Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel , 313 Neb. 135 ( 2023 )


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    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    01/06/2023 09:04 AM CST
    - 135 -
    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    313 Nebraska Reports
    WHEELBARGER V. DETROIT DIESEL
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 135
    Shawn Wheelbarger, appellant, v.
    Detroit Diesel ECM, LLC, a Michigan
    limited liability company, and Mike
    Rodriguez, doing business as M & C
    Distributing, appellees.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed January 6, 2023.   No. S-21-556.
    1. Motions to Dismiss: Jurisdiction: Evidence: Appeal and Error.
    When the hearing on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic-
    tion falls short of an evidentiary hearing held in a matter similar to
    determining the issue at trial, the plaintiff is required only to make a
    prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction in order to survive the
    motion to dismiss and an appellate court examines the question of
    whether the nonmoving party has established a prima facie case of per-
    sonal jurisdiction de novo.
    2. Motions to Dismiss: Appeal and Error. In reviewing the grant of a
    motion to dismiss, an appellate court must look at the facts in the light
    most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all factual conflicts
    in favor of that party.
    3. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Personal jurisdiction is the power of
    a tribunal to subject and bind a particular entity to its decisions.
    4. Constitutional Law: Due Process. The Due Process Clause of the U.S.
    Constitution protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject
    to the binding judgments of a forum with which he or she has estab-
    lished no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.
    5. Jurisdiction: States. The constitutional touchstone for personal juris-
    diction over a nonresident is whether the defendant purposefully estab-
    lished minimum contacts in the forum state.
    6. ____: ____. The minimum contacts requirement protects the defendant
    against litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum and ensures that
    states do not exceed the limits imposed by their status as coequal sover-
    eigns in a federal system.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    313 Nebraska Reports
    WHEELBARGER V. DETROIT DIESEL
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 135
    7. Due Process: Jurisdiction: States. The benchmark for determining if
    the exercise of personal jurisdiction satisfies due process is whether the
    defendant’s minimum contacts with the forum state are such that the
    defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.
    8. ____: ____: ____. The analysis of whether the defendant’s minimum
    contacts with the forum state are such that the defendant should reason-
    ably anticipate being haled into court there is not simply mechanical or
    quantitative, but requires that a court consider the quality and nature
    of the defendant’s activities to ascertain whether the defendant has the
    necessary minimum contacts with the forum to satisfy due process.
    9. Jurisdiction: States. It is essential in each case that there be some act
    by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
    ducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
    protections of its laws.
    10. ____: ____. There must be fair warning that a particular activity might
    subject the nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction of the foreign sov-
    ereign, giving a degree of predictability to the legal system by allowing
    potential defendants to structure their primary conduct with some mini-
    mum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them
    liable to suit.
    11. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Specific personal jurisdiction
    requires that the specific cause of action at issue arise out of or is related
    to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state; in other words, there
    must be an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy.
    12. ____: ____. For specific personal jurisdiction, there must be a substan-
    tial connection between the defendant’s contacts with the forum state
    and the operative facts of the litigation. This is determined at the time a
    suit is commenced.
    13. Jurisdiction: Time. The requisite minimum contacts must exist either
    at the time the cause of action arose, at the time the suit was filed, or
    within a reasonable period of time immediately prior to the filing of
    the lawsuit.
    14. Jurisdiction: States. Contacts with Nebraska unrelated to the action
    brought have no bearing on a specific personal jurisdiction analysis.
    15. ____: ____. Unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship
    with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact
    with the forum state.
    16. Jurisdiction: States: Contracts: Parties. Standing alone, neither the
    existence of a contract with a party in the forum state nor use of inter-
    state communications are enough to support the necessary contacts for
    a finding of specific personal jurisdiction, but they are proper consider-
    ations in the overall analysis.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    313 Nebraska Reports
    WHEELBARGER V. DETROIT DIESEL
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 135
    17. ____: ____: ____: ____. When dealing with contracts, it is the prior
    negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the
    terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing, which
    must be evaluated in determining whether a defendant purposefully
    established minimum contacts within the forum.
