Ramaekers v. Creighton University , 312 Neb. 248 ( 2022 )


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  • Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    09/16/2022 09:07 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    312 Nebraska Reports
    RAMAEKERS V. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 248
    Lauren Ramaekers et al., appellants, v.
    Creighton University, a Nebraska
    nonprofit corporation, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed August 12, 2022.   No. S-21-848.
    1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question that does not
    involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter
    of law.
    2. Judgments. The meaning of the judgment is a question of law.
    3. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing questions of law, an
    appellate court resolves the questions independently of the lower court’s
    conclusions.
    4. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. Before reaching the legal issues
    presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to determine
    whether it has jurisdiction over the matter before it.
    5. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. For an appellate court
    to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, the party must be appealing from a
    final order or a judgment.
    6. Injunction: Final Orders. While it is well established that orders relat-
    ing to temporary injunctions and restraining orders are not final orders,
    it is equally well established that orders entering or denying permanent
    injunctions, which leave no issues remaining to be determined by
    the trial court, are final orders within the meaning of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
     (Cum. Supp. 2020).
    7. Judgments. A judgment’s meaning is determined, as a matter of law, by
    the contents of the judgment in question.
    8. ____. Unless the language used in a judgment is ambiguous, the effect
    of the judgment must be declared in the light of the literal meaning of
    the language used.
    9. Judgments: Words and Phrases. Ambiguity in a judgment exists when
    a word, phrase, or provision therein has, or is susceptible of, at least two
    reasonable but conflicting interpretations or meanings.
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    312 Nebraska Reports
    RAMAEKERS V. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 248
    10. Judgments. If the language of a judgment is ambiguous, there is room
    for construction.
    11. ____. In ascertaining the meaning of an ambiguous judgment, resort
    may be had to the entire record.
    12. Judgments: Intent. Doubtful or ambiguous judgments are to have a
    reasonable intendment to do justice and avoid wrong.
    13. Injunction. Generally, the purpose of a temporary injunction is to pro-
    tect the subject matter of litigation and preserve the status quo of the
    parties until a determination of the case on the merits.
    14. Injunction: Judgments: Moot Question. Where there is a final judg-
    ment against the party enjoined, the temporary injunction merges into
    the judgment and any questions concerning the propriety of the issuance
    of the temporary injunction become moot.
    15. Pleadings. The issues in a case are framed by the pleadings.
    16. ____. In an answer, the defending party shall state in short and plain
    terms the party’s defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny
    the averments upon which the adverse party relies.
    17. Injunction. There are significant procedural differences between tempo-
    rary and permanent injunctions.
    18. Injunction: Judgments. Generally, a district court should not order a
    judgment on the merits at the temporary injunction stage of proceedings.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: Marlon
    A. Polk, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
    Robert M. Sullivan, of Sullivan Law, P.C., L.L.O., for
    appellants.
    William F. Hargens, Abigail M. Moland, and Britni A.
    Summers, of McGrath, North, Mullin & Kratz, P.C., L.L.O.,
    for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Cassel, J.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    Ten students at Creighton University (Creighton) appeal from
    a district court’s order denying injunctive relief. The threshold
    jurisdictional question is whether the order denied only a tem-
    porary injunction, and thus was neither final nor appealable,
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    312 Nebraska Reports
    RAMAEKERS V. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 248
    or whether it denied a permanent injunction. Because we find
    ambiguity within the order’s four corners, we examine the
    record, which shows that only temporary relief was sought and
    denied. We therefore lack jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal.
    II. BACKGROUND
    Because we decide this appeal on jurisdiction, we provide
    only a brief background section. Other facts will be set forth in
    our analysis section below.
    1. Vaccine Mandate
    In July 2021, Creighton mandated that its students must be
    vaccinated against COVID-19 to register for classes. Creighton
    offered students an exemption from the mandate “due to the
    Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) status of the [COVID-
    19] vaccines.” But to obtain this waiver, students had to
    agree in writing to be vaccinated after “the [COVID-19] vac-
    cines [were] granted full approval by the [U.S.] Food and
    Drug Administration.” On August 23, the Food and Drug
    Administration fully approved certain COVID-19 vaccines.
