State v. Chase , 310 Neb. 160 ( 2021 )


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    www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
    10/01/2021 09:10 AM CDT
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    310 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. CHASE
    Cite as 
    310 Neb. 160
    State of Nebraska, appellee, v.
    Amandah K. Chase, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed September 17, 2021.   No. S-20-789.
    1. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Generally, a trial court’s
    determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy
    trial grounds is a factual question that will be affirmed on appeal unless
    clearly erroneous.
    2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. Under a clearly erroneous standard of
    review, an appellate court does not reweigh the evidence but considers
    the judgment in a light most favorable to the successful party, resolving
    evidentiary conflicts in favor of the successful party, who is entitled to
    every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence.
    3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a ques-
    tion of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach
    an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below.
    4. Speedy Trial: Final Orders. The denial of a motion for discharge under
    the speedy trial statutes is a final order under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
    (Cum. Supp. 2020).
    5. Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. An appeal from the denial of a motion
    for discharge under the speedy trial statutes presents a relatively simple
    mathematical computation of whether the 6-month speedy trial clock, as
    extended by statutorily excludable periods, has expired before the com-
    mencement of trial and does not require any showing of prejudice.
    6. Speedy Trial. To calculate the time for speedy trial purposes, a court
    must exclude the day the complaint was filed, count forward 6 months,
    back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
    (4) (Reissue 2016) to determine the last day the defendant can
    be tried.
    7. Speedy Trial: Misdemeanors: Warrants: Arrests. For misdemeanor
    offenses where an “intimate partner” is an element of the offense, the
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    STATE v. CHASE
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    6-month period within which an accused is to be brought to trial com-
    mences the date the defendant is arrested on a complaint filed as part of
    a warrant for arrest.
    8.   Speedy Trial: Proof. The burden of proof is upon the State to show by
    a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the excluded time
    periods under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
    (4) (Reissue 2016) are appli-
    cable when the defendant is not tried within 6 months.
    9.   Speedy Trial: Good Cause. Judicial delay, absent a showing by the
    State of good cause, does not toll the speedy trial statute.
    10.   ____: ____. When a trial court relies on 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
    (4)(f )
    (Reissue 2016) to exclude time from the speedy trial calculation, it
    must make specific findings as to the good cause which resulted in
    the delay.
    11.   Appeal and Error. Where an appellant’s brief contains conclusory
    assertions unsupported by a coherent analytical argument, the appellant
    fails to satisfy the requirement that the party asserting the alleged error
    must both specifically assign and specifically argue it in the party’s ini-
    tial brief.
    12.   Motions for Continuance: Waiver. The statutory requirements of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1148
     (Reissue 2016) can be waived by a defendant’s
    failure to timely object.
    13.   Motions for Continuance. A trial court’s sua sponte decisions to delay
    trial are not governed by 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1148
     (Reissue 2016).
    14.   Speedy Trial: Good Cause. Evidence of good cause is properly pre-
    sented at the hearing on the motion for absolute discharge and need not
    be articulated at the time of the court’s sua sponte order delaying trial.
    15.   Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Waiver. Without a motion for absolute
    discharge under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1208
     (Reissue 2016), a defendant
    waives the statutory right to a trial within 6 months and no evidentiary
    showing of good cause is necessary at all.
    16.   Good Cause: Words and Phrases. Good cause is a substantial reason
    that affords a legal excuse.
    17.   Speedy Trial: Good Cause: Appeal and Error. In determining whether
    the trial court clearly erred in finding good cause after a hearing on a
    motion for discharge, an appellate court looks not just to the evidence
    presented at the hearing on the motion for discharge, but to the whole of
    the record.
    18.   Speedy Trial. The only timing requirement implicit in 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
    (4)(f ) (Reissue 2016) is that the substantial reason affording a
    legal excuse objectively existed at the time of the delay.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County, Gary
    B. Randall, Judge, on appeal thereto from the County Court
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    STATE v. CHASE
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    for Douglas County, Sheryl L. Lohaus, Judge. Judgment of
    District Court affirmed.
    Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and
    Rebekah S. Keller for appellant.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Stacy M. Foust
    for appellee.
    Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and
    Freudenberg, JJ.
    Freudenberg, J.
    INTRODUCTION
    The defendant appeals from the district court sitting as
    an appellate court, which affirmed the county court’s denial
    of her motion for absolute discharge based on her statutory
    right to a speedy trial. She asserts the county court’s failure
    to articulate its reasoning at the time of its sua sponte contin­
    uances of the trial date rendered untimely the evidence of good
    cause ultimately adduced by the prosecution at the hearing on
    her motion for discharge. The defendant argues that because
    of the untimeliness of the reasoning and evidence supporting
    good cause for the judicial delays, we must reverse the district
    court’s determination that the county court did not clearly err
    in finding the delays attributable to its sua sponte orders were
    for good cause and therefore excludable. We disagree and
    affirm the judgment of the district court.
    BACKGROUND
    The underlying charges against Amandah K. Chase are two
    counts of misdemeanor domestic violence assault in the third
    degree in violation of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-323
    (4) (Reissue
    2016). The charges were filed in county court on October 2,
    2019. Chase was arrested on January 21, 2020. A probable
    cause hearing was held that same date. The court set bond and
    appointed Chase defense counsel.
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    STATE v. CHASE
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    March 13, 2020
    A pretrial hearing was held on March 13, 2020, before Judge
    Sheryl Lohaus, in which defense counsel asked to set a hear-
    ing for “cleanup” and voir dire. The court set a hearing for
    March 26.
    March 26, 2020
    At the hearing on March 26, 2020, again before Judge
    Lohaus, defense counsel informed the court that Chase intended
    to pursue a jury trial. The court scheduled a jury trial status
    check for May 28. The journal entry provides, “Case continued
    to 5/28/2020 at 10:30 AM on motion of Defense.”
    May 28, 2020
    The status check hearing on May 28, 2020, was held before
    Judge Jeffrey Marcuzzo. Defense counsel informed the court
    that Chase “is ready to set this for a jury trial.”
    Defense counsel continued, “I’m not sure when Judge
    Lohaus is setting hers or if she’s requiring another cleanup.”
    Judge Marcuzzo stated that he was “not quite sure myself,” and
    he continued matters for a couple of weeks, scheduling another
    pretrial status check in front of Judge Lohaus so she could tell
    Chase “how she intends on handling these matters.” Defense
    counsel responded, “Okay.”
    The journal entry stated, “Case continued to 6/11/2020 at
    10:30 AM on motion of the Court.” It further stated, “Case
    continued. Defendant asking to be set for trial at further hear-
    ing. No objection by State’s Attorney.”
    June 11, 2020
    At the jury trial status check before Judge Lohaus on June
    11, 2020, Chase reiterated her request for a jury trial and stated,
    “I’m not sure when the Court is going to be able to schedule
    those, but we’d like to have it set if possible.”
    The court replied, “Probably September.” Defense coun-
    sel responded, “Okay.” Discussion was had in which defense
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    STATE v. CHASE
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    310 Neb. 160
    counsel expressed willingness to be scheduled as a “backup”
    in order to be tried as soon as possible. Judge Lohaus explained
    that in such a case, the trial could end up being “bumped,”
    because “we have other cases that have priority, which is dis-
    trict court.” Defense counsel stated, “We’ll take what we can
    get, Your Honor.”
    The journal entry provided, “Case continued to 8/10/2020
    . . . for Jury Trial.”
    June 25, 2020
    A journal entry reflects that another hearing was held on
    June 25, 2020, but there is no bill of exceptions for that hear-
    ing. The journal entry states, “Case continued to 8/03/2020 . . .
    on motion of the Court . . . for Jury Trial - Voir Dire.”
    Motion for Discharge and Hearing
    The transcript contains a motion for absolute discharge
    with a certificate of service dated July 27, 2020. The motion
    claimed violations of Chase’s statutory and constitutional rights
    to a speedy trial. The parties agreed that, absent tolling, the
    6-month statutory period would have run on July 21, 2020.
