Karo v. NAU Country Ins. Co. ( 2017 )


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    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    11/03/2017 09:14 AM CDT
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    KARO v. NAU COUNTRY INS. CO.
    Cite as 
    297 Neb. 798
    M att K aro and Michael K aro,
    appellees, v. NAU Country
    Insurance Company, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed September 22, 2017.   No. S-16-810.
    1.	 Judgments: Jurisdiction. A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a
    factual dispute presents a question of law.
    2.	 Arbitration and Award: Federal Acts: Contracts. If arbitration arises
    from a contract involving interstate commerce, it is governed by the
    Federal Arbitration Act.
    3.	 Arbitration and Award: Federal Acts: Contracts: Insurance: Crops.
    The arbitration of disputes arising under federally reinsured crop insur-
    ance contracts plainly involves interstate commerce and, as such, is
    governed exclusively by the Federal Arbitration Act.
    4.	 Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues
    presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine
    whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it. This is so even
    where neither party has raised the issue.
    5.	 Federal Acts: Jurisdiction: Time. To determine whether a time limit
    in a federal statute is a jurisdictional requirement, an appellate court
    inquires whether Congress has “clearly stated” that the rule is jurisdic-
    tional; absent such a clear statement, courts should treat the restriction
    as nonjurisdictional in character.
    6.	 Arbitration and Award: Federal Acts: Jurisdiction: Notice:
    Limitations of Actions: Appeal and Error. The clear language of 9
    U.S.C. § 9 (2012) indicates Congress intended the statutory time limits
    on serving notice of an application for judicial review under the Federal
    Arbitration Act to be jurisdictional.
    7.	 Arbitration and Award: Federal Acts: Limitations of Actions:
    Appeal and Error. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, once the arbi-
    trator has heard a case and entered an award, Congress has placed
    strict limitations on judicial review of the arbitration award by placing
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    KARO v. NAU COUNTRY INS. CO.
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    temporal limits on when a court is authorized to review an award and
    by limiting the grounds upon which a court is authorized to vacate or
    modify an award. In that regard, streamlined judicial review of an arbi-
    trator’s award under the Federal Arbitration Act is similar to a restricted
    appellate review.
    8.	 Jurisdiction: Limitations of Actions: Appeal and Error. Statutory
    time limits on appellate review are almost always considered jurisdic-
    tional in nature, both historically and presently, and strict compliance
    with such time limits is necessary.
    9.	 Jurisdiction: Limitations of Actions: Dismissal and Nonsuit: Appeal
    and Error. The statutory time limits on notices of appeal are more
    than simple claim-processing rules, and when an appeal has not been
    prosecuted in the manner directed, within the time limited by the acts of
    Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
    10.	 Arbitration and Award: Federal Acts: Notice: Time: Appeal and
    Error. Similar to a notice of appeal, the Federal Arbitration Act’s
    requirement that those seeking expedited judicial review must serve
    notice of their application in a certain manner and within a specified
    timeframe is more than a simple claim-processing rule; it is the statutory
    procedure that defines which forum has authority over the dispute and
    delineates the classes of cases the court may review.
    11.	 Arbitration and Award: Federal Acts: Jurisdiction: Motions to
    Vacate: Notice: Time. The notice requirement under 9 U.S.C. § 12
    (2012) is jurisdictional in nature, and a party’s failure to serve notice of
    an application for judicial vacatur in the manner directed and within the
    time limits required has jurisdictional consequences.
    12.	 Judgments: Jurisdiction. When a court lacks jurisdiction and nonethe-
    less enters an order, such order is void.
    13.	 Judgments: Final Orders: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A void
    order is a nullity which cannot constitute a judgment or final order that
    confers appellate jurisdiction on a court.
    Appeal from the District Court for Holt County: M ark D.
    Kozisek, Judge. Vacated and dismissed.
    Thomas M. Locher and Amy Locher, of Locher, Pavelka,
    Dostal, Braddy & Hammes, L.L.C., and Mitch D. Carthel, of
    Mullin, Hoard & Brown, L.L.P., for appellant.
    Sean A. Minahan, of Lamson, Dugan & Murray, L.L.P.,
    for appellees.
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    KARO v. NAU COUNTRY INS. CO.
    Cite as 
    297 Neb. 798
    Heavican, C.J., Wright, Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy,
    K elch, and Funke, JJ.
    Stacy, J.
    This is an appeal from a judgment of the Holt County
    District Court vacating an arbitration award under the Federal
    Arbitration Act (FAA).1 Because we conclude the district court
    lacked jurisdiction to vacate the arbitration award, we vacate
    the district court’s judgment and dismiss the appeal.
    I. FACTS
    Matt Karo and Michael Karo farm together in Holt County,
    Nebraska. They each obtained federally reinsured crop insur-
    ance policies, serviced by NAU Country Insurance Company
    (NAU), for the acres at issue in this dispute.
    In 2012, the Karos submitted “prevented planting” claims
    under their crop insurance policies, claiming they were unable
    to plant corn on certain acres due to wet conditions. Federal
    crop insurance policies are uniform, and the provisions of the
    policies are codified at 7 C.F.R. § 457.8 (2017). “Prevented
    planting” for the purpose of federal crop insurance is defined
    as follows:
    Failure to plant the insured crop by the final planting
    date designated in the Special Provisions for the insured
    crop in the county, or within any applicable late planting
    period, due to an insured cause of loss that is general
    to the surrounding area and that prevents other produc-
    ers from planting acreage with similar characteristics.
    Failure to plant because of uninsured causes such as lack
    of proper equipment or labor to plant the acreage, or use
    of a particular production method, is not considered pre-
    vented planting.2
    The policies issued to the Karos also provided, “[I]f it is pos-
    sible for you to plant on or prior to the final planting date
    1
    9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2012).
    2
    7 C.F.R. § 457.8, ¶ 1.
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    when other producers in the area are planting and you fail to
    plant, no prevented planting payment will be made.”3
    It is undisputed that in 2012, the Karos did not plant their
    corn crop on the insured acres prior to the final planting
    date. The Karos claimed continuous wet conditions prevented
    them from doing so. The Karos did not attempt to plant corn
    during the late planting period, but did plant soybeans on
    some acres.
    NAU denied the Karos’ prevented planting claims. It found
    that excessive moisture was not general to the surrounding area
    and did not prevent other producers from planting acres with
    similar characteristics.
    1. A rbitration
    Pursuant to a mandatory arbitration clause in the crop insur-
    ance policies,4 the parties submitted their disputes to binding
    arbitration. After an evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator issued
    a final arbitration award in favor of NAU, denying the Karos’
    claims under the “prevented planting coverage” of the crop
    insurance policies. The arbitration award denying coverage
    was issued January 21, 2014.
    In denying coverage, the arbitrator found “[t]he evidence
    as presented, concerning the excessive moisture in the area in
    early spring, did not prevent most other producers with acreage
    with similar characteristics from planting their acres.”
    2. The K aros Seek to Judicially
    Vacate A rbitration Award
    On May 15, 2014, the Karos filed what they termed a
    “Petition for Judicial Review” in the Holt County District
    Court seeking to vacate the arbitration award under § 10 of the
    FAA.5 Section 10(a) provides:
    3
    
