 A.2d 856
    (1995); Bobo v.
    Jewell, 
    38 Ohio St. 3d 330
    , 
    528 N.E.2d 180
    (1988); Ribeiro v. Monahan,
    
    524 A.2d 586
    (R.I. 1987); Keegan v. Gudahl, 
    525 N.W.2d 695
    (S.D.
    1994); Barabas v. Rogers, 
    868 S.W.2d 283
    (Tenn. App. 1993); Hamby v.
    Jacobson, 
    769 P.2d 273
    (Utah App. 1989); In re Wilson, 
    162 Vt. 281
    , 
    648 A.2d 648
    (1994).
    10
    See, In re Marriage of Schiffman, supra note 9; Ribeiro v. Monahan, supra
    note 9; Keegan v. Gudahl, supra note 9.
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    Sufficiency of Evidence
    Lastly, we consider Amanda’s claim that the district court
    ignored the evidence which supported the name change to her
    married surname and thereby erred in denying her petition for
    name change and in granting Blake’s complaint to modify the
    decree. As discussed above, whether Connor’s name should be
    changed is driven by his best interests.
    Before engaging in a best interests analysis, we briefly
    address some concerning statements by the district court.
    The court stated that changing Connor’s name to Amanda’s
    married surname would be “like a de facto adoption” and
    “would just simply be wrong.” The court also stated that
    “[t]here’s no reason to be changing the name to a stepfather’s
    name” and that “it would be in the best interest to take the
    natural father’s name instead of taking what would be — in
    the Court’s thinking would be a stepfather’s name.” In mak-
    ing these statements, the court seemingly overlooked the fact
    that Amanda’s married surname is her surname—not just
    “a stepfather’s name.” The court’s focus on Amanda’s mar-
    ried surname as being merely a stepfather’s surname was
    clearly misplaced.
    [6] We have previously set forth a list of nonexclusive fac-
    tors to consider in determining whether a change of surname is
    in the child’s best interests.11 These factors are (1) misconduct
    by one of the child’s parents; (2) a parent’s failure to support
    the child; (3) parental failure to maintain contact with the
    child; (4) the length of time that a surname has been used for
    or by the child; (5) whether the child’s surname is different
    from the surname of the child’s custodial parent; (6) a child’s
    reasonable preference for one of the surnames; (7) the effect
    of the change of the child’s surname on the preservation and
    development of the child’s relationship with each parent; (8)
    the degree of community respect associated with the child’s
    present surname and the proposed surname; (9) the difficulties,
    harassment, or embarrassment that the child may experience
    11
    See, In re Change of Name of Slingsby, supra note 2; In re Change of
    Name of Andrews, supra note 6.
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    from bearing the present or proposed surname; and (10) the
    identification of the child as a part of a family unit.12
    The application of these nonexclusive factors to the evi-
    dence does not support a finding that a name change—either
    to Blake’s surname or to Amanda’s married surname—is in
    Connor’s best interests. Several factors either weigh against
    a change or do not militate in favor of one parental surname
    rather than the other: Connor had used his present surname
    for nearly 5 years at the time of trial; the evidence did not
    establish Connor’s preference for one of the surnames; there
    had been no misconduct by either party; both parents had sup-
    ported Connor (although Blake had been in arrears on his child
    support obligation, he was current at the time of trial); both
    parents maintained contact with Connor; and both parents had
    been able to form and maintain a relationship with Connor
    despite the difference in surnames. Amanda opined that Connor
    would feel more a part of the family if he had the same sur-
    name as the rest of the household, but the evidence did not
    establish difficulties in identifying Connor as part of a family
    unit. In our view, only one factor weighed in favor of changing
    Connor’s surname: Connor’s surname was different from the
    surname of Amanda, Connor’s custodial parent.
    Amanda argues that the district court should have consid-
    ered that she has sole legal custody of Connor. She contends
    that as Connor’s legal custodian, she has the responsibility
    and authority to make fundamental decisions for Connor
    and that she has determined that it is in the best interests
    of Connor for his surname to be changed to Amanda’s mar-
    ried surname.
    Her contention finds some support in case law from other
    jurisdictions.13 The Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted
    12
    In re Change of Name of Slingsby, supra note 2.
    13
    See, e.g., Cormier v. Quist, 77 Mass. App. 914, 
    933 N.E.2d 153
    (2010);
    Gubernat v. Deremer, supra note 9. See, also, Aitkin County Family Serv.
    Agency v. Girard, 
    390 N.W.2d 906
    , 909 (Minn. App. 1986) (“absent
    evidence that the change will be detrimental to the preservation of the
    children’s relationship with their father, we see no reason to put aside the
    preference expressed by their custodial parent”).
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    a strong presumption in favor of the surname chosen by the
    custodial parent, noting the “judicial and legislative recogni-
    tion that the custodial parent will act in the best interest of the
    child.”14 A Massachusetts appellate court reasoned that “[a]
    decision to change a child’s surname is a significant life deci-
    sion; in making such a decision in the child’s best interests,
    the allocation of custodial responsibility should at least be
    considered.”15 But Nebraska has not recognized a presumption
    in favor of the surname chosen by the custodial parent.
    Long ago, we “refuse[d] to suggest or hold that a presump-
    tion exists in favor of the custodial parent.”16 Rather, we stated
    that “custody, along with the other factors, is to be considered
    in determining the best interests of the child.”17 Although we
    made those statements concerning a name change for a child in
    the context of a marital dissolution action, we see no reason to
    apply a custodial—legal or physical—presumption regarding a
    child born out of wedlock.
    [7] Other courts have similarly refused to adopt a presump-
    tion in favor of the surname desired by the custodial parent.18
    The Supreme Court of Arkansas reasoned that “such an inflex-
    ible resolution will not serve the best interests of the children
    involved.”19 Courts in Utah and Vermont have observed that
    “the best interests of the child test can appropriately include
    consideration of the custodial situation of the child, as well
    as other relevant factors”20 and that a presumption “would
    be inconsistent with the best interests analysis because it is
    not the custodial parent’s preference, but the best interests of
    the child that ‘is the paramount consideration in determining
    14
    Gubernat v. Deremer, supra note 
    9, 140 N.J. at 144
    , 657 A.2d at 869.
    15
    Cormier v. Quist, supra note 13, 77 Mass. App. at 
    916, 933 N.E.2d at 155-56
    .
    16
    Cohee v. Cohee, supra note 
    6, 210 Neb. at 861
    , 317 N.W.2d at 384.
    17
    