    Accordingly, Creighton mandated that students who had
    obtained the waiver must receive their first dose of a fully
    approved COVID-19 vaccine by September 7, 2021, at 4:30
    p.m. Students who failed to do so would be “administratively
    withdrawn from [Creighton] and unable to attend classes or be
    on campus” after September 10.
    2. Complaint for Injunctive Relief
    Only 97 minutes before the 4:30 p.m. deadline, four stu-
    dents filed a complaint, styled as a “Petition for Injunction
    & Praecipe.” They sought to enjoin Creighton from adminis-
    tratively withdrawing students who did not comply with its
    COVID-19 vaccine policy.
    The next day, Creighton’s attorneys filed a “Notice of
    Appearance,” but Creighton did not, at that time, file either
    a motion to dismiss or an answer. On that same day, the four
    students amended their complaint and filed a “Motion for
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    312 Nebraska Reports
    RAMAEKERS V. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 248
    Expedited Ex Parte Hearing.” The amended complaint did not
    change the factual allegations but inserted an additional request
    in their prayer for relief. The motion sought “an order restor-
    ing [them] as students of [Creighton], pending further Order of
    the Court.” The motion did not explicitly request a temporary
    restraining order or temporary injunction.
    The court “granted” the motion and set an expedited hear-
    ing date. But before the hearing, a second amended complaint
    added and deleted plaintiffs without otherwise altering the
    body of the complaint.
    3. September 14, 2021, Hearing
    The court heard the motion on September 14, 2021. Counsel
    for all parties attended and participated. To the extent the
    proceedings are relevant to the jurisdictional issue, we sum-
    marize them at the appropriate point in the analysis section
    below. At the hearing’s end, the court took the motion under
    advisement.
    Before the court issued any ruling, third and fourth
    amended complaints were filed adding additional plaintiffs and
    Creighton filed a motion to strike two of the amended com-
    plaints. Because the amended complaints never changed the
    factual allegations stated in their original complaint, we do not
    distinguish between the complaints throughout the remainder
    of this opinion. Ultimately, through these amended complaints,
    10 students, Lauren Ramaekers, Patrice Quadrel, Sarah Sinsel,
    Sydney Case, Anne Clare Culpepper, Emma Carlson, Elliot
    Prusa, Avery Gillett, Nikokije Kozic, and Alecsandar Kozic
    (collectively Students), pursued the action.
    4. September 17, 2021, Hearing
    The court held a hearing on Creighton’s motion to strike
    on September 17, 2021. Counsel for all parties attended and
    participated. For reasons not pertinent here, the court overruled
    Creighton’s motion.
    But at this hearing, the court also announced its decision on
    Students’ motion. To the extent the court’s announcement and
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    RAMAEKERS V. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY
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    312 Neb. 248
    its colloquy with counsel relate to the jurisdictional question,
    we summarize them in the analysis section below.
    5. September 22, 2021, Order
    On September 22, 2021, the court issued a written order
    (the order). After recounting the September 14 appearances
    of counsel, affidavits received, and procedural history, as well
    as summarizing the September 17 appearances and procedural
    history, the order stated in relevant part:
    1. [Ruling on Creighton’s motion to strike.]
    2. The court then took up the matter of [Students’]
    requests for injunctive relief in [their complaint].
    3. Based on arguments of counsel for [Students], the
    Court concludes that [Students’] request for injunctive
    relief is based on a breach of contract theory. However,
    to the extent that there was a contract between [Students]
    and [Creighton], and without finding that such a contract
    existed, the Court finds that [Students’] agreement to
    receive a COVID-19 vaccine once the [Food and Drug
    Administration] fully approved a COVID-19 vaccine
    became part of that contract.
    4. The Court further finds that [Students] have failed to
    show irreparable harm.