    18. ____: ____: ____: ____. Because minimum contacts depend on the
    activities of the defendant related to operative facts of the litigation
    and not on the unilateral actions taken by someone else, direct contacts
    between the independent contracting parties, which the intermediary is
    not involved in, do not create minimum contacts for the intermediary.
    Petition for further review from the Court of Appeals,
    Pirtle, Chief Judge, and Reidmann and Welch, Judges, on
    appeal thereto from the District Court for Buffalo County, John
    H. Marsh, Judge. Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed.
    Jared J. Krejci, of Smith, Johnson, Allen, Connick & Hansen,
    for appellant.
    No appearance for appellees.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Freudenberg, J.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    At issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff made a
    prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction over the
    out-of-state defendants who facilitated the sale of allegedly
    defective software installed by a local mechanic in four of
    the plaintiff’s trucks over a period of 21⁄2 years. The defend­
    ants operate a business acting nationally as a “middleman”
    between mechanics and entities that create software to increase
    engine performance. Although the software company and the
    mechanic negotiate directly in determining the desired prod-
    uct and its price, billing goes through the defendants in order
    to collect a commission. Contact is initiated by mechanics
    through a website of the defendants.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    313 Nebraska Reports
    WHEELBARGER V. DETROIT DIESEL
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 135
    II. BACKGROUND
    1. Complaint
    Shawn Wheelbarger, a resident of Nebraska, operates a
    trucking business. He brought suit in Buffalo County, Nebraska,
    against Newcomb Diesel LLC (Newcomb), a Nebraska lim-
    ited liability company operating a diesel mechanic business.
    Wheelbarger alleged Newcomb installed software in four of
    Wheelbarger’s trucks from December 2013 through May 2016.
    Wheelbarger alleged the software caused mechanical problems
    leading to approximately $100,000 in repair bills and over
    $1 million in lost income. Wheelbarger’s complaint against
    Newcomb was later dismissed with prejudice upon a joint
    motion and stipulation.
    Under the same complaint, Wheelbarger also brought
    suit against Detroit Diesel ECM, LLC (Detroit Diesel), a
    Michigan limited liability company, and Mike Rodriguez, a
    resident of Michigan, doing business as M & C Distributing
    (M & C) (collectively Michigan Defendants). Wheelbarger
    asserted Michigan Defendants “operate businesses creat-
    ing software to reprogram engine control modules in diesel
    trucks”; “designed, manufactured, marketed, sold, and placed
    on market the software installed in Wheelbarger’s trucks”;
    and were “merchants with respect to the software installed in
    Wheelbarger’s trucks.”
    Wheelbarger asserted against Michigan Defendants claims
    for strict liability, negligence, and breach of implied warran-
    ties. With respect to these claims, Wheelbarger alleged the
    software installed in his trucks was “defectively designed,
    manufactured, and/or labeled” and “unreasonably dangerous”
    for its intended or reasonably foreseeable use. Also, Michigan
    Defendants allegedly failed to (1) exercise reasonable care
    in “designing, manufacturing, and/or labeling the software”;
    (2) ensure the software installed in Wheelbarger’s trucks was
    safe for its intended use; and (3) provide Wheelbarger “with
    adequate warning that the software installed in Wheelbarger’s
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    313 Nebraska Reports
    WHEELBARGER V. DETROIT DIESEL
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 135
    trucks may damage Wheelbarger’s trucks.” Wheelbarger
    alleged Michigan Defendants knew or had reason to know the
    software was likely to be dangerous when used in its intended
    and foreseeable uses and Wheelbarger was a foreseeable user
    who reasonably relied on Michigan Defendants’ skill or judg-
    ment to furnish software suitable for the particular purpose of
    safely and reliably operating his trucking business.
    Wheelbarger acknowledged Michigan Defendants’ principal
    place of business was in Michigan, but asserted the district
    court had personal jurisdiction because Michigan Defendants
    “market their products in the State of Nebraska and said prod-
    ucts are the subject of this action.”
    2. Special Appearance and
    Motion to Dismiss
    Michigan Defendants filed a special appearance and motion
    to dismiss, arguing they did not have sufficient minimum con-
    tacts with Nebraska to establish general or specific personal
    jurisdiction. A hearing on the motion was held.
