In re Estate of Loder , 308 Neb. 210 ( 2021 )


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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    308 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE ESTATE OF LODER
    Cite as 
    308 Neb. 210
    In re Estate of Janette H. Loder, deceased.
    Nebraska Department of Revenue, appellant,
    v. Miranda Loder, Personal Representative
    of the Estate of Janette H. Loder,
    deceased, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed January 22, 2021.   No. S-19-1104.
    1. Decedents’ Estates: Judgments: Appeal and Error. In the absence of
    an equity question, an appellate court, reviewing probate matters, exam-
    ines for error appearing on the record made in the county court. When
    reviewing a judgment for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is
    whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent
    evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable.
    2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of
    law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
    3. Decedents’ Estates: Claims: Notice: Time. Under 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2485
    (a) (Reissue 2016), if the personal representative complies
    with the notice provisions of 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-520.01
     (Reissue
    2016) and 30-2483 (Cum. Supp. 2018), a claim generally must be pre-
    sented within 2 months after the date of the first publication of notice
    to creditors.
    4. Decedents’ Estates: Claims: Debtors and Creditors: Notice. There
    are two requirements that must be satisfied to mandate that a personal
    representative mail a creditor notice: (1) The creditor must have a direct
    legal interest in the decedent’s estate, and (2) the personal representative
    must have knowledge of the creditor’s claim.
    5. Decedents’ Estates: Claims. A claim that is easily ascertainable and
    not subject to dispute qualifies as a direct legal interest in a dece-
    dent’s estate.
    6. Taxation: Time. Nebraska individual income taxes are due, without
    demand, on the date fixed for filing individual income tax returns.
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    IN RE ESTATE OF LODER
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    7. Decedents’ Estates: Taxation. A decedent’s unpaid Nebraska individual
    income taxes are easily ascertainable and not subject to dispute, and
    therefore qualify as a direct legal interest in the decedent’s estate.
    8. Decedents’ Estates: Debtors and Creditors. To reasonably ascertain a
    decedent’s creditors, a personal representative must make a reasonably
    diligent search, such as a reasonably prudent person would make in view
    of the circumstances and must extend to those places where information
    is likely to be obtained and to those persons who would be likely to have
    information regarding a decedent’s creditors.
    9. Decedents’ Estates: Debtors and Creditors: Time. Traditionally,
    Nebraska courts have classified the nonclaim statute as a personal repre-
    sentative’s affirmative defense to untimely creditor claims.
    10. Evidence: Proof. Unless an exception applies, the burden of proof in
    civil cases requires only the greater weight of the evidence.
    11. Decedents’ Estates: Debtors and Creditors: Claims: Evidence: Proof.
    If a personal representative disallows a non-notified creditor’s claim, the
    burden of proof is upon the personal representative to prove by the
    greater weight of the evidence that it conducted a reasonably diligent
    search to ascertain a decedent’s creditors.
    Appeal from the County Court for Sarpy County: Todd J.
    Hutton, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and James D. Smith
    for appellant.
    Wayne E. Janssen for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Cassel, J.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    The personal representative of a decedent’s estate dis­
    allowed a claim filed by the Nebraska Department of Revenue
    (Department) for unpaid lifetime Nebraska income taxes,
    because the Department did not file it within 2 months after
    published notice. 1 However, the personal representative never
    mailed the Department a copy of the published notice. The
    1
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2485
    (a)(1) (Reissue 2016) (nonclaim statute).
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    IN RE ESTATE OF LODER
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    parties disagree whether the Department qualified as a known
    creditor, to whom the personal representative was required
    to mail notice. 2 Because it appears the county court failed to
    impose the burden of proof regarding diligent investigation and
    inquiry on the personal representative, we reverse the court’s
    order disallowing the claim and remand the cause for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    II. BACKGROUND
    Janette H. Loder (the Decedent) died intestate on September
    1, 2014. Miranda Loder, acting as personal representative of
    the Decedent’s estate, published a notice to creditors in a local
    newspaper for 3 consecutive weeks and mailed copies of the
    notice to 36 creditors, warning them that the creditors’ claims
    filing deadline was November 24, 2014. But the Department
    was not one of the creditors to whom notice was mailed.