    Id., § 457.8,
    ¶ 17(d)(2).
    4
    See 
    id., § 457.8,
    ¶ 20(a) (“[For Reinsured Policies]”).
    5
    See 9 U.S.C. § 10.
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    In any of the following cases the United States court in
    and for the district wherein the award was made may
    make an order vacating the award upon the application of
    any party to the arbitration—
    (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud,
    or undue means;
    (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in
    the arbitrators, or either of them;
    (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in
    refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause
    shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
    material to the controversy; or of any other misbehav-
    ior by which the rights of any party have been preju-
    diced; or
    (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or
    so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and
    definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
    not made.
    The Karos relied on § 10(a)(4) to support their request to
    vacate the award.
    NAU filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Pldg.
    § 6-1112(b)(6), alleging the Karos had failed to state a claim
    upon which relief could be granted. The district court over-
    ruled the motion and required NAU to file an answer. NAU’s
    answer generally denied the Karos’ complaint for vacatur, and
    it set forth several affirmative defenses, but NAU did not file
    an application or motion to confirm the award.6
    In March 2016, all parties moved for summary judgment.
    After an evidentiary hearing, the court granted the Karos’ sum-
    mary judgment motion and vacated the arbitration award under
    § 10(a)(4) of the FAA, finding that the arbitrator exceeded his
    powers and manifestly disregarded the law.
    NAU timely appealed from that judgment, and we granted
    its petition to bypass the Nebraska Court of Appeals.
    6
    See 9 U.S.C. § 9.
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    II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    NAU assigns, restated, that the district court erred in (1)
    reviewing and vacating the arbitration award; (2) applying
    the manifest disregard of the law doctrine; (3) ruling that the
    arbitrator exceeded his powers or so imperfectly executed them
    that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject mat-
    ter submitted was not made; and (4) refusing to grant NAU’s
    motion for summary judgment.
    III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] A jurisdictional issue that does not involve a factual dis-
    pute presents a question of law.7
    IV. ANALYSIS
    1. FAA Governs This A ppeal
    [2,3] As a threshold matter, we agree with the district court
    and the parties that the issues presented in this appeal are
    governed by the FAA. It is well-settled that “if arbitration
    arises from a contract involving interstate commerce, it is gov-
    erned by the FAA.”8 The arbitration of disputes arising under
    federally reinsured crop insurance contracts plainly involves
    interstate commerce and, as such, is governed exclusively by
    the FAA.9
    2. Judicial Vacatur Under FAA
    [4] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review,
    it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it
    7
    In re Interest of Luz P. et al., 
    295 Neb. 814
    , 
    891 N.W.2d 651
    (2017).
    8
    Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel v. Hunan, Inc., 
    276 Neb. 700
    , 703,
    
    757 N.W.2d 205
    , 209 (2008).
    9
    Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., 
    280 Neb. 591
    , 
    788 N.W.2d 538
          (2010); Svancara v. Rain and Hail, LLC, No. 8:09CV144, 
    2009 WL 2982906
    (D. Neb. Sept. 11, 2009) (unpublished memorandum and order)
    (citing Nobles v. Rural Community Ins. Services, 
    122 F. Supp. 2d 1290
          (M.D. Ala. 2000)).
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    has jurisdiction over the matter before it.10 This is so even
    where, as here, neither party has raised the issue.11 The thresh-
    old issue we must address is whether the Karos satisfied
    the statutory preconditions to seeking judicial vacatur under
    the FAA.
    “Congress enacted the FAA to replace judicial indisposi-
    tion to arbitration with a ‘national policy favoring [it] and
    plac[ing] arbitration agreements on equal footing with all
    other contracts.’”12 The FAA includes mechanisms for enforc-
    ing arbitration awards in state and federal courts that have
    jurisdiction,13 including provisions for obtaining judicial con-
    firmation of the award,14 and separate provisions for judicial
    vacatur15 or modification16 of an award. The U.S. Supreme
    Court has described these provisions as providing “expedited
    judicial review”17 of arbitration awards, and it has observed
    that “[a]n application for any of these orders will get stream-
    lined treatment as a motion, obviating the separate contract
    action that would usually be necessary to enforce or tinker with
    an arbitral award in court.”18
    We observe that in the present case, the district court
    and the parties appear to have treated the Karos’ request for
    