    (a) Affidavit
    An affidavit by Rodriguez was offered by Michigan
    Defendants in support of the motion and entered into evidence.
    Rodriguez averred Michigan Defendants did not create the sub-
    ject software. Rather, the software installed in Wheelbarger’s
    trucks was designed and provided by an unidentified third
    party. Rodriguez explained he and his wife jointly own Detroit
    Diesel and M & C, having operated their business through
    M & C until Detroit Diesel was incorporated. Their business
    is to act as a “‘middleman’” connecting software designers
    with mechanics in need of software for semi-tractor engines to
    increase performance.
    Once Rodriguez puts the mechanics in contact with a soft-
    ware designer, “all information relative to the job . . . is
    directly between the mechanic and the software designer”
    and the “software is directly sent from the software designer
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    313 Nebraska Reports
    WHEELBARGER V. DETROIT DIESEL
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 135
    electronically to the mechanic as I have no part in the delivery
    of the product.”
    Rodriguez’ business makes money by collecting a commis-
    sion for connecting the mechanics with the software designers.
    This is done by the software designer sending Rodriguez an
    invoice, after which Rodriguez “will add a profit margin to the
    invoice and re-invoice the mechanic.” Rodriguez explained, “I
    am paid by the mechanic and I then remit payment to the soft-
    ware designer.” In the transaction at issue, Rodriguez’ business
    made a profit of $200. It is unknown what Newcomb paid for
    the software.
    Rodriguez averred there was no written contract between
    Wheelbarger and either Detroit Diesel or M & C. Neither
    Detroit Diesel nor M & C maintained at any pertinent time
    any office or physical presence in Nebraska. Likewise, at
    all pertinent times, Michigan Defendants have not owned
    property in Nebraska; kept corporate records in Nebraska;
    or had any employees, officers, or directors in Nebraska.
    Michigan Defendants do not “generate any continual revenue
    in Nebraska.”
    Michigan Defendants have a website through which
    Rodriguez believed Newcomb contacted Rodriguez seeking
    his services in relation to Newcomb’s work on Wheelbarger’s
    trucks. He recollected that the first contact was in July 2014
    and that the last contact was in March 2016. The website
    does not mention serving Nebraska or its residents. Rodriguez
    averred, “Although the instant case is not the only contact that
    I have had with [Newcomb] in seeking my services, all con-
    tacts . . . have been in the same scenario . . . .” Rodriguez did
    not elaborate on how many other such contacts had occurred.
    Rodriguez averred he had never had any correspondence
    with Wheelbarger.
    (b) Answer to Interrogatory
    At the hearing, the court also received an exhibit contain-
    ing Newcomb’s answer to an interrogatory asking Newcomb
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    313 Nebraska Reports
    WHEELBARGER V. DETROIT DIESEL
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 135
    to identify any companies that provided it with reprogram-
    ming software. Newcomb stated in its answer, “We purchased
    the software from M & C . . . to enable us to tune the ECM
    programming according to the customer’s request.” Newcomb
    described that M & C “sends the software remotely over the
    internet” and “[a]ll settings and parameter changes are done to
    customer preferences and explicit consent.” The district court
    referred to the exhibit in its order on the motion to dismiss.
    (c) Arguments
    In a brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss, Wheelbarger
    explained that “[a]s against the Michigan Defendants, this is a
    products liability action.” Wheelbarger asked the court to treat
    the matter as one decided on pleadings and affidavits, under
    which he was required to make only a prima facie showing
    of personal jurisdiction. In the event the court believed the
    evidence had converted the motion into a motion for summary
    judgment, Wheelbarger asked the court to continue the matter
    so he could present further evidence.
    Wheelbarger conceded Michigan Defendants did not cre-
    ate the software that Newcomb installed in his trucks, but
    argued that by serving as a “middleman” sending the invoices
    to mechanics, they “supplied” it. He conceded the court
    lacked general personal jurisdiction over Michigan Defendants
    but argued the court had specific personal jurisdiction over
    Michigan Defendants.