    5. The Court further finds that [Students] have failed to
    show a likelihood of success on the merits.
    6. For the reasons set forth above, and for the reasons
    stated by the Court on the record during the September
    17 . . . hearing, including the Court’s reliance upon the
    legal analysis in [a Seventh Circuit opinion], the Court
    hereby denies [Students’] requests for injunctive relief as
    set forth in [Students’ complaint] and, to the extent [the
    complaint] and/or their Motion for an Expedited Ex Parte
    Hearing could be construed as [m]otions for a [t]emporary
    [r]estraining [o]rder or [t]emporary [i]njunction pursuant
    to 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-1063
     and/or 25-1064 [(Reissue
    2016)], those motions are hereby denied.
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    RAMAEKERS V. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY
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    312 Neb. 248
    Students filed a timely appeal. We moved the appeal to our
    docket. 1
    III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Students set forth eight assignments of error, all of which, in
    various ways, attack the district court’s refusal to grant injunc-
    tive relief.
    Creighton’s brief, prior to discussing the merits of the
    court’s order, asserts that we lack jurisdiction of the appeal.
    It contends that the order denied only Students’ request for
    temporary injunctive relief and that, therefore, the order was
    neither final nor appealable.
    IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual
    dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law. 2
    [2] The meaning of the judgment is a question of law. 3
    [3] When reviewing questions of law, an appellate court
    resolves the questions independently of the lower court’s
    conclusions. 4
    V. ANALYSIS
    1. Jurisdictional Question
    [4,5] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review,
    it is the duty of an appellate court to determine whether it has
    jurisdiction over the matter before it. 5 For an appellate court to
    acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, the party must be appealing
    from a final order or a judgment. 6
    [6] While it is well established that orders relating to tem-
    porary injunctions and restraining orders are not final orders,
    1
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106
    (3) (Cum. Supp. 2020).
    2
    In re Estate of Beltran, 
    310 Neb. 174
    , 
    964 N.W.2d 714
     (2021).
    3
    Rice v. Webb, 
    287 Neb. 712
    , 
    844 N.W.2d 290
     (2014).
    4
    In re Estate of Beltran, 
    supra note 2
    .
    5
    Cinatl v. Prososki, 
    307 Neb. 477
    , 
    949 N.W.2d 505
     (2020).
    6
    
    Id.
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    RAMAEKERS V. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 248
    it is equally well established that orders entering or denying
    permanent injunctions, which leave no issues remaining to be
    determined by the trial court, are final orders within the mean-
    ing of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
     (Cum. Supp. 2020). 7 For over
    150 years, we have repeatedly held that the issuance, 8 denial, 9
    or dissolution 10 of a temporary injunction is not a final order.
    Therefore, for this court to have jurisdiction for the instant
    appeal, the order must not only have denied temporary injunc-
    tive relief, but also have denied a permanent injunction.
    Students argue that the court did so, citing the language in
    the order that stated, “[T]he Court hereby denies [Students’]
    requests for injunctive relief as set forth in [their complaint].”
    Creighton, on the other hand, argues that the order addressed
    only Students’ request for temporary injunctive relief, focusing
    on language of the order that recited findings pertinent only to
    temporary injunctive relief. We first turn to the principles of
    law applicable to determining the meaning of a judgment or
    an order.
    2. Principles of Law
    [7-9] A judgment’s meaning is determined, as a matter of
    law, by the contents of the judgment in question. 11 Unless the
    7
    Waite v. City of Omaha, 
    263 Neb. 589
    , 
    641 N.W.2d 351
     (2002).
    8
    See, Shasta Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters, 
    290 Neb. 640
    , 
    861 N.W.2d 425
     (2015); Pennfield Oil Co. v. Winstrom, 
    267 Neb. 288
    , 
    673 N.W.2d 558
     (2004); State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp.,
    
    162 Neb. 683
    , 
    77 N.W.2d 215
     (1956); Guaranty Fund Commission v.