    Id. 18 See,
    e.g., Huffman v. Fisher, 
    337 Ark. 58
    , 
    987 S.W.2d 269
    (1999); In re
    Marriage of Schiffman, supra note 9; Hamby v. Jacobson, supra note 9; In
    re Wilson, supra note 9.
    19
    Huffman v. Fisher, supra note 
    18, 337 Ark. at 70
    , 987 S.W.2d at 275.
    20
    Hamby v. Jacobson, supra note 
    9, 769 P.2d at 277
    .
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    whether a child’s name should be changed.’”21 We agree. No
    presumption exists in favor of the surname desired by a cus-
    todial parent, even if the parent has sole legal and physical
    custody of the child. We will continue to apply a best interests
    of the child test exclusive of any presumption favoring one
    parent’s surname over the other.
    We are not unmindful that declining to change Connor’s sur-
    name leaves him with a surname different from the surnames
    of both of his parents. We were faced with a similar situation
    in In re Change of Name of Slingsby.22 In that case, as in the
    instant case, the child was born out of wedlock and given
    the mother’s surname, the mother subsequently married and
    changed her name, and the mother sought to change the child’s
    surname from her maiden name to her married surname. The
    district court denied the petition, determining that the mother
    failed to prove that the name change was in the child’s best
    interests. On appeal, we affirmed. We noted that there was
    no evidence that the child “would be more or less likely to
    identify himself with a family unit with or without a change in
    his surname.”23
    The dissent in In re Change of Name of Slingsby raised
    serious concerns. It pointed out that “where the child bears
    neither the mother’s new surname nor the biological father’s
    surname, the child will likely be questioned in the future as to
    why he does not carry the last name of either his mother or his
    father.”24 The dissent noted the mother’s desire for the child’s
    name to match potential siblings and reasoned, “There is no
    question that sharing the same surname within a family unit
    provides security, stability, and a feeling of identity and limits
    the potential difficulties, confusion, and embarrassment that
    may arise relating to the paternity of the child.”25
    21
    In re Wilson, supra note 
    9, 162 Vt. at 284
    , 648 A.2d at 650.
    22
    In re Change of Name of Slingsby, supra note 2.
    23
    
    Id. at 119,
    752 N.W.2d at 568.
    24
    
    Id. at 121,
    752 N.W.2d at 569 (Gerrard, J., dissenting; Miller-Lerman, J.,
    joins).
    25
    
    Id. at 122,
    752 N.W.2d at 570 (Gerrard, J., dissenting; Miller-Lerman, J.,
    joins).
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    Several courts have reached a similar conclusion. In Carter
    v. Reddell,26 the child was given the mother’s maiden sur-
    name, the mother married and changed her surname, and the
    father filed a petition requesting that the child’s surname be
    changed to that of the father. In affirming the name change, the
    appellate court stated that it did not appear the name change
    would affect the child’s relationship with either parent, that
    the father’s surname would not change, and that although the
    child had gone by her surname for 4 years, “there would be
    very little stigma attached if she changes her last name now,
    at the beginning of her school attendance.”27 Faced with a
    similar situation, a Missouri appellate court stated, “We fail to
    see how the best interest of this child is served by setting him
    apart from other children in the community who may carry
    either their father’s or mother’s surname.”28 In M.L.M. ex rel.
    Froggatte v. Millen,29 the trial court granted the father’s request
    to change the child’s surname to that of the father, reasoning
    that because the mother had married and taken her husband’s
    last name, it was in the child’s best interests that the child’s last
    name match that of the other biological parent. The appellate
    court affirmed, stating that “[t]he net effect of [the mother’s]
    remarriage and refusal to consent to a name change leaves [the
    child] bearing a last name not used by either parent, particu-
    larly the custodial parent.”30
    But other courts have declined to change a child’s surname,
    even when the child’s surname is different from both parents.
    In In re Berger ex rel. K.C.F.,31 the father filed an action to
    change the child’s surname to that of the father so that the
    child would have the same surname as one of his parents. At
    that time, the child was 7 years old. The father testified that
    26
    Carter v. Reddell, 
    75 Ark. App. 8
    , 
    52 S.W.3d 506
    (2001).
    27
    
