Patterson v. Metropolitan Util. Dist. , 302 Neb. 442 ( 2019 )


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    05/17/2019 01:07 AM CDT
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    PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.
    Cite as 
    302 Neb. 442
    Beverly Patterson, appellant,
    v. M etropolitan Utilities
    District, appellee.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed March 8, 2019.    No. S-18-158.
    1. Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings: Appeal and Error. A district court’s
    grant of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings is reviewed de novo,
    accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all rea-
    sonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.
    2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation presents a ques-
    tion of law, for which an appellate court has an obligation to reach
    an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below.
    3. Tort Claims Act: Actions: Time. If a claimant brings his or her claim
    before a claims board under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 81-8,227(1) (Reissue
    2014) of the State Tort Claims Act and elects to await final disposition
    instead of withdrawing the claim to file suit, a 6-month extension from
    the mailing of a denial applies regardless of whether final disposition
    was made before or after the 2-year limitation for suits.
    4. Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act: Actions: Time. There are only
    two exceptions which extend the 2-year limitation for filing suit by 6
    months under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 13-919(1) (Reissue 2012): (1) where
    the governmental subdivision takes some action on the claim before the
    2 years have expired but at a time when less than 6 months remain for
    filing suit and (2) if the claimant withdraws the claim within the 2-year
    period but at a time when less than 6 months to file suit remain.
    Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: J.
    Michael Coffey, Judge. Affirmed.
    Daniel Wasson, of High & Younes, L.L.C., for appellant.
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    PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.
    Cite as 
    302 Neb. 442
    Joseph J. Kehm, of Metropolitan Utilities District of Omaha,
    for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Funke, J.
    Beverly Patterson appeals the district court’s order dismiss-
    ing her claim against Metropolitan Utilities District (MUD)
    with prejudice. Patterson challenges the court’s determination
    that her claim is time barred under the Political Subdivisions
    Tort Claims Act (PSTCA).1 Patterson contends that § 13-919(1)
    provides a 6-month extension to the 2-year limitation for suits
    arising under PSTCA if the claimant brings the claim before a
    political subdivision and its governing body issues a final dis-
    position denying the claim after the 2-year period has lapsed.
    Because Patterson’s argument is contrary to long-settled prec-
    edent and is based upon a flawed premise, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    On June 30, 2015, Patterson was visiting her sister in
    Omaha, Nebraska. After parking across the street from her sis-
    ter’s home, Patterson stepped onto the road verge and onto a
    manhole cover. The cover slipped from underneath Patterson’s
    feet, and she fell into the manhole injuring her right ankle and
    knee. Patterson alleges this was caused by the negligence of an
    MUD worker who had previously removed the cover for meter-
    reading purposes and who failed to properly secure the cover
    upon completion of his or her work.
    On July 17, 2015, Patterson filed a notice of tort claim
    with MUD. Patterson sent a demand to MUD pursuant to this
    action in June 2016 and a revised demand in April 2017. On
    September 13, MUD denied Patterson’s claim.
    Patterson filed a complaint with the district court on
    November 3, 2017. In the complaint, Patterson asserts MUD
    1
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 13-901 to 13-928 (Reissue 2012 & Cum. Supp. 2018).
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    owed Patterson a nondelegable duty to exercise due care
    in maintaining the manhole covers which MUD’s workers
    access. Patterson contends that the meter reader’s actions
    created an unreasonable risk of harm in failing to secure the
    cover. Specifically, Patterson alleges MUD was negligent in
    the following actions: (1) failure to use due care to inspect,
    discover, and cure the dangerous conditions of a loose man-
    hole cover when MUD had actual or constructive knowledge
    of the cover’s being loose in that MUD’s employee created the
    condition; (2) failure to keep the road verge safe for pedes-
    trians on a public walkway; (3) failure to train and instruct
    employees to regularly monitor and maintain the manhole
    covers they access to perform their duties; and (4) failure to
    warn pedestrians of the dangerous condition, or guard or cor-
    don off the area. Due to this negligence, Patterson alleges she
    sustained injuries.
    MUD filed a motion to dismiss Patterson’s complaint for
    failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In
    its motion, MUD contends the complaint was not filed within
    the statute of limitations proscribed by PSTCA. MUD argues
    § 13-919(1) requires that a suit be filed under PSTCA within
    2 years of the accrual of the claim unless, before the expira-
    tion of that 2-year period, the governing body which hears the
    initial claim issues its final disposition or the claimant files a
    written withdrawal of the claim before the governing body. In
    that case, MUD argues, the claimant would have 6 additional
    months in which to file suit. Here, because Patterson did not
    voluntarily withdraw her claim before MUD and because MUD
    did not issue a final disposition until after the running of the
    2-year period, MUD asserts Patterson’s claim is time barred as
    outside the statute of limitations without satisfying the condi-
    tions precedent necessary for the 6-month extension.
    The district court granted MUD’s motion. The court’s order
    notes that § 13-906 allows a claimant to withdraw his or her
    claim if the governing body has not made a final disposition of
    the claim within 6 months after it is filed and that § 13-919(1)
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    bars any lawsuit arising out of a tort claim unless it is begun
    within 2 years after such claim accrued. Applying these statutes
    to Patterson’s claim, the court stated its findings that “[t]here
    is no evidence nor is there an allegation that [Patterson] ever
    withdrew her claim in writing which is a condition precedent
    to filing suit. In addition, suit was filed more than two years
    after [Patterson’s] claim accrued and therefore is barred pursu-
    ant to . . . § 13-919 (1).” The court dismissed Patterson’s claim
    with prejudice.
    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Patterson assigns, restated, that the district court erred in
    dismissing Patterson’s claim and determining that Patterson’s
    complaint was time barred under § 13-919(1) and that Patterson
    failed to satisfy a condition precedent to filing suit when she
    did not voluntarily withdraw her claim.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] A district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss on the
    pleadings is reviewed de novo, accepting the allegations in
    the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
    favor of the nonmoving party.2
    [2] Statutory interpretation presents a question of law, for
    which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an inde-
    pendent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the
    court below.3
    ANALYSIS
    Patterson’s assignments center on the question of whether
    § 13-919(1) provides an additional 6-month period in which
    to file suit if the claimant does not withdraw his or her claim
    from the political subdivision’s governing board before the
    expiration of the 2-year limitation on commencement of a suit
    2
    Salem Grain Co. v. Consolidated Grain & Barge Co., 
    297 Neb. 682
    , 
    900 N.W.2d 909
    (2017).
    3
    