    Teichmeier, 
    119 Neb. 387
    , 
    229 N.W. 121
     (1930); Barkley v. Pool, 
    102 Neb. 799
    , 
    169 N.W. 730
     (1918); Young v. City of Albion, 
    77 Neb. 678
    , 
    110 N.W. 706
     (1906); Bartram v. Sherman, 
    46 Neb. 713
    , 
    65 N.W. 789
     (1896);
    School Dist. No. 15 v. Brown, 
    10 Neb. 440
    , 
    6 N.W. 770
     (1880).
    9
    See, Waite v. City of Omaha, 
    supra note 7
    ; Manning v. Connell, 
    47 Neb. 83
    , 
    66 N.W. 17
     (1896).
    10
    See, Waite v. City of Omaha, 
    supra note 7
    ; Abramson v. Bemis, 
    201 Neb. 97
    , 
    266 N.W.2d 226
     (1978); Meng v. Coffee, 
    52 Neb. 44
    , 
    71 N.W. 975
    (1897); Smith v. Sahler, 
    1 Neb. 310
     (1871). See, also, Clark v. Fitch, 
    32 Neb. 511
    , 
    49 N.W. 374
     (1891) (declining to dissolve not final).
    11
    See Kerndt v. Ronan, 
    236 Neb. 26
    , 
    458 N.W.2d 466
     (1990).
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    RAMAEKERS V. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY
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    312 Neb. 248
    language used in a judgment is ambiguous, the effect of the
    judgment must be declared in the light of the literal meaning
    of the language used. 12 Ambiguity in a judgment exists when
    a word, phrase, or provision therein has, or is susceptible
    of, at least two reasonable but conflicting interpretations
    or meanings. 13
    [10-12] If the language of a judgment is ambiguous, there
    is room for construction. 14 In ascertaining the meaning of an
    ambiguous judgment, resort may be had to the entire record. 15
    Doubtful or ambiguous judgments are to have a reasonable
    intendment to do justice and avoid wrong. 16
    Although we may not have said so previously, we see no
    reason why these principles should not apply to orders—at
    least where the order may be final. With the principles in mind,
    we turn to the four corners of the order.
    3. Four Corners
    Near the end of the background section, we extensively
    quoted the relevant parts of the order. We need not repeat
    them here.
    We find the order to be ambiguous. It used language that—
    considered in the context of the entire order—can reasonably
    be read to have more than one conflicting meaning.
    In the order, the court “denie[d] [Students’] requests for
    injunctive relief as set forth in [their complaint].” The com-
    plaint sought to permanently enjoin Creighton from enforcing
    its COVID-19 vaccine policy. Accordingly, that part of the
    order could reasonably be read to deny Students’ request for a
    permanent injunction.
    12
    See Bokelman v. Bokelman, 
    202 Neb. 17
    , 
    272 N.W.2d 916
     (1979).
    13
    Carlson v. Carlson, 
    299 Neb. 526
    , 
    909 N.W.2d 351
     (2018).
    14
    Label Concepts v. Westendorf Plastics, 
    247 Neb. 560
    , 
    528 N.W.2d 335
    (1995), disapproved on other grounds, Weyh v. Gottsch, 
    303 Neb. 280
    , 
    929 N.W.2d 40
     (2019).
    15
    
    Id.
    16
    Bayne v. Bayne, 
    302 Neb. 858
    , 
    925 N.W.2d 687
     (2019).
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    However, a conflicting interpretation arises when that lan-
    guage is considered alongside the rest of the order. The court
    denied injunctive relief after applying an analytical framework
    commonly used by courts only to deny requests for tempo-
    rary injunctive relief. 17 Another part of the order, referring to
    “[Students’ complaint] and/or their Motion for an Expedited
    Ex Parte Hearing,” said that they “could be construed as
    [m]otions for a [t]emporary [r]estraining [o]rder or [t]empo-
    rary [i]njunction.”