    During the administration of the estate, Miranda and William
    Loder, the Decedent’s ex-husband, personally investigated the
    Decedent’s affairs to determine her creditors. They reviewed
    her financial records and various documents in her home,
    and talked with friends and acquaintances while compiling
    the creditors list. Miranda testified that she did not know
    that the Department was a creditor of the Decedent’s estate,
    because she and William did not find any records indicating
    that the Decedent had unpaid taxes, such as a notice from the
    Department. However, William admitted that they did not spe-
    cifically search for the Decedent’s tax history, because “[they]
    had no reason to.”
    According to Miranda’s testimony, the Decedent said she
    received alimony from William that was directly deposited
    into her bank account by the State of Pennsylvania. Miranda
    admitted that she had not inquired whether Pennsylvania paid
    taxes on the money the Decedent received as income. And she
    agreed that “any time you have income . . . taxes are owed.”
    2
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-520.01
     (Reissue 2016).
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    IN RE ESTATE OF LODER
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    308 Neb. 210
    In December 2016, the Department notified Miranda that
    the Decedent had not filed her individual income taxes for
    the 3 years preceding her death. In March 2017, Miranda
    filed the Decedent’s individual income tax returns for the tax
    years 2011, 2012, and 2013. Those returns showed income
    taxes due, none of which were paid by the Decedent’s estate.
    In August 2017, the Department filed a claim for $21,331.23,
    representing income tax, penalties, and interest due for the
    unpaid tax years. Miranda did not dispute the Department’s
    tax calculation, but she disallowed the claim, arguing it
    was untimely.
    Within 60 days of disallowance, the Department filed a
    petition with the county court for allowance of the claim. The
    Department argued that because it did not receive notice in com-
    pliance with both § 25-520.01 and 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-2483
    (Cum. Supp. 2018), it retained the right to file a claim within 3
    years of the Decedent’s death under § 30-2485(a)(2).
    The court denied the Department’s petition and sustained
    Miranda’s disallowance, finding that the Department’s claim
    was time barred because it received adequate notice of the
    Decedent’s death under § 30-2483(a). The court stated that
    Miranda “afforded known creditors, by publication and mail-
    ing, and unknown creditors by publication, notice of their
    deadline to present claims.” The court found that “neither
    party was aware the [D]ecedent had neglected to file until
    after [Miranda] filed returns in 2017.” The court reasoned
    that “[b]ecause publication is reasonably calculated to provide
    notice to all claimants of the . . . deadline for presentation
    of claims,” the Department’s claim was untimely. The court
    did not state any factual finding regarding the adequacy of
    Miranda’s investigation and inquiry to identify reasonably
    ascertainable creditors.
    The Department filed a timely appeal. We granted the
    Department’s petition to bypass the Nebraska Court of
    Appeals. 3
    3
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106
    (2) (Cum. Supp. 2018).
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    IN RE ESTATE OF LODER
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    III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    The Department assigns that the county court erred by deny-
    ing its petition and sustaining Miranda’s disallowance of its
    claim against the Decedent’s estate.
    IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] In the absence of an equity question, an appellate
    court, reviewing probate matters, examines for error appear-
    ing on the record made in the county court. When reviewing
    a judgment for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is
    whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by
    competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor
    unreasonable. 4
    [2] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which we
    resolve independently of the trial court. 5
    V. ANALYSIS
    1. Alternative Arguments
    The Department presents three alternative arguments. First,
    the Department argues that 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 77-2768
     (Reissue
    2018) controls over the Nebraska Probate Code for the
    Department’s filing of a creditor claim when the claim involves
    income taxes. Alternatively, the Department claims that its
    regulations, found in 316 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 36, § 015.02
    (2013), govern the Department’s deadline to file its claim
    against an estate for income taxes instead of § 30-2485(a)(1),
    which the county court concluded governed. If neither of
    these arguments is successful, the Department finally argues
    that because it did not receive a written copy of the published
    notice in accordance with § 25-520.01, it retained the right to
    file a claim within 3 years after the Decedent’s death under
    § 30-2485(a)(2). We find no merit to the Department’s first two
    alternatives and turn our attention to its final argument.
    4
    In re Estate of Adelung, 
    306 Neb. 646
    , 
    947 N.W.2d 269
     (2020).
    5
    In re Interest of Nedhal A., 
    289 Neb. 711
    , 
    856 N.W.2d 565
     (2014).
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    IN RE ESTATE OF LODER
    Cite as 
    308 Neb. 210
    [3] Nebraska’s nonclaim statute limits the time in which
    claims may be presented against an estate and specifically
    explains what is to be done when a creditor is not provided
    proper notice. 6 Under § 30-2485(a), if the personal representa-
    tive complies with the notice provisions of §§ 25-520.01 and
    30-2483, a claim generally must be presented within 2 months
    after the date of the first publication of notice to creditors. 7
    However, if the personal representative fails to provide compli-
    ant notice, then a claimant may present its claim within 3 years
    after the decedent’s death. 8
    The nonclaim statute requires that a creditor receive notice
    under both §§ 25-520.01 and 30-2483 to ensure creditors
    know of the decedent’s death and are afforded the opportu-
    nity to collect from the decedent’s estate, while also allowing
    the personal representative to expedite the distribution of the
    estate. 9 It is undisputed that Miranda satisfied the publication
    requirement of § 30-2483(a) and that the notice requirement
    of § 30-2483(b) 10 does not apply to the case before us. The
    parties disagree on whether Miranda was required to mail the
    Department notice under § 25-520.01, with which compliance
    is also required by § 30-2483(a).
    2. Notice Requirements
    Under § 25-520.01
    Section 25-520.01 was not originally included in Nebraska’s
    nonclaim statute. Historically, before adoption of the Uniform
    Probate Code (UPC), the nonclaim statute 11 required only
    6
    See In re Estate of Emery, 
    258 Neb. 789
    , 
    606 N.W.2d 750
     (2000).
    7
    See Mach v. Schmer, 
    4 Neb. App. 819
    , 
    550 N.W.2d 385
     (1996).
    8
    
    Id.
    9
    See, Francisco v. Gonzalez, 
    301 Neb. 1045
    , 
    921 N.W.2d 350
     (2019); In re
    Estate of Feuerhelm, 
    215 Neb. 872
    , 
    341 N.W.2d 342
     (1983).
    10
    See § 30-2483(b) (notice to Department of Health and Human Services
    regarding certain decedents who resided in specified medical institutions).
    11
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-609
     (Reissue 1964) (barring claims not presented
    within time established).
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    IN RE ESTATE OF LODER
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    notice by publication pursuant to the statutes governing notice
    to creditors. 12 The county judge would publish a notice in a
    local newspaper requiring creditors to bring their claims within
    a specified time. 13 However, creditors could request an exten-
    sion from the court to submit their untimely claim for “good
    cause.” 14 Commonly, a creditor could show good cause by
    proving it did not have notice of a decedent’s death, because
    the creditor lived in a different county and did not receive the
    newspaper publication. 15
    When Nebraska first adopted the UPC, § 30-2483 (Reissue
    1975) required publication of notice to creditors, as well as
    “mail[ing] the published notice and giv[ing] proof thereof
    in accordance with section 25-520.01.” But § 30-2485(a)(1)
    (Reissue 1975) adhered to the essence of the former law
    and provided a creditor who did not receive notice only an
    additional 60-day window to apply for additional time and
    show good cause for an extension of the deadline. At that
    time, § 30-2485(a)(2) allowed presentation of a claim “within
    three years after the decedent’s death, if notice to creditors
    has not been published.” (Emphasis supplied.) That language
    later changed.