    At the hearing on the motion, the county court set forth that
    the State carried the burden to show the periods of delay were
    excludable. The State offered into evidence, and asked the
    county court to take judicial notice of, 11 exhibits containing
    administrative orders and other documents of the Nebraska
    Supreme Court and Douglas County relating to the COVID-19
    pandemic. Chase did not object to the exhibits, and they
    were received.
    The exhibits included an affidavit of the clerk of the dis-
    trict court, who averred on March 17, 2020, that due to
    the COVID-19 pandemic, he would be unable to notify and
    impanel the required prospective jurors.
    The exhibits also included an administrative order on
    April 27, 2020, by Judge Shelly Stratman, the presiding dis-
    trict court judge, continuing for good cause all jury trials
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    STATE v. CHASE
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    scheduled for the jury panels beginning June 8 through 22.
    Judge Stratman explained that the court could not conduct jury
    trials within the social distancing guidelines for protection of
    the public during the pandemic. Even if the court could assem-
    ble a willing venire, Judge Stratman explained, there was no
    way to ensure a jury’s deliberations would be unaffected by
    conflicting health and safety concerns.
    The State argued the delays were all on the court’s own
    motion for good cause due to the COVID-19 pandemic. But it
    also pointed out that defense counsel did not object to the May
    28 continuance, but instead responded “[o]kay” after the court
    announced it would be continuing matters.
    Defense counsel argued that when a court continues trial on
    its own motion, it must, at the time of the continuance, make
    specific findings of good cause based on evidence adduced by
    the State. She argued that it was too late for the State to prove
    and the court to find good cause based only on evidence pre-
    sented at the hearing on the motion for discharge.
    In a journal entry on July 30, 2020, the county court found
    that the continuances on March 26, May 28, and June 11 were
    on the court’s own motion and that 96 days associated with
    these continuances were excludable. The court elaborated that
    the exhibits offered by the State at the hearing on the motion
    for discharge proved by a preponderance of the evidence the
    trial was delayed for good cause pursuant to 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207
    (4)(f ) (Reissue 2016), because of a “nationwide
    pandemic of Novel Coronavirus and COVID-19 disease.” The
    court specifically noted the affidavit of the clerk of the district
    court and Judge Stratman’s administrative order in support of
    its finding.
    Appeal to District Court
    Chase appealed the July 30, 2020, order denying her statutory
    right to a speedy trial to the district court. The court affirmed
    the county court’s order denying the motion for discharge on
    the ground that the judicial delays were for good cause.
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    STATE v. CHASE
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    310 Neb. 160
    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
    Chase assigns that the district court erred in affirming the
    order of the county court denying her motion for absolute dis-
    charge under § 29-1207, because the State failed to meet its
    burden to show that good cause existed sufficient to toll her
    speedy trial rights.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1,2] Generally, a trial court’s determination as to whether
    charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a fac-
    tual question that will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly
    erroneous. 1 Under a clearly erroneous standard of review, an
    appellate court does not reweigh the evidence but considers
    the judgment in a light most favorable to the successful party,
    resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the successful party,
    who is entitled to every reasonable inference deducible from
    the evidence. 2
    [3] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for
    which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an inde-
    pendent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below. 3
    ANALYSIS
    [4,5] This case presents an appeal from the denial of Chase’s
    motion for discharge, which was affirmed by the district court.
    The denial of a motion for discharge under the speedy trial
    statutes is a final order under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902
     (Cum.
    Supp. 2020). 4 An appeal therefrom presents a relatively sim-
    ple mathematical computation of whether the 6-month speedy
    trial clock, as extended by statutorily excludable periods,
    1
    State v. Jennings, 
    308 Neb. 835
    , 
    957 N.W.2d 143
     (2021).
    2
    State v. Coomes, 
    309 Neb. 749
    , 
    962 N.W.2d 510
     (2021).
    3
    County of Cedar v. Thelen, 
    305 Neb. 351
    , 
    940 N.W.2d 521
     (2020).
    4
    See State v. Williams, 
    277 Neb. 133
    , 
    761 N.W.2d 514
     (2009).