    [13,14] If, as Students contend, the order was intended to
    deny their request for a permanent injunction, there would have
    been no reason for the court to include a temporary injunc-
    tion analysis. Generally, the purpose of a temporary injunction
    is to protect the subject matter of litigation and preserve the
    status quo of the parties until a determination of the case on
    the merits. 18 Where there is a final judgment against the party
    enjoined, the temporary injunction merges into the judgment
    and any questions concerning the propriety of the issuance of
    the temporary injunction become moot. 19 To paraphrase our
    discussion of a similar situation, a court need not rule on who
    won a battle, if it has already decided who won the war. 20
    Because the order is ambiguous, we turn to the record to
    ascertain its meaning.
    4. Meaning in Light of Entire Record
    (a) Additional Facts
    We now look to the record, focusing on the acts and words
    of the parties and the court at the two hearings and in their
    17
    See, e.g., Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
    555 U.S. 7
    ,
    
    129 S. Ct. 365
    , 
    172 L. Ed. 2d 249
     (2008).
    18
    Pennfield Oil Co. v. Winstrom, 
    272 Neb. 219
    , 
    720 N.W.2d 886
     (2006).
    19
    See State ex rel. Douglas v. Ledwith, 
    204 Neb. 6
    , 
    281 N.W.2d 729
     (1979).
    20
    See Melanie M. v. Winterer, 
    290 Neb. 764
    , 
    862 N.W.2d 76
     (2015)
    (discussing termination of temporary restraining order by overruling of
    motion for temporary injunction and sustaining of motion for summary
    judgment).
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    filings. As we articulate below, we find that the order denied
    only Students’ request for a temporary injunction.
    (i) Students’ Motion Sought Temporary Relief
    To begin, Students’ motion sought “an order restoring
    [them] as students of [Creighton], pending further Order of the
    Court.” (Emphasis supplied.) This clearly reflects a request for
    a temporary order, to be followed at a later time by something
    more—presumably, by a judgment or final order.
    (ii) Pleadings Failed to Frame Issues
    [15,16] When Students filed their motion, Creighton had
    not filed an answer nor had the time expired for the filing of
    an answer. The issues in a case are framed by the pleadings. 21
    In an answer, the defending party shall state in short and plain
    terms the party’s defenses to each claim asserted and shall
    admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party
    relies. 22 Long ago, we said that it is always well to have issues
    framed before judgment. 23 Treating the hearing on Students’
    motion as a trial on the merits would circumvent the issue-
    framing function of pleadings. Moreover, it would deprive
    Creighton of any opportunity to assert defenses.
    (iii) Arguments at September 14, 2021, Hearing
    The court began the September 14, 2021, hearing by noting
    that Students had not filed a motion for a temporary restrain-
    ing order or a motion for temporary injunction. Then, the
    court stated, “[Students] are requesting an order . . . restoring
    [them] as students of [Creighton]” and “the Court is going to
    construe that . . . request by [Students] as . . . requesting tem-
    porary relief from this Court, pursuant to [§] 25-1063, which
    will equitably permit the Court to consider this in [Students’]
    motion as seeking some temporary relief . . . .”
    21
    In re Petition of Anonymous 5, 
    286 Neb. 640
    , 
    838 N.W.2d 226
     (2013).
    22
    See Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1108(b).
    23
    Tecumseh Nat. Bank v. Harmon, 
    48 Neb. 222
    , 
    66 N.W. 1128
     (1896).
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    Neither party contradicted the court’s interpretation of
    Students’ motion. The court then instructed the parties “to pro-
    ceed accordingly.”
    First, the parties submitted affidavits to the court, which the
    court—imposing its own limitation—received “for purposes of
    this hearing.” Neither party objected to the court’s limitation.
    Students and Creighton then argued whether the court should
    grant Students’ request for a temporary injunction. Students
    began by contending that “the allegations set forth in the [com-
    plaint] met the standards necessary for a temporary injunction.
    . . . [I]t would be appropriate for the Court to enter an order
    of temporary injunction, . . . so we can have more evidence on
    this and really open this up and see what’s in there.”