    10 Cl. Ch. v
    . First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 
    296 Neb. 632
    , 
    895 N.W.2d 284
          (2017).
    11
    Schlake v. Schlake, 
    294 Neb. 755
    , 
    885 N.W.2d 15
    (2016).
    12
    Hall Street Associates, L. L. C. v. Mattel, Inc., 
    552 U.S. 576
    , 581, 128 S.
    Ct. 1396, 
    170 L. Ed. 2d 254
    (2008).
    13
    Hall Street Associates, L. L. C., supra note 12.
    14
    9 U.S.C. § 9.
    15
    
    Id., § 10.
    16
    
    Id., § 11
    17
    Hall Street Associates, L. L. C., supra note 
    12, 552 U.S. at 592
    .
    18
    
    Id., 552 U.S.
    at 582. See, also, 9 U.S.C. § 6 (“[a]ny application to the
    court [under the FAA] shall be made and heard in the manner provided
    by law for the making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise herein
    expressly provided”).
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    judicial vacatur not as a motion, but, rather, as an ordinary
    civil complaint, governed by the Nebraska Court Rules of
    Pleading in Civil Cases and amenable to motions for summary
    judgment under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1330 et seq. (Reissue
    2016). While the procedure used here runs contrary to that
    mandated by the FAA and threatens to develop expedited
    judicial vacatur into full scale litigation with evidentiary hear-
    ings and dispositive motions,19 no one assigns this as error,
    and in any event, the procedure followed does not drive our
    disposition of this case. Instead, our disposition focuses on
    the statutory 3-month notice requirement for seeking judicial
    vacatur under the FAA20 and whether that requirement is juris-
    dictional in nature.
    Section 12 of the FAA governs motions to vacate and
    modify awards under §§ 10 and 11 of the FAA.21 Section 12
    provides, in relevant part:
    Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an
    award must be served upon the adverse party or his
    attorney within three months after the award is filed or
    delivered. If the adverse party is a resident of the district
    within which the award was made, such service shall be
    made upon the adverse party or his attorney as prescribed
    by law for service of notice of motion in an action in
    the same court. If the adverse party shall be a nonresi-
    dent then the notice of the application shall be served
    by the marshal of any district within which the adverse
    party may be found in like manner as other process of
    the court.
    19
    See O.R. Securities v. Professional Planning Assoc., 
    857 F.2d 742
    (11th
    Cir. 1988) (under FAA and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, proper way
    to request judicial vacatur is filing motion in district court rather than
    complaint; one defending award should not have burden of dismissing
    complaint).
    20
    9 U.S.C. § 12.
    21
    See 
    id., §§ 10
    through 12.
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    Use of the terms “must” and “shall” in 9 U.S.C. § 12 of
    the FAA leaves little room to argue that the requirements
    of serving notice are permissive rather than mandatory. And
    we understand the 3-month notice requirement to implicitly
    require filing the application within the same timeframe.
    Here, the record shows the arbitration award was issued
    January 21, 2014. It was received January 23, but the Karos
    did not move to vacate the award until May 15, when they
    filed the application in the district court and provided NAU
    notice of the same via U.S. mail. Because the Karos’ motion
    to vacate was filed and served outside the 3-month period
    mandated by § 12, we must determine the legal effect, if
    any, of the Karos’ delay. The U.S. Supreme Court has not
    addressed this question, but the Eighth Circuit Court of
    Appeals has.
    In Piccolo v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc.,22 the Eighth
    Circuit determined that serving notice within the 3-month
    timeframe under § 12 is a statutory precondition to judicial
    review of an arbitration award. In that case, pro se par-
    ties to an arbitration award governed by the FAA sought to
    vacate the award more than 3 months after it was issued.
    The federal district court dismissed the matter, finding that
    the parties’ failure to serve notice within 3 months of the
    arbitration award deprived the court of power to review
    the award under the FAA. The Eighth Circuit Court of
    Appeals agreed, reasoning that “[a] party to an arbitration
    award who fails to comply with the statutory precondi-
    tion of timely service of notice [under § 12 of the FAA]
    forfeits the right to judicial review of the award [under
    § 10 of the FAA].”23 The court went on to conclude that a
    party’s “failure to serve [a motion] to vacate within three
    months of the award deprived [the district court] of power
    22
    Piccolo v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 
    641 F.2d 598
    (8th Cir. 1981).
    23
    