    Wheelbarger elaborated that Michigan Defendants either
    directly sent or directly facilitated sending software to Nebraska
    and knew they were doing so—indeed, they had been doing
    business with Newcomb for almost 2 years. This was dis-
    tinct from it simply being generally predictable that through
    the stream of commerce, the subject software would reach
    Nebraska.
    Michigan Defendants responded that their business relation-
    ship with Newcomb was “very brief, lasting approximately a
    year and a half.” Given the passivity of their website, Michigan
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    313 Nebraska Reports
    WHEELBARGER V. DETROIT DIESEL
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 135
    Defendants argued such purchases did not create the substantial
    connection necessary for personal jurisdiction.
    (d) Order
    The district court granted the motion to dismiss. It explained
    Wheelbarger needed only to make a prima facie showing of
    jurisdiction to survive Michigan Defendants’ motion to dis-
    miss, because the matter was submitted solely on the pleadings
    and supporting affidavits. It ultimately concluded, however,
    that Wheelbarger had failed to make a prima facie show-
    ing of jurisdiction. Focusing on the lack of contact between
    Wheelbarger and Michigan Defendants and the passivity of
    Michigan Defendants’ website, the court found Michigan
    Defendants should not have reasonably anticipated being haled
    into court in Nebraska.
    3. Nebraska Court of Appeals’ Decision
    The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
    order dismissing the claims against Michigan Defendants for
    lack of personal jurisdiction. 1
    It quoted at length our opinion in Abdouch v. Lopez, 2
    describing that, for internet jurisdiction cases, the Eighth
    Circuit, like the majority of circuit courts, has adopted the
    analytical framework set forth in the memorandum opinion of
    Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. 3 Zippo Mfg. Co. sets
    forth a sliding scale where at one end there is personal jurisdic-
    tion because a “defendant enters into contracts with residents
    of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated
    transmission of computer files over the Internet” and at the
    “opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply
    posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible
    1
    Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel, 
    31 Neb. App. 145
    , 
    978 N.W.2d 334
     (2022).
    2
    Abdouch v. Lopez, 
    285 Neb. 718
    , 
    829 N.W.2d 662
     (2013).
    3
    Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 
    952 F. Supp. 1119
     (W.D. Pa.
    1997).
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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    WHEELBARGER V. DETROIT DIESEL
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 135
    to users in foreign jurisdictions.” 4 In the middle ground are
    websites where a user can exchange information with the host
    computer and “the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by
    examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of
    the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site.” 5
    The Court of Appeals quoted our statement in Abdouch
    that the Zippo Mfg. Co. “‘sliding scale of interactivity test’”
    is recognized by most circuits “‘only as a starting point.’” 6 A
    defendant cannot be haled into court simply because a website
    is “highly interactive.” 7 Traditional statutory and constitutional
    principles, including territorial limitations on the power of the
    respective States, remain the touchstone of the inquiry. 8
    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Michigan Defendants
    “simply responded to Newcomb[’s] inquiry” through its pas-
    sive website. 9 Michigan Defendants did not negotiate, contract
    for, or sell the software. Michigan Defendants “simply facili-
    tated the request for the product to a third party who negotiated
    and supplied the product to Newcomb.” 10
    The Court of Appeals noted that “[t]he causes of action deal
    directly with alleged problems with that product, the nature of
    which was separately negotiated with the software developer
    and Newcomb . . . based on Wheelbarger’s expectations.” 11
    The Court of Appeals found that, under the circumstances,
    Michigan Defendants lacked sufficient minimum contacts to
    have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Nebraska.
    We granted Wheelbarger’s petition for further review.
    4
    Id. at 1124.
    5
    Id.
    6
    Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel, supra note 1, 31 Neb. App. at 156, 978
    N.W.2d at 344, quoting Abdouch v. Lopez, 
    supra note 2
    .
    7
    
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    8
    See Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel, supra note 1.
    9
    Id. at 160, 978 N.W.2d at 346.
    10
    Id.
