Wheatland Indus. v. Perkins Cty. Bd. of Equal. , 304 Neb. 638 ( 2019 )


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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    304 Nebraska Reports
    WHEATLAND INDUS. v. PERKINS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 638
    Wheatland Industries, LLC/Mid America Agri
    Products, appellee, v. Perkins County
    Board of Equalization, appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed December 6, 2019.   No. S-19-305.
    1. Taxation: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Appellate courts review
    decisions rendered by the Tax Equalization and Review Commission for
    errors appearing on the record.
    2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a judgment for errors
    appearing on the record, an appellate court’s inquiry is whether the deci-
    sion conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is
    neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
    3. Administrative Law: Judgments: Words and Phrases. Agency action
    is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable if it is taken in disregard of the
    facts or circumstances of the case, without some basis which would lead
    a reasonable and honest person to the same conclusion.
    4. Taxation: Valuation: Presumptions: Evidence. A presumption exists
    that a board of equalization has faithfully performed its official duties
    in making an assessment and has acted upon sufficient competent
    evidence to justify its action. That presumption remains until there is
    competent evidence to the contrary presented, and the presumption
    disappears when there is competent evidence adduced on appeal to
    the contrary.
    5. ____: ____: ____: ____. Once the challenging party overcomes the pre-
    sumption of validity by competent evidence, the reasonableness of the
    valuation fixed by the board of equalization becomes one of fact based
    upon all of the evidence presented.
    6. Taxation: Valuation: Proof: Appeal and Error. The burden of show-
    ing a valuation to be unreasonable rests upon the taxpayer on appeal
    from the action of the board of equalization.
    7. Taxation: Valuation: Proof. The burden of persuasion imposed on
    a complaining taxpayer is not met by showing a mere difference of
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    304 Nebraska Reports
    WHEATLAND INDUS. v. PERKINS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 638
    opinion unless it is established by clear and convincing evidence that
    the valuation placed upon the property when compared with valuations
    placed on other similar property is grossly excessive and is the result of
    a systematic exercise of intentional will or failure of plain duty, and not
    mere errors of judgment.
    Appeal from the Tax Equalization and Review Commission.
    Affirmed.
    Richard H. Roberts, Perkins County Attorney, and Gary F.
    Burke for appellant.
    Frederick D. Stehlik and Zachary W. Lutz-Priefert, of Gross
    & Welch, P.C., L.L.O., for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Cassel, J.
    INTRODUCTION
    This review proceeding addresses the taxable valuation of
    commercial real estate used as an ethanol plant. The tax-
    payer unsuccessfully protested the county’s $16.3 million valu-
    ation—a valuation based upon mass appraisal techniques—and
    then appealed to the Tax Equalization and Review Commission
    (TERC), which reduced the value to $7.3 million based upon
    the taxpayer’s appraisal. Here, because the county’s valua-
    tion relied upon admittedly incorrect information and lacked
    evidentiary support regarding applicable depreciation, the evi-
    dence showed more than a mere difference of opinion. Finding
    no error appearing on the record, we affirm TERC’s ruling.
    But our decision should not be read to categorically reject
    mass appraisal as a proper valuation methodology for an etha-
    nol plant.
    BACKGROUND
    Wheatland Industries, LLC/Mid America Agri Products
    (Wheatland) owned an ethanol plant on commercial real estate
    in Madrid, Perkins County, Nebraska (Madrid property). The
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    304 Nebraska Reports
    WHEATLAND INDUS. v. PERKINS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 638
    Perkins County assessor, Peggy Burton, assessed the value of
    the Madrid property at $16,364,768 for the 2017 tax year.
    Wheatland protested the assessment to the Perkins
    County Board of Equalization (Board). At the protest hear-
    ing, Wheatland did not present evidence. The Board affirmed
    Burton’s valuation of the Madrid property.
    Wheatland appealed to TERC. A hearing was held and both
    parties presented evidence. We first summarize the evidence
    regarding the county’s assessment, then the evidence of the
    taxpayer’s appraisal, and finally TERC’s decision.
    County Assessment
    For the county, Darrell Stanard conducted an appraisal of
    the Madrid property using the mass appraisal method. He had
    appraised five other ethanol plants in different counties using
    the mass appraisal approach. He agreed with the $16 million
    value of the Madrid property.
    In order to aid the mass appraisal assessment, Burton pre-
    pared a spreadsheet of the values of all ethanol plants in
    Nebraska. She obtained the values directly from the other
    counties’ assessors but she was unaware how those counties
    assessed their ethanol plants. She maintained that the $16 mil-
    lion value was the proper value for the Madrid property.
    Wheatland elicited evidence about the value shown on
    Burton’s spreadsheet for the Furnas County ethanol plant.
    Stanard agreed with Wheatland that the Furnas County plant’s
    nameplate capacity shown on the spreadsheet was incorrect. Its
    nameplate capacity was actually 44 million gallons, not 22 mil-
    lion gallons as shown on the spreadsheet. He explained that the
    nameplate capacity is critical to determining the value of the
    plant. Before this court, the Board in effect concedes the error.
    And Burton agreed that if the spreadsheet contained incor-
    rect information about the nameplate capacity of the Furnas
    County plant, it would change her opinion about the value of
    the Madrid property. But she did not quantify how her opinion
    would change.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    304 Nebraska Reports
    WHEATLAND INDUS. v. PERKINS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 638
    Wheatland’s appraiser, Joseph Calvanico, had valued the
    Furnas County plant twice. He stated that the Furnas County
    plant was “almost a mirror copy” of the Madrid property—both
    were constructed at the same time, used the same technol-
    ogy, and are about the same size. When appraising the Furnas
    County plant, he used the same methodology as he did for the
    Madrid plant. Wheatland’s chief executive officer stated that
    he owned the Furnas County plant and that it was identical
    to the Madrid property, except there was 200 more acres of
    land for the Furnas County plant. The Furnas County plant
    was assessed at $8,943,575. Stanard agreed that if Calvanico
    was correct that the Furnas County plant was a “sister” plant
    to the Madrid property, he would have no disagreement with
    Calvanico’s appraisal of the Madrid property.
    Wheatland Appraisal
    At the time of TERC’s hearing, Calvanico had been a
    real property appraiser for 35 years. Wheatland hired him to