    Id. at 600.
    See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 and 12.
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    to review the award.”24 Other courts have reached similar
    conclusions.25
    Although the Eighth Circuit in Piccolo did not expressly
    hold the 3-month notice requirement under § 12 jurisdictional,
    it implied as much by holding that a court’s “power to review
    the award” is present only when the statutory preconditions
    of § 12 have been met.26 “Jurisdiction” is a term that “refers
    to a court’s adjudicatory authority,”27 and the U.S. Supreme
    Court has observed that “jurisdictional statutes ‘speak to the
    power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of
    the parties.’”28
    The Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Piccolo has been cited
    with approval by one panel of the 10th Circuit Court of
    Appeals,29 but another panel of the same circuit has con-
    cluded that the notice requirement in § 12 is more “in
    the nature of a statute of limitations, which is subject to
    waiver.”30 Other courts have relied upon the 3-month notice
    requirement under § 12 to preclude judicial consideration
    of untimely vacatur requests without expressly addressing
    whether the r­equirement is jurisdictional in nature.31 And
    24
    Piccolo, supra note 
    22, 641 F.2d at 600
    .
    25
    See, Pfannenstiel v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
    477 F.3d 1155
    (10th Cir. 2007);
    Franco v. Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 
    719 F. Supp. 63
    (D. Puerto
    Rico 1989).
    26
    Piccolo, supra note 
    22, 641 F.2d at 600
    .
    27
    Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 
    559 U.S. 154
    , 160, 
    130 S. Ct. 1237
    , 
    176 L. Ed. 2d 18
    (2010).
    28
    Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 
    511 U.S. 244
    , 274, 
    114 S. Ct. 1483
    , 
    128 L. Ed. 2d 229
    (1994).
    29
    See Pfannenstiel, supra note 25.
    30
    See Foster v. Turley, 
    808 F.2d 38
    , 41 (10th Cir. 1986). See 9 U.S.C. § 12.
    31
    See, e.g., Lafarge Conseils et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement, 
    791 F.2d 1334
    (9th Cir. 1986); White v. Mayflower Transit, LLC, 
    481 F. Supp. 2d 1101
    (C.D. Cal. 2007); M.J. Woods, Inc. v. Conopco, Inc., 
    271 F. Supp. 2d 576
    (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Ex. v. Nationwide Mut.,
    
    134 F. Supp. 2d 923
    (S.D. Ohio 2001).
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    while some courts have indirectly approached the juris-
    dictional question by considering whether the time limit
    in § 12 is subject to equitable tolling, those courts have
    reached inconsistent conclusions despite applying similar
    legal principles.32
    The present case requires us to squarely address this unset-
    tled question of federal law and decide whether the 3-month
    time limit in § 12 is a jurisdictional requirement. If it is, the
    Karos’ delay in filing their application and serving notice
    deprived the district court of jurisdiction to vacate the award.
    If, however, the time limit is more in the nature of an affirma-
    tive defense, then NAU waived it by failing to raise it in the
    district court.33
    Before undertaking this jurisdictional analysis, we pause
    to clarify that the question before us has little to do with the
    unrelated, but equally unsettled, question of when a federal
    court has subject matter jurisdiction under the FAA.34 We
    are aware of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Vaden
    v. Discover Bank35 and its holding that federal courts may
    hear claims under the FAA only when there is an inde-
    pendent basis for federal jurisdiction. In Vaden, the Court
    32
    Compare, e.g., Move, Inc. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 
    840 F.3d 1152
    (9th Cir. 2016) (3-month time limit under FAA is subject to equitable
    tolling), and Chilcott Entertainment v. John G. Kinnard, 
    10 P.3d 723
          (Colo. App. 2000) (3-month notice requirement under § 12 of FAA is not
    subject to equitable tolling).
    33
    See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 130
    , 
    128 S. Ct. 750
    , 
    169 L. Ed. 2d 591
    (2008) (unless statutory time limitation
    is jurisdictional, law typically treats statute of limitations defense as
    affirmative defense that must be raised or is waived). Cf. State v. Crawford,
    
    291 Neb. 362
    , 
    865 N.W.2d 360
    (2015).
    34
    See, e.g., Kristen M. Blankley, A Uniform Theory of Federal Court
    Jurisdiction Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 23 Geo. Mason L. Rev.
    525 (2016).
    35
    Vaden v. Discover Bank, 
    556 U.S. 49
    , 
    129 S. Ct. 1262
    , 
    173 L. Ed. 2d 206
          (2009).
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    explained that the “‘body of federal substantive law’” gen-
    erated by the FAA is “equally binding on state and federal
    courts”36 but:
    “As for jurisdiction over controversies touching arbitra-
    tion,” however, the [FAA] is “something of an anomaly”
    in the realm of federal legislation: It “bestow[s] no fed-
    eral jurisdiction but rather requir[es] [for access to a
    federal forum] an independent jurisdictional basis” over
    the parties’ dispute. . . . Given the substantive supremacy
    of the FAA, but the [FAA’s] nonjurisdictional cast, state
    courts have a prominent role to play as enforcers of
    agreements to arbitrate.37
    The Karos filed their application for judicial vacatur in
    state court rather than federal court, so we are not concerned
    here with questions of federal court jurisdiction. Rather, the
    threshold question presented is whether the 3-month time limit
    under § 12 of the FAA is jurisdictional in nature, such that
    it cannot be waived and courts must consider the issue sua
    sponte even when the parties do not raise it.38
    (a) Framework Under Federal Law
    for Determining When Statutory
    Time Limits Are Jurisdictional
    Because the question presented requires this court to inter-
    pret federal law, we look to federal court decisions for guid-
    ance. The U.S. Supreme Court has, in recent years, endeavored
    to “‘bring some discipline’” to its “use of the term ‘jurisdic-
    tional’” due to what it described as its “‘less than meticulous’
    use of the term in the past.”39 Generally speaking, it has done
    so by attempting to distinguish between those statutory time
    36
    