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    and the governing board thereafter issues a denial of the claim.
    Long ago, we settled the meaning of § 13-919(1). But before
    turning to that case law, we recall basic claim filing procedures
    and consequences under PSTCA.
    Before filing suit under PSTCA, a claimant is required to
    first bring his or her claim before the governing body of the
    political subdivision at issue.4 The claim must be in writing and
    must set forth the time and place of the occurrence giving rise
    to the claim and other known facts pertinent to the claim.5 The
    primary purpose of notice provisions in connection with actions
    against political subdivisions is to afford municipal authorities
    prompt notice of the accident and injury in order that an inves-
    tigation may be made while the occurrence is still fresh and the
    municipal authorities are in a position to intelligently consider
    the claim and to allow it if deemed just or, in the alternative, to
    adequately protect and defend the public interest.6
    After the filing of a claim with the governing body, PSTCA
    prohibits filing suit unless (1) the governing body has finally
    disposed of the claim or (2) the governing body has not taken
    final action within 6 months after the claim was filed and the
    claimant thereafter gives notice to withdraw the claim in order
    to commence suit.7 The statute specifically states that “if the
    governing body does not make final disposition of a claim
    within six months after it is filed, the claimant may, by notice
    in writing, withdraw the claim from consideration of the gov-
    erning body and begin suit.”8 PSTCA does not impose a time
    limit on the governing body’s opportunity to take action on a
    claim, other than by allowing a claimant to withdraw the claim
    if not disposed of within 6 months after it was filed. With this
    4
    §§ 13-905 and 13-906.
    5
    See § 13-905.
    6
    Keller v. Tavarone, 
    265 Neb. 236
    , 
    655 N.W.2d 899
    (2003).
    7
    See § 13-906.
    8
    