    appraise the Madrid property. He testified that his appraisal
    conformed with the Uniform Standards of Professional
    Appraisal Practice.
    Calvanico utilized the cost approach method to appraise
    the property. He stated that the income approach would not
    be useful, because the income stream associated with the
    property came from the separately assessed equipment rather
    than from the real estate. He opined that the sales compari-
    son approach was useful to underscore the information from
    the cost approach. He explained that the sales comparison
    approach would not be effective as a stand-alone method of
    appraisal for the Madrid property, because most sales of etha-
    nol plants were older and not from the area.
    Calvanico explained his application of the cost approach
    method. He began by determining the value of the underlying
    land. He examined land sales of dry farmland and concluded
    that the price per acre was $1,600. He appraised the value
    of the underlying land at $277,000. He then appraised the
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    304 Nebraska Reports
    WHEATLAND INDUS. v. PERKINS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 638
    buildings and improvements on the land. He classified the
    buildings and improvements and used the Marshall Valuation
    Service to estimate the replacement cost. He estimated the base
    actual value of the buildings at $9,387,529 and improvements
    at $5,641,172.
    He then discussed depreciation. He concluded that the physi-
    cal depreciation of the buildings that were 10 years old would
    depreciate 20 to 22 percent, the structures built within the past
    few years would depreciate 4 to 6 percent, and the improve-
    ments would depreciate 25 percent.
    Burton stated that when performing mass appraisal, she did
    not apply depreciation to any property and did not believe
    that depreciation was applied to the Madrid property. Stanard
    agreed that physical depreciation should be factored into the
    value of the Madrid property.
    Calvanico discussed the functional depreciation attributed to
    the buildings. He stated that if the fermentation and main proc­
    ess buildings were put to an alternative use, those buildings
    would be the most difficult to repurpose, because their function
    is to house the equipment. He applied a 20-percent functional
    depreciation to those buildings. Stanard stated that functional
    depreciation should not be applied.
    Calvanico discussed the economic depreciation attributed
    to the buildings and improvements. He examined the etha-
    nol industry in Nebraska and nationwide. He discussed the
    decrease in the price per bushel of corn and the diminished
    number of ethanol plants in Nebraska. He emphasized that in
    2011, there were 39 ethanol plants in Nebraska, and that at the
    time of appraisal, there were 26 ethanol plants. He articulated
    that this was a 40-percent decrease in the ethanol industry in
    Nebraska and concluded that the economic value of the Madrid
    property would depreciate 40 percent. Stanard agreed that
    “some” economic depreciation should be applied but did not
    quantify how much that should be.
    Ultimately, Calvanico appraised the actual value of the
    Madrid property at $6.8 million.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    304 Nebraska Reports
    WHEATLAND INDUS. v. PERKINS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 638
    TERC’s Decision
    TERC found that because Calvanico performed the appraisal
    according to professionally approved standards, his appraisal
    report was competent evidence sufficient to rebut the presump-
    tion in favor of the Board’s determination.
    TERC then found that, for two reasons, it was unreason-
    able and arbitrary for the Board to rely upon Burton and
    Stanard’s valuation. First, TERC agreed with Burton, Stanard,
    and Calvanico that physical depreciation should be applied to
    the Madrid property. It characterized Burton’s and Stanard’s
    testimony as to whether physical depreciation had been applied
    as “inconsistent,” and it determined that they had provided
    no evidence of the amount of physical depreciation. Second,
    TERC pointed to the incorrect information Burton’s spread-
    sheet contained and the absence of a revised opinion based
    upon the correct information.
    TERC then discussed Calvanico’s appraisal and focused
    on his analysis of depreciation. First, TERC agreed with
    Calvanico’s assessment of physical depreciation. Second, it
    reasoned that the Madrid property was still operating as an
    ethanol plant with the “Delta-T technology” at the time of the
    assessment and that therefore, it did not suffer from functional
    depreciation. Finally, it agreed that
    due to the state of the ethanol industry, including a reduc-
    tion in the price per gallon paid for ethanol, a reduction
    if not contraction of the rate of ethanol plant construction
    and other factors the depreciation to be applied to the
    [Madrid property] for economic obsolescence should be
    40 [percent].
    Except regarding functional depreciation, TERC found
    Calvanico’s appraisal persuasive and assessed the value of the
    Madrid property for 2017 at $7,336,042.
    The Board timely petitioned for review of TERC’s decision.1
    We moved the review proceeding to our docket.2
    1
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-5019
    (2)(a)(i) (Reissue 2018).
    2
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106
    (3) (Reissue 2016).
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    304 Nebraska Reports
    WHEATLAND INDUS. v. PERKINS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 638
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    The Board assigns that (1) there was insufficient evidence
    for TERC to find that the Board’s determination was unrea-
    sonable and arbitrary, (2) TERC erred when it allowed a
    40-­percent economic depreciation, and (3) it erred when it
    found the value of the Madrid property to be $7,336,042.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1-3] Appellate courts review decisions rendered by TERC
    for errors appearing on the record.3 When reviewing a judg-
    ment for errors appearing on the record, an appellate court’s
    inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is sup-
    ported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capri-
    cious, nor unreasonable.4 Agency action is arbitrary, capri-
    cious, and unreasonable if it is taken in disregard of the
    facts or circumstances of the case, without some basis which
    would lead a reasonable and honest person to the same
    conclusion.5
    ANALYSIS
    [4] We begin by noting that the presumption of validity
    does not apply at this stage. A presumption exists that a board
    of equalization has faithfully performed its official duties in
    making an assessment and has acted upon sufficient competent
    evidence to justify its action. That presumption remains until
    there is competent evidence to the contrary presented, and
    the presumption disappears when there is competent evidence
    adduced on appeal to the contrary.6 Neither party disputes that
    Wheatland presented competent evidence through Calvanico’s
    appraisal and thereby overcame the presumption of validity of
    the Board’s valuation.
    3
    Betty L. Green Living Trust v. Morrill Cty. Bd. of Equal., 
    299 Neb. 933
    ,
    