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    has expired before the commencement of trial and does not
    require any showing of prejudice. 5
    [6-8] To calculate the time for speedy trial purposes, a court
    must exclude the day the complaint was filed, count forward
    6 months, back up 1 day, and then add any time excluded
    under § 29-1207(4) to determine the last day the defendant
    can be tried. 6 Although the speedy trial statutes expressly refer
    to indictments and informations, we have held that they also
    apply to prosecutions commenced by the filing of a complaint
    in county court. 7 For misdemeanor offenses, such as this, where
    an “intimate partner” is an element of the offense, the 6-month
    period in which an accused is to be brought to trial commences
    the date the defendant is arrested on a complaint filed as part
    of a warrant for arrest. 8 The burden of proof is upon the State
    to show by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more
    of the excluded time periods under § 29-1207(4) are applicable
    when the defendant is not tried within 6 months. 9
    Section 29-1207(4)(b) designates as excluded in comput-
    ing the time for trial “[t]he period of delay resulting from
    a continuance granted at the request or with the consent of
    the defendant or his or her counsel.” Section 29-1207(4)(c)
    designates as excluded the period of delay resulting from a
    continuance granted at the request of the prosecuting attorney
    for two reasons. Those reasons, as set forth in the statute,
    are as follows: (1) if the continuance is granted because of
    the unavailability of evidence material to the State’s case,
    when the prosecuting attorney has exercised due diligence
    to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable grounds to
    believe that such evidence will be available at the later date, 10
    5
    See id.
    6
    State v. Chapman, 
    307 Neb. 443
    , 
    949 N.W.2d 490
     (2020).
    7
    See 
    id.
    8
    See State v. Lebeau, 
    280 Neb. 238
    , 
    784 N.W.2d 921
     (2010).
    9
    See State v. Chapman, 
    supra note 6
    .
    10
    § 29-1207(4)(c)(i).
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    and (2) if the ­continuance is granted to allow the prosecut-
    ing attorney additional time to prepare the State’s case and
    additional time is justified because of the exceptional circum-
    stances of the case. 11
    [9,10] Section 29-1207(4) does not specifically describe a
    “continuance” by the court’s own motion or judicial delay, but
    § 29-1207(4)(f ) presents a catchall that designates as excluded
    in computing the time for trial “[o]ther periods of delay not
    specifically enumerated in this section, but only if the court
    finds that they are for good cause.” We have explained that
    judicial delay, absent a showing by the State of good cause,
    does not toll the speedy trial statute. 12 And when a trial court
    relies on § 29-1207(4)(f ) to exclude time from the speedy trial
    calculation, it must make specific findings as to the good cause
    which resulted in the delay. 13
    The county court specifically found that 96 days were
    associated with continuances at the court’s own motion and
    that those days were excludable for good cause pursuant to
    § 29-1207(4)(f ), because of a “nationwide pandemic of Novel
    Coronavirus and COVID-19 disease.” An appellate court will
    give deference to such factual findings unless they are clearly
    erroneous. 14 Since the statutory 6-month period ran on July 21,
    2020, and the motion for discharge was on July 27, we, like
    the district court, will affirm the county court’s order denying
    the motion if the record supports that the district court did not
    clearly err in finding at least 7 days were excludable.
    [11] Chase does not specifically argue that the evidence in
    the record pertaining to the COVID-19 pandemic, entered into
    evidence at the hearing on the motion for discharge, failed to
    provide good cause for the delays resulting from the court’s
    sua sponte orders. Chase’s challenge on appeal is instead to
    11
    § 29-1207(4)(c)(ii).
    12
    State v. Baird, 
    259 Neb. 245
    , 
    609 N.W.2d 349
     (2000).
    13
    See State v. Kinstler, 
    207 Neb. 386
    , 
    299 N.W.2d 182
     (1980).
    14
    See State v. Feldhacker, 
    267 Neb. 145
    , 
    672 N.W.2d 627
     (2004).