    After the U.S. Supreme Court held in Tulsa Professional
    Collection Services v. Pope 16 that reasonably ascertainable
    creditors must be provided actual notice of a decedent’s
    death, the Legislature amended § 30-2485 to condition the
    2-month bar date upon compliance with both § 25-520.01
    12
    See 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 30-601
     to 30-604 (Reissue 1964) (publication of
    notice and establishment of time for claim presentation).
    13
    See 
    id.
    14
    See, 
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 30-605
     (Reissue 1964); In re Estate of Tucker, 
    128 Neb. 387
    , 
    258 N.W. 645
     (1935).
    15
    See 
    id.
    16
    Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 
    485 U.S. 478
    , 
    108 S. Ct. 1340
    , 
    99 L. Ed. 2d 565
     (1988).
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    and § 30-2483. 17 We have observed that notice by publica-
    tion, while constitutionally permitted in some circumstances,
    is a poor bet to provide actual notice to a party of an action
    that affects his or her rights. 18 Recognizing the Court’s deci-
    sion that due process requires actual notice to known or rea-
    sonably ascertainable creditors, the Legislature incorporated
    § 25-520.01 into the nonclaim statute, supplementing the
    notice statute’s mailing requirement. 19
    And the Legislature did so in both subsections (1) and (2)
    of § 30-2485(a). Now, § 30-2485(a)(2) (Reissue 2016) speci-
    fies that a claim will be barred if it is not presented “[w]ithin
    three years after the decedent’s death if notice to creditors has
    not been given in compliance with sections 25-520.01 and
    30-2483.” (Emphasis supplied.)
    [4] Under § 25-520.01, the personal representative must
    now mail “every party appearing to have a direct legal interest
    in [the administration of a decedent’s estate] whose name and
    post office address are known to [the personal representative]”
    a copy of the published notice. 20 The personal representative
    or his or her attorney must also state by affidavit that “after
    diligent investigation and inquiry,” both were unable to ascer-
    tain the address of any other party appearing to have a direct
    legal interest in the proceeding. 21 Therefore, there are two
    requirements that must be satisfied to mandate that a personal
    representative mail a creditor notice: (1) The creditor must
    have a direct legal interest in the decedent’s estate, and (2) the
    personal representative must have knowledge of the creditor’s
    claim. 22 Each requirement will be addressed in turn.
    17
    See, id.; 1991 Neb. Laws, L.B. 95. See, also, Mullane v. Central Hanover
    Tr. Co., 
    339 U.S. 306
    , 
    70 S. Ct. 652
    , 
    94 L. Ed. 865
     (1950).
    18
    See Francisco, 
    supra note 9
    .
    19
    See 1991 Neb. Laws, L.B. 95.
    20
    See, § 30-2485(a)(2) (incorporating § 25-520.01); Francisco, 
    supra note 9
    .
    21
    See § 25-520.01.
    22
    Id.