    Id., 556 U.S.
    at 59.
    37
    
    Id. 38 See,
    John R. Sand & Gravel Co., supra note 33; 9 U.S.C. § 12.
    39
    Gonzalez v. Thaler, 
    565 U.S. 134
    , 141, 
    132 S. Ct. 641
    , 
    181 L. Ed. 2d 619
          (2012).
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    limits which are merely “‘claim-processing rules’” and those
    which affect a court’s “‘adjudicatory authority’” and thus
    are jurisdictional.40
    Over the past decade or so, the Court has granted certiorari
    in several cases to determine whether statutory time limitations
    were jurisdictional and, in most of those cases, concluded they
    were not.41 The Supreme Court has observed that “[m]ost stat-
    utes of limitations seek primarily to protect defendants against
    stale or unduly delayed claims” and for that reason, “the law
    typically treats a limitations defense as an affirmative defense
    that the defendant must raise at the pleadings stage and that
    is subject to rules of forfeiture and waiver.”42 The Court has
    described these ordinary statutory filing deadlines as “‘quint-
    essential claim processing rules’” which “‘seek to promote
    the orderly process of litigation,’ but do not deprive a court
    of authority to hear a case.”43 Alternatively, when statutory
    time limitations “seek not so much to protect a defendant’s
    case-specific interest in timeliness as to achieve a broader
    40
    
    Id. 41 Compare,
    e.g., U.S. v. Kwai Fun Wong, ___ U.S. ___, 
    135 S. Ct. 1625
    ,
    
    191 L. Ed. 2d 533
    (2015) (statutory requirement that suit under Federal
    Tort Claims Act be filed within 6 months after claim denied by federal
    agency is not jurisdictional); Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical
    Center, 
    568 U.S. 145
    , 
    133 S. Ct. 817
    , 
    184 L. Ed. 2d 627
    (2013) (180-day
    filing deadline for filing appeals to Medicare’s Provider Reimbursement
    Review Board is not jurisdictional); and Henderson v. Shinseki, 
    562 U.S. 428
    , 
    131 S. Ct. 1197
    , 
    179 L. Ed. 2d 159
    (2011) (120-day deadline for
    filing notice of appeal seeking de novo review before Board of Veterans’
    Appeals is not jurisdictional), with John R. Sand & Gravel Co., supra
    note 33 (6-year statutory limitation on filing claims before U.S. Court
    of Federal Claims is jurisdictional and cannot be waived); Bowles
    v. Russell, 
    551 U.S. 205
    , 
    127 S. Ct. 2360
    , 
    168 L. Ed. 2d 96
    (2007)
    (statutory time limits for taking appeal in civil case are mandatory and
    jurisdictional).
    42
    John R. Sand & Gravel Co., supra note 
    33, 552 U.S. at 133
    .
    43
    Kwai Fun Wong, supra note 
    41, 135 S. Ct. at 1632
    (quoting Henderson,
    supra note 41).
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    system-related goal,” they more often are considered jurisdic-
    tional in nature.44
    The Court has “urged that a rule should not be referred to
    as jurisdictional unless it governs a court’s adjudicatory capac-
    ity, that is, its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction.”45 But
    the Court has also recognized that even where a statutory time
    limitation appears to be a claim-processing rule, it may nev-
    ertheless be jurisdictional because “Congress is free to attach
    the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label to a rule
    that we would prefer to call a claim-processing rule.”46 The
    Court has acknowledged that “[w]hile perhaps clear in theory,
    the distinction between jurisdictional conditions and claim-
    processing rules can be confusing in practice.”47
    [5] To make it easier for courts applying federal law to
    determine whether statutory time limits are jurisdictional, the
    U.S. Supreme Court has recently adopted what it refers to
    alternatively as the “clear statement rule”48 or the “‘bright
    line’” rule.49 In Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center,50
    the Court explained the rule as follows:
    To ward off profligate use of the term “jurisdiction,”
    we have adopted a “readily administrable bright line”
    for determining when to classify a statutory limitation
    as jurisdictional. . . . We inquire whether Congress
    has “clearly state[d]” that the rule is jurisdictional;
    absent such a clear statement, we have cautioned,
    “courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional
    44
    John R. Sand & Gravel Co., supra note 
    33, 552 U.S. at 133
    .
    45
    Henderson, supra note 
    41, 562 U.S. at 435
    .
    46
    