    Creighton responded by first noting its difficulties in suf-
    ficiently defending against Students’ allegations, because “this
    case . . . has been a moving target. The facts, the allegations,
    the even purported evidence offered by [Students] has been
    evolving . . . .”
    Creighton also highlighted perceived deficiencies in
    Students’ complaint. Creighton noted, “We’ve got several
    people named in the caption of the case. None of them are
    identified in . . . the body of the [complaint]. . . . [T]wo of the
    plaintiffs have already received the [COVID-19] vaccine. . . .
    They’ve not been unenrolled, . . . they don’t have a place in
    this lawsuit.”
    Creighton concluded by contending that the evidence in
    the record did not support Students’ request for a temporary
    injunction. For instance, Creighton argued that there was not
    “any medical evidence to support” Students’ allegation that
    “some [of them] have serious medical conditions which make
    the vaccine ‘not recommended’” in the affidavits received by
    the court.
    In rebuttal, Students conceded that “this case has been a
    moving target since we filed it.” However, they argued that
    “the nature of a temporary injunction is such that . . . the plead-
    ings may not look all that finely tuned originally, but as soon as
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    we can get something in place that can allow us all to breathe,
    then we can go back in and clean things up quite a bit.”
    The court concluded the hearing by taking the matter under
    advisement. The court expressed its desire to issue a ruling
    quickly “based on the circumstances involving [Students].”
    However, the court never indicated it planned to issue a final
    ruling on the merits of Students’ complaint.
    (iv) Discussion at September 17, 2021, Hearing
    Three days later, the court orally announced its ruling on
    Students’ request for a temporary injunction. The court stated:
    [I]t is the Court’s intention to deny [Students’ com-
    plaint] for [i]njunction and/or [t]emporary [r]estraining
    order under [§§] 25-1063 and 25-1064, et seq. [Students]
    have asserted a kind of a breach of contract theory against
    Creighton. . . . [T]he Court does not believe that [Students]
    could show any irreparable injury that [Students] would
    be able to show a likelihood of succeeding on the merits
    of a breach of contract against Creighton.
    In response, Students’ attorney asked the court, “I assume,
    Your Honor, that this is a final order and that the case has been
    dismissed?” The court answered that it was not a final order
    and that the case was not dismissed, because the court read
    Students’ complaint as “still seeking some breach of contract
    related damages, monetary damages. It had claims for unjust
    enrichment . . . . [T]he Court’s ruling is only . . . in regards to
    the request for the temporary injunction.”
    Students’ attorney rebutted the court’s belief that Students
    were seeking monetary damages. Their attorney claimed that
    the allegations of monetary damages “were simply for purposes
    of alleging to the Court the need for a temporary injunction.”
    Creighton’s attorney noted that it was immaterial whether
    Students were seeking monetary damages, because “a denial
    of a request for a temporary injunctive relief does not con-
    stitute a dismissal on the merits, so I don’t think the case
    stands dismissed. I don’t think it’s a final appealable order at
    this point.”
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    The court concluded the hearing without providing a defini-
    tive answer on whether it still believed issues remained before
    it or whether its denial of Students’ request for a temporary
    injunction was a final order. The court stated, “I do not need
    to weigh in on [that,] because that’s above my pay grade. So I
    will let you all deal with the implications of it . . . .”
    (b) Resolution
    It is apparent from the record that the order meant only to
    deny Students’ request for a temporary injunction. The record
    reflected an understanding—by the court and the parties—
    that only the temporary injunction was before the court. The
    record does not include any stipulation to enter a final judg-
    ment based on the evidence adduced in support of a temporary
    injunction. 24 Nor did either party file a motion to dismiss or
    motion for summary judgment in order to reach the merits of
    Students’ complaint. 25
    Further, it is evident from the instructions given to the
    ­parties at the September 14, 2021, hearing that the court
    intended only to rule on whether Students were to receive a
    temporary injunction. At the hearing, the court informed the
    parties that it construed Students’ motion as requesting tem-
    porary injunctive relief and instructed the parties “to proceed
    accordingly.”