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    (a) Direct Legal Interest
    [5] The Department must have a direct legal interest
    in a decedent’s estate in order to satisfy § 25-520.01. The
    Legislature has not defined the term “direct legal interest” for
    purposes of § 25-520.01, but we have inferred from the lan-
    guage employed by the Legislature that the reference was to
    property of the estate and property in which the law recognized
    that the claimant had an existing interest. 23 A claim that is
    “easily ascertainable and not subject to dispute” qualifies as a
    direct legal interest in a decedent’s estate. 24 In contrast, a claim
    featuring potential liability of a decedent, without establish-
    ment of liability and amount of damage, does not constitute a
    direct legal interest. 25
    [6,7] The Department possesses a direct legal interest in all
    unpaid individual income taxes. Nebraska individual income
    taxes are due, without demand, on the date fixed for filing
    individual income tax returns. 26 Failure to pay taxes results in
    the Department’s having a claim for unpaid taxes against the
    person, which the Department may collect through the seizure
    and sale of a person’s property. 27 A decedent’s unpaid Nebraska
    individual income taxes are easily ascertainable and not subject
    to dispute, and therefore qualify as a direct legal interest in the
    decedent’s estate. 28
    The Department may not have a direct legal interest in
    every estate, but it does here. Prior to the Decedent’s death,
    she owed individual income taxes for the tax years 2011, 2012,
    23
    See Farmers Co-op. Mercantile Co. v. Sidner, 
    175 Neb. 94
    , 
    120 N.W.2d 537
     (1963).
    24
    See In re Estate of Karmazin, 
    299 Neb. 315
    , 322, 
    908 N.W.2d 381
    , 387
    (2018).
    25
    Mach, supra note 7.
    26
    § 77-2768.
    27
    See 316 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 36, § 009.01 (2014).
    28
    Compare In re Estate of Karmazin, 
    supra note 24
    , with Sidner, supra
    note 23.
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    and 2013. After she died and Miranda was appointed personal
    representative, the Department was entitled to present its claim
    for the Decedent’s Nebraska individual income taxes as a claim
    against the Decedent’s estate. 29 Death did not extinguish her
    tax obligations, and the Department had full authority to collect
    from the Decedent’s estate. 30 Therefore, the Decedent’s failure
    to pay her overdue taxes generated a direct legal interest for
    the Department.
    (b) Known to Personal
    Representative
    [8] Moving to the second requirement, Miranda must have
    “known” the Department was a creditor of the Decedent’s
    estate for § 25-520.01 to require that Miranda mail the
    Department notice. But a personal representative is not
    allowed to rely on ignorance; the Pope Court’s decision
    requires actual notice to known or reasonably ascertainable
    creditors. 31 The statutory text requires a party to learn what
    he or she could discover through diligent investigation and
    inquiry. 32 Legislative history confirms our understanding of
    the plain text: a personal representative knows of a creditor
    if the creditor is known or can reasonably be ascertainable. 33
    To reasonably ascertain a decedent’s creditors, a personal
    representative must make a reasonably diligent search, such
    as a reasonably prudent person would make in view of the
    circumstances and must extend to those places where infor-
    mation is likely to be obtained and to those persons who
    would be likely to have information regarding a decedent’s
    29
    See 316 Neb. Admin. Code, supra note 27, § 015.02 (2013).
    30
    See id.
    31
    See Pope, 
    supra note 16
    .
    32
    See § 25-520.01.
    33
    See Statement of Legislative Bill, L.B. 589, Judiciary Committee, 68th
    Leg. (Apr. 25, 1957). See, also, Pope, 
    supra note 16
    .
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    creditors. 34 If a personal representative fails to perform a rea-
    sonably diligent search to ascertain creditors, it cannot avoid
    the requirement of § 25-520.01 to mail notice to those who are
    reasonably ascertainable.
    The county court did not make an express determination as
    to whether Miranda performed a reasonably diligent search.
    And our previous decisions have not articulated who bears the
    burden of proving that a reasonably diligent search was or was
    not made.
    [9] Traditionally, Nebraska courts have classified the non-
    claim statute as a personal representative’s affirmative defense
    to untimely creditor claims. 35 Nebraska law consistently places
    the burden of proving an affirmative defense on the person uti-
    lizing the defense. 36 However, no Nebraska court has addressed
    whether the nonclaim statute remains an affirmative defense
    after the Legislature incorporated § 25-520.01 into the non-
    claim statute.