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    claim processing framework in mind, we turn to the specific
    statute at issue.
    Section 13-919 outlines the timing requirements for claims
    under PSTCA and states, in relevant part:
    (1) Every claim against a political subdivision permit-
    ted under [PSTCA] shall be forever barred unless within
    one year after such claim accrued the claim is made
    in writing to the governing body. Except as otherwise
    provided in this section, all suits permitted by the act
    shall be forever barred unless begun within two years
    after such claim accrued. The time to begin a suit shall
    be extended for a period of six months from the date of
    mailing of notice to the claimant by the governing body
    as to the final disposition of the claim or from the date of
    withdrawal of the claim from the governing body under
    section 13-906 if the time to begin suit would otherwise
    expire before the end of such period.
    (Emphasis supplied.) Although Patterson focuses on the last
    quoted sentence, the two preceding sentences are critical to
    our analysis.
    The first sentence of § 13-919(1) “forever bar[s]” a claim
    unless the written claim has been submitted to the governing
    body within 1 year after the claim accrued. Here, the claim
    accrued on June 30, 2015—the date the accident occurred.
    Patterson filed the claim with MUD on July 17, 2015. The
    claim satisfied the first sentence of § 13-919(1). With the filing
    of Patterson’s claim, the 6-month period before Patterson could
    have withdrawn her claim began to run.9
    But the second sentence of § 13-919(1) is even more sig-
    nificant to the situation here. It “forever bar[s]” all suits under
    PSTCA unless a suit is begun within 2 years “after such claim
    accrued.”10 Here, because the claim accrued on June 30, 2015,
    the second sentence of § 13-919(1) required that Patterson file
    9
    See § 13-906.
    10
    § 13-919(1).
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    suit by June 30, 2017. Because Patterson did not file her suit
    until November 3, the second sentence of § 13-919(1) barred
    her action.
    Patterson, however, points to the third sentence of § 13-919(1),
    which she claims extended the time for her to commence suit
    until March 13, 2018—6 months after MUD denied her claim
    on September 13, 2017. According to Patterson, a claimant
    would have an additional 6 months after mailing of the final
    disposition even if the disposition occurs after the 2-year date
    barring all suits.
    Such an interpretation of § 13-919(1) is at odds with our
    holding in Ragland v. Norris P. P. Dist.11 In that case, we
    considered the parameters of the 6-month extension under
    § 13-919(1), formerly codified as Neb. Rev. Stat. § 23-2416
    (Reissue 1977).12 Specifically, we explained that there are only
    two exceptions to the 2-year limitation on suits and stated:
    One is where the governmental subdivision takes some
    action on the claim before the 2 years has expired but at a
    time when less than 6 months remains for filing suit. The
    second occurs if the claimant withdraws his claim within
    the 2-year period but at a time when less than 6 months
    to file suit remains.13
    The claimant in Ragland argued the language of § 13-919(1)
    should be construed so that failure to withdraw a claim and
    failure of the governmental subdivision to deny the claim
    within the 2-year period constitute an action which would trig-
    ger the 6-month extension.14 In contrast, we held that the lan-
    guage in § 13-919(1) is clear and that the inaction of the parties
    does not amount to the conditions statutorily required for the
    6-month extension.15 Again, we stated:
    11
    Ragland v. Norris P. P. Dist., 
    208 Neb. 492
    , 
    304 N.W.2d 55
    (1981).
    12
    