    Id. 47 Reed
    Elsevier, Inc., supra note 
    27, 559 U.S. at 161
    .
    48
    Kwai Fun Wong, supra note 
    41, 135 S. Ct. at 1632
    . See, also, Gonzalez,
    supra note 39.
    49
    Sebelius, supra note 
    41, 568 U.S. at 153
    .
    50
    Sebelius, supra note 41.
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    in character.” . . . This is not to say that Congress must
    incant magic words in order to speak clearly. We con-
    sider “context, including this Court’s interpretations of
    similar provisions in many years past,” as probative of
    whether Congress intended a particular provision to rank
    as jurisdictional.51
    With these principles in mind, we review the statutory
    language of the FAA for any clear indication that Congress
    intended the statutory time limits on serving notice of an appli-
    cation for expedited judicial review to be jurisdictional.
    (b) Congress Intended Notice Requirements
    Under §§ 9 and 12 to Be Jurisdictional
    As noted, the FAA authorizes parties to an arbitration to
    apply for expedited judicial review of arbitration awards seek-
    ing either to confirm the award,52 vacate the award,53 or modify
    the award.54 The notice requirements for judicial confirmation
    are set out in § 9 of the FAA and the notice requirements for
    judicial vacatur and modification are set out in § 12.55 Under
    both §§ 9 and 12, it is mandatory that notice of any applica-
    tion be served on the adverse party, and the manner in which
    notice must be served is the same. Only the time period for
    serving the required notice is different—those applying for
    judicial confirmation may do so anytime within 1 year after
    the award,56 and those applying for judicial vacatur or modi-
    fication must do so within 3 months after the award is filed
    or delivered.57
    51
    
    Id., 568 U.S.
    at 153-54 (citations omitted).
    52
    9 U.S.C. § 9.
    53
    
    Id., § 10.
    54
    
    Id., § 11
    .
    55
    
    Id., §§ 9
    and 12.
    56
    
    Id., § 9.
    57
    
    Id., § 12.
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    Section 9, which is titled “Award of arbitrators; confirma-
    tion; jurisdiction; procedure,” provides in pertinent part:
    [A]ny time within one year after the award is made any
    party to the arbitration may apply to the court . . . for
    an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court
    must grant such an order unless the award is vacated,
    modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and
    11 of this title. . . . Notice of the application shall be
    served upon the adverse party, and thereupon the court
    shall have jurisdiction of such party as though he had
    appeared generally in the proceeding. If the adverse
    party is a resident of the district in which the award
    was made, such service shall be made upon the adverse
    party or his attorney as prescribed by law for service of
    notice of motion in an action in the same court. If the
    adverse party shall be a nonresident, then the notice of
    the application shall be served by the marshal of any dis-
    trict within which the adverse party may be found in like
    manner as other proc­ess of the court.58
    Section 9 provides that an application for judicial confir-
    mation “may” be filed anytime within 1 year after an award
    appears, and this language has caused federal courts to split
    over whether the 1-year time period is mandatory or permis-
    sive.59 But here, we are not concerned with interpreting the
    requirements for timely filing applications to confirm awards.
    Rather, we look to the language of § 9 for instruction, if
    any, on whether Congress considered the notice requirements
    attend­ant to the streamlined process for judicial review to be
    mandatory and jurisdictional in nature.
    58
    
    Id., § 9
    (emphasis supplied).
    59
    See Teresa L. Elliott, Conflicting Interpretations of the One-Year
    Requirement on Motions to Confirm Arbitration Awards, 38 Creighton L.
    Rev. 661 (2005) (analyzing split in federal courts over whether 9 U.S.C.
    § 9 allows parties to seek judicial confirmation of award more than 1 year
    after award is entered).
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    Section 9 requires that notice of any application for judicial
    confirmation “shall be served upon the adverse party” and
    “shall be made” in the manner provided, and it then expressly
    provides that “thereupon,” after service of such notice, “the
    court shall have jurisdiction” over the adverse parties to the
    arbitration. This is a clear indication that Congress intended
    the statutory requirements for serving notice of an applica-
    tion for expedited judicial review under the FAA to be juris-
    dictional in nature. And while it is tempting to think about
    the FAA’s notice requirements using traditional notions of
    personal jurisdiction, we are not persuaded that the general
    jurisprudence governing obtaining and waiving personal juris-
    diction in federal court actions has any proper application to
    the sort of streamlined judicial review Congress authorized
    under the FAA.
    Both the title and the statutory language of § 9 indicate that
    Congress intended compliance with the notice requirement to
    carry jurisdictional consequence. This makes practical sense,
    because expedited judicial review under the FAA gets “stream-
    lined treatment as a motion”60 and thus is not subject to the
    formal process or time restrictions on serving complaints. The
    FAA’s requirement of serving notice of an application on the
    adverse party is the only procedure governing movement of
    the case from the arbitral forum to the judicial forum.
    [6] We conclude, based on the clear statutory language of
    § 9, that the notice requirements governing judicial review
    under the FAA are intended to “govern[] a court’s adjudica-
    tory capacity”61 and properly are termed jurisdictional. We next
    consider whether the same can be said for the 3-month time
    limit under § 12.
    60
    See Hall Street Associates, L. L. C., supra note 
    12, 552 U.S. at 582
    . See,
    also, 9 U.S.C. § 6 (“[a]ny application to the court [under the FAA] shall be
    made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing
    of motions, except as otherwise herein expressly provided”).
    61
    Henderson, supra note 
    41, 562 U.S. at 435
    .
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    Under § 12, Congress used mandatory language to set out
    both the notice requirements and the timeframe for serving
    such notice. That section requires that notice of an applica-
    tion seeking judicial vacatur “must be served upon the adverse
    party or his attorney within three months after the award is
    filed or delivered.” Although Congress did not, in § 12, repeat
    the phrase from § 9 that “thereupon the court shall have juris-
    diction” when addressing notice under § 12, we conclude it is
    appropriate to analyze §§ 9 and 12 together when considering
    the effect of the jurisdictional language.
    We are mindful that the U.S. Supreme Court has counseled
    against restrictively “parsing the language” when comparing
    similar provisions of the sections governing judicial review
    under the FAA.62 In Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert
    Constr. Co.,63 the Court considered whether differences in the
    permissiveness of the venue language used in § 9 (judicial
    confirmation) could be reconciled with the more mandatory
    venue language used in §§ 10 and 11 (judicial vacatur and
    modification). There, a unanimous Court held that the lan-
    guage of §§ 10 and 11 should be read to “supplement, but . . .
    not supplant” the permissive language of § 9, reasoning that
    these sections “are best analyzed together, owing to their con-
    temporaneous enactment and the similarity of their pertinent
    language.”64 The Court noted some of the practical problems
    that would result from construing the venue requirements
    differently for judicial confirmation and vacatur, and it ulti-
    mately concluded that permissive venue was more consistent
    with the FAA’s “‘statutory policy of rapid and unobstructed
    enforcement of arbitration agreements.’”65 We assume the
    same interpretive reasoning applies here.
    62
    Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 
    529 U.S. 193
    , 198,
    