    Because Nebraska adopted its current statutory structure
    from the UPC, we look for guidance to the UPC and the states
    that have adopted it. 37 But since Nebraska’s adoption of the
    UPC, the UPC has been amended, causing the Nebraska non-
    claim statute to become nonconforming. 38 Additionally, the
    UPC does not propose a knowledge requirement as seen in
    § 25-520.01, because the UPC does not mandate that notice
    34
    See, Francisco, 
    supra note 9
    ; In re Interest of A.W., 
    224 Neb. 764
    , 
    401 N.W.2d 477
     (1987); Committee Statement, L.B. 95, Judiciary Committee,
    92d Leg., 1st Sess. (Jan. 23, 1991) (summary of purpose); Judiciary
    Committee Hearing, L.B. 95, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 38-42 (Jan. 23, 1991);
    Floor Debate, L.B. 95, Judiciary Committee, 92d Leg., 1st Sess. 267-72
    (Jan. 28, 1991).
    35
    See, In re Estate of Masopust, 
    232 Neb. 936
    , 
    443 N.W.2d 274
     (1989); In
    re Estate of McCleneghan, 
    145 Neb. 707
    , 
    17 N.W.2d 923
     (1945).
    36
    See, e.g., Kaspar v. Schack, 
    195 Neb. 215
    , 
    237 N.W.2d 414
     (1976).
    37
    See Committee Statement, L.B. 354, Judiciary Committee, 83d Leg., 2d
    Sess. 1-2 (Feb. 4, 1974).
    38
    See, Unif. Probate Code § 3-801, 8 (part II) U.L.A. 261 (2013); Unif.
    Probate Code § 3-803, 8 (part II) U.L.A. 271 (2013).
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    be mailed to known creditors. 39 Uncertain about “the possible
    applicability [of Pope] to [its nonclaim statute],” 40 the UPC
    editors updated the UPC to make mailing notice to creditors
    optional, stating: “A personal representative may give writ-
    ten notice by mail or other delivery to a creditor . . . .” 41
    Consequently, the UPC’s language provides little guidance on
    this matter, because it does not mandate a personal representa-
    tive to perform a reasonably diligent search to ascertain credi-
    tors and mail notice to known creditors. These requirements
    are imposed by Nebraska’s nonclaim statute. 42
    Looking to other UPC states, the UPC’s uncertainty on Pope
    has led to significant variation in states’ nonclaim statutes and
    who carries the burden of proving compliance. 43 Some states
    have incorporated Pope into their nonclaim statutes and require
    personal representatives to conduct a reasonably diligent search
    to ascertain the decedent’s creditors, but other states have mir-
    rored the UPC’s optional approach. 44
    UPC states incorporating Pope into their nonclaim stat-
    utes have classified the nonclaim statute as an affirmative
    defense that a personal representative has the burden of prov-
    ing. 45 Because, as a non-UPC state explains, “the operation
    of the nonclaims provisions result[s] in the forfeiture of what
    39
    See 
    id.
    40
    Unif. Probate Code, supra note 38, § 3-803, comment, 8 (part II) U.L.A.
    at 272. See Pope, 
    supra note 16
    .
    41
    Unif. Probate Code, supra note 38, § 3-801, 8 (part II) U.L.A. at 261.
    42
    Compare § 25-520.01 and § 30-2485, with Unif. Probate Code, supra note
    38, §§ 3-801 and 3-803.
    43
    Compare 
    Fla. Stat. Ann. § 733.2121
    (3)(a) (West 2017 & Cum. Supp.
    2020) and Jones v. Golden, 
    176 So. 3d 242
     (Fla. 2015), with 
    N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-3-801
     (2019) and Corlett v. Smith, 
    106 N.M. 207
    , 
    740 P.2d 1191
    (N.M. App. 1987).
    44
    Compare § 733.2121(3)(a) and Jones, supra note 43, with § 45-3-801 and
    Corlett, 
    supra note 43
    .
    45
    See, Jones, supra note 43; Morgenthau v. Estate of Andzel, 
    26 So. 3d 628
    (Fla. App. 2009), disapproved on other grounds, Jones, supra note 43.