    Id. 13 Id.
    at 
    495, 304 N.W.2d at 57
    .
    14
    
    Id. 15 Id.
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    PATTERSON v. METROPOLITAN UTIL. DIST.
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    Where the governmental subdivision does not act on
    a claim within 2 years after the claim accrued and the
    claimant does not withdraw the claim within 2 years after
    the claim accrued, all suits permitted by [PSTCA] are
    barred and the additional 6-month period granted under
    particular circumstances does not apply.16
    Explicit in our opinion in Ragland is the requirement that the
    governing body act on the claims before it within the 2-year
    period in order for its action to trigger the 6-month extension.17
    Three important principles underlie the Ragland court’s
    reasoning. First, as we have repeatedly proclaimed, statutory
    language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and
    an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain
    the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and
    unambiguous.18 Second, in determining the meaning of statu-
    tory language, its ordinary and grammatical construction is to
    be followed, unless an intent appears to the contrary or unless,
    by following such construction, the intended effect of the pro-
    visions would apparently be impaired.19 Finally, a court must
    attempt to give effect to all parts of a statute, and if it can be
    avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as super-
    fluous or meaningless.20
    Patterson’s interpretation violates two of those principles.
    First, the condition specified in the third sentence (“if the time
    to begin suit would otherwise expire before the end of such
    period”) is stated in the future tense.21 But by the date MUD
    denied the claim, the 2-year period to begin suit had already
    expired. Thus, the 2-year period to begin suit did not expire at
    any time during the 6-month period following MUD’s denial.
    16
    
    Id. at 497-98,
    304 N.W.2d at 58.
    17
    
    Id. 18 Mays
    v. Midnite Dreams, 
    300 Neb. 485
    , 
    915 N.W.2d 71
    (2018).
    19
    State v. Swindle, 
    300 Neb. 734
    , 
    915 N.W.2d 795
    (2018).
    20
    Wisner v. Vandelay Investments, 
    300 Neb. 825
    , 
    916 N.W.2d 698
    (2018).
    21
    § 13-919(1).
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    Second, and perhaps more important, Patterson’s interpreta-
    tion fails to give any meaning to the word “otherwise.” Here,
    the time to begin suit had already expired; thus, it would not
    “otherwise” expire after MUD’s denial. Our ordinary rules of
    statutory interpretation dictate that the Ragland court’s inter-
    pretation of § 13-919(1) was correct and compelled by the
    statutory language. And Ragland did not prompt any legisla-
    tive response, which raises the presumption that we correctly
    discerned the Legislature’s intent.22
    Instead of following our precedent from Ragland, Patterson
    asks this court to adopt an alternative interpretation in line with
    a similar provision under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA).23
    Before addressing the merits of her argument, we explain her
    reasoning.
    Patterson focuses on the second sentence of § 81-8,227(1),
    in which STCA uses language essentially identical to the third
    sentence of § 13-919(1) under PSTCA. Section 81-8,227(1)
    states, in relevant part:
    Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section,
    every tort claim permitted under [STCA] shall be forever
    barred unless within two years after such claim accrued
    the claim is made in writing to the Risk Manager in the
    manner provided by such act. The time to begin suit under
    such act shall be extended for a period of six months from
    the date of mailing of notice to the claimant by the Risk
    Manager or State Claims Board as to the final disposition
    of the claim or from the date of withdrawal of the claim
    under section 81-8,213 if the time to begin suit would
    otherwise expire before the end of such period.
    (Emphasis supplied.) She relies upon our interpretation of this
    language in the context of STCA and argues that we should
    import the same interpretation into PSTCA.
    22
    See Estate of Schluntz v. Lower Republican NRD, 
    300 Neb. 582
    , 
    915 N.W.2d 427
    (2018).
    23
    Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8,209 to 81-8,235 (Reissue 2014). See Komar v.
    State, 
    299 Neb. 301
    , 
    908 N.W.2d 610
    (2018).
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    [3] In Collins v. State,24 we interpreted this language and
    held that if a claimant brings his or her claim before a claims
    board under STCA and elects to await final disposition instead
    of withdrawing the claim to file suit, a 6-month extension
    from the mailing of a denial applies regardless of whether
    final disposition was made before or after the 2-year limitation
    for suits.
    While similar, § 81-8,227(1) is distinguishable from
    § 13-919(1). As we noted in Collins 25 and the cases preceding
    it,26 there is a possibility under § 81-8,227(1) that a claim-
    ant could bring a claim before the claims board under STCA
    within the 2-year period but with less than 6-months before
    the running of that period. As such, there is a chance that the
    claims board could retain a claim under STCA until after the 2
    years and the claimant would be unable to withdraw the claim
    prior to the end of the 2 years to bring suit.
    However, under § 13-919(1), the period to bring a claim
    before the governing board is 1 year and the period to file suit
    is 2 years after accrual of the claim. Unlike § 81-8,227, there
    is no possibility that a claim could be appropriately brought
    within the 1-year period before the governing board, the gov-
    erning board could wait until after the end of the 2-year period
    to issue its final disposition, and the claimant would be unable
    to withdraw the claim prior to the end of the 2-year period.
    Accordingly, the reasoning of our interpretation of § 81-8,227
    is inapplicable to the timing requirements of § 13-919(1) and
    we decline to modify our holding in Ragland.27
    24
    Collins v. State, 
    264 Neb. 267
    , 
    646 N.W.2d 618
    (2002), disapproved on
    other grounds, Geddes v. York County, 
    273 Neb. 271
    , 
    729 N.W.2d 661
         (2007).
    25
    