    11
    Id.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    313 Nebraska Reports
    WHEELBARGER V. DETROIT DIESEL
    Cite as 
    313 Neb. 135
    III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Wheelbarger assigns that the Court of Appeals erred in (1)
    failing to correctly apply the standard of review by looking at
    the facts in the light most favorable to Wheelbarger and (2)
    concluding that Nebraska courts lacked jurisdiction over the
    Michigan Defendants due to an overreliance on or misapplica-
    tion of the Zippo Mfg. Co. test.
    IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] When the hearing on a motion to dismiss for lack of
    personal jurisdiction falls short of an evidentiary hearing held
    in a matter similar to determining the issue at trial, the plaintiff
    is required only to make a prima facie showing of personal
    jurisdiction in order to survive the motion to dismiss and an
    appellate court examines the question of whether the nonmov-
    ing party has established a prima facie case of personal juris-
    diction de novo. 12
    [2] In reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss, an appel-
    late court must look at the facts in the light most favorable to
    the nonmoving party and resolve all factual conflicts in favor
    of that party. 13
    V. ANALYSIS
    On appeal, as he did below, Wheelbarger focuses on his
    products liability claim and argues Michigan Defendants’ direct
    involvement with Newcomb in facilitating multiple contacts
    with the software developer and billing for the sales estab-
    lished specific personal jurisdiction. He argues the Court of
    Appeals disregarded Newcomb’s answer to the interrogatory
    stating M & C sent the software to it, failed to view the facts in
    the light most favorable to Wheelbarger, and placed undue reli-
    ance on the passivity of Michigan Defendants’ website under
    12
    See, Yeransian v. Willkie Farr, 
    305 Neb. 693
    , 
    942 N.W.2d 226
     (2020);
    RFD-TV v. WildOpenWest Finance, 
    288 Neb. 318
    , 
    849 N.W.2d 107
     (2014).
    13
    Nimmer v. Giga Entertainment Media, 
    298 Neb. 630
    , 
    905 N.W.2d 523
    (2018).
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    WHEELBARGER V. DETROIT DIESEL
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    313 Neb. 135
    the Zippo Mfg. Co. test for personal jurisdiction when the case
    involved direct business dealings.
    [3] Personal jurisdiction is the power of a tribunal to sub-
    ject and bind a particular entity to its decisions. 14 Because
    our long‑arm statute 15 confers personal jurisdiction over non-
    residents to the fullest extent constitutionally permitted, the
    inquiry here is whether Michigan Defendants had sufficient
    minimum contacts with Nebraska so that the exercise of per-
    sonal jurisdiction would not offend traditional notions of fair
    play and substantial justice. 16
    [4-6] The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution pro-
    tects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the
    binding judgments of a forum with which he or she has estab-
    lished no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations. 17 The consti-
    tutional touchstone for personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
    is whether the defendant purposefully established minimum
    contacts in the forum state. 18 The minimum contacts require-
    ment protects the defendant against litigating in a distant or
    inconvenient forum and ensures that states do not exceed the
    limits imposed by their status as coequal sovereigns in a fed-
    eral system. 19
    [7,8] The benchmark for determining if the exercise of per-
    sonal jurisdiction satisfies due process is whether the defend­
    ant’s minimum contacts with the forum state are such that the
    defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
    there. 20 This analysis is not simply mechanical or quantita-
    tive, but requires that we consider the quality and nature of
    14
    VKGS v. Planet Bingo, 
    285 Neb. 599
    , 
    828 N.W.2d 168
     (2013).
    15
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-536
     (Reissue 2016).
    16
    See Yeransian v. Willkie Farr, 
    supra note 12
    .
    17
    Kugler Co. v. Growth Products Ltd., 
    265 Neb. 505
    , 
    658 N.W.2d 40
     (2003).
    18
    Quality Pork Internat. v. Rupari Food Servs., 
    267 Neb. 474
    , 
    675 N.W.2d 642
     (2004).
    19
    See Hand Cut Steaks Acquisitions v. Lone Star Steakhouse, 
    298 Neb. 705
    ,
    
    905 N.W.2d 644
     (2018).
    20
    Kugler Co. v. Growth Products Ltd., 
    supra note 17
    .