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    might otherwise be meritorious claims, the burden of pleading
    and proof regarding compliance with the provisions properly
    rests on one claiming the benefit of those provisions.” 46 In
    fact, some UPC states that do not have a knowledge require-
    ment nonetheless apply this policy principle and classify the
    nonclaim statute as an affirmative defense, citing “the general
    rule in civil cases that one who pleads an affirmative defense
    has the burden of proving it.” 47
    [10,11] We see no reason not to continue to classify the non-
    claim statute as an affirmative defense and follow other UPC
    states in that regard. Unless an exception applies, the burden
    of proof in civil cases requires only the greater weight of the
    evidence. 48 We therefore hold that if a personal representative
    disallows a non-notified creditor’s claim, the burden of proof is
    upon the personal representative to prove by the greater weight
    of the evidence that it conducted a reasonably diligent search
    to ascertain a decedent’s creditors. 49
    3. Resolution
    Because Miranda relied upon the affirmative defense of the
    nonclaim statute, she had the burden of proving that she con-
    ducted a reasonably diligent search to ascertain whether the
    Department was a creditor of the Decedent’s estate. We have
    already noted that Nebraska individual income taxes are due
    every year, without demand, by any individual who generates
    income over a specified threshold. 50
    The language of the county court’s order suggests that it
    did not address the question whether Miranda conducted a
    46
    See Matter of Estate of Pope, 
    733 P.2d 396
    , 399 (Okla. 1987), reversed
    sub nom. Pope, 
    supra note 16
     (overturned on other grounds).
    47
    Hitt v. J. B. Coghill, Inc., 
    641 P.2d 211
    , 213 (Alaska 1982).
    48
    Burgardt v. Burgardt, 
    304 Neb. 356
    , 
    934 N.W.2d 488
     (2019).
    49
    See, generally, § 733.2121(3)(a); Jones, supra note 43; Morgenthau, supra
    note 45; Hitt, supra note 47.
    50
    See § 77-2768.
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    Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
    308 Nebraska Reports
    IN RE ESTATE OF LODER
    Cite as 
    308 Neb. 210
    reasonably diligent search regarding the potential claim against
    the Decedent for unpaid lifetime individual income taxes.
    Rather, the court seems to have focused only on Miranda’s and
    the Department’s actual knowledge. This may have been driven
    by the court’s articulation regarding the publication require-
    ment for unknown creditors. Thus, the court’s language does
    not demonstrate that it examined whether Miranda established
    that the Department’s potential claim was not ascertainable by
    reasonably diligent inquiry. In this sense, the court’s decision
    did not conform to the law.
    But the question thus posed turns upon the court’s view of
    the facts. As William testified, he and Miranda did not search
    for tax records. Miranda seemed to have some knowledge of
    the Decedent’s alimony income. And Miranda acknowledged
    that when one has income, taxes are owed. Whether the extent
    of the inquiry was reasonable may turn on issues of credibility
    and heavily depends upon the fact finder’s view of the evi-
    dence. Because our standard of review gives considerable def-
    erence to the county court’s factual findings, that court should
    assess in the first instance the facts underlying the sufficiency
    of Miranda’s search.
    VI. CONCLUSION
    We therefore reverse the disallowance of the Department’s
    claim and remand the cause to the county court for reconsid-
    eration of the existing record to determine whether Miranda
    met her burden of proving that she conducted a reasonably
    diligent search and that the Department’s status as a creditor
    was not reasonably ascertainable. If upon remand the court
    concludes that Miranda did so, the court should disallow the
    Department’s claim. On the other hand, Miranda did not dis-
    pute the amount of taxes owed or that she did not mail notice
    of the proceeding to the Department. If the court concludes that
    Miranda did not satisfy her burden of proof, the court should
    allow the claim in full.
    Reversed and remanded.