    120 S. Ct. 1331
    , 
    146 L. Ed. 2d 171
    (2000).
    63
    Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc., supra note 62.
    64
    
    Id., 529 U.S.
    at 198.
    65
    
    Id., 529 U.S.
    at 201.
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    Although different timeframes apply for serving notice
    under §§ 9 and 12, there is no difference in the mandatory
    proc­ess by which the adverse party must be served with notice
    of the application, and no difference in the practical pur-
    pose for requiring such notice. It would make little sense for
    Congress to give clear jurisdictional weight to serving notice
    in one context but not the other, and we see nothing in the
    language or purpose of the FAA that would compel the conclu-
    sion that Congress intended the statutory notice requirements
    for expedited judicial review to be jurisdictional when a party
    seeks judicial confirmation, but not when a party seeks judi-
    cial vacatur or modification. Even though § 9 governs judicial
    confirmation, it expressly references vacating, modifying, or
    correcting awards “as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of
    this title”66 before stating the jurisdictional impact of serving
    notice of applications for judicial review. Due to the similarity
    of the mandatory notice procedures, we analyze §§ 9 and 12
    together, and we conclude that whether an arbitrating party is
    applying for judicial review to confirm an award under § 9 or
    to vacate or modify an award under §§ 10 and 11, Congress
    intended that a party’s failure to serve notice of the applica-
    tion in the manner directed, and within mandatory time limits,
    would have jurisdictional consequences.
    (c) Context and Purpose of § 12
    Indicate It Is Jurisdictional
    Our conclusion that Congress intended the 3-month time
    limit under § 12 to be jurisdictional is supported by more
    than just the presence of clear jurisdictional language in
    § 9. The U.S. Supreme Court has directed that in addition
    to considering whether Congress used language clearly stat-
    ing that a time limitation is jurisdictional, courts should
    consider “‘context, including this Court’s interpretations of
    similar provisions in many years past,’” as probative of
    66
    9 U.S.C. § 9.
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    whether Congress intended a particular provision to rank as
    jurisdictional.67
    In discussing the purpose of the time limit in § 12, the
    Second Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned:
    The role of arbitration as a mechanism for speedy dispute
    resolution disfavors delayed challenges to the validity
    of an award. . . . Thus, when a party to an arbitration
    believes that he has been prejudiced in the proceedings
    by behavior that the [FAA] condemns he must bring a
    motion to vacate within the allotted time. When the three
    month limitations period has run without vacation of
    the arbitration award, the successful party has a right to
    assume the award is valid and untainted, and to obtain its
    confirmation in a summary proceeding.68
    Under the FAA, state and federal courts have only an ancil-
    lary role in the arbitration process. The U.S. Supreme Court
    has described judicial review under §§ 9 through 11 of the
    FAA as
    substantiating a national policy favoring arbitration with
    just the limited [judicial] review needed to maintain arbi-
    tration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straight-
    away. Any other reading opens the door to the full-bore
    legal and evidentiary appeals that can “rende[r] informal
    arbitration merely a prelude to a more cumbersome and
    time-consuming judicial review process” . . . .69
    [7] Under the FAA, once the arbitrator has heard a case and
    entered an award, Congress has placed strict limitations on
    judicial review of the arbitration award by placing temporal
    limits on when a court is authorized to review an award70 and
    67
    Sebelius, supra note 
    41, 568 U.S. at 153
    -54.
    68
    Florasynth, Inc. v. Pickholz, 
    750 F.2d 171
    , 177 (2d Cir. 1984) (citation
    omitted).
    69
    See Hall Street Associates, L. L. C., supra note 
    12, 552 U.S. at 588
    .
    70
    See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 9 and 12.
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    by limiting the grounds upon which a court is authorized to
    vacate or modify such an award.71 In that regard, the stream-
    lined judicial review of an arbitrator’s award is similar to
    restricted appellate review, and we conclude it is appropriate to
    view the timely notice requirements governing judicial review
    in that context as well.
    Before addressing the law which has developed around the
    jurisdictional nature of notices of appeal, we pause to acknowl-
    edge that the streamlined motion process which Congress
    adopted for expedited judicial review of arbitration awards is
    procedurally unique and resists easy application of the settled
    jurisprudence that federal courts apply in both actions and
    appeals. Traditional concepts of subject matter jurisdiction,
    personal jurisdiction, and appellate jurisdiction are strained by
    the FAA’s streamlined procedure for judicial review of arbitra-
    tions. But until the U.S. Supreme Court weighs in on this issue,
    we find it necessary to draw from the settled jurisprudence
    governing those traditional concepts in order to resolve the
    jurisdictional questions which are not answered in the sparse
    provisions of the FAA.
    [8] Unlike statutes of limitation that govern filing actions in
    the trial courts, statutory time limits on appellate review are
    almost always considered jurisdictional in nature, both his-
    torically and presently, and strict compliance with such time
    limits is necessary.72 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized as
    much in Bowles v. Russell.73
    71
    See, 
    id., §§ 10
    and 11; Hall Street Associates, L. L. C., supra note 12.
    72
    See, generally, 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 361 (2007). See, also,
    Henderson, supra note 
    41, 562 U.S. at 438
    (“time for taking an appeal
    from a district court to a court of appeals in a civil case has long
    been understood to be jurisdictional”); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 
    286 Neb. 96
    , 
    835 N.W.2d 44
    (2013) (appellate courts do not generally acquire
    jurisdiction of appeal unless notice of appeal is filed and docket fee is paid
    within 30 days of final order).
    73
    Bowles, supra note 41.
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    [9] In Bowles, the Court considered whether the statutory
    time limit for filing a notice of appeal in a habeas action was
    jurisdictional. The district court had denied habeas relief and
    then gave the petitioner additional time in which to file his
    notice of appeal. According to federal statute, a notice of
    appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of judgment,74
    and district courts have limited authority to grant motions to
    reopen the time to file an appeal for a period of 14 days.75 The
    district court purported to reopen the filing period for more
    than 14 days. Because of this, the Court of Appeals found the
    notice of appeal was untimely filed and concluded it lacked
    jurisdiction over the appeal. The Supreme Court granted cer-
    tiorari, and affirmed. The Court acknowledged that several of
    its recent opinions had undertaken to clarify the distinction
    between jurisdictional rules and claims-processing rules, but
    pointed out that “none of them calls into question our long-
    standing treatment of statutory time limits for taking an appeal
    as jurisdictional.”76 The Court went on to explain:
    Because Congress specifically limited the amount of time
    by which district courts can extend the notice-of-appeal
    period in §2107(c), that limitation is more than a simple
    “claim-processing rule.” As we have long held, when an
    “appeal has not been prosecuted in the manner directed,
    within the time limited by the acts of Congress, it must
    be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”77
    Like the time-sensitive notice-of-appeal requirements con-
    sidered jurisdictional in Bowles, the notice requirements that
    govern judicial review under the FAA are “more than a simple
    ‘claim-processing rule.’”78 Like notices of appeal, the notice
    74
    See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (2012).
    75
    See 
    id., § 2107(c).
    76
    Bowles, supra note 
    41, 551 U.S. at 210
    .
    77
    