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    WHEELBARGER V. DETROIT DIESEL
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    the defendant’s activities to ascertain whether the defendant
    has the necessary minimum contacts with the forum to satisfy
    due process. 21
    [9,10] It is essential in each case that there be some act by
    which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege
    of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking
    the benefits and protections of its laws. 22 This requirement
    ensures that a defendant will not be subject to litigation in
    a jurisdiction solely due to random, fortuitous, or attenuated
    contacts. 23 There must be fair warning that a particular activ-
    ity might subject the nonresident defendant to the jurisdiction
    of the foreign sovereign, giving a degree of predictability to
    the legal system by allowing potential defendants to struc-
    ture their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as
    to where that conduct will and will not render them liable
    to suit. 24
    [11-14] Specific personal jurisdiction requires that the
    specific cause of action at issue arise out of or is related to
    the defendant’s contacts with the forum state; in other words,
    there must be an affiliation between the forum and the under-
    lying controversy. 25 For specific personal jurisdiction, there
    must be a substantial connection between the defendant’s
    contacts with the forum state and the operative facts of the lit-
    igation. 26 This is determined at the time a suit is commenced.
    The requisite minimum contacts must exist either at the time
    the cause of action arose, at the time the suit was filed, or
    21
    
    Id.
     See, also, Internat. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
    326 U.S. 310
    , 
    66 S. Ct. 154
    , 
    90 L. Ed. 95
     (1945).
    22
    Hand Cut Steaks Acquisitions v. Lone Star Steakhouse, 
    supra note 19
    .
    23
    Crete Carrier Corp. v. Red Food Stores, 
    254 Neb. 323
    , 
    576 N.W.2d 760
    (1998).
    24
    See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
    471 U.S. 462
    , 
    105 S. Ct. 2174
    , 
    85 L. Ed. 2d 528
     (1985). See, also, e.g., Quality Pork Internat. v. Rupari Food
    Servs., supra note 18.
    25
    See Yeransian v. Willkie Farr, 
    supra note 12
    .
    26
    
    Id.
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    WHEELBARGER V. DETROIT DIESEL
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    within a reasonable period of time immediately prior to the
    filing of the lawsuit. 27 Contacts with Nebraska unrelated to
    the action brought have no bearing on a specific personal
    jurisdiction analysis. 28
    [15-17] Unilateral activity of those who claim some relation-
    ship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the require-
    ment of contact with the forum state. 29 Standing alone, neither
    the existence of a contract with a party in the forum state nor
    use of interstate communications are enough to support the
    necessary contacts for a finding of specific personal jurisdic-
    tion, but they are proper considerations in the overall analy-
    sis. 30 When dealing with contracts, it is the prior negotiations
    and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms
    of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing, which
    must be evaluated in determining whether a defendant purpose-
    fully established minimum contacts within the forum. 31
    Applying these principals, where there has been “protracted
    business” related to the action involving “substantial and
    numerous purchases” and communications, we have found
    minimum contacts supporting specific personal jurisdiction. 32
    In VKGS v. Planet Bingo, 33 for example, we held there was
    specific personal jurisdiction in an action for declaratory judg-
    ment as to rights under agreements between a Nebraska busi-
    ness and an out-of-state software company with which there
    had been monthly communications involving seven separate
    contracts over the course of 6 years. We said the nonresident
    defendant, although having never physically entered Nebraska,
    27
    
    Id.
    28
    See Hand Cut Steaks Acquisitions v. Lone Star Steakhouse, 
    supra note 19
    .
    29
    Crete Carrier Corp. v. Red Food Stores, 
    supra note 23
    .
    30
    See 
    id.
    31
    VKGS v. Planet Bingo, supra note 14.
    32
    McGowan Grain v. Sanburg, 
    225 Neb. 129
    , 142, 
    403 N.W.2d 340
    , 349
    (1987).
    33
    VKGS v. Planet Bingo, supra note 14.
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    deliberately reached out beyond its home state to voluntarily
    create a long-term relationship with and assume obligations
    toward a Nebraska company.