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    the timing of the presentation of the evidence supporting good
    cause and the lack of any articulation on the record by the
    court concurrently with its orders as to why the court believed
    at that time the delays were for good cause. While Chase
    asserts in a conclusory fashion that the evidence was insuffi-
    cient to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard, she
    fails to elaborate on this assertion other than challenging the
    timing of the presentation of the evidence. Where an appel-
    lant’s brief contains conclusory assertions unsupported by a
    coherent analytical argument, the appellant fails to satisfy the
    requirement that the party asserting the alleged error must both
    specifically assign and specifically argue it in the party’s ini-
    tial brief. 15
    Relying on State v. Vela-Montes 16 and statutory requirements
    for applications for continuances by the parties to an action,
    Chase asserts it was untimely for the prosecution to present the
    evidence supporting good cause at the hearing on the motion
    for absolute discharge. Chase also argues the county court’s
    failure to articulate any reasoning at the time of the contin­
    uances makes it impossible for the prosecution to support good
    cause later.
    In Vela-Montes, the prosecution had failed to support its
    application for a continuance with a contemporaneous affidavit
    as required by 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1148
     (Reissue 2016). 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1206
     (Reissue 2016) provides that “[a]pplica-
    tions for continuances shall be made in accordance with sec-
    tion 25-1148”; § 25-1148, in turn, contemplates that a hearing
    will be held on the application for a continuance and states
    that “[w]henever application for continuance or adjournment is
    made by a party or parties to any cause or proceeding pending
    in the district court of any county, such application . . . shall
    be supported by the affidavit or affidavits of person or persons
    15
    See Dycus v. Dycus, 
    307 Neb. 426
    , 
    949 N.W.2d 357
     (2020).
    16
    State v. Vela-Montes, 
    19 Neb. App. 378
    , 
    807 N.W.2d 544
     (2011).
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    competent to testify as witnesses . . . .” The prosecution in
    Velz-Montes had supported its application for a continuance
    with only an unsworn statement to the court that one of the
    victims was unavailable, and the trial court had granted the
    continuance after overruling the defendant’s objection that it
    was not supported. At the hearing on the defendant’s subse-
    quent motion for absolute discharge, the State adduced the
    testimony of the victim, whose unavailability had promoted
    the motion to continue. The trial court overruled the defend­
    ant’s objection that this testimony was untimely and denied the
    motion for absolute discharge, rejecting the defendant’s argu-
    ment that the period of delay could not be excluded from the
    speedy trial calculation because the prosecution had failed to
    support its application for continuance with a contemporane-
    ous affidavit.
    The Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of abso-
    lute discharge, concluding that the State’s failure to comply
    with the dictates of § 25-1148 with respect to the timing of the
    presentation of the evidence in support of its application for a
    continuance deprived the defendant of a mere technical right,
    which did not warrant reversal. 17 The Court of Appeals rejected
    the defendant’s attempt “to bootstrap a substantial right to the
    mere technical right actually affected” of the timing of the evi-
    dentiary support for the applications for a continuance. 18 The
    Court of Appeals explained that the trial court did not deprive
    the defendant of a substantial right by receiving evidence to
    support the prior continuance at the later hearing on the motion
    for discharge for two reasons: (1) there was “precise conform­
    ity” between the prosecution’s proffered justification at the
    time of the motion for the continuance and the later evidence
    presented by the prosecution at the hearing on the motion for
    discharge and (2) the law generally permits courts to consider
    evidence relevant to earlier proceedings, which is adduced
    17
    See id.
    18
    Id. at 386-87, 807 N.W.2d at 551.
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    during the hearing on the motion for discharge. 19 The Court
    of Appeals said, however, that “had there been any significant
    variance [between the prosecution’s proffered justification at
    the time of the motion and the evidence later presented at the
    hearing on the motion for discharge], we could not reach the
    same conclusion” that the failure to comply with § 25-1148 did
    not affect a substantial right. 20
    Chase asserts that, unlike in Vela-Montes, a substantial
    right was affected by the timing of the evidence in this case.
    She explains there is a significant variance between the prof-
    fered reason for the court’s sua sponte delay at the time of its
    order and the evidence presented at the motion for discharge,
    because the court proffered no reason for its delay at all.
    Chase argues that because the county court failed to articulate
    on the record any reasoning at the time of its sua sponte con-
    tinuances of her trial, the evidence presented at the hearing
    on the motion for discharge was an impermissible attempt to
    “fabricate ‘good cause’ after the fact” 21 and improperly “put
    words in the county court’s mouth.” 22 We find no merit to
    these arguments.