    911 N.W.2d 551
     (2018).
    4
    
    Id.
    5
    
    Id.
    6
    
    Id.
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    WHEATLAND INDUS. v. PERKINS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 638
    [5-7] This leads to the principles governing TERC’s deci-
    sion. Once the challenging party overcomes the presumption
    of validity by competent evidence, the reasonableness of the
    valuation fixed by the board of equalization becomes one of
    fact based upon all of the evidence presented.7 That applies
    here. The burden of showing a valuation to be unreasonable
    rests upon the taxpayer on appeal from the action of the board
    of equalization.8 The burden of persuasion imposed on a com-
    plaining taxpayer is not met by showing a mere difference
    of opinion unless it is established by clear and convincing
    evidence that the valuation placed upon the property when
    compared with valuations placed on other similar property is
    grossly excessive and is the result of a systematic exercise of
    intentional will or failure of plain duty, and not mere errors
    of judgment.9
    The Board makes three arguments that there was insufficient
    evidence to support TERC’s determination. First, it argues
    that once the presumption of the Board was rebutted, there
    was sufficient evidence to support that the Board’s valuation
    of the Madrid property, when compared to a similar prop-
    erty, was not grossly excessive. Second, it argues that there
    was insufficient evidence to support the 40-percent economic
    depreciation, because the Madrid property had been profit-
    able and the ethanol plant numbers Calvanico relied upon
    were proposed plants not completed plants. Third, it argues
    that if we determine the economic depreciation percentage
    was incorrect, then we should value the Madrid property
    without economic depreciation or remand the matter to TERC
    with instruction to determine the correct amount of economic
    depreciation, if any.
    Wheatland presented evidence of the Furnas County plant as
    a comparable property. Calvanico stated that he had appraised
    7
    See 
    id.
    8
    