    Likewise, in Crete Carrier Corp. v. Red Food Stores, 34
    we held, in an action for indemnification under a transporta-
    tion contract, that there was personal jurisdiction over the
    nonresident defendant as a result of the ongoing contrac-
    tual relationship over a period of 5 years and over 2,000
    contacts placing orders and verifying deliveries during the
    2‑year period of the relevant contract. Similarly, in Kugler
    Co. v. Growth Products Ltd., 35 we held, in an action by a local
    agricultural company for breach of contract and warranties,
    that minimum contacts supported specific personal jurisdic-
    tion over the nonresident seller of nitrogen products when the
    local company had initially reached out to the nonresident
    corporation after seeing an advertisement in a trade journal
    and they developed an ongoing relationship surrounding a
    substantial amount of product purchased by the local company
    from the nonresident corporation over the course of 7 years.
    Additionally, there were numerous communications relating to
    the local company ultimately becoming an assigned distribu-
    tor of the nonresident corporation’s products. We explained
    that the situation was a far cry from “an isolated sale to a
    Nebraska citizen.” 36
    On the other hand, because the minimum contacts analy-
    sis is not simply mechanical or quantitative, but requires
    that we consider the quality and nature of the defendant’s
    activities, there have been occasions where a single contract
    is deemed sufficient because a substantial connection was
    created. 37 To illustrate, we have found sufficient minimum con-
    tacts where the singular contract created a substantial ongoing
    34
    Crete Carrier Corp. v. Red Food Stores, 
    supra note 23
    .
    35
    Kugler Co. v. Growth Products Ltd., 
    supra note 17
    .
    36
    
    Id. at 513
    , 
    658 N.W.2d at 48
    .
    37
    See Kugler Co. v. Growth Products Ltd., 
    supra note 17
    .
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    relationship between a franchisor and a franchisee. 38 We have
    also found sufficient minimum contacts under a single contract
    where the nonresident defendant has acted as a guarantor for
    the transaction in question, 39 thereby “purposefully reach[ing]
    out to induce a particular action within the forum state.” 40
    Finally, we have found sufficient minimum contacts under a
    contract by a nonresident attorney to provide legal services
    when such services were rendered by the attorney in Nebraska,
    appearing pro hac vice and participating at length in filings and
    hearings in a Nebraska court. 41 These instances are in contrast
    to Roth Grading v. Martin Bros. Constr., 42 wherein the Court of
    Appeals held minimum contacts were lacking in an action for
    breach of a purchase agreement, when the contact between the
    parties was limited to the subject transaction by the Nebraska
    company to sell, for approximately $140,000, a single piece of
    heavy equipment to the nonresident defendant.
    [18] We have not addressed minimum contacts by an inter-
    mediary who introduced parties that independently negotiated
    and entered into the underlying contracts. However, because
    minimum contacts depend on the activities of the defendant
    related to the operative facts of the litigation and not on the
    unilateral actions taken by someone else, 43 direct contacts
    between the independent contracting parties, which the inter-
    mediary is not involved in, do not create minimum contacts
    38
    See Castle Rose v. Philadelphia Bar & Grill, 
    254 Neb. 299
    , 
    576 N.W.2d 192
     (1998).
    39
    See, Hand Cut Steaks Acquisitions v. Lone Star Steakhouse, 
    supra note 19
    ;
    Quality Pork Internat. v. Rupari Food Servs., supra note 18.
    40
    Hand Cut Steaks Acquisitions v. Lone Star Steakhouse, 
    supra note 19
    , 298
    Neb. at 731, 905 N.W.2d at 665.
    41
    See Holste v. Burlington Northern RR. Co., 
    256 Neb. 713
    , 
    592 N.W.2d 894
    (1999). But see Yeransian v. Willkie Farr, 
    supra note 12
    .
    42
    Roth Grading v. Martin Bros. Constr., 
    25 Neb. App. 928
    , 
    916 N.W.2d 70
    (2018).
    43
    See, Crete Carrier Corp. v. Red Food Stores, 
    supra note 23
    ; 4 American
    Law of Products Liability 3d § 48:82 (2014).