    [12,13] Chase did not object at the time of the continuances,
    and the statutory requirements of § 25-1148 can be waived by a
    defendant’s failure to timely object. 23 But more fundamentally,
    a trial court’s sua sponte decisions to delay trial are not gov-
    erned by § 25-1148. While judicial delays might be character-
    ized as continuances by the court, they are not “[a]pplications
    for continuances” as described by § 29-1206. (Emphasis sup-
    pied.) They accordingly need not be in conformance with the
    requirements of § 25-1148, which describes a hearing on the
    19
    Id. at 388, 807 N.W.2d at 551.
    20
    Id.
    21
    Brief for appellant at 12.
    22
    Id. at 13.
    23
    See, State v. Shipler, 
    17 Neb. App. 66
    , 
    758 N.W.2d 41
     (2008); State v.
    Roundtree, 
    11 Neb. App. 628
    , 
    658 N.W.2d 308
     (2003).
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    application and the necessary form of support for applications
    for continuances or adjournment “made by a party or parties.”
    Chase’s reliance on Vela-Montes is therefore misplaced.
    [14,15] When a trial court’s sua sponte decision to delay
    trial implicates statutory speedy trial rights, the exclusion of
    the period attributable to such delay is governed by a showing
    on the record of good cause as described by § 29-1207(4)(f ).
    Evidence of good cause is properly presented at the hearing
    on the motion for absolute discharge and need not be articu-
    lated at the time of the court’s sua sponte order delaying trial.
    Without a motion for absolute discharge under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1208
     (Reissue 2016), a defendant waives the statutory
    right to a trial within 6 months and no evidentiary showing of
    good cause is necessary at all.
    [16-18] Good cause is a substantial reason that affords a
    legal excuse. 24 A showing of good cause is not an attempt to
    put words in the trial court’s mouth, because there is no legal
    principle that requires the good cause shown to be consistent
    with the court’s prior, contemporaneous rationale. Indeed, we
    have said that trial court’s articulation of its reasoning, includ-
    ing its knowledge of docket congestion, is not competent evi-
    dence to support a finding of good cause, 25 because, by statute,
    the judge presiding at the trial may not testify as a witness. 26
    The burden under § 29-1207(4)(f ) is simply that there be “good
    cause.” In determining whether the trial court clearly erred in
    finding good cause after a hearing on a motion for discharge,
    we look not just to the evidence presented at the hearing on
    the motion for discharge, but to the whole of the record. 27 The
    only timing requirement implicit in § 29-1207(4)(f ) is that the
    substantial reason affording a legal excuse objectively existed
    at the time of the delay.
    24
    See State v. Kolbjornsen, 
    295 Neb. 231
    , 
    888 N.W.2d 153
     (2016).
    25
    See, e.g., State v. Baird, 
    supra note 12
    .
    26
    
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-605
     (Reissue 2016).
    27
    See State v. Soltis, 
    11 Neb. App. 61
    , 
    644 N.W.2d 160
     (2002).
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    310 Neb. 160
    The State did not fabricate good cause that did not exist at
    the time of the court’s sua sponte orders delaying trial. Rather,
    at the hearing on the motion for discharge, the State presented
    competent evidence that conditions relating to the COVID-19
    pandemic were present at the time of the judicial delays. Chase
    does not contest that those conditions provided good cause.
    In summary, we find no merit to Chase’s argument on appeal
    that she was deprived of her statutory right to a speedy trial
    because the evidence supporting good cause for the judicial
    delays was adduced at the hearing on the motion for discharge
    and the court did not articulate its reasoning at the time those
    delays were ordered. We need not determine whether Chase
    consented to the court’s continuances on May 28 and June 11,
    2020, by responding “[o]kay” to the court’s statements from
    the bench about when trial could be scheduled.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the judgment of the district court, which affirmed
    the order of the county court denying Chase’s motion for abso-
    lute discharge.
    Affirmed.
    Heavican, C.J., not participating.