    Id. at 13,
    52 S.W.3d at 509.
    28
    R.W.B. v. T.W. ex rel. K.A.W., 
    23 S.W.3d 266
    , 268 (Mo. App. 2000).
    29
    M.L.M. ex rel. Froggatte v. Millen, 
    28 Kan. App. 2d 392
    , 
    15 P.3d 857
          (2000).
    30
    
    Id. at 394,
    15 P.3d at 859.
    31
    In re Berger ex rel. K.C.F., 
    778 N.W.2d 579
    (N.D. 2010).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    258	289 NEBRASKA REPORTS
    the child indicated a desire to have the father’s surname and
    that the child had encountered “awkward situations” due to
    having a different last name.32 The mother testified that when
    she changed her name, the child’s only concern was that he
    would not have to change his surname. Upon her inquiry, the
    child said he would not be sad or hurt if she had a different
    surname than the child. In affirming the denial of the petition
    for name change, the appellate court reasoned that the child
    was now in school, that he had an established identity, that
    friends have known him by his name for some time, and that
    changing his surname now could invite more questions from
    his peers. In a similar situation, a North Dakota appellate court
    affirmed a trial court’s denial of a mother’s petition to change
    the child’s surname to match her own. The trial court in that
    case had reasoned:
    “Whatever the Court’s decision, there are going to be
    awkward moments in the child’s future when she will be
    forced to explain her name. It will be more confusing for
    her to explain that her stepfather is not her father though
    she has his last name than to explain that she has her
    mother’s maiden name. If the petitioner and her husband
    divorce, the petitioner said [the child’s] surname would
    remain the stepfather’s name. Not only would that be con-
    fusing, but then [the child’s] surname would be that of a
    man to whom she has no legal or biological connections.
    Finally, the Court believes allowing the name change
    could lead to alienation of the child from the respondent,
    even if there is no intent to do so.”33
    As the North Dakota court cogently explained, some awkward-
    ness is probably inevitable.
    [8] In each of the cases discussed above, a child was born
    out of wedlock and given his mother’s maiden name, the
    mother later married and changed her surname, and one of the
    parents brought an action to change the child’s surname. But
    courts reached different conclusions from case to case. The
    32
    
    Id. at 583.
    33
    Grad ex rel. Janda v. Jepson, 
    652 N.W.2d 324
    , 325 (N.D. 2002).
    Nebraska Advance Sheets
    STATE ON BEHALF OF CONNOR H. v. BLAKE G.	259
    Cite as 
    289 Neb. 246
    differing conclusions reinforce the concept that name-change
    decisions are to be made on a case-by-case basis.34
    The case before us presents a twist in that both parents
    sought to change Connor’s surname, but the evidence does not
    establish that Connor’s best interests necessitate a change in
    his surname. The testimony disclosed Blake’s and Amanda’s
    respective reasons for wanting to change Connor’s surname,
    but the evidence fell short of demonstrating that Connor’s sub-
    stantial welfare required such a change. In the future, Connor
    may very well decide that he wants to change his surname.
    But at this time, the evidence is simply insufficient to show
    that a change to either Blake’s surname or Amanda’s married
    surname would promote his best interests. We therefore reverse
    the order in the paternity action granting Blake’s request to
    change Connor’s surname and affirm the judgment denying
    Amanda’s separate petition to change Connor’s surname.
    CONCLUSION
    Upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude that
    neither parent met his or her burden to show that a change
    in Connor’s surname was in his best interests. Accordingly,
    in case No. S-13-995, we reverse the district court’s order
    changing Connor’s surname to that of Blake and remand
    the cause with direction to deny the requested relief. In
    case No. S-13-1000, we affirm the judgment dismissing
    Amanda’s petition.
    Judgment in No. S-13-995 reversed, and
    cause remanded with direction.
    Judgment in No. S-13-1000 affirmed.
    34
    See Matthews v. Smith, 
    80 Ark. App. 396
    , 
    97 S.W.3d 418
    (2003).
    Miller-Lerman, J., concurring.
    I concur and write separately only to observe that unlike In
    re Name Change of Slingsby, 
    276 Neb. 114
    , 
    752 N.W.2d 564
    (2008), this record does not contain testimony of a trained
    fact witness or professional, the testimony of whom regarding
    the impact of a name change on the child could be helpful in
    meeting a party’s burden of proof.