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    for the intermediary. We have held that even the acts of pred­
    ecessor corporations have no bearing on the requisite mini-
    mum contacts over the defendant successor corporation, absent
    express adoption of the predecessor’s liabilities. 44 For example,
    in RFD-TV v. WildOpenWest Finance, 45 we found the defendant
    successor corporation lacked minimum contacts for purposes
    of an action on a 5-year contract entered into by the local
    plaintiff with a nonresident predecessor corporation. Contacts
    between the parties consisted of the nonresident successor
    cable television provider sending, based on terms negotiated by
    the predecessor corporation, monthly licensing fees to the local
    programming service over the course of 2 years. The television
    provider also occasionally communicated remotely with the
    programming service’s employees to discuss and pay invoices.
    We summarized that the “actual business dealings” between the
    actual parties were “extremely limited.” 46
    As the Court of Appeals pointed out, 47 the Florida district
    court opinion in Miller v. Berman 48 is instructive as to the
    more specific scenario of a nonresident defendant who acts as
    an independent intermediary to the contracting parties. In an
    action for negligent misrepresentation, breach of express war-
    ranty, false advertising, and joint venture liability, the court in
    Miller held that the plaintiff’s forum lacked personal jurisdic-
    tion over the nonresident broker and exclusive distributor of
    a certain foreign yacht manufacturer. The broker had been
    contacted by the plaintiff through the broker’s website. When
    it became apparent the plaintiff wished to purchase a highly
    customized yacht that was beyond the scope of the broker’s
    distributorship, the broker advised the plaintiff to negotiate
    44
    RFD-TV v. WildOpenWest Finance, supra note 12. See Nimmer v. Giga
    Entertainment Media, 
    supra note 13
    .
    45
    RFD-TV v. WildOpenWest Finance, supra note 12.
    46
    Id. at 328, 849 N.W.2d at 116.
    47
    See Wheelbarger v. Detroit Diesel, supra note 1.
    48
    Miller v. Berman, 
    289 F. Supp. 2d 1327
     (M.D. Fla. 2003).
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    directly with the foreign yacht manufacturer. The plaintiff did
    and entered into a contract directly with the yacht manufac-
    turer. The broker accepted a commission on the sale. The court
    in Miller reasoned that, based upon the limited nature of the
    exchange between the parties over the internet and the broker’s
    website, the broker did not purposefully direct business activi-
    ties toward the forum state.
    The claim for which Wheelbarger asserts there is specific
    personal jurisdiction over Michigan Defendants is for prod-
    ucts liability in relation to the software Newcomb installed
    in four of Wheelbarger’s trucks over the course of 21⁄2 years.
    There is no dispute that Michigan Defendants had no direct
    contacts with Wheelbarger. There is no dispute that Michigan
    Defendants did not design the software at issue and did not
    participate directly with Newcomb in negotiations relative
    to the creation of software. Michigan Defendants’ relation-
    ship with Newcomb began when Newcomb reached out to
    Michigan Defendants upon finding their website advertising
    their services as a “middleman” who connects software design-
    ers with mechanics. Michigan Defendants sent the invoices
    for the software to Newcomb and accepted payment directly
    from Newcomb, after which Michigan Defendants remitted the
    payment, minus the commission, to the unidentified software
    designer. Viewing the exhibits in a light most favorable to
    Wheelbarger, we determine Michigan Defendants electroni-
    cally delivered the software to Newcomb as well.
    Although, unlike in Miller, this case allegedly involves
    four transactions rather than one, it is similar to Miller in
    the limited nature of the relevant contacts. 49 It is also similar
    to our cases dealing with successor entities participating in
    multiple underlying transactions because the actual business
    dealings between Michigan Defendants and Newcomb were
    extremely limited. It does not involve, as in many of our
    cases finding personal jurisdiction, protracted business. And
    49
    See 
    id.
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    the actual business dealings between Michigan Defendants and
    Wheelbarger were nonexistent.
    We agree with the Court of Appeals and the lower court
    that the quality and nature of Michigan Defendants’ activities
    related to the action brought against them by Wheelbarger do
    not support personal jurisdiction. Even if Michigan Defendants
    electronically transferred the software to Newcomb, Michigan
    Defendants’ contacts were too attenuated for Michigan
    Defendants to have purposefully established minimum contacts
    within Nebraska.
    VI. CONCLUSION
    For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of
    Appeals affirming the district court’s dismissal of Michigan
    Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction.
    Affirmed.