    Id.
    9
    
    Id.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
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    WHEATLAND INDUS. v. PERKINS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 638
    the Furnas County plant twice and that it was nearly identical
    to the Madrid property in blueprint, technology, and capac-
    ity. He referred to the Furnas County plant as a “sister” plant.
    Wheatland owned the Furnas County plant, and its chief execu-
    tive officer affirmed that they were identical.
    Stanard explained that Burton’s spreadsheet contained incor-
    rect information about the Furnas County plant. The Furnas
    County plant was not a 22-million-gallon plant, but, rather,
    it was a 44-million-gallon plant. This affirmed Wheatland’s
    evidence that the plants were identical in capacity. Stanard’s
    statement—that the nameplate capacity of a plant was criti-
    cal to determining its value—emphasized the importance of
    the relationship in value between the Furnas County plant
    and the Madrid property. Although Burton did not state how
    her opinion of the Madrid property value would change from
    the incorrect spreadsheet, she did not dispute the $8.9 million
    value of the Furnas County plant. Stanard did state that if
    the Furnas County plant was a “sister” plant, he would have
    no disagreement with Calvanico’s appraisal of the Madrid
    property. Clearly, the evidence presented showed that the
    Furnas County plant was a “sister” plant. Calvanico’s opinion
    purported to show that the Board had overvalued the Madrid
    property by well over $6 million—hardly a mere difference of
    opinion. Stanard’s acceptance of Calvanico’s appraisal under-
    mines the Board’s argument attempting to characterize it
    as such.
    As part of Wheatland’s evidence intended to show a grossly
    excessive value, it focused on the failure to apply depreciation.
    Burton, Stanard, and Calvanico all agreed that physical depre-
    ciation should be applied to the Madrid property. Burton and
    Stanard were unaware if physical depreciation was applied, and
    there was no evidence that it was. Additionally, Stanard agreed
    with Calvanico that “some” economic depreciation should be
    applied to the Madrid property but the Board did not present
    evidence as to an appropriate amount. This evidence showed
    that the Board’s valuation was unreliable, because it failed to
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    WHEATLAND INDUS. v. PERKINS CTY. BD. OF EQUAL.
    Cite as 
    304 Neb. 638
    take into account any depreciation, which in turn resulted in an
    excessively high valuation.
    Because the evidence showed that the Furnas County plant
    was comparable and that the Board’s valuation was unreliable,
    there was competent evidence to show that the Board’s valua-
    tion was grossly excessive. Accordingly, TERC’s determination
    that it was arbitrary and unreasonable to rely on the Board’s
    determination of value was supported by competent evidence
    and was not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
    The Board argues that there was insufficient evidence to
    support economic depreciation of 40 percent. “Based upon
    the applicable law, the Board need not put on any evidence to
    support its valuation of the property at issue unless the tax-
    payer establishes the Board’s valuation was unreasonable or
    arbitrary.”10 Because Wheatland established that the Board’s
    valuation was unreasonable and arbitrary, TERC did not err in
    relying upon Calvanico’s appraisal.
    “Economic depreciation results from external economic
    forces which depress the value of the property.”11 Calvanico
    observed the state of the ethanol industry, the decrease in the
    price per gallon of ethanol, and the reduction of the rate of
    ethanol plant construction. He emphasized that Nebraska had
    39 ethanol plants in 2010 and 26 ethanol plants in 2017. From
    his observations, he opined that economic depreciation of 40
    percent was appropriate.
    We cannot say that TERC’s reliance on Calvanico’s opinion
    was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Stanard asserted that
    the numbers that Calvanico relied upon were not all constructed
    and operational ethanol plants—that is, some were proposed
    plants that never came to fruition. But he did not expound why
    proposed plants versus operational plants makes a difference
    10
    Bottorf v. Clay Cty. Bd. of Equal., 
    7 Neb. App. 162
    , 168, 
    580 N.W.2d 561
    ,
    566 (1998).
    11
    First Nat. Bank v. Otoe Cty., 
    233 Neb. 412
    , 414, 
    445 N.W.2d 880
    , 882
    (1989).
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    to the state of the Nebraska ethanol industry or how it would
    affect economic depreciation. Moreover, Stanard admitted that
    “some” economic depreciation was appropriate, but failed to
    quantify his opinion. TERC was left with the choice between
    “some” and 40 percent. Further, the Board failed to present
    evidence as to how the profitability of the ethanol plant would
    affect economic depreciation of the property and quantify
    that amount. Accordingly, TERC’s determination of economic
    depreciation was based on competent evidence and was not
    arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
    CONCLUSION
    We reiterate that our decision does not mean that mass
    appraisal valuation techniques do not apply to ethanol plants.
    Here, because evidence was presented to show that a similar
    property was valued comparably to Wheatland’s appraisal and
    the Board’s valuation was unreliable, we conclude that TERC’s
    determination that the Board’s valuation was unreasonable and
    arbitrary was supported by competent evidence and was not
    arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Additionally, we con-
    clude that TERC’s determination of economic depreciation was
    supported by competent evidence and was not arbitrary, capri-
    cious, or unreasonable. We affirm its decision.
    Affirmed.