    [17] If the court intended to make an ultimate determination
    on the merits of Students’ complaint, we believe that it would
    have instructed the parties differently. As the U.S. Supreme
    Court has explained, there are significant procedural differ-
    ences between temporary and permanent injunctions. 26 As the
    court stated:
    24
    See, generally, Fetherkile v. Fetherkile, 
    299 Neb. 76
    , 
    907 N.W.2d 275
    (2018).
    25
    See, generally, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1332
     (Cum. Supp. 2020); Neb. Ct. R.
    Pldg. § 6-1112(b).
    26
    See University of Texas v. Camenisch, 
    451 U.S. 390
    , 
    101 S. Ct. 1830
    , 
    68 L. Ed. 2d 175
     (1981).
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    RAMAEKERS V. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY
    Cite as 
    312 Neb. 248
    The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to
    preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial
    on the merits can be held. Given this limited purpose, and
    given the haste that is often necessary if those positions
    are to be preserved, a preliminary injunction is customar-
    ily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal
    and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the
    merits. A party thus is not required to prove his case in
    full at a preliminary-injunction hearing . . . . 27
    Further, the Court warned that it is generally inappropriate for
    a federal court at the preliminary injunction stage to give a
    final judgment on the merits. 28
    [18] While we are not bound by the high court’s discus-
    sion or by the federal rules of civil procedure, we agree that a
    similar principle should apply to Nebraska trial courts having
    equity jurisdiction. Generally, a district court should not order
    a judgment on the merits at the temporary injunction stage
    of proceedings. 29 Doing so could raise due process concerns,
    because, as a federal court has observed in the context of a
    federal rule, 30 when a trial court disposes of a case on the
    merits after a preliminary injunction hearing without expressly
    ordering consolidation, it is likely that one or more of the
    parties will not present their entire case at an unconsolidated
    preliminary injunction hearing. 31
    Here, reading the order as disposing of Students’ com-
    plaint on the merits would raise due process concerns. Neither
    Students nor Creighton presented its entire case to the court at
    27
    
    Id.,
     
    451 U.S. at 395
    .
    28
    
    Id.
     But see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2) (allowing federal court to consolidate
    preliminary injunction hearing with trial on merits, but only if sufficient
    notice is given to parties).
    29
    See University of Texas v. Camenisch, 
    supra note 26
    .
    30
    See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).
    31
    See Francisco Sánchez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 
    572 F.3d 1
     (1st Cir.
    2009).
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    RAMAEKERS V. CREIGHTON UNIVERSITY
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    312 Neb. 248
    the September 14, 2021, hearing. As detailed earlier, the argu-
    ments were directed toward whether the court should grant
    Students’ temporary injunctive relief—not the final disposition
    of the claims and any defenses.
    Judgments are to have a reasonable intendment to do justice
    and avoid wrong. 32 Accordingly, to avoid infringing on the
    parties’ due process rights, we find that the order denied only
    Students’ request for temporary injunctive relief.
    At oral argument, relying upon our 2018 decision in Tilson
    v. Tilson, 33 Students argued that even if the order was properly
    characterized as a denial of a temporary injunction, it was
    nonetheless a final order under § 25-1902. We are not per-
    suaded. There, we found that an order denying a request for
    temporary relief was not a final order. 34 So, in that case, we
    dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 35 Students’ reli-
    ance on that decision is misplaced.
    VI. CONCLUSION
    Students appeal from an order that denied only their request
    for temporary injunctive relief. For over 150 years, we have
    held that such orders are neither final nor appealable. Because
    the court’s denial of a temporary injunction was not a final
    order, we lack jurisdiction of the appeal and must dismiss it.
    Appeal dismissed.
    32
    See Bayne v. Bayne, 
    supra note 16
    .
    33
    Tilson v. Tilson, 
    299 Neb. 64
    , 
    907 N.W.2d 31
     (2018).
    34
    See 
    id.
    35
    See 
    id.