    Id. 26 See,
    Hullinger v. Board of Regents, 
    249 Neb. 868
    , 
    546 N.W.2d 779
    (1996),
    overruled, Collins, supra note 24; Coleman v. Chadron State College, 
    237 Neb. 491
    , 
    466 N.W.2d 526
    (1991), overruled, Collins, supra note 24. See,
    also, Komar, supra note 23.
    27
    Ragland, supra note 11.
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    In essence, Patterson argues that PSTCA and STCA must
    be read in pari materia. But PSTCA was initially created
    by one act28 of the Legislature, and STCA was created by a
    totally separate act.29 Patterson’s argument exceeds the limits
    of the in pari materia canon. Here, this canon must be applied
    only to the statutes within PSTCA. More significantly, her
    argument violates an important rule of construction applicable
    to PSTCA: Statutes that purport to waive the protection of
    sovereign immunity of the State or its subdivisions are strictly
    construed in favor of the sovereign and against the waiver.30
    While her argument seems attractive at first blush, because
    a snippet of nearly identical language must be applied one
    way under PSTCA and a different way under STCA, that
    outcome is dictated by the overall language chosen by the
    Legislature in each respective act. If the Legislature believes
    that the time limitations and procedures of PSTCA and STCA
    should be identical, it can establish a uniform procedure.
    It is not this court’s function to do so in the guise of statu-
    tory interpretation.
    [4] As detailed above, § 13-919(1) requires that a claim-
    ant bring a claim before the governing board of a political
    subdivision prior to filing suit and that suits be filed within
    2 years of the date the claim accrued. There are only two
    exceptions which extend the 2-year limitation for filing suit
    by 6 months under § 13-919(1): (1) where the governmental
    subdivision takes some action on the claim before the 2 years
    have expired but at a time when less than 6 months remain
    for filing suit and (2) if the claimant withdraws the claim
    within the 2-year period but at a time when less than 6 months
    to file suit remain.31 Neither ground for exception occurred
    here. The board did not deny Patterson’s claim until after the
    28
    1969 Neb. Laws, ch. 138, § 20, p. 634.
    29
    1969 Neb. Laws, ch. 756, § 1, p. 2845.
    30
    Geddes, supra note 24.
    31
    
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    2-year period, and Patterson did not withdraw her claim. Thus,
    the district court did not err in dismissing Patterson’s claim
    against MUD with prejudice.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we conclude Patterson’s
    petition was filed outside of the timing requirements of
    § 13-919(1). Accordingly, the district court did not err in dis-
    missing Patterson’s claim.
    A ffirmed.