    Id., 551 U.S.
    at 213.
    78
    
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    requirements for judicial review under the FAA play a critical
    role in the orderly movement of the case between forums in a
    multiforum system.
    [10] The concept of jurisdiction—in its most essential form—
    has been described as “erect[ing] both the fences that separate
    forums and the gates that cases may pass through.”79 The FAA’s
    requirement that one seeking judicial vacatur must serve notice
    of the application in a certain manner and within a specified
    timeframe, like the notice of appeal considered jurisdictional in
    Bowles, is the statutory procedure that defines which forum has
    authority over the dispute. Because it “‘delineat[es] the classes
    of cases’” the court may review, it is properly considered juris-
    dictional.80 Indeed, if the notice requirements under § 12 are
    not considered jurisdictional in nature, then we see nothing else
    in the FAA which purports to govern the movement of a case
    from the arbitral forum into the judicial forum for purposes of
    judicial vacatur or modification under §§ 10 and 11.
    (d) 3-Month Notice Requirement
    Is Jurisdictional
    [11] For all these reasons, we conclude that the 3-month
    notice requirement of § 12 is jurisdictional in nature and that
    the Karos’ failure to comply with the requirement deprived
    the district court of authority under the FAA to vacate the
    arbitration award under § 10. While expedited judicial review
    under § 10(a) of the FAA may not be the only way to bring an
    arbitration award before the courts,81 it was the only ground
    relied upon by the Karos in seeking vacatur, and we express no
    opinion about other possible avenues for judicial enforcement
    of this award.
    79
    Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 Geo. L.J. 619, 634 (2017).
    80
    Reed Elsevier, Inc., supra note 
    27, 559 U.S. at 160
    .
    81
    See Hall Street Associates, L. L. C., supra note 
    12, 552 U.S. at 590
    (noting
    §§ 10 and 11 of FAA are “not the only way into court for parties wanting
    review of arbitration awards”).
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    [12,13] When a court lacks jurisdiction and nonetheless
    enters an order, such order is void.82 “‘[A] void order is a nul-
    lity which cannot constitute a judgment or final order that con-
    fers appellate jurisdiction on [a] court.’”83 Because the district
    court lacked jurisdiction to enter a judgment vacating the arbi-
    tration award under the FAA, its judgment is void and NAU’s
    appeal from such judgment cannot confer appellate jurisdiction
    upon this court. Accordingly, we do not reach the other juris-
    dictional and legal issues briefed by the parties.
    V. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s
    judgment and dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
    Vacated and dismissed.
    82
    Anderson v. Finkle, 
    296 Neb. 797
    , 
    896 N.W.2d 606
    (2017).
    83
    
    Id. at 802-03,
    896 N.W.2d at 611.